Tahir Hussain vs District Board Muzaffarnagar
Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.
Court: Supreme Court of India
Case Number: Writ Petition (civil) 26 of 1953
Decision Date: 25 January 1954
Coram: M.C. Mahajan, B.K. Mukherjea, S.R. Das, V. Bose, Ghulam Hasan
In the writ petition numbered 26 of 1953, filed under Article 32 of the Constitution, the petitioner, Tahir Hussain, challenged the constitutional validity of Bye-law No 2 issued by the District Board of Muzaffarnagar, Uttar Pradesh. The petition alleged that the bye-law exceeded the powers conferred on the Board by Section 174(2)(1) of the United Provinces District Board Act X of 1922 and that it infringed the petitioner’s fundamental right to practice a trade or business under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The case was heard by a Bench consisting of Chief Justice M. C. Mahajan, Justice B. K. Mukherjee, Justice S. R. Das, Justice V. Bose and Justice Ghulam Hasan, and the judgment was delivered by Justice Ghulam Hasan. The Court was called upon to determine whether the prohibition contained in the bye-law was ultra vires the statutory authority of the District Board and whether it violated the petitioner’s right to carry on his cattle-market business.
The petitioner was a tenant of a parcel of land situated in the village of Banat in the Muzaffarnagar district. He owned a tract measuring thirty-five bighas adjacent to the village and, on a weekly basis, conducted a cattle market, locally known as a “painth,” on that land every Wednesday. In operating the market, he collected a modest commission on each sale and asserted that, in consideration of this commission, he looked after the comfort and convenience of the public who attended the market. The District Board of Muzaffarnagar, however, owned no land in Banat and did not operate any market in that locality. According to the petitioner, the Board served a notice to him and his partner directing them not to hold the market and requiring them to show cause why they should not be prosecuted. The notice was issued under Bye-law No 2, which stated that “No person shall establish or maintain or run any cattle market in the District within the jurisdiction of the Board.” The petitioner contended that this provision was beyond the Board’s authority and that it interfered with his protected right to engage in his trade. Section 174 of the Uttar Pradesh District Board Act 1922 governs the power of district boards to make bye-laws. Sub-section (1) provides that a board may, by a special resolution and, where required, with the sanction of the Provincial Government, make bye-laws applicable to the whole or any part of the rural area of the district, provided that such bye-laws are consistent with the Act and any relevant rule and are aimed at promoting or maintaining the health, safety and convenience of the inhabitants and at furthering the administration of the district. Sub-section 2(1) enumerates the subjects on which the board may legislate, including poor houses, orphanages, libraries, asylums, veterinary hospitals, markets, staging-houses, inspection houses, public parks and gardens, encamping grounds, sarais, paraos and other public institutions. These provisions demonstrate that the board’s power to make bye-laws is limited to matters that serve the health, safety or convenience of the community and that any regulation of markets must fall within that defined scope.
The Court explained that the authority to make bye-laws under the Act must be exercised solely for the purpose of promoting or maintaining the health, safety and convenience of the inhabitants of the area within the Board’s jurisdiction, and that this authority expressly includes the power to regulate markets as provided in sub-section 2(1). The bye-law that the District Board enacted was not a rule intended to regulate the market in the ordinary sense; rather, it was devised to prevent the petitioner from holding a market altogether. In the face of the language of section 174, such a bye-law exceeded the Board’s jurisdiction. Moreover, the bye-law and the order made under it infringed the petitioner’s fundamental right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, which protects the right to carry on any trade, business, or profession, by effectively barring him from conducting his market business.
The Court then considered a comparable set of bye-laws previously made by the Municipal Board of Kairana. Those bye-laws stipulated that no person could establish any new market or place for wholesale vegetable transactions without obtaining prior permission from the Board, and another provision granted a monopoly to a contractor for wholesale vegetable dealings at a designated market. The monopoly was awarded to the highest bidder, and the market location was fixed by the Board. When an individual who had been engaged in wholesale vegetable trade before the enactment of those bye-laws applied for a licence to continue his business at his shop, his application was rejected and he was prosecuted for violating the bye-laws. The Court upheld the aggrieved person’s fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) and held that, because the bye-laws contained no provision authorising the issue of licences, the prohibition they imposed became absolute. By attempting to create a monopoly, the Municipal Board placed the power to grant a licence beyond its authority, rendering the restrictions unreasonable within the meaning of Article 19(1)(g). Consequently, the bye-laws were declared void, as affirmed in Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kairana, 1950 AIR(SC) 163 (A).
Applying this reasoning, the Court held that Bye-law No. 2 was invalid because it conflicted with the petitioner’s fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g). The order issued under that bye-law could not be sustained. Accordingly, the Court set aside the bye-law and the order, granting costs to the petitioner against the respondent.