Atley vs State Of Uttar Pradesh

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 16 September, 1955

Coram: Sinha, J.

In this matter the Supreme Court recorded that the appeal was filed under special leave from a judgment and order issued by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court on 31-03-1953. That order had allowed the State of Uttar Pradesh to pursue an appeal against the acquittal granted by the Additional Sessions Judge of Meerut on 25-05-1951, but the appeal concerned only the appellant and not the co-accused. Both the appellant, identified as Atley, and another individual named Hoshiara had been tried for an offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The trial judge had acquitted both of them. Nevertheless, the State of Uttar Pradesh filed an appeal limited to the appellant, and the appellate court subsequently convicted the appellant under the same provision and sentenced him to transportation for life.

The charge alleged that on the night between 3 June and 4 June 1950, in the village of Tavela Garhi, post office Binauli, sub-district Sardhana, district Meerut, the appellant had murdered Smt. Shivdevi inside the appellant’s “gher”, a term that may be understood as a farmhouse, thereby committing an offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. According to the first information report lodged by Sub-Inspector Bishram Singh, he, together with Head Constable Ram Bahadur Singh and Constable Bhagat Singh of the Provincial Armed Constabulary, were stationed with a platoon outside the village for the prevention of serious crimes. While on patrol they halted in front of the appellant’s gher after hearing a sound that aroused their suspicion. Shortly thereafter, Asaram Kahar, identified as PW 1, arrived running from the direction of the police camp situated just outside the village. He told the police that he and his wife had heard a woman’s shrieks emanating from the roof of their house, which seemed to be coming from inside the appellant’s gher, and that he had reported the incident to the police camp.

The informant repeated the name “Atley” several times from outside the gher because the main door was bolted from the inside and there was no answer. Consequently, he summoned the village watchman Sajawal and directed him, along with Constable Bhagat Singh and Asaram, to climb over the low wall and enter the gher to ascertain the situation. The police posted guards around the house and discovered the appellant lying on a bed with his face covered by a cloth. The appellant was removed from the house and, when questioned by the Sub-Inspector, began to tremble and, with folded hands, begged forgiveness. The police’s suspicion increased because of the appellant’s behaviour. While still inside the gher, the officers conducted a search of the premises and made a gruesome discovery: a corpse was found inside a sack. The body was subsequently identified as that of the appellant’s wife. The record noted that the appellant was alleged to have made a self-incriminating statement, which led to his custody and the forwarding of information to the police station.

The appellant gave a statement that was self-incriminating, after which the police took him into custody and forwarded the information to the Binauli police station. The second officer of that station, identified as P. W. 15, travelled approximately eight or nine miles to the location and arrived at about ten o’clock in the morning, where he commenced the investigation. Upon entering the appellant’s “gher”, he discovered the dead body of Shivdevi concealed in a gunny sack inside a “kotha”. He observed that a piece of cloth was jammed in the mouth of the corpse and that a female petticoat lay inside the “kotha”. The body showed clear marks of strangulation on the neck and was entirely naked. On the same day and the following day, namely 5-6-1950, the officer examined the individuals later designated as P. Ws. 1 to 9 and 11 to 14. The Civil Surgeon of Meerut performed the post-mortem examination on 5 June at 6:15 p.m. The surgeon reported that the body was uniformly bloated, in an advanced stage of decomposition, with skin peeling, bulging eyes, bloody discharge from both nostrils, and a protruding tongue. Because of the advanced decomposition, no external injuries could be identified. However, internal examination revealed fractures of the second to fifth ribs on the right side, the second to sixth ribs on the left side, and a fracture of the sternum. The medical opinion concluded that death resulted from compression of the chest leading to rib and sternum fractures, shock and haemorrhage. After the investigation and the preliminary inquiry by the committing magistrate, the appellant and another accused, Hoshiara, were committed to trial, resulting in the findings already noted.

At trial, several witnesses – specifically P. Ws. 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 – were examined to establish that neighbours heard Shivdevi’s shrieks during the dead of night and inferred that she was being severely beaten. Upon hearing her cries, P. W. 1, identified as Asaram, hurried to the P. A. C. camp to alert the police. P. W. 2, Sub-Inspector Bishram Singh, arrived at the same location from the opposite direction while on patrol and also suspected that something nefarious was occurring inside the appellant’s “gher”. The remaining witnesses recounted how they entered the “gher” and discovered Shivdevi’s dead body, leading them to conclude that the appellant was the perpetrator. The appellant’s defence, as recorded during his examination under Section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code in the Sessions Court, asserted that he had not taken Shivdevi from his residence to the “gher” on the night of 3 to 4 June 1950. When questioned further by the court, he replied, “I”.

In his testimony before the trial court, the appellant denied any participation in the death of Shivdevi and also denied that Hoshiara was present with him. He asserted that he was not at the ‘gher’ on the night in question and that he was not lying on the cot as the prosecution alleged. He further insisted that he had not been at his ‘gher’ at any time until that moment. According to his statement, two sepoys named Asa and Mangat had approached his Persian wheel while he was working in his field, and they escorted him to a military officer that night. He maintained that when he was taken from the jungle to the officer, no recovery of the dead body occurred in his presence. From these admissions, it appeared that the appellant completely repudiated any presence at the ‘gher’ during the night of the incident. The appellate argument was that if he was indeed away from his ‘gher’, occupied with his Persian wheel in the field, and only later brought to his ‘gher’ by police officers, then the prosecution’s evidence failed to establish any connection between him and the crime. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, however, seemed to accept the appellant’s defence, as reflected in a notable passage of his judgment: “The fact of murder is not disputed but it is seriously disputed that Atley was present in the gher’ when people entered the ‘gher’ where after the dead body was recovered from the ‘kotha’. I am referred to the statement of P.W. Raja Ram, the Mukhia and sarpanch of the village who pays Rs. 100 as land revenue. He was sent for to Atley’s ‘gher’ by the military police. According to him when he reached that ‘gher’ Atley was under the custody of the military police and standing in the public path in front of the door of the ‘gher’. It is clear from his statement that Atley was arrested first and the entry into his ‘gher’ was effected thereafter.” The trial judge derived this conclusion primarily from the cross-examination of Raja Ram, PW 11, who had been summoned by the chowkidar Sajawal to the appellant’s ‘gher’: “Atley accused was in custody and standing in the public path in front of the door of the ‘gher’. Nobody talked to Atley in my presence.” These sentences were the opening remarks of the brief cross-examination of PW 11. It was evident that the counsel conducting the cross-examination obtained those statements in a terse form without any reference to the chronological sequence of events. Moreover, the examination-in-chief of the same witness showed that his statements were given without regard to the temporal order in which the events he described occurred. Consequently, the learned trial judge appears to have been misled by reading excessive significance into the witness’s cross-examination testimony. Once this pivotal error was made and the substantive defence of the accused was accepted, the judge encountered little difficulty in discarding the remaining evidence presented by the prosecution. The judgment of the trial court thus reflected a reliance on a misinterpretation of the witness’s statements rather than a thorough appraisal of the prosecution’s case.

The trial judge recorded the evidence of each witness in separate paragraphs, presenting them one after another. At the outset of his analysis, however, he incorrectly imposed a chronological order on the statements of plaintiff-witness 11, Raja Ram. A careful reading of Raja Ram’s testimony shows that it does not support any such sequence. For that reason, the judges of the High Court correctly observed that the trial judge had misdirected himself when he concluded that the prosecution’s case—especially the evidence of Asaram and Sub-Inspector Bishram Singh—was undermined by the statements of Raja Ram. The High Court also noted that the prosecution’s chief examination had been poorly conducted because the lawyer had failed to elicit the witnesses’ statements in their proper chronological order. After conducting an exhaustive and thorough appraisal of all the material on record, the High Court determined that the appellant had indeed been found inside the “gher,” as the prosecution alleged. The evidence, taken as a whole, led the court to the inference that the appellant was responsible for the murder, perhaps with the assistance of another individual. The High Court did not give detailed consideration to the role attributed to Hoshiara, since the State Government had not filed any appeal against him. Nevertheless, the High Court judges were unequivocal that, with respect to the appellant, the prosecution had succeeded in establishing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Counsel for the appellant argued that, because the trial court had acquitted the accused, the High Court should not have set aside that judgment merely by reassessing the prosecution’s evidence unless it found the lower court’s decision to be perverse. The Court disagreed with that contention. It held that it is not a correct statement of law to say that an appellate court exercising jurisdiction under Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code may set aside an acquittal only when it deems the trial court’s order to be perverse. Established precedent declares that a High Court, on appeal against an order of acquittal, is entitled to review the entire body of evidence and reach its own conclusion. This power is exercised while observing the well-settled principle that the presumption of innocence attached to an accused is not weakened but rather reinforced by an acquittal rendered by a trial court that had the advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses as they testified. Moreover, the appellate court possesses the same wide latitude in evaluating evidence in an appeal against an acquittal as it does in an appeal against a conviction, subject only to the requirement that the presumption of innocence, with which the accused begins the trial, continues to apply throughout the appellate process and that the trial court’s observations are accorded appropriate weight.

It was held that, once a matter reaches the appellate stage, the appellate court must give appropriate weight to the opinion of the trial court that recorded the order of acquittal. The principle underlying this requirement is that the trial court, having heard the witnesses live, is in a better position to observe their demeanor and credibility. Consequently, when the appellate court undertakes a review of the entire evidence, it must do so while keeping in mind the presumption of innocence that continues to attach to the accused and the respect owed to the trial court’s findings. If, after such a review, the appellate court arrives at a conclusion that differs from that of the trial court, the appellate judgment cannot be said to be vitiated. In support of this proposition, the Court referred to the authorities cited at the Bar, namely Surajpal Singh v. The State and Wilayat Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh. The Court expressed the view that the contention raised on behalf of the appellant, alleging that the High Court was not justified in reviewing the entire evidence and forming its own conclusions, lacked any substance. Therefore, the appellate court was fully empowered to examine all the material placed before it and to reach its own independent determination.

The other contentions advanced by the appellant were deemed not to merit serious consideration because they concerned merely the appreciation of evidence and did not raise any question of principle. It was submitted that the prosecution evidence failed to establish a clear motive for the crime and that, although the deceased was the appellant’s first wife who had been set aside after he married a second wife, there was no clear evidence of serious quarrels between them. The Court accepted the factual basis of this submission but observed that the presence of a clear motive would have reinforced the finding of guilt, whereas the absence of a clear motive does not, by itself, compel a contrary conclusion. The Court noted that motive, while helpful, is not a mandatory element for establishing guilt in a murder case when the surrounding circumstances point convincingly to the accused. Because the prosecution did not produce unequivocal proof that the appellant had a personal reason for eliminating his first wife, the other evidential material bearing on the appellant’s guilt required close scrutiny. The judges of the High Court, having examined the prosecution case in detail, found that the sequence of events, the forensic findings, and the testimony of witnesses together created a chain of inference that left no reasonable doubt about the appellant’s participation in the homicide. The Court further observed that the evidence suggested the appellant might have been assisted by Hoshiara, but that the High Court did not feel it was necessary to pronounce a final finding on that aspect because the primary issue of the appellant’s own culpability had already been established. The Court affirmed that the sentence imposed, which was the maximum penalty other than death, was appropriate in the circumstances and that the High Court’s decision not to impose the death penalty was within its discretion. Having found no error in the reasoning or the appreciation of evidence, the Court concluded that no ground existed for interference and dismissed the appeal.