Bhim Sen vs The State Of U. P

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 22 of 1954

Decision Date: 15 March, 1955

Coram: B. Jagannadhadas, Vivian Bose, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha

In this matter, the Supreme Court recorded that the petition was filed by Bhim Sen against the State of Uttar Pradesh, and the judgment was delivered on 15 March 1955. The case was heard by a bench consisting of Justice B. Jagannadhadas, Justice Vivian Bose and Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha. The official citation of the judgment is 1955 AIR 435 and 1955 SCR (1) 1444. The dispute involved the application of the Uttar Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 (U. P. Act XXVI of 1947), specifically sections 49, 52 and 55, together with Rule 84 that had been framed by the State Government under section 49(4) of the Act. The factual matrix was that a theft having a value of three rupees was committed by three accused persons, one of whom was a resident of Madhya Pradesh while the other two were residents of Uttar Pradesh. A Panchayat Adalat had been constituted in accordance with the provisions of section 49 of the Act and the aforementioned Rule 84 to try the case. The Court’s task was to determine whether such an Adalat could be validly constituted, whether Rule 84 fell within the authority granted by the Act, and whether the ordinary criminal courts were thereby excluded from jurisdiction under section 55 of the Act.

The petitioners contended that the three accused had been tried and convicted by a Magistrate under section 379 of the Indian Penal Code for the offence of theft, and each had been sentenced to a fine of twenty-five rupees. The central question for determination was whether the trial should have proceeded before a Panchayat Adalat as prescribed by the Uttar Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act, rendering the Magistrate without jurisdiction. Section 52(1) of the Act expressly provides that certain offences, including theft where the stolen property’s value does not exceed fifty rupees, are cognizable by a Panchayat Adalat. Section 55 further stipulates that no other court shall take cognizance of a case that is cognizable by a Panchayat Adalat under the Act. Section 49 delineates the composition of the bench for a Panchayat Adalat, requiring that the bench consist of five Panches, one of whom must reside in the area of the Gaon Sabha where the complainant lives, another who resides in the area where the accused lives, and three who reside in areas where neither party resides; in police cases, the bench must include a Panch from the Gaon Sabha where the offence was committed, a Panch from the accused’s area, and three others from different areas. Rule 84, framed by the State Government under section 49(4), provides that when the parties to a case reside in different circles, districts or when a party resides outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Act, the authority having jurisdiction over the Panchayat Adalat shall constitute a special bench comprising Panches of that Adalat and, if convenient, may include a Panch from the other circle, appointing one of them as Chairman unless the Sarpanch is a member of the bench. The Court examined these statutory provisions and the rule to decide whether the Panchayat Adalat in this case was properly constituted and whether the ordinary criminal courts retained jurisdiction.

The Court explained that when a case or proceeding is instituted or transferred for disposal, the authority having jurisdiction over the Panchayati Adalat must form a special bench composed of Panches of that Adalat. Where it was convenient and possible, the bench could also include a Panch from the other circle, and one of the members had to be appointed as Chairman unless the Sarpanch himself was a member of the bench. The Court then held that because one of the accused in the present matter was a resident of Madhya Pradesh, it was impossible to constitute a bench that complied strictly with section 49(2) of the Act for trying his case. The Court further observed that Section 84, to the extent that it deals with the constitution of a special bench when one of the parties belongs to a place outside the State of Uttar Pradesh, exceeded the authority granted by the Act and was therefore ultra vires. Consequently, no competent bench could be constituted under section 49 of the Act for the trial, since the case involved three accused, one of whom belonged to a different State. In view of this deficiency, the Court stated that the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts was not displaced. It clarified that the jurisdiction of a general-purpose court can be excluded only when a court of limited jurisdiction is created for a specific field, and the vesting and exercise of that limited jurisdiction are clear and operative. The Court also noted that the bar created by section 55 of the Act applies to the case as a whole and concerns the entire proceeding with respect to all the accused together.

The judgment that follows was rendered in criminal appellate jurisdiction under Criminal Appeal No 22 of 1954. The appeal was filed under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution against the judgment and order dated 27 October 1953 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Reference No 121 of 1953. Counsel for the appellant and for the respondent were instructed, and the judgment was delivered on 15 March 1955 by Justice Jagannadhadas. The Court described the facts as straightforward. At the relevant time, the appellant and two other individuals worked as parcel porters at Manikpur railway station in Banda district of Uttar Pradesh. On the night of 18 June 1952, two watchmen of the Watch and Ward staff observed the three men breaking open a railway parcel and stealing several packets of biscuits, an act that they could commit because of their duties handling parcels. The head watchman, Ram Prasad, lodged a first information report before the Sub-Inspector of Railway Police. The Railway Police filed a charge-sheet under section 379 of the Indian Penal Code on 20 June 1952. The Railway Magistrate of Manikpur took cognizance of the case. All three accused pleaded guilty, and on 15 July 1952 the Magistrate convicted them and imposed a fine of Rs 25 on each. Following this conviction, the appellant filed a revision petition seeking relief.

In this case the appellant filed a revision before the Sessions Judge of Banda. The appellant argued that, under the Uttar Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act of 1947, the Panchayati Adalats in Uttar Pradesh possessed criminal jurisdiction over certain matters, and therefore the offence for which the appellant had been convicted ought to have been tried before a Panchayati Adalat rather than before the Railway Magistrate. The Sessions Judge accepted this contention and consequently referred the matter to the High Court for the purpose of setting aside the conviction and the fine imposed.

A Single Judge of the High Court examined the reference and expressed doubt that the Railway Magistrate had possessed jurisdiction to try the case. However, without reaching a definitive conclusion on the jurisdictional issue, the High Court Judge declined to entertain the reference, holding that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court was discretionary. In an apparently contradictory step, the same Judge nevertheless issued a certificate permitting appeal to the Supreme Court, even though his own order had not resolved the question of jurisdiction. It was observed that, had the Judge found it appropriate to grant leave to appeal, he could also have decided the jurisdictional question so that the parties would have benefited from his consideration of that issue.

To resolve the jurisdictional question, it was necessary to examine the scheme of the Uttar Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 (U.P. Act XXVI of 1947), and the specific provisions that were relevant. The Act had been amended in 1952 and later in 1955, but those amendments did not apply to the present case because the offence was committed and the conviction rendered before those changes took effect. At the relevant time, the Act provided that the State Government, by notification in the official Gazette, would establish a Gaon Sabha for each village or group of villages (section 3). Under section 42 the State Government or a prescribed authority would divide each district into circles, each circle comprising as many Gaon Sabha jurisdictions as were expedient, and would establish a Panchayati Adalat for each such circle, ensuring that the Gaon Sabha areas within a circle were, as far as possible, contiguous. Section 43 required every Gaon Sabha in a circle to elect five qualified adults who permanently resided within its jurisdiction to serve as panches in the Panchayati Adalat of that circle; the panches elected by all Gaon Sabhas in a circle would together form a panel. Section 44 directed that the panches so elected would choose among themselves a person capable of recording proceedings to act as the Sarpanch of the Panchayati Adalat. The subsequent provisions of the Act conferred on the Panchayati Adalat jurisdiction to adjudicate all disputes and cases, both civil and criminal, arising within its area.

In this case the Court observed that the provisions dealing with the criminal jurisdiction of a Panchayati Adalat are confined to the portions of the Act that relate specifically to criminal matters. Section 52(1) stipulates that certain specified offences, if committed within the local jurisdiction of a Panchayati Adalat, are cognizable by that Adalat. The subsections of Section 52 enumerate the classes of offences under the Indian Penal Code and other special and local Acts that fall within the Adalat’s jurisdiction. For example, Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code is listed, and the Act provides that the Adalat may exercise jurisdiction over that offence only where the value of the stolen property does not exceed Rs 50. Section 51(1) further provides that, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, every case instituted under the Act must be instituted before the Sarpanch of the Panchayati Adalat of the circle where the offence occurred. Section 55 adds that no court shall take cognizance of any case that is cognizable under the Act by the Panchayati Adalat unless an order has been passed by a Sub-Divisional Magistrate under Section 85. Section 85 empowers a Sub-Divisional Magistrate, on the application of a party or on his own motion, to cancel the jurisdiction of the Panchayati Adalat with respect to any pending case if there is an apprehension of miscarriage of justice. Section 49 sets out the machinery for the trial of cases by the formation of benches. The relevant portion of that section as it applies to criminal cases reads: “(1) The Sarpanch shall, for the trial of every case, form a bench of five Panches from the panel (the panel referred to in Section 43 above) provided that at least one of the Panches in the bench shall be a person who is able to record evidence and proceedings. (2) Every such bench shall include one Panch who resides in the area of the Gaon Sabha in which the complainant resides and likewise one Panch in the area in which the accused resides and three Panches residing in the area of the Gaon Sabha in which neither party resides, provided that in police cases one Panch shall be such as may be residing in the Gaon Sabha in which the offence was committed, one Panch residing in the area of the Gaon Sabha in which the accused resides and three Panches residing in the areas other than those mentioned above. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, the State Government may, by rules, prescribe the constitution of special benches for determining any dispute arising between any parties or Gaon Sabhas or different circles or for any other purpose.” The Court noted that these provisions collectively define the scope and mechanics of criminal jurisdiction of the Panchayati Adalat.

In this matter the Court examined rule 84, which had been framed pursuant to the subsection that is pertinent to the present issue. The rule states: “For the purposes of trial or decision of any case or proceeding parties of which are residents of different circles or different districts or any one of the parties is a resident of a place not governed by the Act, the prescribed authority having jurisdiction over the Panchayati Adalat in which a case or proceeding is instituted or transferred for disposal shall constitute a special bench consisting of Panches of the said Panchayati Adalat and, if convenient and possible, may include a Panch of the other circle and shall appoint one of them as Chairman of the bench unless the Sarpanch is a member of it.” The Court then turned to the question of jurisdiction under the provisions of the Act. The charge-sheet filed by the police indicated that the theft involved property valued at Rs 3 and that the offence unquestionably occurred within the territorial limits of Manikpur. Accordingly, on a prima facie basis, sections 51 and 52 conferred jurisdiction on the Panchayati Adalat of Manikpur to try the case. If that jurisdiction was proper, the jurisdiction of the regular magistrate would be displaced under section 55, because there was no indication of any order made under section 85. However, the Court identified a serious obstacle to the exercise of that jurisdiction by the Adalat. Section 49 requires that a criminal case be tried by a bench of Panches formed by the Sarpanch, and the bench must comprise five Panches: one from the Gaon Sabha of Manikpur (the place where the offence was committed and which is a police case), one from the Gaon Sabha of the accused, and three from Gaon Sabhas that are outside those two areas. When there is a single accused who belongs to a Gaon Sabha already formed under the Act, or when multiple accused belong to the same Gaon Sabha, the composition of such a bench presents no difficulty. In the present case, however, the record showed that one of the three accused, namely Tulsi, resided in Jubbalpore, Madhya Pradesh, which lies outside Uttar Pradesh. Consequently, it was impossible to constitute a bench that strictly complied with section 49(2) of the Act for his trial. The Court therefore had to resort to section 49(4) and the rules made thereunder. Rule 84, as quoted above, expressly provides for the formation of a special bench in situations where more than one accused resides in different areas, thereby offering a mechanism to overcome the difficulty encountered in this case.

In this case the Court examined the scope of rule 84, which deals with the constitution of benches of a Panchayati Adalat. The Court observed that the portion of the rule that applies when all the parties are residents of Uttar Pradesh is clearly permissible. However, the Court questioned whether the rule may also be applied to a person who resides outside the State. To decide this issue, the Court referred to section 49(4) of the Uttar Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act, the provision that empowers the Government to make rules for the formation of special benches “for determining disputes between parties of different circles or Gaon Sabhas or for any other purpose.” The Court explained that the terms “circles or Gaon Sabhas” refer strictly to those circles and Gaon Sabhas that have been created under the Act, and therefore the section does not give authority to make a rule that includes a person belonging to a place beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the State. Moreover, the phrase “for any other purpose” cannot be interpreted so broadly as to permit a rule that affects an outsider, even assuming without deciding that a State Legislature could, by delegation, validly confer jurisdiction on a Panchayati Adalat over a person outside the State. Accordingly, the Court held that rule 84, insofar as it attempts to constitute a special bench when one of the parties is from outside Uttar Pradesh, exceeds the power granted by the statute and is ultra vires. Consequently, no competent bench could be constituted under section 49 of the Act to try the present case in which three accused are involved, one of whom is a resident of a different State.

The Court then considered whether the ordinary criminal courts were barred from trying the case. Section 55 of the Act provides a bar on the jurisdiction of regular courts, stating that “no court shall take cognizance of any case which is cognizable under the Act by a Panchayati Adalat.” The Court pointed out that under section 2(a) of the Act, the term “case” means the entire criminal proceeding in respect of an offence triable by a Panchayati Adalat, and the definition of “Panchayati Adalat” includes any bench of such an Adalat. Thus, the bar created by section 55 applies to the whole proceeding, covering all the accused together. Such a bar can operate only when a valid mechanism exists for the trial of the entire case before a Panchayati Adalat. In the present circumstance, because at least one accused is a person from outside the territorial reach of the Act, no valid bench of the Adalat can be formed to try all three accused together, and therefore the Panchayati Adalat has no jurisdiction over the whole case. As a result, the jurisdiction of the ordinary criminal courts is not displaced by section 55. The Court reminded that the jurisdiction of criminal courts under section 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is comprehensive, covering investigation, inquiry, trial and other actions for offences under the Indian Penal Code, and that this jurisdiction remains intact when the statutory scheme fails to provide a valid limited-jurisdiction forum for the case.

Because a bench of the Panchayati Adalat could not be validly formed, it was unable to try the three accused together and consequently possessed no jurisdiction over the entire case. The Court observed that the operation of section 55 of the Uttar Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act does not remove the jurisdiction of the regular criminal court with respect to such a case. It further noted that the jurisdiction granted to criminal courts by section five of the Code of Criminal Procedure is comprehensive and all-encompassing. That provision commands that every offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code must be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with in accordance with the provisions that follow in the Code. Consequently, when no valid machinery is established under the Uttar Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act for the trial of a particular case, the ordinary criminal court retains its jurisdiction under section five of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that jurisdiction cannot be said to be excluded. The Court explained that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction can occur only when a court of limited jurisdiction is created for a specific field and the vesting of that limited jurisdiction, together with its exercise, is clear and operative. In the present matter, because there was no adequate machinery to exercise the limited jurisdiction in the specific case, the Court could not hold that the exercise of jurisdiction by the court of general jurisdiction was illegal. Accordingly, the Court was of the opinion that the Railway Magistrate possessed the authority to try the case. As a result, the appeal was dismissed.