Brajnandan Sinha vs Jyoti Narain

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 25 of 1954

Decision Date: 8 November 1955

Coram: Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Syed Jaffer Imam

In this case the judgment was recorded on 8 November 1955 by the Supreme Court of India. The matter was styled Brajnandan Sinha versus Jyoti Narain and was decided by a bench consisting of Justice Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha and Justice Syed Jaffer Imam. The petitioner, Brajnandan Sinha, appealed against the respondent, Jyoti Narain. The citation for the decision is reported in 1956 AIR 66 and also in 1955 SCR (2) 955. The statutory provision under consideration was the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act of 1850, specifically the section authorising the appointment of a Commissioner, and the issue was whether such a Commissioner qualified as a court within the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act of 1952. The headnote of the judgment stated that a Commissioner appointed under the 1850 Act did not constitute a court for the purposes of the 1952 Contempt Act. The Court referred to several earlier authorities, including Shell Co. of Australia v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation, Huddart-Parker & Co. v. Moorehead, Rex v. Electricity Commissioners, Bharat Bank Limited v. Employees of Bharat Bank Ltd., Maqbool Hussain v. The State of Bombay, Cooper v. Wilson, S. A. Venkataraman v. The Union of India and Another, Royal Aquarium and Summer and Winter Garden Society Ltd. v. Parkinson, Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby, Kapur Singh v. Jagat Narain, and M. V. Bajwade v. Dr. S. M. Hassan. The appeal was listed as Criminal Appeal No. 25 of 1954 and was filed under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution against a judgment and order dated 12 January 1954 of the Patna High Court in Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 10 of 1953. Counsel for the appellant included the Attorney-General of India and the Advocate-General of Bihar, while counsel for the respondent was also noted.

The judgment was delivered by Justice Bhagwati. The appeal, which carried a certificate under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution, arose from an application made under section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act and section 8 of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, read together with article 227 of the Constitution. The respondent, who served as a member of the Bihar Civil Service (Executive Branch), had been alleged by the State Government to have engaged in serious misconduct and corrupt practices while acting as Sub-Divisional Officer at Aurangabad. Consequently, the State Government decided to conduct an inquiry into the allegations pursuant to the provisions of the 1850 Act. An Additional District and Sessions Judge named Anjani Kumar Saran was appointed as Commissioner to conduct the inquiry, with Gaya designated as the venue. The Government also ordered the respondent’s suspension for the duration of the inquiry. The appointment was made after the High Court gave its administrative concurrence, subject to the creation of an extra-temporary post of Additional District and Sessions Judge to cover the period of the commissioner’s service. The appointment occurred on 2 June 1952, and the Government expected the inquiry to be completed within three months. However, the respondent employed delaying tactics, filing multiple representations, including a demand on 6 June 1952 that a Judge of the High Court be appointed as Commissioner instead of a judicial officer from the lower courts.

Mr. Anjani Kumar Saran, who at that time served as the Additional District and Sessions Judge of Gaya and later became the District and Sessions Judge of the same district, was appointed as Commissioner under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act to conduct the inquiry against the respondent. The venue for the inquiry was fixed at Gaya, and the State Government ordered that the respondent would remain suspended for the duration of the inquiry. The government made this appointment only after securing the administrative concurrence of the High Court, which was conditioned upon the creation of an extra-temporary post of Additional District and Sessions Judge for the period that Mr. Saran would be occupied with the inquiry. The appointment took effect on 2 June 1952, and the government expected that Mr. Saran could complete the inquiry within three months.

The respondent, however, resorted to dilatory tactics. On 6 June 1952 he sent a representation demanding that a Judge of the High Court be appointed as Commissioner and that the inquiry be held at Patna instead of Gaya. He followed this with another representation dated 10 July 1952, in which he protested the appointment of Mr. Saran and requested that a confirmed District and Sessions Judge be named as Commissioner in his place. A third representation, dated 17 November 1952, asked the government to appoint three Commissioners rather than one, to pay the entire cost of his defence at the same rates as the Special Public Prosecutor engaged by the government, and to reimburse other incidental expenses that he might incur. The government rejected all three representations.

Having been thwarted in his attempts to postpone the inquiry, the respondent tried to evade the process but failed. He neglected to answer the queries sent to him by the Commissioner and did not remain at the headquarters, leaving no proper address for communication at either Gaya or Motihari. Consequently, the Commissioner could not serve the orders he issued to the respondent. On 24 November 1952 the Commissioner issued an order calling the parties to appear before him on 8 December 1952 and sent a copy of that order to the appellant for transmission to the respondent. The District Magistrates of Champaran and Gaya, who had been instructed to serve a true copy of the order on the respondent, were unable to do so because the respondent was absent from both Motihari and Gaya. After considerable effort, the respondent was finally located in Patna, where the order was served upon him. On 18 December 1952 the Commissioner issued another order expressing the great difficulty he faced in contacting the respondent and communicating his orders, describing the situation as highly undesirable and emphasizing the necessity of delivering the orders to the respondent as soon as possible.

The Commissioner recorded that the difficulty he was experiencing in locating the respondent and in communicating his orders to the respondent was a highly undesirable situation and that it was necessary for his orders to be communicated to the respondent as early as possible. A copy of the Commissioner’s order was sent to the appellant together with a letter dated 20 December 1952, instructing the appellant to inform the respondent and to take the necessary steps. Following receipt of that communication, the appellant wrote a letter of complaint to the Commissioner on 26 December 1952, identified as D.O. No. II/3C-306/52A-11614. In that letter the appellant wrote: “Dear Mr. Saran, I am desired to refer to your memo No. 8266 dated the 26th November 1952 and to say that Government are anxious not to allow Mr. Jyoti Narayan to adopt dilatory tactics and delay the progress of the inquiry against him. I am to request you to be vigilant against such tactics adopted by Mr. Narayan. Yours sincerely, (Sd.) B. N. Sinha.” The Commissioner acknowledged receipt of the appellant’s letter by issuing D.O. letter No. 244 dated 5 January 1953, in which he stated that he would not permit the respondent to employ any dilatory tactics that might delay the progress of the inquiry. On 2 February 1953 the respondent filed a petition before the Commissioner, claiming that he had been unable to engage any lawyer or counsel because he lacked the necessary papers and copies, and consequently prayed for an adjournment of the inquiry. The respondent also prayed that a contempt of Court proceeding be instituted against the appellant. The Commissioner rejected both prayers. The order that the Commissioner issued on those applications is reproduced in full because it bears directly on the question of whether the appellant was guilty of contempt of Court for addressing the complained-against letter to the Commissioner. In that order the Commissioner observed: “3-2-53. Another point raised in the first petition of the accused was that Mr. B.N. Sinha, Deputy Secretary to Government, in addressing his D.O. letter No. 11614 dated 26 December 1952, was guilty of contempt because he had interfered in my judicial discretion. I do not find anything in this letter from which it can be inferred that the author intended to influence me in the exercise of my judicial function. This letter was sent to me in reply to my memo No. 8266 dated 26-11-1952 whereby I had forwarded a copy of my order dated 24-11-1952 for communication to Mr. Narayan. Mr. B.N. Sinha wrote in his letter dated 26 December 1952 that Government are anxious not to allow Mr. Jyoti Narayan to adopt dilatory tactics and to delay the progress of the inquiry. Now it is to be noted that Mr. Narayan in paragraph 11 of his petition has himself charged the State Government for delaying the inquiry and thereby causing harassment to him. Therefore, it is obvious that both parties, that is, the State and the accused are anxious that the inquiry should be expedited.”

In the Court’s view, the purpose behind Mr B.N. Sinha’s dispatch of the D.O. was solely to urge that the inquiry proceed more quickly. The Court held that, even if this intention were taken to an extreme, it could not be said that the officer attempted to influence the judge while performing judicial duties. Consequently, the Court declined to entertain the two reliefs that were sought in the first petition filed by Mr J. Narayan. After this decision, the State commenced contempt proceedings against the appellant before the High Court of Judicature at Patna. The High Court issued a rule directing the appellant to appear, and the matter was finally heard and disposed of on 12 June 1954. In that hearing, the High Court concluded that the Commissioner appointed under Act XXXVII of 1850 should be regarded as a Court, that this Court was subordinate to the High Court, and that the letter that formed the basis of the complaint amounted to contempt of Court. Accordingly, the High Court found the appellant guilty of contempt, imposed a fine of Rs 250, and ordered that, should the fine remain unpaid, the appellant would be liable to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month.

The appellant subsequently obtained a Certificate under Article 134(1)(e) of the Constitution from the High Court. That Certificate, however, addressed only the specific question of whether the Commissioner appointed under the Act qualified as a Court. At the present hearing, the appellant moved the Supreme Court by filing a petition that raised additional grounds. Among those grounds were the contention that the High Court had erred in deeming the Commissioner a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act, on the basis that the Commissioner’s orders were subject to judicial review by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. The appellant also argued that the High Court was wrong in holding that the disputed letter tended to interfere with or obstruct the course of justice and therefore constituted contempt of Court. The learned Attorney-General for the appellant advanced three principal submissions. First, he argued that the Commissioner appointed under the Act should not be classified as a Court. Second, he submitted that even if the Commissioner were a Court, it could not be considered a Court subordinate to the High Court for the purposes of the Contempt of Courts Act. Third, he maintained that the letter in question did not aim to interfere with or obstruct the administration of justice and therefore did not amount to contempt of Court. The Court also noted that before the Contempt of Courts Act 1952 came into force, the governing legislation was the Contempt of Courts Act 1926 (XII of 1926) along with similar statutes in various States, including Hyderabad, Madhya Bharat, Mysore, Pepsu, Rajasthan, Travancore-Cochin, and the Saurashtra Ordinance II of 1948. All of those earlier enactments had been repealed by the Contempt of Courts Act 1952, which introduced a uniform statute intended to define and limit the powers of certain Courts to punish contempt of Court.

In this case the Court observed that the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 applied throughout India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The Act’s Section 2 defined the term “High Court” to mean the High Court of a Part A State or a Part B State and also to include the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in a Part C State. Section 3 of the Act then provided that, subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), every High Court possessed and could exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority, following the same procedure and practice, in matters of contempt of courts subordinate to it as it exercised in matters of contempt of the High Court itself. Sub-section (2) further stipulated that no High Court could take cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been committed with respect to a subordinate court where that contempt constituted an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860). The Court noted that the Act did not give a definition of the word “Court”, and that, on its face, the phrase “courts subordinate to the High Courts” would ordinarily refer to the courts of law that are hierarchically below the High Courts and that exist for the administration of justice throughout the Union. The judgment then turned to other sources for the meaning of “Court”. It cited the classic definition of Coke on Littleton and Stroud, which described a Court as the place where justice is judicially administered. It also quoted Stephen, who explained that every Court must contain at least three essential components – the actor or plaintiff who alleges an injury, the reus or defendant who is called upon to make satisfaction, and the judex or judicial power that examines the facts, determines the applicable law, and, when an injury is found, orders the appropriate remedy. The Court further referred to Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which defines “Court” to include all Judges and Magistrates and all persons, except arbitrators, who are legally authorised to take evidence. The Court pointed out that this definition was intended solely for the purposes of the Evidence Act and should not be extended beyond that context unless warranted. Finally, the judgment examined Sections 19 and 20 of the Indian Penal Code, which define the terms “Court” and “Court of Justice”. Section 19 states that the word “Judge” includes not only persons officially designated as judges but also any person empowered by law to deliver a definitive judgment in a civil or criminal proceeding, whether that judgment is final unless appealed or would become final if confirmed by another authority, as well as members of a body empowered to give such judgments. Section 20 describes “Court of Justice” as a Judge who is empowered by law to act judicially alone, or a body of Judges empowered to act judicially as a collective.

The Court explained that a body of judges which is empowered by law to act judicially as a collective, when such a judge or body of judges is exercising judicial functions, must be able to pronounce a definitive judgment. The ability to render a binding and authoritative judgment is regarded as the essential condition for an institution to be considered a Court. In the absence of such a power to issue a final judgment, an individual or a group cannot be said to constitute a Court. The Privy Council, in Shell Co. of Australia v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation(1), addressed the meaning of “judicial power” and quoted Lord Griffith’s definition from Huddart, Parker & Co. v. Moorehead(2), stating that judicial power, as used in section 71 of the Constitution, is the power that every sovereign authority inevitably possesses to resolve controversies between its subjects, or between itself and its subjects, concerning rights to life, liberty or property. The Council noted that the exercise of this power commences only when a tribunal capable of delivering a binding and authoritative decision, whether or not subject to appeal, is called upon to act. Further, the Privy Council listed several propositions that do not, by themselves, make a tribunal a Court: a tribunal is not a Court merely because it gives a final decision; nor because it hears witnesses under oath; nor because two or more opposing parties appear before it; nor because it issues decisions affecting the rights of subjects; nor because there is an avenue of appeal to a Court; nor because another body refers a matter to it, as illustrated in Rex v. Electricity Commissioners(3). At the same time, the Council observed that an administrative tribunal may perform judicial functions yet remain an administrative tribunal distinct from a Court, emphasizing that external characteristics alone do not transform a direction issued by an ad hoc tribunal to an administrative officer into an exercise of judicial power. This principle was reaffirmed by this Court in Bharat Bank Limited v. Employees of Bharat Bank Ltd. and Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay, where the Court adopted the test for a judicial tribunal articulated in Cooper v. Wilson(1). According to that test, a true judicial decision presupposes an existing dispute between two or more parties and involves four essential elements: first, the presentation of the parties’ case, not necessarily oral; second, if the dispute concerns factual issues, the determination of those facts through evidence presented by the parties, often aided by arguments on their behalf; third, if the dispute concerns legal questions, the submission of legal arguments by the parties; and fourth, a decision that resolves the entire matter by applying the law to the facts found, including any rulings on contested points of law.

In the passage quoted from Cooper v. Wilson the Court laid down four essential components of a true judicial decision. First, there must be a genuine dispute between two or more parties and the parties must be given the opportunity to present their case, whether orally or in writing. Second, if the dispute involves questions of fact, the facts must be determined by evidence presented by the parties, often supported by argument on the evidence. Third, if the dispute concerns questions of law, the parties must be allowed to submit legal arguments. Fourth, the adjudicating body must render a decision that resolves the entire controversy by finding the facts in dispute and applying the law of the land to those facts, and, where necessary, by deciding any disputed question of law. This formulation was applied by this Court in Maqbool Hussain v. The State of Bombay and later reaffirmed in S. A. Venkataraman v. The Union of India and Another, where a Constitution Bench emphasized that both finality and authoritativeness are essential tests of a judicial pronouncement. Consequently, the Court explained that to be regarded as a Court in the strict sense, an institution must possess, in addition to certain trappings of a judicial tribunal, the power to issue a decision or definitive judgment that carries finality and authoritativeness, which are the essential hallmarks of a judicial pronouncement.

Nevertheless, Shri Purshottam Tircamdas, representing the respondent, urged that the term “Court” should not be confined to a Court of Justice or a Court of law but should be interpreted broadly to include other bodies that, although not Courts of Justice, are nevertheless Courts according to law. He relied on the decision of the Court of Appeal in England in Royal Aquarium and Summer and Winter Garden Society Ltd. v. Parkinson and on the observations of Fry, L.J. at page 446, where it was stated: “I do not desire to attempt any definition of a ‘court’. It is obvious that, according to our law, a court may perform various functions. Parliament is a court. Its duties as a whole are deliberative and legislative: the duties of a part of it only are judicial. It is nevertheless a court. There are many other courts which, though not Courts of Justice, are nevertheless courts according to our law. There are, for instance, courts of investigation, like the coroner’s court. In my judgment, therefore, the existence of the immunity claimed does not depend upon the question whether the subject-matter of consideration is a Court of Justice, but whether it is a Court in law. Wherever you find a Court in law, to that the law attaches certain privileges, among which is the immunity in question.” The English case concerned whether a county council member was entitled to absolute immunity for acts performed while handling applications for music and dancing licences. The defendant argued that he was exercising a judicial function when he made the disputed statements and therefore should enjoy absolute immunity for anything he said in the performance of his duties.

The proposition that “wherever you find a Court in law, the law attaches certain privileges among which is the immunity in question” was advanced on behalf of the defendant. Fry, L. J., addressing that proposition at page 447, explained that the contention rested on public-policy considerations. He observed that the argument asserted that any body required to decide questions and to act judicially must be deemed to be engaged in a judicial proceeding to which the immunity ought to attach. According to Fry, L. J., the word “judicial” in that argument was employed in the sense of describing proceedings that must be conducted with the fairness and impartiality characteristic of Courts of Justice and appropriate to the functions of a judge, rather than implying that the members of the body are themselves members of a Court. He warned that if the immunity were to be applied to every entity that is obliged to decide matters fairly and impartially, the doctrine would extend to assessment committees, boards of guardians, the Inns of Court when reviewing the conduct of their members, the General Medical Council when considering issues affecting a medical practitioner, and to all arbitrators. Fry, L. J., questioned whether public policy required the doctrine to be carried so far, concluding that ordinary privilege law already provides ample protection in such circumstances and that there was no necessity or propriety in extending the immunity to the breadth demanded by the argument.

Lord Esher, M. R., considered the same argument at page 442 and affirmed that statements made during proceedings before a Court of Justice—whether by a judge, counsel, or witness—enjoy absolute immunity from liability, a rule grounded in public policy. He noted that while this rule applies to all varieties of Courts of Justice, the doctrine has been extended beyond them to encompass authorised inquiries before tribunals possessing attributes similar to those of Courts of Justice. Citing the case of Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby, L.R. 8 Q.B. 255; L.R. 7 H.L. 744, he explained that the extension was justified because the military Court of Inquiry functioned as an authorised inquiry acting judicially, in a manner as close as possible to that of a Court of Justice. Lord Esher, M. R., emphasized that the doctrine has never been taken further than to Courts of Justice and tribunals that operate in a manner akin to such courts, thereby limiting the reach of absolute immunity to those entities that closely resemble judicial bodies in their conduct of inquiries.

The Court examined whether a meeting of the county council, when it was considering applications for licences for music and dancing, could be characterised as a tribunal. It noted that it was not easy to determine who might be regarded as judges acting judicially in such a setting. The Court then referred to the earlier decision in Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby, a case in which a witness sought immunity after giving evidence before a military Court of inquiry. That matter had been appealed to the House of Lords, and the Lord Chancellor, in his speech at page 754 of the report (7 H.L. 744), explained that the settled law protected witnesses in judicial proceedings. He expressed the view that, on all principles and public-policy considerations, the same protection given to a witness examined on oath in a judicial proceeding should also be given to a military officer called before a Court of Inquiry to testify about a question of military discipline. The Court observed that both the appeal before the Court of Appeal and the appeal before the House of Lords dealt with extending the principle of immunity for members of a tribunal or for witnesses in judicial proceedings. It explained that the courts had logically extended the immunity beyond the traditional Courts of Justice to tribunals or bodies of persons that functioned in a manner and according to procedures that resembled a judicial inquiry. However, the Court stressed that such an extension of immunity to those tribunals or bodies did not transform them into Courts of Justice or courts of law. To illustrate this point, the Court quoted a passage from Halsbury’s Laws of England (Hailsham Edition, Volume 8, page 526), which stated that many bodies are not courts even though they must decide questions and act judicially, meaning that their proceedings must be conducted with fairness and impartiality. Examples listed included assessment committees, guardians committees, the Court of Referees established under the Unemployment Insurance Acts to decide insurance claims, the benchers of the Inns of Court when considering the conduct of one of their members, and the General Medical Council when considering matters that affect a medical practitioner. Consequently, the Court concluded that it must return to the tests previously laid down for determining what constitutes a “court” in the strict sense used in the Contempt of Courts Act. At the same time, the Court indicated that it would be appropriate to consider the provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act (XXXVII of 1850) in order to decide whether the Commissioner appointed under that Act should be regarded as a court. The Act had been enacted to regulate inquiries into the behaviour of public servants, and its relevant sections would therefore be examined to determine the character of the Commissioner’s authority.

The Act dealing with public servants begins with a preamble that states: “Whereas it is expedient to amend the law for regulating inquiries into the behaviour of public servants not removable from their appointments without the sanction of Government, and to make the same uniform throughout India; It is enacted as follows:” Section 2 of the Act obliges the government, whenever it believes there are sufficient grounds, to frame articles of charge and to order a formal and public inquiry to ascertain the truth of any allegation of misconduct against any such public servant. Section 3 provides that the inquiry may be assigned either to the Court, to a Board or other authorities to which the accused person is subordinate, or to any other individual or individuals specially appointed by the Government as Commissioners for that purpose. Sections 4 through 7 contain the rules governing the conduct of the prosecution, while Section 8 outlines the powers vested in the Commissioners. The wording of Section 8 has been specifically relied upon to argue that the Commissioners constitute a Court. It reads: “The commissioners shall have the same power of punishing contempts and obstructions to their proceedings, as is given to Civil and Criminal Courts by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and shall have the same powers for the summons of witnesses, and for compelling the production of documents, and for the discharge of their duty under the commission, and shall be entitled to the same protection as the Zila and City Judges, except that all process to cause the attendance of witnesses or other compulsory process, shall be served through and executed by the Zila or City Judge in whose jurisdiction the witness or other person resides, on whom the process is to be served, and if he resides within Calcutta, Madras or Bombay, then through the Supreme Court of Judicature thereto. When the commission has been issued to a Court, or other person or persons having power to issue such process in the exercise of their ordinary authority, they may also use all such power for the purposes of the commission.” Section 9 establishes a penalty for anyone who disobeys the process issued under the commission. Sections 10 to 20 prescribe in detail the procedure to be followed in conducting the inquiry. The procedure is deliberately modeled, as far as practicable, on the conduct of a prosecution in a criminal court, thereby ensuring that the accused is afforded the fullest opportunity to present a defence and to lead evidence in order to clear himself of the charges. Sections 21 and 22 set out the functions of the Commissioners with respect to the report they must submit to the Government after the inquiry, and the powers of the Government to issue final orders based on those reports. These two sections are particularly relevant to the issue before this Court, as they contain the operative provisions that define the role and authority of the Commissioners in the context of the inquiry.

Section 21 stipulates that immediately after an inquiry is concluded, the commissioners must promptly submit a report to the Government describing their proceedings under the commission. The report must be accompanied by the record of the inquiry and must contain the commissioners’ opinion on each article of charge taken separately, together with any observations they consider appropriate concerning the case as a whole. Section 22 provides that, after reviewing the commissioners’ report, the Government may direct the commissioners to obtain additional evidence or to clarify further their opinions. The Government may also order that new articles of charge be framed; any inquiry into the truth of these additional charges must follow the same procedure that is prescribed for the original charges. Where special commissioners have been appointed, the Government, if it deems fit, may refer the commissioners’ report to the Court or to any other authority to which the accused person is subordinate in order to obtain that authority’s opinion on the matter, and thereafter the Government will pass any orders it considers just and within its powers in such cases. These statutory provisions were examined by this Court in the matter of S.A. Venkataraman v. the Union of India and Another [1954] S.C.R. 1150. The issue before the Court was whether an inquiry conducted and terminated under the Act constitutes prosecution and punishment for an offence within the meaning of Article 20(2) of the Constitution. In that case, articles of charge had been framed against the petitioner, and evidence was presented by both the prosecuting side and the defence. Witnesses on both sides were examined on oath, cross-examined and re-examined in the usual manner. After assessing the evidence, the Commissioner found that some of the charges were proven against the petitioner and submitted a report to the Government reflecting those findings. The President accepted the Commissioner’s opinion and, based on the several charges identified, provisionally decided that the petitioner should be dismissed. The petitioner was then afforded an opportunity, under Article 311(2) of the Constitution, to show cause against the proposed action. After considering the petitioner’s representation and consulting the Union Public Service Commission, the President finally imposed the penalty of dismissal, and the petitioner was dismissed. Subsequent to his dismissal, the police filed a charge-sheet against him before the Special Judge of the Sessions Court in Delhi, charging him with offences under sections 161 and 165 of the Indian Penal Code and section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The learned Judge issued summons directing the petitioner to appear before the Court. The petitioner challenged the legality of these proceedings by filing a writ petition, contending that the proceedings lacked jurisdiction because they amounted to a fresh prosecution for offences for which he had already been prosecuted and punished. The Court then considered whether, under these circumstances, the petitioner’s fundamental right under Article 20(2) of the Constitution had been infringed.

In this case the Court considered whether the inquiry conducted under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act of 1850 infringed the petitioner’s fundamental right guaranteed by Article 20(2) of the Constitution. The Court examined the statutory provisions of the Act and the role assigned to the Commissioner who is appointed pursuant to that legislation. Justice Mukherjea, who delivered the judgment of the Court, set out his observations beginning at page 1159. He explained that, at the present stage of the law, the sole purpose of an enquiry under the 1850 Act is to assist the Government in reaching a definite conclusion about alleged misbehaviour by a public servant. Such a conclusion enables the Government to provisionally decide what punishment, if any, should be imposed, but only after the public servant has been given a reasonable opportunity to show cause as required by Article 311(2) of the Constitution. The Justice further noted that the enquiry under the Act is not mandatory; the Government remains free to adopt any alternative procedure it deems appropriate. Accordingly, the enquiry is a matter of convenience rather than a compulsory requirement. In light of this background the Court said it must examine the essential provisions of the Act to determine whether the nature and result of the enquiry could be characterised as a criminal prosecution and punishment.

Proceeding to page 1160, the Court observed that a Commissioner appointed under the Act does not have a duty to investigate any offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code or the Prevention of Corruption Act, and the Commissioner possesses no jurisdiction to do so. The Commissioner’s investigation is confined to ascertaining the truth or falsity of the allegation of misbehaviour levelled against a public servant. The investigation therefore concerns only the specific instances of alleged misbehaviour that form the articles of charge, and any disciplinary action that might follow is at the discretion of the Government. The Court emphasized that merely using the term “prosecution” does not transform the proceedings before the Commissioner into a criminal prosecution. While the Commissioner is empowered to form an opinion based on legal evidence, to summon witnesses, to administer oaths, and to compel the production of relevant documents, these powers are merely procedural tools. They may resemble certain features of a judicial tribunal, but they do not elevate the proceeding beyond a fact-finding enquiry. This conclusion is expressly supported by sections 21 and 22 of the Act. At the conclusion of the enquiry, the Commissioner must submit a report to the Government setting out his findings on each charge. The Court held that such a report represents only an expression of opinion, lacking both finality and authoritativeness—the hallmarks of a judicial pronouncement. Moreover, the opinion expressed in the report is not binding on the Government. Under section 22, the Government may, after receiving the report, request the Commissioner to collect additional evidence or to clarify his opinion. The Court therefore affirmed that the Commissioner’s role is limited to fact-finding and that his report does not constitute a definitive judicial decision.

In that earlier decision, the Court observed that when Commissioners were appointed, “their report could be referred to the court or other authority to which the officer concerned is subordinate for further advice and after taking the opinion of the different authorities and persons, the Government has to decide finally what action it should take.” The Court’s principal concern in that case was to determine whether the inquiry conducted before the Commissioner amounted to a prosecution of the petitioner. While addressing that issue, the Court examined the nature of the Commissioner’s role and concluded that the Commissioner functioned merely as a fact-finding authority. The Court held that the report submitted by the Commissioner to the Government represented only an expression of opinion and that it lacked both finality and authoritativeness—qualities that are essential for a judicial pronouncement. This finding was deemed sufficient to establish that a Commissioner appointed under the Act was not a Court, and that his report or findings did not constitute a definitive judgment or a judicial pronouncement because they were neither binding nor authoritative and they lacked finality. The present Court shares that view.

Beyond the considerations previously weighed by the Court, the present Court also examined section 8 of the Act, which shows that Commissioners are granted certain powers that are described as those of the Civil and Military Courts with respect to punishing contempt and obstruction of their proceedings, summoning witnesses, compelling the production of documents, and serving process, together with the same protection accorded to Zila and City Judges. The very enactment of this provision indicates that Commissioners were not intended to be assimilated to Judges and that they did not constitute Courts of Justice or Courts of law. Rather, they were established as fact-finding tribunals that could exercise only those powers expressly conferred by the Act that created them. The power to punish contempt and obstruction, which parallels the authority given to Civil and Criminal Courts under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, further demonstrates that Commissioners were not Courts in the ordinary sense of the term. No provision of this nature would have been intended to create Courts of Justice or Courts of law, and it is not persuasive to argue that these provisions were enacted merely as an abundance of caution or for clarification. Accordingly, the Court is of the opinion that a Commissioner appointed under the Act does not constitute a Court within the meaning of the term used in the Contempt of Courts Act. The Court’s attention was drawn by Shri Purshottam Tricamdas to a decision of a Division Bench of the Punjab High Court in Kapur Singh v. Jagat Narain, a case that is directly on point and aligns wholly with the present matter.

In that case the learned Chief Justice of the Punjab High Court had been appointed a Commissioner under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act to conduct an inquiry against Sardar Kapur Singh, I.C.S., and Lala Jagat Narain, who was the editor, printer and publisher of an Urdu daily newspaper published at Jullundur called The Hindu Samachar. The Commissioner was called upon to show cause why he should not be punished under section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act with respect to a leading article that appeared in his name in the issue of the paper dated 12 March 1951. On his behalf a preliminary objection was raised that the Court lacked jurisdiction to institute contempt proceedings against him because the Court of the Commissioner appointed to hold the inquiry under the Act was not a Court and, in any event, was not a Court subordinate to the High Court. Justice Falshaw, delivering the judgment of that Court, observed at page 50 that the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act itself appears to indicate that a Commissioner or Commissioners appointed under the Act constitute a Court, since they are given all the powers of a Court with regard to summoning witnesses and other matters. He noted that the only ground on which the learned counsel for the respondent could base his argument that the Commissioner does not constitute a Court was that the Commissioner cannot give a final decision but merely has to draw up a report of his findings on the charge or charges against the respondent, which is to be forwarded to the Government. Justice Falshaw expressed the opinion that this fact alone is not sufficient to deny the status of a Court to the Commissioner or Commissioners. He further pointed out that the definition of “Court” in section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act is very wide, reading: “‘Court’ includes all Judges and Magistrates and all persons, except arbitrators, legally authorised to take evidence.” The learned Judges relied upon that definition, which, as already noted, is framed only for the purposes of the Evidence Act and is not to be extended where such extension is unwarranted. That definition, according to Justice Falshaw, does not aid in determining whether the Commissioners appointed under the Act constitute a Court, and the learned Judges were not alerted to the principle that finality and authoritativeness are the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement. Consequently, the Court held that the decision of the Punjab High Court’s learned Judges in that earlier case was erroneous and could not assist the respondent. The Court’s attention was also drawn to another decision of the Nagpur High Court in M. V. Rajwade v. Dr. S. M. Hassan (A.I.R. 1954 Nag. 71), where the question considered was whether a commission appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act was a Court within the meaning of section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952, and the learned Judges of that Court also examined the provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850.

In that case, the Nagpur High Court examined whether a commission appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 qualified as a “Court” within the meaning of section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. While doing so, the judges also looked at the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850. The judges correctly stated that the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 does not contain a definition of the word “Court”. However, the Act does refer to a “Court of Justice” as defined in section 20 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which describes a judge who is empowered by law to act judicially. The judges explained that the minimum requirement for an entity to be considered a Court is the ability to deliver a definitive judgment, and that this power must be vested in the tribunal for a particular case. They further observed that merely having a legally characterised procedure and the authority to administer an oath does not automatically confer the status of a Court. Consequently, the judges concluded that the commission created under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 was not a Court within the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. The judges clarified that their analysis was confined to the provisions of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 and did not involve interpreting the provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850. Any remarks they made about the latter Act were solely for the purpose of comparison with the former Act and did not create a legal construction of the 1850 Act that could be relied upon by the respondent in the present matter. The ratio followed by the judges was therefore correct, although the judgment included a discussion of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 to highlight the nature and position of the commission established under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952. While this additional discussion was not essential for reaching the decision, the judges accurately described the commission’s character, stating that the commission appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 is created by the State Government “for the information of its own mind” so that the Government does not exercise its executive power in a manner contrary to justice and equity when ordering a departmental enquiry against its officers. Accordingly, the commission functions as a fact-finding body intended only to inform the Government, without producing any judicial document. The Court expressed the view that the two earlier decisions relied upon by Shri Purshottam Tricamdas did not assist the respondent nor alter the position already set out. The only conclusion to which we can come on a consideration of all

The Court observed that the provisions of the Act expressly stipulate that the Commissioner appointed under that legislation does not constitute a Court for the purposes of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. In light of this conclusion, the Court found it unnecessary to examine the question of whether the Commissioner might be regarded as a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of the same Contempt legislation. Likewise, the Court considered that it was not required to express any view on whether the letter that formed the basis of the complaint could be classified as contempt of Court. Nevertheless, the Court noted in passing the particular circumstances in which the letter was addressed by the appellant to the Commissioner, the specific wording of that letter, and the order issued by the Commissioner on 2 February 1953 in response to the respondent’s application to proceed against the appellant for contempt. These factors, according to the Court, lend support to the argument advanced by the appellant that the letter in question did not amount to contempt of Court. Accordingly, the Court held that the appeal must be allowed, the order passed against the appellant by the lower Court is set aside, and the original Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 10 of 1953 filed by the respondent in the High Court of Judicature at Patna is dismissed. The Court further directed that any fine that may have been paid should be refunded.