The Edward Mills Co. Ltd., Beawar, And... vs The State Of Ajmer And Another

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeals Nos. 138 and 139 of 1954

Decision Date: 14 October 1954

Coram: B.K. Mukherjea, Mehar Chand Mahajan, Vivian Bose, B. Jagannadhadas

The case is titled The Edward Mills Co. Ltd., Beawar, and others versus the State of Ajmer and another. In this case the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 14 October 1954. The petition was filed by The Edward Mills Co. Ltd., Beawar, together with other parties, against the State of Ajmer and an additional respondent. The opinion was authored by Justice B.K. Mukherjea and the bench was composed of Justice B.K. Mukherjea, Justice Mehar Chand Mahajan, Justice Vivian Bose and Justice B. Jagannadhadas. The decision is reported in the 1955 Annual Report of Indian Reports at page 25 and also appears in the 1955 Supreme Court Reporter, volume one, page 735. The judgment is cited as 1955 AIR 25 and 1955 SCR (1) 735 and is referenced in subsequent reports including R 1960 SC 424, RF 1961 SC 4 (5,25), RF 1961 SC 298 (12), F 1962 SC 12 (11), RF 1962 SC 97 (6) and R 1964 SC 648 (17,4). Further citations include R 1964 SC 980 (8), R 1964 SC1260 (6), RF 1966 SC1788 (38), RF 1967 SC 669 (29), RF 1967 SC 691 (66), R 1970 SC2042 (10), R 1974 SC1044 (6), E 1980 SC 350 (5), RF 1982 SC 149 (803), D 1986 SC 872 (110) and R 1990 SC 560 (13).

The principal question before the Court concerned the interpretation of the phrase ‘law in force’ in Article 372 of the Constitution of India. The Court examined whether the expression covered only statutes or also extended to regulations or orders possessing the force of law. In particular the Court considered an order made under section 94(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, which conferred upon the Chief Commissioner the authority to administer a province. The Court held that such an order was essentially a legislative provision because it defined the rights and powers of the Chief Commissioner with respect to that province. Accordingly the order fell within the meaning of ‘law in force’ under Article 372 and therefore continued to operate at the moment the Constitution came into force. The order would cease to apply only if it was adapted pursuant to clause (1) of the same article. The Court observed that the order could be adapted so as to bring it into conformity with the constitutional scheme, and that this adaptation had been effected by the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950. In the Court’s view an order originally issued under section 94(3) of the 1935 Act should now be treated as an order issued under Article 239 of the Constitution. The President, acting under clause (2) of Article 372, possessed the competence to make the adaptation order, and the adaptation therefore derived its authority from the constitutional provision.

In this case, the Court explained that under section 27 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, the “appropriate Government” was authorised to add any employment to either part of the schedule whenever it considered that minimum wages should be fixed by issuing a notification in the prescribed manner, and that such addition would be treated as an amendment of the scheme as it applied to the State. The Court observed that the provision in section 27 implied a limited delegation, because the Legislature, in effect, permitted a body it identified to perform a function that the Legislature itself could perform. However, the Court held that this delegation was neither unwarranted nor unconstitutional and that it remained within the permissible limits of legislative delegation. The legislative intent, the Court said, was clear from the text of the Act: the purpose was to fix minimum wages by law so as to prevent the exploitation of labour. Accordingly, the power given to the appropriate Government was intended to enable it to consider local conditions and to decide whether it was desirable to fix minimum wages for a trade or industry not already listed. The Court therefore concluded that by enacting section 27 the Legislature had not surrendered its essential powers nor transferred a core function to the administration; rather, it had granted an auxiliary or subordinate power necessary to achieve the Act’s objectives. Turning to the rules made under section 30, the Court noted that Rule 3 empowered the State Government to determine the term of the committee appointed under section 5 and to extend that term as circumstances required. The original term had expired and was later extended, but the committee failed to function and did not submit any report during the extended period. The Court assumed that an order extending a dead committee could not revive it, so a new committee could be deemed to have been constituted, and any report it submitted would be a valid report. Moreover, the Court emphasized that the committee was merely an advisory body and that procedural irregularities of this nature could not invalidate the final report fixing the minimum wages. The Court referred to the authorities Baxter v. Ah Way (8 C.L.R. 626) and Reg. v. Burah (3 App. Cas. 889). The judgment proceeded under the civil appellate jurisdiction for Civil Appeals Nos. 138 and 139 of 1954, filed under articles 132 and 133 of the Constitution of India, appealing the order dated 16 February 1953 of the Judicial Commissioner of Ajmer in Civil Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 260 and 263 of 1952. Counsel for the appellants represented the first two appellants in Civil Appeal No. 138 of 1954 (Edward Mills and Krishna Mills), while counsel for the third appellant appeared in Civil Appeal No. 139 of 1954.

In this case, counsel for the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 138 of 1954, known as Mahalaxmi Mills, were assisted by senior advocates, while counsel for the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 139 of 1954 were similarly represented by a team of advocates. The Union of India, identified as respondent No. 2, was defended by the Solicitor-General of India together with two junior counsel. The judgment was pronounced on 14 October 1954 by Justice Mukherjea. Both appeals challenged a single order dated 16 February 1953 issued by the Judicial Commissioner of Ajmer. That order arose from two analogous petitions filed under article 226 of the Constitution; in the first petition the petitioners were the parties who later became the appellants in Appeal No. 138, and in the second petition the petitioner corresponded to the appellant in Appeal No. 139.

The petitioners in each proceeding sought a declaration that the notification dated 7 October 1952, issued by the State Government of Ajmer and fixing the minimum rates of wages for employment in the textile industry within the State under the Minimum Wages Act (Act XI of 1948), was illegal and beyond the authority of the State Government. They also prayed for writs of mandamus directing the respondents not to enforce the contested notification against them. To understand the arguments presented, the Court found it helpful to set out the material facts in chronological order.

On 15 March 1948, the Central Legislature enacted the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, whose preamble declared the purpose of fixing minimum rates of wages for certain employments. The Act’s schedule, divided into two parts, listed the employments for which minimum wages could be fixed. Section 27 empowered the “appropriate Government” to add any other employment to either part of the schedule, provided that a three-month notice of intention was given. The term “appropriate Government”, as defined in section 2(b), refers, for any scheduled employment not carried out by the Central Government, to the State Government concerned. Under section 3, the appropriate Government was required to fix the minimum wages payable to workers employed in any employment specified in the schedule at the commencement of the Act or subsequently added pursuant to section 27. Sub-section (1)(a) of that provision allowed the appropriate Government to refrain from fixing minimum rates where, throughout the State, fewer than one thousand persons were engaged in the particular employment.

Section 5 laid down the procedure for fixing minimum wages. It authorised the appropriate Government either to appoint a committee to conduct enquiries and advise on the matter of fixing wages, or, alternatively, to publish its proposals by notification in the official gazette for the information of persons likely to be affected. After considering the committee’s advice or the representations received on the proposals, the appropriate Government would then fix the minimum rates by a further notification in the official gazette, with the rates generally coming into force after a three-month period unless the notification indicated otherwise.

In accordance with the provisions of the Act, after publishing its proposals in the official gazette for the information of persons likely to be affected, the appropriate Government must consider either the advice of the advisory committee or any representations made on those proposals, as the situation requires. Following that consideration, the appropriate Government fixes the minimum rates of wages for any scheduled employment by issuing a notification in the official gazette; the rates thus fixed become effective three months after the date of the notification unless the notification itself specifies a different commencement date. Section 9 of the Act, inter alia, stipulates that an advisory committee formed under section 5 shall consist of persons nominated by the appropriate Government. The committee must contain an equal number of representatives of employers and employees in the scheduled employment, and may also include independent members, who shall not exceed one-third of the total membership; one of the independent members must be appointed as Chairman. Section 30 confers on the appropriate Government the authority to make rules for the implementation of the purposes of the Act. It is relevant to note that when the Act was originally enacted, Part I of the schedule listed only twelve items of employment and did not include employment in the textile industry. On 16 March 1949, the Central Government, exercising its powers under section 94(3) of the Government of India Act 1935, issued a notification directing that, for each Chief Commissioner’s Province, the functions of the “appropriate Government” under the Minimum Wages Act would be performed by the Chief Commissioner. Subsequently, on 17 March 1950, the Chief Commissioner of Ajmer, acting as the “appropriate Government” of the State, published a notification under section 27 of the Act giving three months’ notice of his intention to add employment in textile mills as a new item in Part I of the schedule. The final notification was issued on 10 October 1950, confirming that employment in the textile industry was to be included in Part I of the schedule. A further notification dated 23 November 1950, signed by the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, contained rules purportedly framed by the Chief Commissioner under the authority conferred by section 30 of the Act. Among those rules, only Rules 3, 8 and 9 are material to the present case. Rule 3 provides that the term of office of members of an advisory committee shall be, in the opinion of the State Government, the duration necessary to complete the enquiry into the scheduled employment concerned; the State Government may fix such a term at the time of constituting the committee and may, as circumstances require, extend it from time to time. Rule 8 deals with the procedure for filling vacancies that arise or are likely to arise in the membership of the committee due to the resignation of any member. Rule 9, which is introduced at the conclusion of the passage, sets out further provisions governing the composition and operation of the advisory committee.

The rule provided that a member of the advisory committee would lose his membership if he failed to attend three consecutive meetings. The same rule allowed such a member, should he wish, to apply within a prescribed period for restoration of his membership; restoration could be granted if a majority of the members were satisfied that adequate reasons existed for his non-attendance. On 17 January 1952 a committee was constituted to conduct enquiries and advise the Chief Commissioner on fixing minimum wages for the textile industry in the State. The committee comprised ten members: four representatives of employers, four representatives of employees, and two independent members. Shri Annigeri was appointed as the expert member and Dr Bagchi as the Chairman. The term of office for all members was fixed at six months, commencing from the date of the notification and expiring on 16 July 1952. The committee held its first meeting on 29 February 1952, at which Shri Annigeri was present and the members resolved that minimum wages should not merely secure bare subsistence but must also be sufficient to maintain the worker’s efficiency. Subsequent meetings were held on 29 March 1952 and on 14 June 1952; Shri Annigeri attended only the inaugural meeting. On 27 May 1952 he wrote to the Chief Commissioner informing that he would travel to Europe on 3 June 1952 for three months and that he would be willing to assist the Chairman in preparing the report after his return in the first week of September, provided the committee’s term was extended. He further requested that, if extension were impossible, his letter be treated as a resignation. No action was recorded in response to this letter, and the committee continued with meetings on 8 July 1952 and 15 July 1952.

On 20 August 1952 the Chairman of the committee reported to the Chief Commissioner that Shri Annigeri had ceased to be a member by virtue of his failure to attend three consecutive meetings and that he had also requested his 27 May 1952 letter to be treated as a resignation. The Chairman asked the Chief Commissioner to fill the resulting vacancy. The very next day, on 21 August 1952, the Chief Commissioner issued a notification extending the term of the committee up to 20 September 1952. Subsequently, on 28 August 1952 further action was taken, as recorded in the next notification, to address the membership vacancy.

Subsequently, a further notification was issued which appointed Shri Annigeri as a member of the Committee. By means of another notice, the term of the Committee was subsequently extended to run until 5 October 1952. During the interval, the Committee assembled on 10 September 1952; Shri Annigeri was absent from that meeting. The sole resolution adopted at that gathering directed that all papers relevant to the Committee’s work should be sent to Shri Annigeri, in accordance with his request. It later transpired that, sometime after 14 September 1952, the Chairman personally delivered those papers to Nagpur, where Shri Annigeri was residing. There, in consultation with the expert member of the Committee, the Chairman prepared a draft final report, and both the Chairman and the expert member signed the report at Nagpur. The signed report was subsequently placed before the remaining Committee members on 4 October 1952. On 7 October 1952, a notification was issued fixing minimum wage rates for employees engaged in the textile industry of the State of Ajmer; the notification bore the signature of the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner and declared that the rates were to be deemed effective from 1 September 1952. Aggrieved by that notification, the three appellants in Appeal No. 138 of 1954 filed an application under article 226 of the Constitution with the Judicial Commissioner of Ajmer on 31 October 1952, seeking a writ of mandamus directing the State of Ajmer not to enforce the wage rates. A similar application was filed by Bijay Cotton Mills, the appellant in the other appeal, on 6 November 1952. The two petitions were heard together, and on 16 February 1953 the Judicial Commissioner delivered a common judgment. While both applications were dismissed, the Commissioner held that the Chief Commissioner had exceeded his legal authority by giving retrospective effect to the 7 October 1952 notification; consequently, the State of Ajmer was restrained from enforcing that notification for any date prior to 8 January 1953. The two present appeals arise against that judgment, each supported by certificates issued by the Judicial Commissioner, Ajmer. Counsel for the appellants in Appeal No. 138, identified only as a representative for the three petitioners, advanced a three-fold contention. First, he argued that, absent a delegation of authority from the President under article 239 of the Constitution, the Chief Commissioner of Ajmer could not act as the “appropriate Government’’ for purposes of the Minimum Wages Act, rendering every step taken by the Commissioner—including the issuance of the final notification on 7 October 1952—ultra-vires and illegal. Second, he contended that section 27 of the Act itself was ultra-vires, because it constituted an unlawful and unconstitutional delegation of legislative power by the legislature in favour of the “appropriate Government.”

The third and final contention asserted that the Chief Commissioner had no authority to extend retrospectively the term of the Advisory Committee after that committee’s expiry on 16 July 1952. Mr Seervai, appearing for the other appeal, embraced all of the arguments previously raised on behalf of his client. In addition, he advanced further points challenging the constitutional validity of the Minimum Wages Act on the ground that its provisions conflicted with the fundamental rights of the appellants and their employees guaranteed by article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. He set out these additional challenges in detail while arguing the two petitions filed on behalf of Bijay Cotton Mills Ltd and a number of its employees under article 32 of the Constitution, and the Court indicated that those points would be examined when dealing with those petitions. The Court then stated that it would now proceed to consider the three issues that had been raised in support of the appeals. With respect to the first issue, the argument advanced by counsel for the appellants contended that the expression “appropriate Government” as used in section 2(b)(ii) of the Minimum Wages Act is defined to refer, for any scheduled employment not carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government, to the State Government. The term “State Government” is defined in section 3(60) of the General Clauses Act to mean, with respect to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution in a Part C State, the Central Government. Prior to the commencement of the Constitution, section 94(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935 permitted a chief commissioner’s province to be administered by the Governor-General, acting as he thought fit, through a Chief Commissioner appointed at his discretion. Moreover, section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, as it stood before 26 January 1950, provided that the phrase “Central Government” included, in the case of a chief commissioner’s province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of authority conferred by section 94(3) of the 1935 Act. Article 239 of the Constitution, which corresponds to section 94(3) of the Government of India Act but is broader in scope, provides that a State listed in Part C of the First Schedule shall be administered by the President, to the extent he deems appropriate, through a Chief Commissioner or a Lieutenant Governor appointed by him, or through the Government of a neighbouring State. In accordance with this constitutional provision, section 3(8)(b)(ii) of the General Clauses Act, as amended by the Adaptation Laws Order 1950, states that the term “Central Government” shall also include, inter alia, the Chief Commissioner of a Part C State exercising authority granted under article 239 of the Constitution. It is undisputed that Ajmer was a

The territory that had been designated as a Chief Commissioner’s Province under section 94(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935, was transformed into a Part C State when the Constitution came into force. The Central Government, by a notification dated 16 March 1949 and issued under section 94(3) of the Government of India Act, had stated that the responsibilities of the “appropriate Government” under the Minimum Wages Act, as they applied to any Chief Commissioner’s Province, were to be performed by the Chief Commissioner. After the Constitution became operative, no comparable delegation of authority was made under article 239 of the Constitution.

Mr Chatterjee argued that, because article 239 did not transfer such authority, the Chief Commissioner of Ajmer could not be treated as “Central Government” within the meaning of section 3(8)(b)(ii) of the General Clauses Act as presently applicable, and therefore could not be considered the “appropriate Government” contemplated by section 2(b)(ii) of the Minimum Wages Act. He further contended that the Government of India Act had been repealed by article 395 of the Constitution, so an order issued under section 94(3) of that Act could not remain operative after the Constitution’s commencement, nor could it be viewed as an order made under article 239. The Court found this line of reasoning unconvincing. In its view, a full answer to the argument was provided by clauses (1) and (2) of article 372 of the Constitution. Article 372 states:

“(1) Notwithstanding the repeal by this Constitution of the enactments referred to in article 395 but subject to the other provisions of this Constitution, all the law in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall continue in force therein until altered or repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or other competent authority. (2) For the purpose of bringing the provisions of any law in force in the territory of India into accord with the provisions of this Constitution, the President may by order make such adaptations and modifications of such law, whether by way of repeal or amendment, as may be necessary or expedient, and provide that the law shall, as from such date as may be specified in the order, have effect subject to the adaptations and modifications so made, and any such adaptation or modification shall not be questioned in any court of law.”

Clause (1) therefore ensures that existing laws continue to operate despite the constitutional repeal of the statutes listed in article 395, while clause (2) empowers the President to adapt or amend those laws so that they conform to constitutional requirements. Although the Government of India Act, 1935, was indeed repealed by article 395, the statutes and orders promulgated under it that were in force immediately before the Constitution’s commencement remained effective under article 372(1) and could be adapted pursuant to article 372(2).

In this case the Court examined the relevance of article 372 of the Constitution to an order issued by the Central Government under section 94(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935. Counsel for the petitioner, Mr Chatterjee, contended that article 372 did not apply because the order could not be described as “a law in force” within the meaning of that article. He sought to differentiate an “existing law” as defined in article 366(10) from a “law in force,” arguing that while an order might qualify as an existing law, it could not be classified as a law in force. Further, he maintained that even if the term “law” were interpreted broadly enough to include an order, the order would have to be legislative rather than merely an executive directive issued by an administrative authority. To support this view, he cited several decisions of the Privy Council and various Indian High Courts. The Court did not find this first argument persuasive and held that there was no substantial distinction between “an existing law” and “a law in force.” Beyond article 366(10), the Court noted that section 3(29) of the General Clauses Act defined “Indian law” to encompass any act, ordinance, regulation, rule, order or bye-law that had the force of law in any province of India before the Constitution commenced. Consequently, the Court concluded that the phrase “law in force” in article 372 was sufficiently wide to cover not only legislative enactments but also any regulation or order possessing legal force. While agreeing with Mr Chatterjee that a legislative order, rather than a purely executive one, must fall within the definition of law, the Court disagreed with his characterization of the order made by the Governor-General under section 94(3) as a mere executive order. The Court explained that Part IV of the Government of India Act, beginning with section 94, dealt with the administration of Chief Commissioner’s provinces, and sub-section (3) authorized the Governor-General, acting through a Chief Commissioner, to administer such provinces as he deemed appropriate. An order issued under this provision, which vested the Chief Commissioner with authority to govern a province, was therefore legislative in nature because it defined the rights and powers of the Chief Commissioner concerning that province. In the Court’s view, this order fell within the scope of article 372 and, being a “law in force” immediately before the Constitution’s commencement, continued to operate under clause (1) of that article. Accordingly, the order was also capable of adaptation under clause (2) of article 372, a step later effected by the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950.

The Court observed that the order issued under section 94(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, could be brought into conformity with the Constitution by invoking clause 2 of article 372. That purpose had been fulfilled through the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950. The Court reproduced paragraph 26 of that Order, which stated: “Where any rule, order or other instrument was in force under any provision of the Government of India Act, 1935, or under any Act amending or supplementing that act, immediately before the appointed day, and such provision is re-enacted with or without modifications in the Constitution, the said rule, order or instrument shall, so far as applicable, remain in force with the necessary modifications as from the appointed day as if it were a rule, order or instrument of the appropriate kind duly made by the appropriate authority under the said provision of the Constitution, and may be varied or revoked accordingly.” Accordingly, the Court held that the former order under section 94(3) should now be regarded as an order made under article 239 of the Constitution. It therefore disagreed with the submission of counsel for the petitioner, Mr Chatterjee, that the President had exceeded his authority under clause 2 of article 372 in making the adaptation order. The Court concluded that the first contention raised by Mr Chatterjee could not be sustained.

Turning to the second matter, counsel for the petitioner, Mr Chatterjee, argued that the preamble and the title of the Minimum Wages Act clearly revealed a legislative intention to fix minimum wages only for the employments listed in the Schedule and not for every possible employment. He emphasized that the Schedule enumerated specific employments and that the wages were to be fixed only with respect to those entries. However, the Court noted that section 27 of the Act granted the “appropriate Government” the power to add any employment to either part of the Schedule whenever it was of its opinion that a minimum wage ought to be fixed, provided that such addition was made by a notification in the prescribed manner. Upon such notification, the Schedule would, for the State concerned, be deemed to have been amended accordingly. Mr Chatterjee contended that the Act did not lay down any legislative policy or criteria for selecting employments to be included in the Schedule, nor did it prescribe any guiding principles or standards to assist the administrative authority in making such choices. He argued that the discretion left to the “appropriate Government” amounted to an unfettered power that effectively surrendered the essential legislative function of the Legislature, rendering the delegation invalid. The Court acknowledged that section 27 indeed implied a delegation of authority, as the Legislature, by its terms, authorized a specified body to perform a function that it itself could have performed.

The Court observed that, even if the term “delegation” could be applied, the power granted under the provision was not unwarranted nor unconstitutional in the facts before it. The Court cited the observation of Justice O’Connor of the High Court of Australia in Baxter v. Ah Way (1), where he explained that every legislature strives to anticipate future circumstances and to enact provisions in as general a form as possible, yet it is impossible to anticipate every specific case. Consequently, from early times and especially in contemporary legislation, statutes are often framed as conditional legislation, leaving to a designated authority the task of deciding the situations in which the law will operate, the extent of its operation, or the particular classes of persons or goods to which it will apply. The Court noted that the Australian case bore a striking factual similarity to the present matter. In that case the issue concerned the validity of certain provisions of the Customs Act of 1901, which prohibited the importation of expressly listed goods and authorised the Governor-General in Council, by proclamation (see 8 C.L.R. 626 at 637), to add other goods to the prohibited list. That statutory scheme was challenged on the ground that it amounted to an improper delegation of legislative power. The challenge was rejected, the Court holding that the scheme represented conditional legislation rather than an unlawful delegation, a view that had previously been endorsed by the Privy Council in Reg v. Burah (1). In Reg v. Burah the power left to the Lieutenant Governor was to apply the Act to certain territories, which were themselves identified in the Act, thereby showing that the legislature had contemplated the scope of application and left to the executive merely the timing of its operation. The High Court of Australia affirmed that the same principle applies when the executive is empowered to extend the law to additional persons or goods beyond those specifically mentioned. The Court emphasized that it was not essential to label the provision strictly as “conditional legislation”; the critical enquiry was whether the power exceeded the permissible limits of delegation. Justice O’Connor further observed that when a legislature grants itself plenary authority over a subject, it implicitly includes the power to enact incidental laws necessary for the effective exercise of that authority. The Court therefore concluded that the power in question fell within the scope of permissible legislative delegation.

The Court explained that a basic rule of constitutional law holds that every element required to exercise a delegated power is automatically included within the grant of that power. In other words, a Legislature may not abandon its core responsibilities and transfer them to a separate authority that is not part of the legislative process. The essential function of making law must remain with the Legislature, although it may delegate certain ancillary or subsidiary powers to aid in the execution of its purpose. Counsel for the petitioner, Mr Chatterjee, argued that the core legislative function consists of formulating a policy and converting that policy into a mandatory rule of conduct. He maintained that the Act did not contain any discernible legislative policy, and therefore there was no clear standard or criterion to direct the administrative authority when it exercised the subsidiary legislative powers conferred by the statute. The Court disagreed with that view. It observed that the legislative intent is evident from the language of the enactment itself. The statute was designed to establish a statutory floor for minimum wages so as to prevent the exploitation of labor. The Legislature clearly intended the Act to apply not to every industry indiscriminately, but only to those sectors where labor was unorganized, where there were no effective mechanisms for wage regulation, or where wages were demonstrably low. To identify such sectors, the Act includes a schedule of trades, but the schedule is expressly not exhaustive. The legislative policy, as the Court read it, was to avoid fixing a permanent, all-encompassing list of industries; instead, it recognized that labor conditions differ across circumstances and among the States. Accordingly, determining whether a particular trade or industry not already listed should be brought within the scope of the Act depends on a variety of facts that are not uniform and are best assessed by the authority responsible for administering the law in each State. For this reason, the statute confers on the “appropriate Government” the power to decide, taking local conditions into account, whether it is expedient to fix minimum wages for a trade or industry that is not presently included in the schedule. The Court concluded that by enacting section 27 the Legislature did not relinquish any of its essential powers, nor did it transfer any substantive authority to the administrative body; the power given to the government is merely an accessory or subordinate one, intended to further the purpose and policy of the Act. Consequently, the second contention raised by Mr Chatterjee could not be sustained.

The third and final point advanced by Mr Chatterjee concerned a notification issued by the Chief Commissioner that extended the term of the Advisory Committee until 20 September 1952. He argued that the original term of the committee, as fixed in the initial instrument, had expired on 16 July 1952, and that from 17 July onward the members of the committee became functus officio. On that basis, he contended that the Commissioner lacked the authority to revive a committee that had already ceased to exist. The Court noted this argument but indicated that it found little merit in it, as the issue would be addressed in the subsequent discussion of the relevant statutory rules.

The Court noted that the original term of the committee was prescribed to end on the sixteenth day of July 1952 and that, from the seventeenth day of July 1952, every member of the committee became functus officio. Consequently, the Court held that the Commissioner did not possess authority to grant a fresh lease of life to a committee that had already ceased to exist. The Court expressed the view that this contention was of little substance. It then examined Rule 3 of the rules framed under section 30 of the Act, which expressly provides that the State Government may fix the term of the committee at the time of its constitution and may, from time to time, extend that term as circumstances require. Accordingly, the State Government possessed the right to extend the committee’s term in whatever manner it deemed appropriate. The only question, the Court said, was whether such an extension could be effected after the originally fixed period had expired. Counsel for the petitioner relied upon certain authorities in which the Court was held unable to extend time in an arbitration proceeding after an award had been filed, holding that an award made after the prescribed period was a nullity. The Court considered that analogy inapplicable to the present appeals. It further observed that it was not contested that the committee performed no functions and produced no work after the sixteenth day of July 1952 and before the twenty-first day of August 1952, when its term was extended. No report had been submitted during that interval, nor was any extension of time granted after a report was filed. Assuming that the order dated twenty-first August 1952 could not revive a committee that was already dead, the Court held that a new committee could be deemed to have been constituted on that date, and that any report submitted by such a newly constituted committee would be a perfectly valid report. Moreover, the Court pointed out that a committee appointed under section 5 of the Act functions only as an advisory body and that the Government is not bound to accept any of its recommendations. Therefore, procedural irregularities of this nature could not invalidate the final report that fixed the minimum wages. In conclusion, the Court found that neither of the contentions raised in support of the appeals could succeed, and consequently both appeals were dismissed with costs.