Waryam Singh And Another vs Amarnath And Another

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 64 of 1953

Decision Date: 19 January 1954

Coram: Mehar Chand Mahajan, B.K. Mukherjea, Vivian Bose, Ghulam Hasan, Das

In the case titled Waryam Singh And Another versus Amarnath And Another, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 19 January 1954. The bench that heard the matter consisted of Mehar Chand Mahajan, B. K. Mukherjea, Vivian Bose and Ghulam Hasan, with the Chief Justice Mehar Chand Mahajan presiding.

The petition was filed by Waryam Singh and another appellant seeking relief against the respondents, Amarnath and another. The judgment was recorded on 19 January 1954 and subsequently reported in the law reports as 1954 AIR 215 and 1954 SCR 565. The decision has been cited in numerous later cases, including R 1955 SC 233, R 1958 SC 321, R 1958 SC 398, F 1965 SC 1994, F 1972 SC 1598, R 1975 SC 1297, R 1978 SC 45, RF 1979 SC 1, RF 1986 SC 1272, and F 1987 SC 117.

The principal question before the Court concerned the scope of the powers conferred on a High Court under Articles 227 and 241 of the Constitution of India. Specifically, the Court was asked to determine whether the Rent Controller and the District Judge, who operate under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act (III of 1949, as extended to Himachal Pradesh), qualify as “tribunals” within the meaning of Article 227, and consequently whether the High Court possesses judicial superintendence over them.

The Court observed that the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Himachal Pradesh exercised jurisdiction over the entire territory of Himachal Pradesh. It held that the Rent Controller and the District Judge, although performing adjudicatory functions under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, were indeed tribunals and not courts within the meaning of Article 227. Accordingly, Article 227(1) read together with Article 241 conferred on the Judicial Commissioner the power of superintendence over such tribunals.

In analysing the phrase “in relation to which” in Article 227(1), the Court clarified that it qualified the word “territories” and not the words “courts and tribunals.” The Court rejected the argument that clause (2) of Article 227 limited the High Court’s supervisory authority to administrative superintendence only, noting that clause (2) was expressly without prejudice to the generality of the provisions in clause (1). The Court further emphasized that the supervisory power under Article 227 should be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases to keep subordinate courts within their jurisdiction, rather than to correct mere errors.

Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, the Court found that the tenants had failed to pay rent as required by the rent deed and as mandated by the proviso to section 13(2)(i) of the Rent Restriction Act at the first hearing of the ejectment application. The lower courts had acted arbitrarily by refusing to issue an order of ejectment against the defaulting tenants, thereby neglecting the jurisdiction vested in them by law. The Court concluded that such a situation warranted interference by the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, which had correctly exercised its supervisory powers.

The judgment also referred to earlier authorities, namely Moti Lal v. State through Shrimati Sagrawati (I.L.R. [1952] 1 All. 558 at p. 567) and Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee (A.I.R. 1951 193), to support its reasoning on the scope of judicial superintendence.

In this appeal by special leave, the Court considered the order dated 20 November 1951 issued by the Judicial Commissioner of Himachal Pradesh in proceedings instituted by the respondents under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The appeal concerned civil matters arising from a tenancy of shop premises situated in Solan Bazar, district of Mahasu, Himachal Pradesh. The appellants were tenants of the premises and, on 11 October 1947, they executed a rent deed whereby they agreed to pay an annual rent of Rs 175. Under the deed, Rs 50 was to be paid on the last day of Baisakh and the remaining Rs 125 was to be paid in the month of October; failure to make the October payment would entitle the landlords, the respondents, to recover the entire rent in a single lump sum. The tenancy created by the deed was initially for one year, with a provision that the tenants could continue in occupation only if they executed a further rent deed before the expiration of that term. The appellants never executed a subsequent rent deed but nonetheless remained in possession of the premises after the first year elapsed.

The appellants fell into arrears for the years 1948 and 1949. Consequently, the respondents applied to the Rent Controller for eviction of the appellants under section 13 (2)(i) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, as extended to Himachal Pradesh. The appellants, however, paid the outstanding rent into court and invoked the proviso to section 13 (2)(i). The Rent Controller allowed this claim and dismissed the eviction applications on 18 December 1950. Later, the appellants again fell into arrears for the rent due for the year 1950. On 26 December 1950 the respondents served a notice requiring the appellants to pay the entire rent immediately, but the appellants failed to comply. Accordingly, on 2 January 1951 the respondents filed another eviction application under section 13 (2)(i) on the ground of non-payment of rent.

Subsequently, on 10 January 1951 the appellants filed an application before the Rent Controller seeking fixation of a fair rent under section 4 of the same Act. On 25 January 1951 the appellants filed their written statements in the eviction proceedings, admitting non-payment of rent and receipt of the notice, but contending that (i) the respondents’ present application was barred by the earlier dismissal of their eviction applications and (ii) the pending application for fixation of a fair rent should preclude any order of ejectment. The procedural history, the tenancy terms, the sequence of arrears, the applications for eviction, the payment of arrears, and the appellant’s subsequent request for a fair-rent determination formed the factual matrix on which the Court based its judgment.

The appellants admitted that they had not paid the rent for the year 1950 and that they had received the notice issued by the respondents, but they raised two defenses. First, they argued that the respondents’ present eviction application was barred because earlier applications for eviction had been rejected by the respondents. Second, they contended that the present application could not be heard while their own application for the fixation of a fair rent under section 4 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act was still pending. On 20 February 1951, the Rent Controller framed three issues for determination. The first issue asked whether the present application was inadmissible in view of the District Judge’s judgment dated 18 December 1950, placing the burden on the defendants. The second issue, if the first was not proved, asked whether the tenants, having failed to pay the rent, were liable to be evicted, placing the burden on the plaintiffs. The third issue asked whether the tenants, having already applied to the court for the fixation of rent, were therefore exempt from eviction pending the decision on that application and what effect that pending application would have, again placing the burden on the defendants. By his judgment dated 29 May 1951, the Rent Controller held that the earlier eviction applications concerned non-payment of rent for 1948 and 1949, and therefore the present application based on non-payment of rent for 1950 was not barred by section 14 of the Act. Although the appellants admitted that rent was in arrears, the Rent Controller declined to order the respondents to take possession of the premises. He explained that when the tenant’s only defence was that he was awaiting the determination of a fair rent, there was insufficient ground for eviction and that a civil suit for recovery of rent would have been a more appropriate remedy, and therefore he dismissed the eviction suit. The respondents subsequently filed an appeal to the District Judge of Mahasu under section 15 of the Act. The District Judge dismissed the appeal, observing that under section 13(2) of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, as applied to Himachal Pradesh, the Controller must direct the tenant to surrender possession to the landlord when rent is not paid, but that in the present case the non-payment arose from a misunderstanding caused by the tenant’s own application for fair rent fixation, and consequently the case was distinguishable and did not fall within section 13(2). The respondents then moved the Judicial Commissioner of Himachal Pradesh under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, seeking to set aside the District Judge’s order.

In this matter, the Judicial Commissioner of Himachal Pradesh found that the rent had been admitted as unpaid under the rent deed and that, according to the proviso to section 13 (2), the lower courts had acted arbitrarily by refusing to issue an ejectment order against tenants who had failed to fulfil their legal duty to pay rent. The Commissioner considered that such arbitrariness required his intervention to keep the subordinate courts within the limits of their authority. Consequently, he set aside the orders of the lower courts, allowed the application for ejectment and directed that the appellants be given three months within which to vacate the premises. The appellants subsequently approached this Court on appeal, having obtained special leave to file the appeal. Counsel supporting the appeal argued that the Judicial Commissioner had acted without jurisdiction for two reasons. First, the counsel submitted that the Rent Controller and the District Judge exercising powers under the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, as applied to Himachal Pradesh, were not subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court; therefore, article 227 of the Constitution gave no power to the Judicial Commissioner over those authorities. Second, the counsel contended that, when read together with article 241, article 227 did not confer any power of judicial superintendence on the Judicial Commissioner. In response, the Court noted that the Judicial Commissioner of Himachal Pradesh exercised jurisdiction over the entire territory of the State, and that both the Rent Controller and the District Judge were tribunals (if not courts) operating within that territory. Accordingly, article 297 (1) read with article 241 did confer on the Judicial Commissioner the power of superintendence over such tribunals, and the phrase “in relation to which” qualified the word “territories” rather than “courts and tribunals”. The Court further observed that the substantive part of article 227 closely reproduced section 107 of the Government of India Act 1915, differing only in that the constitutional provision expressly extended the power of superintendence to tribunals. While it was undisputed that the Rent Controller and the District Judge were tribunals, the remaining question concerned the nature of the superintendence power granted by article 227. The appellant’s reliance on clause (2) of article 227, which purported to limit the power to administrative superintendence, was rejected because clause (2) was expressed as without prejudice to the generality of clause (1). Moreover, the prevailing judicial opinion in India held that section 107, which was analogous to section 15 of the High Courts Act 1861, conferred a distinct power of judicial superintendence on the High Court, independent of other statutory provisions.

In this case the Court noted that the authority for revisional jurisdiction of the High Court originated in section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915, which was later reproduced in the Government of India Act, 1935 as section 224. Section 224 of the 1935 Act introduced a new sub-section (2) that expressly declared that nothing in that section should be interpreted as granting the High Court jurisdiction to question any judgment of an inferior court that was not already subject to appeal or revision. The purpose of that provision appears to have been to nullify the effect of earlier decisions of various High Courts on the same point. The Court further observed that article 227 of the Constitution incorporates section 224 of the 1935 Act with certain modifications, but omits sub-section (2). This omission has been treated by every High Court that has considered the question as a restoration of the judicial superintendence power that the High Court possessed under section 15 of the High Courts Act, 1861, and under section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915, as indicated in the authorities cited, for example Moti Lal v. The State through Shrimati Sagrawati (I.L.R. 1952 1 All. 558 at p. 567). The Court stated that it is not aware of any decision taking a contrary view and therefore sees no reason to depart from the established interpretation. The power of superintendence conferred by article 227, the Court explained, must be exercised only sparingly and in appropriate cases so as to keep subordinate courts within the limits of their authority and not merely to correct trivial errors, a principle highlighted by Justice Harries C. J. in Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee (A.I.R. 1951 Cal. 193). The Court agreed with the Judicial Commissioner that the lower courts had acted arbitrarily by refusing to grant an order for ejectment. Although the lower courts understood the legal position, they declined to perform the duty imposed by section 13 (2) (i), thereby refusing to exercise the jurisdiction vested in them by law. Consequently, the matter warranted interference by the Judicial Commissioner, who acted appropriately. The Court concluded that there was no basis for interfering with the Judicial Commissioner’s decision on the basis of a special leave appeal under article 136. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed with costs. Counsel for the appellants was identified, and counsel for the respondent was identified.