T. C. Basappa vs T. Nagappa And Another

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 48 of 1954

Decision Date: 5 May, 1954

Coram: B.K. Mukherjea, Mehar Chand Mahajan, Vivian Bose, Natwarlal H. Bhagwati

In the matter titled T. C. Basappa versus T. Nagappa and another, the judgment was delivered on 5 May 1954 by the Supreme Court of India. The opinion was authored by Justice B. K. Mukherjea and the bench was composed of Justices B. K. Mukherjea, Mehar Chand Mahajan, Vivian Bose, and Natwarlal H. Bhagwati. The petitioner was identified as T. C. Basappa and the respondents were T. Nagappa and another individual. The decision was recorded on 5 May 1954 and the bench list also appears as Mukherjea, B. K., Aiyyār, T. L., Venkatarama Mahan J., Mehar Chand (Chief Justice), Bose, Vivian, Bhagwati, and Natwaral H. The case is cited as 1954 AIR 440 and 1955 SCR 250, and it has been referenced in numerous subsequent reports, including R 1955 SC 233, R 1955 SC 756, R 1957 SC 804, R 1958 SC 398, F 1958 SC 845, R 1959 SC 725, R 1960 SC 321, R 1962 SC 1621, F 1966 SC 81, RF 1967 SC 1, RF 1970 SC 1334, R 1973 SC 2684, R 1981 SC 789, F 1990 SC 487, and RF 1992 SC 435. The relevant statutory provision mentioned was Article 226 of the Constitution of India, concerning the issuance of certiorari and related general principles.

The headnote explained that prerogative writs such as habeas corpus, mandamus, quo‑warrant‑to, prohibition, and certiorari originated in England under the Crown’s power to supervise the lawful conduct of its officials and tribunals. Under Articles 32 and 226 of the Indian Constitution, both the Supreme Court and the High Courts possessed very wide authority to issue orders or writs of certiorari in appropriate cases, provided that the fundamental English principles governing the exercise of such jurisdiction were observed. A writ of certiorari could be used only to test the validity of judicial acts; this term covered quasi‑judicial functions performed by administrative bodies or other persons required to act in a quasi‑judicial capacity, but it did not extend to purely ministerial actions. In granting certiorari, the superior court acted in a supervisory rather than an appellate role; it did not re‑examine evidence or replace the findings of the lower tribunal. Generally, certiorari was granted when a court acted without jurisdiction or beyond its jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction could arise from an improper subject‑matter, the absence of a required preliminary proceeding, a defect in the legal constitution of the court, or a disability caused by external circumstances. When jurisdiction depended on a collateral fact, the court could not assume jurisdiction by mistakenly deciding that fact. Moreover, certiorari was available where a competent tribunal, while conducting an inquiry, flagrantly ignored procedural rules or violated natural‑justice principles, even if no specific procedure was prescribed. A mere erroneous decision could not be corrected by certiorari, as that would convert the writ into an appeal in disguise; however, a manifest error evident on the face of the proceedings, based on clear ignorance or disregard of law, or an absence or excess of jurisdiction, could be remedied by the writ. The Court concluded that, considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, the High Court was not correct in holding that sufficient and proper grounds existed for issuing certiorari.

It was observed that when a tribunal’s jurisdiction depended on a collateral fact, the court could not claim jurisdiction through an erroneous finding of that fact that it would otherwise lack. A writ of certiorati was said to be available only in situations where a tribunal, although legally competent to conduct an inquiry, acted in blatant disregard of procedural rules or violated the principles of natural justice where no specific procedure was prescribed. A mere erroneous decision could not be corrected by a writ of certiorati, because that would amount to using the writ as a disguised appeal. However, a manifest error that was apparent on the face of the proceedings, based on a clear ignorance or disregard of legal provisions or on an absence of or excess of jurisdiction, could be corrected by such a writ. The court held that, given the facts and circumstances of the present case, the High Court was not correct in concluding that sufficient and proper grounds existed for the issue of a writ of certiorati. The judgment cited several authorities, including Ryots of Garabandho v. Zemindar of Parlakimedi (70 I.A. 129, 140); Election Commission of India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao ([1953] S.C.R. 1144, 1150); Rex v. Electricity Commissioners ([1924] 1 K.B. 171, 205); Walshall’s Overseers v. London and Northern Western Railway Co. (4 A.C. 30, 39); King v. Nat Bell Liquors Limited ([1922] 2 A.C. 128, 156); Banbury v. Fuller (9 Exch. 111); Queen v. Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income Tax (21 Q.B.D. 313); Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appellate Tribunal ([1952] 1 K.B. 338, 357); Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd. ([1952] S.C.R. 583, 594); and the reference work Halsbury, Vol. IX, 2nd edition, page 880.

The appeal concerned Civil Appeal No. 48 of 1954, filed against a judgment and order dated 11 January 1954 of the High Court of Judicature of Mysore in Civil Petition No. 29 of 1953. The High Court had set aside the order of the Shimoga Election Tribunal dated 15 January 1953 in Shimoga Election Case No. 1 of 1952‑53. Counsel for the appellant consisted of K. S. Krishnaswami Iyengar together with K. S. Venkataranga Iyengar and M. S. K. Iyengar. Counsel for respondent No. 1 comprised Dr. Bakshi Tek Chand with R. Ganapathy Iyer and M. S. K. Sastri. The Solicitor‑General for India, C. K. Daphtary, appeared for respondent No. 3, assisted by Jindra Lal, Porus A. Mehta and P. O. Gokhale. The judgment was delivered on 5 May 1954 by Justice M. U. K. Ergea. The appeal challenged a Division Bench order that had granted, on an application under article 226 of the Constitution filed by respondent No. 1, a writ of certiorati to quash the proceedings and order of the Shimoga Election Tribunal. The factual background, as outlined for the purposes of the appeal, involved the appellant, respondent No. 1, and eight other individuals who had been nominated as candidates for election to the Mysore Legislative Assembly from the Tarikere constituency in the State general election held in January 1952. Five of those nominated withdrew their candidature within the prescribed period, leaving a contest between the remaining five candidates, including the appellant and respondent No. 1. The polling occurred on 4 January 1952, and the votes were counted on 26 January 1952. Respondent No. 1 received 8,093 votes, the appellant received 8,059 votes, and the other three candidates obtained 6,239, 1,644 and 1,142 votes respectively. The Returning Officer declared respondent No. 1 elected, and the declaration was published in the Mysore Gazette on 11 February 1952. The subsequent proceedings formed the basis of the writ petition and the present appeal.

In the Tarikere Constituency election for the Mysore Legislative Assembly held in January 1952, the appellant, respondent No 1 and eight other individuals were originally nominated as candidates. Within the statutory period, five of those nominees withdrew, leaving five contestants—among them the appellant and respondent No 1—to compete for the seat. Polling was conducted on 4 January 1952, and the votes were tallied on 26 January. After the count, respondent No 1 received the highest total of 8,093 votes, while the appellant obtained a close 8,059 votes. The three remaining candidates, who later appeared before the High Court as respondents Nos 2, 3 and 4, secured respectively 6,239, 1,644 and 1,142 votes. The Returning Officer therefore declared respondent No 1 to be the successful candidate, and this declaration was published in the Mysore Gazette on 11 February 1952. Subsequent to the declaration, respondent No 1 lodged his return of election expenses together with the requisite declaration; the notice of this return appeared on 31 March 1952.

Displeased with the result, the appellant filed a petition with the Election Commission alleging that respondent No 1, either directly or through his agents, had committed several serious corrupt practices that materially influenced the outcome, and that certain election rules had been violated. The petition sought a declaration that the election of respondent No 1 was void and that the appellant should be recognized as the duly elected member. The petition, dated 10 April 1952, was sent by registered post and was actually received by the Commission on 14 April 1952. The Election Commission referred the matter to the Election Tribunal at Shimoga, where the hearing was scheduled for 25 October 1952.

On the day of the hearing, the appellant submitted an application for amendment of his petition under Order VI, Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code. The amendment requested that the prayer clause be altered to include a new prayer for declaring the entire election void, while also stipulating that, if that relief could not be granted, the original prayer would remain—that the election of respondent No 1 be set aside and the appellant be declared elected. Although respondent No 1 objected, the Tribunal permitted the amendment. The case then proceeded to full hearing; based on the parties’ submissions, the Tribunal framed twenty‑seven issues for determination. Of these, issues numbered 1, 5, 6, 11, 12 and 14 were identified as relevant to the present appeal.

Fourteen questions were identified as relevant to the matters before this Court. These questions were numbered and framed as follows: First, whether there was a breach of the regulations governing the time at which polling was to begin, specifically concerning Booth No. I at Ajjampur, which was scheduled to open at eight o’clock in the morning but, according to paragraph 4 of the petition, actually started about thirty minutes later. Second, whether the first respondent hired and procured a motor bus – a service bus that operated on the Tarikere‑Hiriyur route and was owned by a person named Ahmed Jan – as alleged in paragraph 1 of the particulars, thereby committing the corrupt practice described therein. Third, whether the first respondent obtained the assistance of several government servants to promote his chances of election, as alleged in paragraph 2 of the list of particulars. Fourth, whether the return of election expenses filed by the first respondent was materially false and whether the respondent omitted from that return expenses that he incurred in connection with the election, expenses that would easily have exceeded the permitted limit of Rs 5,000, as set out in paragraph 7 of the list of particulars. Fifth, whether the election of the first respondent was obtained and influenced by the alleged corrupt practices, resulting in a material effect on the election outcome. Sixth, whether the petitioner would have secured a majority of votes if those corrupt and unlawful practices by the first respondent had not occurred. These six questions formed the core of the issues that the Tribunal was asked to resolve.

The Election Tribunal, by a majority decision of two judges to one, found that each of the six issues was decided in favour of the petitioner and against the first respondent. Relying on those findings, the Tribunal declared the election of the first respondent void and held that the petitioner had been duly elected. The Tribunal’s judgment was dated 15 January 1953. On 5 February 1953, the first respondent filed an application before the Mysore High Court under article 226 of the Constitution, seeking a writ of certiorari and requesting the record of the Tribunal’s proceedings in Election Petition No. 1 of 1952‑53 to be set aside, together with the order issued by the Tribunal. That application was heard by a Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Medappa and Justice Balakrishnaiya. By judgment dated 11 January 1954, the bench allowed the first respondent’s petition and directed that a writ of certiorari be issued as requested. The present appeal arises from that High Court judgment, having been filed on the basis of a certificate granted by the High Court under articles 132(1) and 133(1)(c) of the Constitution. The principal argument advanced by counsel for the appellant, Mr Ayyangar, was that the High Court judges had misdirected themselves on both factual and legal grounds in granting certiorari to overturn the Tribunal’s determination.

In the appeal, counsel submitted that the High Court had erred both in fact and in law when it granted a writ of certiorari to set aside the determination of the Election Tribunal. The argument advanced was that the Tribunal, in reaching its decision, had neither acted without jurisdiction nor exceeded its authority, and that no apparent error surfaced on the face of the record that would justify the issuance of a writ to nullify the Tribunal’s order. It was further contended that the High Court’s characterization of the alleged errors as jurisdictional was misplaced, because those matters did not impinge upon the Tribunal’s competence to entertain or adjudicate the dispute between the parties. According to counsel, the reasons supplied by the learned judges for their decision were based on a misreading and misunderstanding of the factual findings recorded by the Tribunal. From these submissions, two principal questions emerged for consideration. The first question concerned the grounds on which the High Court, exercising the powers conferred by article 226 of the Constitution, could lawfully issue a writ of certiorari to overturn the adjudication of the Election Tribunal. The second question interrogated whether such grounds actually existed in the present case and whether the findings of the High Court on that point were proper and therefore not open to disturbance on appeal. The Court noted that the principles governing the issuance of writs of certiorari by superior courts in England are well‑known and have largely informed Indian judicial decisions. Although English authorities have not always been uniform in stating the precise grounds for granting a writ of certiorari, such variations are inevitable in judge‑made law that has evolved over many years. Historically, prerogative writs, including certiorari, originated in England from the King’s prerogative to supervise the lawful conduct of his officials and tribunals. The term “certiorari” derives from the original requirement that the King be “certified of” the proceedings to be examined, the purpose being to ensure that an inferior tribunal exercised its jurisdiction correctly. These doctrines were later extended to other parts of the King’s dominions. During the British period in India, only the three chartered High Courts of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras possessed the authority to issue such writs, and even then within expressly limited parameters, a power not available to the other High Courts (see Vide Ryots of Garbandho v. Zemindar of Parlkime 70 I.A. 129 at p. 140). As observed by this Court in Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao (1), the framers of the Constitution, in providing fundamental rights, deliberately incorporated a swift and inexpensive remedy for their enforcement, finding the prerogative writs, as developed in England, particularly suitable for that purpose and thus conferring wide powers on the High Courts to issue directions, orders, or writs for the enforcement of fundamental rights as well as for other purposes.

In framing the Constitution, the framers sought to furnish the people with basic safeguards that they designated as fundamental rights. They also considered it essential to create a rapid and inexpensive mechanism for enforcing those rights. Noting that the prerogative writs developed by English courts were especially appropriate for urgent and decisive intervention, they bestowed upon the High Courts, within the jurisdiction of the States, expansive powers to issue directions, orders, or writs chiefly for the enforcement of fundamental rights. The constitutional provision likewise permitted the High Courts to issue such directions for any other purpose, apparently intending to place every High Court in India in a position similar to that of the Court of King’s Bench in England.

The wording of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution is deliberately broad, and it confers on the Supreme Court as well as on all High Courts the authority to issue orders, writs, or directions, including writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, prohibition, and certiorari, whenever such remedies are considered necessary for the enforcement of fundamental rights. In the case of the High Courts, the same authority extends to purposes beyond the protection of fundamental rights. Because the Constitution expressly provides these powers, it is unnecessary to refer back to the early history or the procedural technicalities of the writs as they existed in English law, nor is it required to be constrained by any differences of opinion expressed by English judges in particular cases. The courts may issue an order or a writ of certiorari in all appropriate circumstances, provided they adhere to the broad and fundamental principles that govern the exercise of jurisdiction over such writs as derived from English law.

One of the core principles governing the issuance of a writ of certiorari is that the writ may be directed against judicial acts. The term “judicial acts” comprehends the exercise of quasi‑judicial functions by administrative bodies, other authorities, or persons tasked with such functions, and it is distinguished from purely ministerial acts. As Lord Atkin explained in Rex v Electricity Commissioners, whenever any body or person possessing legal authority to resolve questions affecting the rights of individuals and bearing the duty to act judicially exceeds that authority, they become subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King’s Bench Division exercised through these writs. The second essential feature of a writ of certiorari is that the control it imposes over judicial or quasi‑judicial tribunals or bodies is supervisory rather than appellate. In granting a writ of certiorari, the superior court does not assume the powers of an appellate tribunal; it does not re‑examine or re‑weigh the evidence upon which the determination of the

In this case the Court explained that a writ of certiorari is not intended to substitute the superior Court’s own view for that of the inferior tribunal; rather it merely nullifies an order that the inferior tribunal has issued when that order is found to be without jurisdiction or plainly erroneous. By doing so the Court removes the offending order or proceeding from the legal landscape so that it can no longer be used to the detriment of any person, as observed in the earlier authority cited. The supervision exercised by the superior Court through a writ of certiorati​n is confined to two principal aspects, a point articulated by Lord Sumner in King v. Nat. Bell Liquors Limited. The first aspect concerns the scope of the inferior tribunal’s jurisdiction and the qualifications and conditions attached to its exercise; the second aspect deals with the requirement that the tribunal observe the law while exercising its jurisdiction. These two heads normally encompass all the grounds on which a party may seek a writ of certiorati​n. While the principles themselves are relatively straightforward to state, the real difficulty lies in applying those principles to the facts of an individual case.

The Court further noted that a writ of certiorati​n may be issued and is generally granted when a tribunal has acted without jurisdiction or has acted in excess of its jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction may stem from the nature of the subject‑matter of the proceeding, from the failure to conduct a required preliminary proceeding, or from the fact that the tribunal itself is not legally constituted or is incapacitated by extraneous circumstances. Where a tribunal’s jurisdiction depends upon the existence of a collateral fact, it is well settled that the tribunal cannot create jurisdiction for itself by reaching an erroneous factual conclusion. A tribunal may have the competence to commence an enquiry, but if it conducts that enquiry in flagrant disregard of procedural rules, or where no specific procedure is prescribed, if it violates the principles of natural justice, a writ of certiorati​n may be appropriate. An error in the substantive decision itself may also give rise to a writ, provided the error is manifest on the face of the record, such as when the decision is based on a clear ignorance or disregard of legal provisions. In other words, the error must be patent and capable of correction by certiorati​n, rather than a mere erroneous judgment. The essential characteristics of the remedy by way of certiorati​n were succinctly summarized by Morris L. J. in Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appellate Tribunal, where the Lord Justice observed that certiorati​n is not a disguised appeal, does not serve to rehear the issues, but exists solely to correct a clear error of law apparent on the face of the order or decision, or an irregularity, excess, or absence of jurisdiction that has resulted in manifest injustice.

In discussing the authority of the High Court to issue writs under article 226 of the Constitution, the Court has stated that a writ may be issued “when an order or decision or irregularity or absence of or excess of jurisdiction is shown.” The Court further observed, in language closely parallel to that of earlier authorities, that such writs are intended for grave situations where subordinate tribunals, bodies, or officials act wholly without jurisdiction, act beyond their jurisdiction, violate the principles of natural justice, refuse to exercise jurisdiction vested in them, or commit an error apparent on the face of the record, and where such act, omission, error or excess results in manifest injustice. The Court clarified, however, that even a wide jurisdiction does not permit the High Court to transform itself into an appellate court to reevaluate the correctness of the impugned decision or to determine the proper order to be made. The Court’s observations are supported by references to authorities such as Halsbury, 2nd edition, Vol. IX, page 880; Banbury v. Fuller, 9 Exch. III; R. v. Income Tax Special Purposes Commissioners, 21 Q.B.D. 313; the 1952 case reported in K.B. 338 at 357; and Veerappa Pillai v. Ramon & Raman Ltd., [1952] S.C.R. at 594. These passages collectively set out the general principles governing the exercise of jurisdiction in granting certiorari under article 226. The Court now turns to the specific judgment of the High Court to determine whether the learned judges correctly found sufficient and proper grounds for the issuance of certiorari in the present case. The High Court’s order enumerates three distinct heads of ground for granting the writ. The first head alleges that the Election Tribunal acted without jurisdiction, asserting that the Tribunal lacked authority to extend the limitation period for filing the election petition and also lacked power to permit the petitioner’s amendment and to hear and dispose of the case on the amended petition. The second head addresses alleged acts in excess of jurisdiction, contending that the Tribunal ventured into and decided questions that were not expressly pleaded, that it set aside the election of respondent No. 1 and declared the petitioner duly elected despite the absence of a definitive finding or proper material establishing that the petitioner would have secured more votes than respondent No. 1 but for the latter’s corrupt practices. The third head concerns errors apparent on the face of the record, with the High Court asserting that such apparent errors further justify the issuance of the writ.

The Court noted that the Tribunal’s decision rested on three material findings, each of which was defective. The first finding alleged that polling at one booth began considerably later than the prescribed time. The second finding asserted that respondent No. 1 had secured the assistance of a Government servant to improve his chances of election. The third finding claimed that respondent No. 1 had submitted a false return of election expenses. The Court said it would examine these three points sequentially. Turning to the question of jurisdiction, the Court recorded that the High Court held the Tribunal had acted without authority on two grounds. First, the High Court said the Tribunal improperly extended the limitation period for filing the election petition. Second, the High Court said the Tribunal wrongly entertained the petitioner’s request to amend the petition and then decided the case on the basis of that amended pleading. According to the High Court, the Representation of the People Act provides no power to an Election Tribunal to excuse a delay when a petition is filed after the statutory time limit, nor does it allow the Tribunal to permit a general amendment of the petition after filing, except for the limited purpose of adding further or better particulars of alleged illegal or corrupt practices as permitted by section 83(3) of the Act. The Court observed that, although it did not accept the legal propositions advanced by the learned Judges, those propositions were irrelevant to the facts of the present matter. Regarding the first ground, the Court pointed out that the petitioner had dispatched the election petition by registered post to the Election Commission on 12 April 1952, and the petition was received by the Commission on 14 April 1952. Consequently, 14 April 1952 could be regarded as the date on which the petition was deemed presented to the Commission under section 81(2)(b) of the Act. The Court then explained the relevant procedural rule: under rule 119 of the Election Rules made under the Act, a petition against a returned candidate must be presented after the candidate’s name is published under section 67, but no later than fourteen days from the date the official gazette notice—issued under rule 113—declares that the candidate’s return of election expenses and the associated declaration have been lodged with the Returning Officer. It was not contested that such a notice of return of election expenses appeared in the Mysore Gazette on 31 March 1952. Therefore, the petition, filed on 14 April 1952, fell within the fourteen‑day period and was timely. The High Court, however, appeared to treat the date of publication as part of the fourteen‑day count. The Court found that approach untenable and contrary to ordinary rules of statutory construction. Dr.

Tek Chand, appearing for respondent No 1, plainly stated that he could not accept the view that the Tribunal had entertained the election petition after the prescribed time, and consequently the Court found that no question of untimeliness arose in the present case. The matter then turned to the question of amendment. The High Court, after a detailed discussion of many provisions of the Act, concluded that the Election Tribunal, being a special Court with a special jurisdiction, possessed no general power to permit amendment of pleadings, and that the specific power conferred by section 83(3) of the Act to allow amendments only with respect to certain enumerated matters impliedly excluded the broader power contemplated by Order VI, rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Court considered this discussion unnecessary and unwarranted. The petitioner had applied for only a single amendment, namely a modification of the prayer clause by inserting an alternative prayer alongside the original prayer. No alteration was sought in the substantive averments of the petition, and the original prayer was reproduced unchanged in the amendment application. The Tribunal ultimately did not permit the alternative prayer and instead granted the prayer as originally pleaded. In these circumstances, the mere fact that the Tribunal entertained the amendment application became immaterial and had no effect on the final decision. Accordingly, the Court was unable to conclude that the Tribunal had acted without jurisdiction on either of these two points.

The High Court additionally held that the Tribunal had acted beyond its jurisdiction by addressing issues that were not raised in the pleadings and by declaring the petitioner to be a duly elected candidate on speculative grounds, despite lacking evidence that the petitioner secured more votes than respondent No 1. Regarding the first allegation, the Judges referred only to the claim made by the appellant that respondent No 1 had hired and procured a motor bus owned by Ahmed Jan for the purpose of transporting his voters to the polls. Issue 5 was framed accordingly: “Did the first respondent hire and procure a motor bus which was a service bus running between Tarikere and Hiriyur, belonging to one Ahmed Jan, as alleged in paragraph 1 of the list of particulars and thereby commit the corrupt practice referred to in it?” The Tribunal found that the allegation of hiring the bus by respondent No 1 was not proved, but…

The Tribunal found that the first respondent had indeed procured the service bus owned by Ahmed Jan, who was acting as the respondent’s agent, for the purpose of transporting the respondent’s voters. Moreover, the Tribunal held that even if Ahmed Jan were not formally an agent of the first respondent, the fact that he transported the latter’s voters from Gowrapur to Sollapur in a vehicle bearing the first respondent’s election symbol, and that this was done with the respondent’s knowledge and connivance, was sufficient to make the first respondent guilty of the corrupt practice alleged. The High Court, however, contended that the petition did not allege that Ahmed Jan was an agent of respondent No. 1 or that he was transporting voters with the respondent’s connivance, and therefore the Tribunal had overstepped its jurisdiction by addressing issues that were not specifically pleaded. The Court rejected that view, observing that paragraph 8 of the petition expressly stated that the first respondent, either personally or through his agent, had committed major corrupt practices, one of which was the hiring or procurement of Ahmed Jan’s motor bus. After considering the evidence presented, the Tribunal concluded that the bus had been procured by the first respondent and that the evidence showed the voters were being carried by Ahmed Jan with the respondent’s knowledge and participation. Paragraph 9 of the petition further clarified that the corrupt practices were committed by respondent No. 1, his agents, or by several persons acting with his knowledge and connivance. Consequently, the Tribunal’s finding was a factual determination based on the parties’ evidence and did not exceed the pleadings or contradict them. The High Court also argued that the Tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction in declaring the appellant to be the duly elected candidate, claiming that there were no materials to show the appellant would have secured more votes than respondent No. 1 but for the respondent’s corrupt practices. The Court found no merit in that argument, noting that the learned judges had not properly considered the Tribunal’s findings on this issue. It was noted that the petitioner fell short of the respondent by only thirty‑four votes. The Tribunal had determined that Ahmed Jan’s bus, procured by respondent No. 1, had transported roughly sixty voters to the polling stations in two trips, and that, given the circumstances, it was reasonable to presume that most of those voters had cast their ballots for respondent No. 1. If the votes of at least forty or fifty of those voters were excluded as having been obtained through the corrupt practice, the respondent’s margin of thirty‑four votes would be eliminated, thereby altering the election result.

In the Tribunal’s own words, it concluded that the petitioner would have obtained a majority of votes had the corrupt practices alleged against the first respondent not occurred. The Tribunal recorded this conclusion in paragraph thirty‑three of its judgment, stating that on the fourteenth issue it held the petitioner would have secured a majority if not for the said corrupt practices. The Tribunal therefore possessed a finding supported by evidence. Whether that finding was correct or not was a separate question; the dissenting member of the Tribunal might have been right in his view, but the Tribunal’s exercise of its authority was not beyond its jurisdiction.

The Court then turned to the High Court’s claim of errors apparent on the face of the record, which the High Court said related to three findings of the Tribunal. The first finding concerned the commencement of polling at Booth No I in Ajjampur on election day. The Tribunal observed that the notification fixed the polling start time at eight o’clock in the morning, yet polling actually began twenty‑five minutes later. As a result, a number of voters left the polling station. It was alleged that many of those voters would probably have voted for the appellant, and because the margin between the appellant and respondent No 1 was only thirty‑four votes, the Court considered that the election result might have been materially affected by this irregularity. Evidence undeniably showed that some voters departed when polling was delayed, but the exact number of such voters was unknown and there was no positive proof indicating how many of them would have voted for the appellant. The Court noted that if the Tribunal had, on the basis of these facts alone, declared the appellant duly elected on the premise that he could have secured more votes than respondent No 1, such a declaration would have been an error apparent on the face of the record because the conclusion would have rested merely on conjecture. However, the Tribunal discussed the delay only to determine whether any violation of a statutory rule or order in conducting the election had materially affected the result, a question that could lead to voiding the election of the returned candidate under section 100(2)(c) of the Act. The Tribunal was competent to consider the circumstances and probabilities of the case under the provisions of the Act. Nevertheless, as already stated, the Tribunal ultimately declared the appellant duly elected based on its specific finding that, but for the corrupt practice of respondent No 1 in procuring the service bus of Ahmed Jan, the appellant would have obtained a majority of votes.

The Court observed that the Tribunal had concluded that, but for the provision of a service bus by Ahmed Jan, the appellant would have obtained a majority of the votes. The Court held that such a conclusion could not be characterised as an error apparent on the face of the record that would justify interference by the High Court through a writ of certiorari. Regarding the second finding, the Court noted that it related to the alleged assistance received from Paramessh Warappa, a Patel, by respondent No. 1 in furtherance of his election prospects. The High Court had not disputed the appellant’s allegation that Paramessh Warappa accompanied the first respondent, canvassed at several locations, and openly canvassed at one polling booth on the day of polling. The learned Judges, however, had expressed the view that even if those facts were accepted, they merely demonstrated that Paramessh Warappa canvassed for the petitioner and did not amount to respondent No. 1 taking assistance from him. The Court found this view unsatisfactory. The appellant had alleged that respondent No. 1 obtained assistance from a Government servant within the meaning of section 123(8) of the Act. Evidence on the record substantiated the facts described above. Consequently, if the Tribunal, having found those facts to be true, concluded that assistance had indeed been taken from a Government servant falling within section 123(8), the Court could not deem that conclusion an error apparent on the face of the record.

The remaining finding concerned the appellant’s allegation that respondent No. 1, in his return of election expenses, had omitted several items and that inclusion of those items would have caused the total expenses to exceed the sanctioned limit. The Tribunal held that respondent No. 1 had failed to include petrol charges, hiring charges for certain cars and vans, and dinner expenses incurred at hotels. The High Court had observed that, with respect to the petrol charges, the Tribunal’s finding was based on no evidence and rested on mere speculation. The Court rejected that observation. Respondent No. 1 had stated that he used two of his own cars and incurred petrol expenses of Rs 1,083‑3‑0. The Tribunal, relying on both documentary and oral evidence, found in paragraph 29 of its order that respondent No. 1 had used six additional cars and had purchased petrol for them for his election campaign, concluding that he must have spent at least Rs 1,250 on petrol, an amount omitted from the expense return. The Court could not say that this finding lacked evidential support. Concerning the alleged omission of hiring charges, the High Court had noted that the Tribunal did not record any finding that such hiring was proved. The Tribunal actually found that some cars were hired while others were obtained on loan, and that respondent No. 1 had paid the monetary value for the use of those vehicles, which was tantamount to paying hiring charges. This was addressed in paragraph 29(d) of the Tribunal’s order after a full consideration of the evidence. Finally, the Tribunal’s finding that respondent No. 1 had omitted dinner and hotel charges was supported by detailed analysis in paragraph 29(f) of the order. The Court concluded that the so‑called apparent errors identified by the High Court were neither errors of law nor apparent on the face of the record.

The Tribunal did not record any specific finding that the hiring of the cars had been proved beyond dispute. The Tribunal found that some of the cars used in the election campaign had been hired by the candidate. It also found that other cars had been obtained on loan and that the first respondent had paid the monetary value for their use, which is equivalent to paying hiring charges. This finding was recorded in paragraph 29(d) of the Tribunal’s order after the entire evidence had been examined. The Court is not persuaded that the Tribunal’s finding that respondent No 1 omitted the dinner and hotel charges from his election expense return is unsupported by any evidence. The detailed discussion of that issue appears in paragraph 31(f) of the Tribunal’s order. Overall, the Court believes that the apparent errors identified by the High Court are not errors of law and are not evident on the face of the record. Although an appellate court might, on a fresh review of the evidence, reach a different conclusion, such a difference would not justify issuing a writ of certiorari. Consequently, the Court holds that the judgment of the High Court lacks support and that the present appeal must be allowed. Accordingly, the writ issued by the High Court is vacated and set aside in its entirety. The Court makes no order regarding the allocation of costs of this appeal to either party. In sum, the appeal is allowed, affirming the relief sought by the applicant.