Bhikaji Keshao Joshi And Another vs Brijlal Nandlal Biyani And Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 158 of 1954

Decision Date: 2 May 1955

Coram: B. Jagannadhadas, Vivian Bose, Syed Jaffer Imam

In this case, the Court recorded that the petitioners, who were two electors of the Akola constituency of the Madhya Pradesh State Assembly, filed an election petition against the successful candidate of the election held on 13 December 1951 and three other respondents who had also been validly nominated but were defeated at the polls. The petition was filed under Section 80 of the Representation of the People Act of 1951. The Court noted that the petition was filed one day after the period prescribed by law, and therefore it was technically time‑barred. The Election Commission, exercising the power granted by the proviso to Section 85 of the same Act, accepted an explanation for the delay and condoned the late filing. Following the condonation, the Commission constituted an election tribunal to try the petition. The Court listed the statutory provisions that were material to the dispute, including the proviso to Section 85, Section 90(4) dealing with reconsideration of limitation, Section 82 relating to the inclusion of parties, Section 83(1) on verification of pleadings, Section 83(2) on the requirement of full particulars of corrupt practices, and the relevant rules of Order 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure. After hearing the parties, the tribunal framed nine issues. The issues covered whether the petition had been presented by a person duly authorised, whether there was sufficient cause for filing the petition one day out of time, whether the non‑joinder of certain respondents made the petition defective, whether the petition suffered from lack of proper verification, and whether the particulars of alleged corrupt practices set out in Schedule A were sufficiently specific, among others. By a majority, the tribunal held that the petition was presented by an authorised person, but it unanimously found the petition defective on the remaining four points. Because of those adverse findings, the tribunal dismissed the petition without proceeding to a trial on the merits. The petitioners then applied for special leave to appeal the dismissal before the Supreme Court.

The Court further explained that once the Election Commission had condoned a delay in filing an election petition under the power conferred by the proviso to Section 85, the election tribunal was not entitled to revisit the question of limitation under Section 90(4) of the Act. The Court emphasized that even if, according to the requirement of Section 82, a necessary party other than the returned candidate had not been impleaded, the petition could not be dismissed solely on that ground. Instead, the omission of a party was to be considered at the appropriate stage of the proceedings, taking into account the final outcome of the case. The Court also addressed the verification requirement of Section 83(1), noting that verification of pleadings follows the procedure laid down in Order VI, Rule 15(2) and (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court observed that dismissing an application merely because the verification lacked a date would be an improper exercise of discretion. In such circumstances, the applicant should normally be given an opportunity to supply a supplementary verification that states the original date and explains the omission. The Court reiterated the mandate that corrupt‑practice allegations must be set out with full particulars under Section 83(2), and that the tribunal has a duty to investigate serious allegations of corrupt practices when they are raised in the petition.

The Court observed that when a candidate who ought to have been impleaded is omitted from an election petition, the petition cannot be dismissed solely on that ground of limitation. Instead, such an omission must be considered at the appropriate stage, taking account of the final outcome of the case.

Section 83(1) of the Representation of the People Act requires that an election petition be verified in the same manner as verification of pleadings under the Code of Civil Procedure. The procedure for verification of pleadings is set out in clauses (2) and (3) of Rule 15 of Order VI of the Code. Except in situations where the date of the pleading and its verification are material, the Court held that it would be an improper exercise of discretion to dismiss an application merely because the verification lacks a date. In such circumstances, the applicant should normally be directed to cure the defect by filing a supplementary verification that states the date of the original verification and explains why the date was omitted.

The requirement under Section 83(2) that a petition contain “full particulars” of alleged corrupt practices must be satisfied with sufficient detail and clarity. This enables the opposite party to meet the allegations fairly and prevents the inquiry from becoming an unfocused investigation. The primary duty to provide these full particulars rests with the petitioners. If they fail to do so initially, they are obligated to rectify the deficiencies when given the opportunity.

The Court cautioned that Tribunals should not adopt an overly narrow approach in dealing with alleged defects in a petition. Rather than dismissing the petition for lack of particulars, the Tribunal should order the petitioners to supply better particulars; if the order is ignored, the Tribunal may strike out those charges that remain vague.

In the present case, the petitioners alleged that the returned candidate was disqualified because he had an interest in government contracts. The Tribunal ignored these allegations and, without investigating their veracity, dismissed the petition on the ground that the corrupt‑practice charges were vague. The Court held that ignoring allegations of disqualification is contrary to the interest of electoral purity and that such matters warrant inquiry. Consequently, the case was remitted for further enquiry on the specific allegations that the returned candidate was disqualified and that the corrupt‑practice charge was not vague, following the precedents set in Dinabandhu v. Jadumoni ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 140) and Jagan Nath v. Joswant ([1954] S.C.R. 892).

The matter before the Court was an appeal by special leave from the judgment and order of the Election Tribunal at Akola, Madhya Pradesh, dated 1 May 1953, which had dismissed the election petition filed by the appellants. The dispute concerned the election to the Akola constituency of the State Assembly of Madhya Pradesh that was held on 13 December 1951, and whose result had been announced in the Gazette on 4 April 1952. The two appellants were registered electors of that constituency. The first respondent had been declared the successful candidate. Respondents numbered two, three and four were the other three candidates who had been duly nominated, had contested the poll, and had been defeated.

The appellants instituted an election petition under section 80 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (Act XLIII of 1951), seeking to set aside the election on several grounds. The petition was presented on 19 April 1952 before the Election Commission in Delhi, admittedly one day after the period prescribed by law had expired. The Election Commission, invoking the proviso to section 85 of the Act, accepted the petition despite the delay and ordered the constitution of a Tribunal to try the petition. The Tribunal was constituted by notifications dated 30 July 1952 and 22 September 1952, which directed that the trial be held at Akola.

The first respondent filed his written statement on 6 October 1952, and the petitioners filed their reply on 16 October 1952. After reviewing these pleadings, the Tribunal decided that it was appropriate to formulate certain preliminary issues and to resolve them before proceeding to a trial on the merits. Consequently, it framed nine preliminary questions. These questions, in substance, dealt with: (1) whether the petition had been presented by a person duly authorized to do so; (2) whether the one‑day delay in filing the petition was justified; (3) whether the petition suffered from a failure to join certain parties as respondents; (4) whether the petition was lacking proper verification; and (5) whether the particulars of alleged corrupt practices set out in Schedule A of the petition were too vague.

The Tribunal, by a majority decision, found in favour of the petitioners only on the first issue concerning proper authorisation. On the remaining four issues—delay, non‑joinder of parties, defective verification, and vagueness of corrupt‑practice particulars—the Tribunal held unanimously against the petitioners. Because of these adverse determinations, the Tribunal dismissed the petition without conducting a trial on its merits. The appellants now approached the Supreme Court seeking special leave to challenge that dismissal. It is also necessary to note that, at an early stage of the Tribunal proceedings, an objection had been raised to the composition of the Tribunal on the ground that one of its members was alleged to be biased in favour of the first respondent.

In this matter the petitioners challenged the membership of Shri A S Athalye on the ground that he was not competent to serve as a member of the Tribunal because of an alleged bias in favour of the first respondent. The allegation of bias was founded on a letter that Shri Athalye had purportedly written to the first respondent shortly before the election, offering assistance for the respondent’s election campaign. When this objection was raised, the Tribunal halted its proceedings to obtain a preliminary determination on the question of the member’s competence. While the Tribunal was considering that preliminary issue, the petitioners instituted proceedings in the High Court seeking to set aside the constitution of the Tribunal on the same ground, invoking article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court heard arguments from both sides and ultimately dismissed the petitioners’ application. Following that dismissal the petitioners appealed to this Court for special leave, but the Court refused to grant such leave. Subsequently, counsel for the appellants attempted to revive the challenge to the Tribunal’s decision on the basis of the alleged bias, but the Court declined to permit a re‑examination because the issue had already been decided against the petitioners in the earlier proceedings. On the opposite side, the Attorney‑General for the first respondent sought to reopen before this Court the question of whether the election petition had been presented to the Election Commission by a person duly authorised, a point that the Tribunal had decided against the respondent by a majority. The Attorney‑General contended that the Tribunal’s finding was based on an erroneous view of the burden of proof. This Court, however, was not prepared to allow that factual finding to be revisited in the present special leave appeal, irrespective of any dispute about the proper allocation of the burden of proof. Consequently, the only questions that remain for determination before this Court are whether the Tribunal’s conclusions on (i) limitation, (ii) joinder of parties, (iii) verification, and (iv) the specification of particulars of corrupt practices in Schedule A attached to the petition, were correct, and if those conclusions necessarily required the dismissal of the petition. These matters will be examined one by one.

Regarding the limitation issue, the petition was filed on 19 April 1952, which the petitioners admittedly admitted was one day later than the period prescribed by the relevant rules. The petitioners subsequently filed an application for condonation of delay on 28 April 1952, in which they set out the reasons for the delay. In paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of that application they explained that they had been under the mistaken belief that the notice required under Rule 113 of the Rules framed under the Act had been published in the official Gazette of the State of Madhya Pradesh on 5 April 1952. On that basis they thought the petition had been presented within the fourteen‑day period specified by Rule 119. Later they learned that the notice under Rule 113 had actually been published in the Gazette on 4 April 1952. This discovery meant that the petition had, in fact, been filed a day after the expiry of the statutory period, creating a one‑day delay in the representation of the election petition. The petitioners therefore sought condonation of that single‑day delay, explaining the circumstances that led to their misunderstanding of the publication date of the notice.

There was a delay of one day in the filing of the election petition, and the Court set out the circumstances that gave rise to that delay. The applicants prepared the petition on 17 April 1952 and sent it to a senior counsel from Akola, authorising this counsel to present the petition through any person of his choice at Nagpur on 18 April. Along with the petition they also forwarded a sum of Rs 1,000 to be deposited in the Government Treasury at Nagpur as required by section 117 of the Act, so that a Treasury receipt for security of costs could be filed with the petition. The applicants believed that an officer appointed by the Election Commission under section 81 of the Act must have been in place at Nagpur to receive election petitions for the State of Madhya Pradesh. Accordingly, the counsel left Akola for Nagpur by the 1 Down Nagpur Mail and arrived in Nagpur at about 9 minutes 30 seconds a.m. on 18 April 1952. On that same day the counsel arranged for the deposit of the Rs 1,000 security through an advocate from Nagpur and obtained the required Government Treasury receipt. After securing the receipt, the counsel sought to identify the officer authorized to receive election petitions. He consulted an official attached to the Election Office at Nagpur and was informed that no such officer existed in Nagpur who was authorized under the Act. Faced with this situation, the counsel booked a seat on a night flight to Delhi, departed on the night of 18 April and reached Delhi on the morning of 19 April 1952. On 19 April the counsel presented the petition to the Secretary of the Election Commission. The explanation provided by the counsel was accepted by the Election Commission, as evidenced by a letter addressed to the petitioners dated 30 July 1952.

The Tribunal, however, held that despite the Election Commission’s order condoning the delay and admitting the petition, it retained the authority under section 90(4) of the Act to reconsider the question of delay. Exercising that power, the Tribunal examined the merits of the explanation supplied by the counsel and concluded that the petitioners had been negligent and that a delay of even one day could not be condoned. Consequently, the Tribunal ruled that the petition was time‑barred and should be dismissed. The present issue, apart from the adequacy of the reasons for delay, is whether a Tribunal may revisit the matter after the Election Commission has already exercised its power to condone the delay under section 90(4) of the Act. This question has been addressed by the Supreme Court in the case reported as Dinabandhu v. Jadumoni, where it was held that a Tribunal does not have the jurisdiction to reconsider a matter that has been settled by the Election Commission’s condonation of delay. The Court’s decision in that precedent therefore limits the Tribunal’s authority in the present case.

In the circumstances described, the Tribunal’s conclusion on the point of reconsideration could not be sustained. The learned Attorney‑General contended that the earlier decision of this Court was merely obiter regarding the legal issue and therefore warranted further examination, but the Court was not prepared to reopen the question. Moreover, the Court found no sufficient justification for the Tribunal to interfere with the Election Commission’s view that a one‑day delay was properly condoned on the basis of the explanation offered, an explanation that even the Tribunal had not deemed false. The objection concerning the joinder of parties arose from the fact that three individuals, namely Shri Sohoni, Shri Kulkarni and Shri Kothkar, had been nominated as candidates and their nominations had been validated by the Returning Officer after scrutiny. However, each of them withdrew from the election within the prescribed period under section 37 of the Act. While the petitioners named as respondents the three unsuccessful candidates who actually contested the poll, they omitted these three withdrawn nominees. The Tribunal held that the withdrawn nominees were also necessary parties and that their omission rendered the petition liable for dismissal, relying on the authority cited at (1) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 140. To support its view, the Tribunal invoked section 82 of the Act, which provides: “A petitioner shall join as respondents to his petition all the candidates who were duly nominated at the election other than himself if he was so nominated.” It was argued before the Court that this interpretation was erroneous because persons who filed nominations and subsequently withdrew within the allowed time, despite their nominations being found in order, should not be classified as “candidates duly nominated at the election.” The arguments were supported by the decisions in Sitaram v. Yograjsing (1) and Sheo Kumar v. V. G. Oak (2). On the opposite side, the case of Mohammad Umair v. Ram Charan Singh (3) was cited in favor of the Tribunal’s position. All three authorities treated the issue as one of construing the phrase “at the election” in section 82. The Bombay and Allahabad judgments held that the phrase limited the necessary parties to those who actually stood for the poll, whereas the Patna High Court regarded the phrase as having no such limiting effect. The Court considered it unnecessary and academic to delve into this rivalry of opinions, especially in light of its own decision in Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh (4). Even if the Court were required to resolve the controversy, it would prefer to base its ruling on a broader consideration of the statutory scheme rather than on a strict semantic construction of the words “at the election.”

In this case the Court explained that the analysis should not be limited to a narrow construction of the phrase “at the election” in section 82 of the Representation of the People Act, but should instead be based on a comprehensive examination of all the relevant statutory provisions, the rules made under the Act, and the purpose, if any, of the requirement in section 82 concerning the joinder of parties other than the returned candidate. The Court, however, noted that it was not required to engage in such a detailed analysis because the earlier decision of this Court in Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh (4) had already settled the issue. That precedent held that even if a necessary party other than the returned candidate had not been impleaded – as indicated by the citations (1) A.I.R. 1953 Bombay 293, (2) A.I.R. 1953 All. 633, (3) A.I.R. 1954 Patna 225, and (4) [1954] S.C.R. 892 – the election petition could not be dismissed at the outset on that sole ground. Instead, the question of an omitted necessary party was to be considered at the appropriate stage of the proceedings, taking into account the final result of the case. Consequently, the Court held that the Tribunal’s decision to reject the petition on the basis that a necessary party had not been joined could not be sustained in view of the authority of Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh.

The Court then turned to the issue of verification of the election petition. The Tribunal had based its view on section 83(1) of the Act, which provides that “an election petition shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies and shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for the verification of pleadings.” The Court identified the specific provisions of the Civil Procedure Code that govern verification, namely Order VI, Rule 15, clauses (2) and (3). Clause (2) requires the person verifying to specify, by reference to the numbered paragraphs of the pleading, what is verified from personal knowledge and what is verified on information received and believed to be true. Clause (3) further requires the verification to be signed by the person making it and to state the date and place of signing. In the present matter, both the petition and the schedule of particulars of corrupt practices were signed by the two petitioners, and there was no dispute that they had been signed. The verification clause in the petition read: “The above‑named applicants hereby affirm that the contents of the above petition are true to information received from the press reports and several other electors and believed by them to be true. Signed and verified at Akola on …” The verification clause in Schedule A similarly read: “The above‑named applicants affirm that the contents in this schedule are true to information received and believed by us to be true. Signed and verified at Akola on …” The Tribunal found two defects in these verifications: they did not refer to any numbered paragraphs of the pleading, and they did not bear the dates on which they were signed. On that basis, the Tribunal held that the petition was liable to be dismissed for non‑compliance with the specific provision of the Act. While the Court noted that the absence of dates on the verification in both the petition and the schedule was not contested, it reserved judgment on whether the lack of reference to numbered paragraphs was a fatal defect.

In this case the parties argued that the Tribunal’s opinion, which held that the verification statements were defective because they did not refer to any numbered paragraphs, could not be sustained. They explained that the wording of the verification was intended to show that all of the allegations contained in both the petition and the accompanying schedule were based, in their entirety, on information that the petitioners had received and on their belief in that information. Consequently, they submitted that there was no requirement to indicate, for each specific allegation, whether it rested on personal knowledge or merely on information, and therefore no need to enumerate the paragraphs for that purpose. The Court accepted this submission. It observed that a verified pleading is not the same as an affidavit, which, according to Order XIX, rule 3, must be limited to facts that the deponent can prove from his own knowledge, except in interlocutory applications where statements of belief may be admitted if the grounds are disclosed. No such limitation is imposed on pleadings, and therefore a verification attached to a pleading need not be confined in the same way. Nonetheless, a verification must clearly distinguish between allegations founded on personal knowledge and those founded on information. In the present petition, every allegation was asserted to be based solely on information. Because the verification clauses expressly covered the whole petition together with the attached schedule, the failure to list each paragraph as being based on information did not constitute a defect. The only defect identified was the omission of dates on the verification statements. The Court then considered whether the absence of dates justified dismissal of the petition. While it recognized that the date of a pleading and its verification can sometimes be relevant, it held that to dismiss an application solely because the verification lacked a date would be an improper exercise of discretion. Instead, the appropriate course was to require the petitioners to remedy the omission by furnishing a supplementary verification that stated the original date of verification and explained why the date had been omitted. The objection concerning the particulars of corrupt practices was based on section 83(2) of the Act, which requires the petition to be accompanied by a list that is signed and verified in the same manner and that sets out full particulars of every corrupt or illegal practice alleged, including as complete a statement as possible of the names of the parties alleged to have committed each practice and the date and place of each such practice. The respondents contended that the particulars contained in Schedule A of the petition were vague and did not comply with the statutory requirement. The schedule was described as a list of particulars of instances referred to in the accompanying petition, beginning with an allegation that in December 1951 respondent No 1 visited the premises of Akola Shree Gurudwara where the local Sikh community had assembled to listen to the recitation of the holy book on the seventh day after the death of a community member. It was further alleged that respondent No 1 canvassed for votes, paid a sum of two hundred and one rupees ostensibly as a donation to the Gurudwara but in reality as a gift intended to induce the Sikh community in the Akola constituency to vote for him, thereby constituting bribery under section 123 of the Representation of the People Act. Similar instances of illegal gratification were also listed, including donations to various religious and social organisations and the distribution of blankets, sarees and money to voters. The Court therefore needed to assess whether these particulars satisfied the detailed requirements of section 83(2) and whether the lack of dates in the verification warranted dismissal of the petition.

The Court noted that the petition set out a series of specific allegations against respondent No. 1. First, it alleged that on the seventh day after the death of a woman named Sardar Suratsingb’s daughter, a gathering was held at the Akola Shree Gurudwara for the recitation of the holy book Granth Saheb. At this meeting respondent No. 1 allegedly canvassed for votes and handed over Rs 201, purportedly as a donation to the Gurudwara but in reality as a gift intended to induce the Sikh community of the Akola constituency to vote for him in the forthcoming election. The Court recorded that this act was described as bribery within the meaning of section 123 of the Representation of the People Act. The petition further listed similar instances of illegal gratification, namely a donation to Hkariharpeth Akhada, a payment to the Panch‑bungalow Committee of the Bhangis of Old City, a donation to the Bhaji Bazar Association, and the distribution of blankets, saris and money to voters. Second, the petition alleged that respondent No. 1 convened a meeting of workers employed by Berar Oil Industries, a company of the Birla group, on the eve of the election. At that meeting the workers were threatened that they must vote for respondent No. 1 or else lose their jobs or suffer financial loss, and the poster of the rival candidate that had been affixed on the post‑office within the plant premises was removed and stolen. Third, the petition claimed that respondent No. 1 caused various caste and community groups—including Bohara, Lohars, Marwaries, Muslims, Rajasthanies and Bhangies—to issue appeals and resolutions urging their members to vote for him, employing threats, communal and caste‑based canvassing and undue influence. Fourth, it alleged that pamphlets and handbills were issued without any identification of the printer or publisher. Fifth, the petition asserted that during the counting of votes at Polling Station No. 53, the Returning Officer discovered about twenty folded bundles, each containing three or more ballot papers, inside the ballot box of respondent No. 1. The Court recorded that these bundles could not have been formed by votes cast directly into the box; rather, they were said to have been placed by persons acting on behalf of respondent No. 1 after obtaining the ballot papers from voters who had been paid illegal gratifications. The bundles were alleged to have been deposited on 31 December 1951 at Chandur with the connivance of respondent No. 1. Finally, the petition alleged that false personation of several deceased voters and other voters had been carried out in furtherance of the corrupt practices.

In the course of the election, absentee voting in Pakistan was reported to have occurred in Ward No. 12 and Ward No. 15. The respondent No. 1 engaged in a programme of false propaganda. According to the evidence, an agent acting for respondent No. 1 used loud‑speaker announcements at various locations to allege that the rival candidate, Dr. Joglekar, belonged to the caste and political party of Godse, the assassin of Mahatma Gandhi, and that casting a vote for Dr. Joglekar was equivalent to voting for Gandhi’s murderer. A further piece of false propaganda asserted that Dr. Joglekar was a subordinate of Mishra and that his campaign was financed by Mishra’s money. During public meetings organised by respondent No. 1, and also in meetings attended by respondent No. 1, these false, defamatory, and malicious statements were repeated, thereby damaging the electoral prospects of Dr. Joglekar. The alleged defamation also extended to attacks on the personal character and conduct of Dr. Joglekar, which further prejudiced his chances of election. In addition, voters were transported in hired carts to a number of polling stations, especially at the Kapshi Polling Station. This conveyance was arranged by persons working for and on behalf of respondent No. 1, at his expense and with his connivance. Written objections seeking police investigation were lodged at Kapshi and also at the Rifle Range area. Moreover, respondent No. 1 is alleged to have spent lacs of rupees on his election campaign, thereby exceeding the statutorily prescribed expenditure limit of Rs 6,000. He is further accused of submitting a completely false return of election expenses, an act that contravenes the applicable law. The record also shows that Mohota Mills released its workers on polling day and paid them for canvassing work in favour of respondent No. 1; substitutes for these workers were also engaged by the mills and paid, all at the direction of respondent No. 1. The Court observed that almost all of the instances set out above were extremely vague and lacked sufficient particulars. Counsel for the appellants drew the Court’s attention to the fact that the Tribunal, when examining the issue of vagueness, considered only the corrupt practice allegations enumerated in paragraphs I(a), I(b), I(c), I(d), 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8, and omitted the others. On this basis, counsel argued that, by implication, the Tribunal had not found the items mentioned in paragraphs 1, 3, 9 and 10 to be vague, and therefore those four items should be treated as sufficiently particularised. He further urged that there was no reason why the petitioners should not have been required to amend the schedule by providing better particulars for the remaining items, and that, at any rate, the petitioners were entitled to a trial on those four specific allegations of corrupt practices. The Court could not agree with the counsel’s contention that the allegations in paragraphs 3, 9 and 10 were not vague. The Court noted that the statutory provision, Section 83(2), requires not only what may reasonably be regarded as “full particulars” in view of the nature of each allegation, but also expressly mandates the inclusion of specific details: the names of the parties alleged to have committed the corrupt or illegal practice, the date of each alleged practice, and the place where each alleged practice was purportedly committed. The Court therefore found that the particulars set out in the challenged paragraphs did not satisfy the requirements of Section 83(2).

The law requires that, for each alleged corrupt or illegal practice, the petition must set out (1) the name of the party alleged to have committed the practice, (2) the date of its commission, and (3) the place where it was committed. There can be no reasonable doubt that the requirement of “full particulars” must be satisfied with enough detail and clarification to enable the opposite party to meet the allegations fairly, and the particulars must not turn the inquiry before the Tribunal into a vague and unfocused investigation. After a careful examination of the list contained in Schedule A, the Court is satisfied that none of the items, except the one described in paragraph I of item No. I, complies with the requirements of section 83(2). In view of this finding, counsel for the appellants submitted that, nevertheless, the Tribunal ought to have required the petitioners to provide better particulars for all of the remaining items, relying on the powers conferred on it by section 83(3). Alternatively, the counsel argued, the Tribunal should at least have asked the petitioners to substantiate the allegation contained in paragraph 1 of item No. 1, which was sufficiently specific and, if proven, could have led to the election being set aside.

The question of whether the Tribunal should have called upon the petitioners to amend the schedule by furnishing better particulars was highlighted by the Attorney‑General for the first respondent, who drew the Court’s attention to the objection raised in the written statement concerning the vagueness of the particulars and to the various orders recorded in the Tribunal’s order‑sheet. Paragraph 9 of the first respondent’s written statement reads as follows: “9. (a) It is, further, submitted that the petition ought to be dismissed as it does not contain concise statement of material facts on which the petitioners rely. Similarly the list of particulars given in the schedule or in the petition are not in compliance with section 83(2). (b) Without prejudice to the generality of this objection, it is further submitted that para V of petition read with para VI(e) will show that the particulars given in Schedule relate to corrupt and illegal practices alleged to have been committed by respondent No. 1 and by his agents and persons working on‑behalf of respondent No. 1 with his connivance. Such particulars are bad in law. The applicants are bound to state the names of the persons who are alleged to have actually committed the corrupt or illegal practice. (c) Paras 1 and 2 of the petition allege that there was no free election by reason of general bribery and undue influence exercised by and on behalf of respondent No. 1. Similarly the allegation in para 2 is that the coercion was the result of manipulation by, or at the instance of respondent No. 1. Thus these allegations must be supported by giving the necessary particulars regarding the names, date.”

In the petition, the allegations set out in paragraphs one and two were characterized as allegations of corrupt and illegal practice falling within the scope of sections 123, 124 and 125 of the Representation of the People Act, rather than as vague, general accusations that did not directly implicate the candidate personally. By way of illustration, paragraph I of the schedule did not disclose any names or dates relating to the alleged corrupt practices; the same deficiency was observed in the allegations contained in paragraphs 2 through 10 of the schedule. The responsibility to demonstrate to the Election Commission and to the Tribunal that the particulars supplied complied with the statutory requirements rested on the petitioners, and the Court noted that this burden had not been satisfied; consequently, the petition was deemed liable to be dismissed on that ground. The order‑sheet of the Tribunal proceedings subsequently revealed the procedural chronology. An order dated 16 October 1952 recorded that the Tribunal had decided to initially consider the case on the preliminary issues, and it directed the parties to state whether they wished to amend their pleadings on factual matters already presented, given that some of the preliminary points involved questions of fact. The respondents indicated that they did not wish to amend their pleadings on the factual aspects of the preliminary issues, while the petitioners filed an application under Order VI, Rule 16 of the Civil Procedure Code seeking to strike out portions of paragraph 3‑b and paragraph 4‑(d)(2) of respondent No 1’s written statement. On 17 January 1953, the Tribunal granted respondent No 1’s request for time to amend his written statement and to seek particulars, directing that the application for amendment and for particulars be filed five days prior to the hearing, with copies served on the petitioners, who were required to be ready with their replies on the hearing date. On 27 January 1953, the Tribunal noted that the petitioners had filed their reply to respondent No 1’s amendment application and that respondent No 1 had thereafter amended his application without any objection. On 29 January 1953, the Tribunal recorded that the petitioners declined to amend their pleadings in response to the amendment of the written statement. Considering the specific objection raised in the written statement and the opportunities afforded to the petitioners to amend their pleadings, as reflected in the orders, the Court observed that the argument advanced by the learned Attorney‑General—that the petitioners, for reasons known only to themselves, had filed an imprudent petition—had considerable merit. While acknowledging that the Court possessed the authority to allow amendment of the schedule of corrupt practices by permitting the furnishing of more precise particulars, the Court concluded that no duty was imposed on the Tribunal to order, on its own motion, the provision of such particulars.

In this matter the Court examined whether the Tribunal was required to order, of its own motion, the furnishing of better particulars. The petitioners, in the reply they filed to the written statement of the first respondent and in response to the objection that the particulars of the alleged corrupt practices were vague, stated that they were prepared to give further particulars if the Tribunal was pleased to permit it under section 83(3) of the Representation of the People Act. That reply was filed on 16 October 1952, the same day on which the first of the orders extracted from the order‑sheet was passed. A later order dated 17 January 1953 shows that the first respondent, at one stage, indicated an intention to ask for particulars himself.

The Court observed that the primary responsibility for furnishing full particulars of the alleged corrupt practices and for filing a petition that fully complied with section 83(2) of the Act rested on the petitioners. While it was acknowledged that the Tribunal had taken a very narrow view of its function in dealing with the various alleged defects in the petition and had treated those defects as sufficient ground for dismissal, the petitioners were not relieved of their duty to comply of their own accord with the requirements of section 83(2) and to rectify the defects when an opportunity was available. They could not hide behind the fact that neither the Tribunal nor the first respondent had, in any terms, called upon them to furnish better particulars.

Consequently, the Court held that, with respect to compliance with section 83, two matters were clear: first, the verifications in the petition and its schedule were defective because the dates of the alleged corrupt practices were not specified; second, the schedule of particulars comprised a number of items, of which at most one could have been taken up for inquiry by the Tribunal, while the remaining items were extremely vague, no amendment was applied for, and the petitioners did not avail themselves of the two occasions on which a general amendment of pleadings was open.

Counsel for the appellants argued that, nevertheless, there was no justification for the Tribunal dismissing the petition in its entirety. They submitted that the Tribunal should have called upon the petitioners to substantiate the first allegation by evidence after striking out, if necessary, the remaining particulars, using the powers vested in it under Order VI, rule 16 of the Civil Procedure Code. On the other side, the Attorney‑General for the first respondent contended that the Tribunal was free to consider whether, taking the petition as a whole and in its total effect, there was substantial compliance with the requirements of section 83. He maintained that even if the Tribunal thought there was substantial non‑compliance, it was not bound to order a striking out of the various items and to confine the trial to a single item, because doing so would effectively create a different petition from what had been presented before the Election Commission. He emphasized that in such cases the Tribunal should exercise great strictness so that the mechanism for setting aside elections would not be abused by vague and irresponsible charges.

The learned Attorney‑General contended that even if some of the petition’s items were specific, the Tribunal was not obligated to use its discretion to favor the petitioners by striking out all of the vague items and limiting the trial to a single issue. He argued that such an approach would effectively create a different petition from the one originally presented to the Election Commission, and that in matters of this nature the Tribunal possessed both the right and the duty to apply strict standards so that the mechanism for setting aside elections would not be misused to tarnish a winning candidate by means of vague or irresponsible allegations. Although the argument carried considerable weight, the Court observed that in a case of this kind the Tribunal, at the early stage of proceedings, should not have dismissed the application outright. Instead, the Tribunal ought to have exercised the powers conferred on it to require the petitioners to furnish clearer particulars. If the petitioners failed to comply with such a direction, the appropriate step would have been to strike out only those charges that remained vague, while directing the petitioners to substantiate the allegations that were reasonably specific. Accordingly, the Court held that the Tribunal’s order dismissing the petition in its entirety was manifestly erroneous. Notwithstanding this view, the Court indicated that, under normal circumstances, it would not have entertained an interference under article 136, given the considerable lapse of time and the fact that the petitioners before the Court were merely voters without any direct personal stake in the election result. Nevertheless, the Court noted an additional circumstance that had not been raised during the arguments. Paragraphs 6(a), (b) and (c) of the petition for setting aside the election enumerated certain grounds alleging the disqualification of the returned candidate. The petition also claimed that objections to the candidate’s nomination had been raised at the time of scrutiny of the nomination papers, but that the Returning Officer had summarily dismissed those objections without conducting an inquiry. The petition therefore restated those objections, which were detailed as follows: (a) the election for the Madhya Pradesh State Assembly seat in the single‑member Akola constituency was scheduled for 31‑12‑1951, nominations were due by 15‑11‑1951, and scrutiny was to occur on 17‑11‑1951; at the scrutiny stage an objection was made to the nomination of respondent No. 1 on several grounds, the principal ground being that respondent No. 1 was disqualified under Chapter III, section 7(d) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 because of his position as Managing Agent or Managing Director of Rajasthan Printing and Litho Works ‑ a private limited company incorporated under the Companies Act, in which he held shares and directorship, and from which he derived commissions on contracts for supplying stationery, paper, printing materials and other services to the Madhya Pradesh State Government.

The Court noted that the petition relied upon the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (Act XLIII of 1951) to allege that the first respondent was disqualified from filling the seat. The petition claimed that the respondent held the position of Managing Agent or Managing Director of Rajasthan Printing and Litho Works Private Limited, a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act. As a shareholder and director of that company, the respondent allegedly possessed an interest in contracts for the supply of stationery, paper, printing materials and similar goods to the State Government of Madhya Pradesh. The petition further asserted that the respondent had an interest in contracts for the execution of works or performance of services, such as printing, undertaken by the same State Government. It was alleged that the respondent received a commission on sales effected by the limited company, thereby creating a personal interest in the contracts between the company and the Madhya Pradesh Government. In addition, the petition alleged that the respondent was a partner in the firm Berar General Agency, which had entered into a contract to distribute cloth on behalf of the State Government to retailers and held a licence for that purpose; consequently, the respondent was said to have a personal interest in that government contract. The petition further alleged that the respondent owned the monthly journal “Prawaha” and the bi‑weekly newspaper “Matru‑bhumi,” both of which printed government advertisements on a contract basis, thereby giving the respondent an interest in another contract for the performance of services for the Madhya Pradesh Government. The income derived from these contracts, the petition said, was reflected in the respondent’s private accounts and disclosed in the profit and loss statements filed with the income‑tax return for the relevant and current years, and the sales and other details of the “Matru‑bhumi” concern were likewise recorded in the respondent’s private accounts. The petition contended that these objections had been summarily overruled by the Returning Officer without any inquiry or explanation, and that, if proven with the necessary details, the allegations could be serious enough to warrant setting aside the election of the returned candidate. In response, the first respondent denied any improper acceptance of his nomination paper and specifically denied that the allegations in paragraphs 6(a), (b) and (c) of the petition amounted to a disqualification under section 7 of the Representation of the People Act. He further submitted, without prejudice to his other arguments, that he was not suffering from any of the alleged disqualifications at the date of filing his nomination.

The Court observed that the questions concerning the alleged disqualification ought to have been examined in the enquiry that precedes the Election Tribunal. It held that disregarding such allegations without an enquiry would run counter to the requirement of maintaining the purity of elections, and it expressed surprise that the Tribunal had omitted them and had exercised its authority to dismiss the petition. Although the Court recognised its hesitancy to intervene after a lapse of three years and four months, and despite the proximity of only one year and eight months to the forthcoming general elections, it nevertheless concluded that the matter had to be remitted for a proper enquiry. In view of the delay already incurred and the surrounding circumstances, the Court, exercising the same powers that the Tribunal could normally have exercised, directed that every item of alleged corrupt practice listed in Schedule A be struck out, except for the specific allegation contained in paragraph I of item 1. That allegation, set out in detail, concerned an incident in December 1951 when respondent No 1 attended the premises of Akola Shree Gurdwara, where the local Sikh community had gathered to listen to the recitation of the holy book “Granth Saheb” on the seventh day after the death of the daughter of Sardar Suratsingh. During that meeting respondent No 1 is said to have canvassed for votes and to have paid a sum of Rs 201, which was presented as a donation to the Gurdwara but was, in reality, intended as a gift to induce the Sikh community in the Akola constituency, and particularly those assembled, to vote for him in the ensuing election. The Court found that this conduct amounted to bribery within the meaning of section 123 of the Representation of the People Act.

Consequently, the case was ordered to be sent back for an enquiry and trial limited to two matters: first, the allegations recorded in paragraphs 6(a), (b) and (c) of the application filed for setting aside the election; and second, the allegation contained in paragraph 1 of item 1 of Schedule A as described above. The Court directed the Election Commissioner to reconstitute an appropriate Tribunal for this purpose. It further instructed that, before the newly constituted Tribunal proceeds to trial, the petitioners be required to correct the deficiency concerning the dates in the verification clauses of both the petition and the schedule. The Court expressed the hope that these fresh proceedings before the Tribunal would be concluded at a very early date. Finally, the appeal was allowed as set out, but, given the circumstances, the Court ordered that no costs be awarded.