State of Rajasthan vs Rao Manohar Singhji

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 143 of 1952

Decision Date: 15 March, 1954

Coram: Ghulam Hasan, Mehar Chand Mahajan, B.K. Mukherjea, Vivian Bose

In the case styled State of Rajasthan versus Rao Manohar Singhji, the judgment was delivered on fifteen March 1954 by a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India. The bench comprised Justice Ghulam Hasan, Chief Justice Mehar Chand Mahajan, Justice B. K. Mukherjea, Justice Vivian Bose and Justice G. Hasan. The appeal is recorded as Civil Appeal No. 143 of 1952, filed under article 132(1) of the Constitution of India against the judgment and order dated eleven December 1951 of the High Court of Judicature at Jodhpur in the civil miscellaneous case No. 1 of 1951. The citation for the decision is 1954 AIR 297 and 1954 SCR 996. The headnote of the judgment states that Section 8-A, as inserted in Rajasthan Ordinance No. XXVII of 1948 by Section 4 of Rajasthan Ordinance No. X of 1949 and subsequently amended by Section 3 of Rajasthan Ordinance No. XV of 1949, is declared void on the ground of violation of article 14 of the Constitution. The judgment referred to several authorities, including Frank J. Bowman v. Edward A. Lewis, Ramjilal v. Income Tax Officer, Mohindargarh, The State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh, and Thakur Madan Singh v. Collector of Sikar, to support its reasoning.

The appeal arose from a certificate granted by the Rajasthan High Court under article 132(1), which itself originated from a petition filed under article 226 of the Constitution. In that petition, the High Court, presided over by Chief Justice Wanchoo and Justice Bapna, had held that the provision creating Section 8-A in the Rajasthan Ordinance was unconstitutional and issued a writ restraining the State of Rajasthan from collecting rents from tenants of lands that formed part of the Jagir of Bedla, which was owned by the respondent, Rao Manohar Singhji. The respondent was the proprietor of the Jagir of Bedla, situated in the former princely State of Mewar, which had been merged into the United State of Rajasthan in April 1948. The High Court’s decision consequently directed that the State could not enforce rent collection on that Jagir. The Supreme Court’s judgment, delivered by Justice Ghulam Hasan, examined the legality of the Ordinance provisions in light of article 14 and considered the historical integration of Mewar and the enactment of the three Ordinances—No. XXVII of 1948 and Nos. X and XV of 1949—by the former State of Rajasthan concerning the management of State Jagirs, including the Jagir of Bedla.

In this case the Court described how the present United State of Rajasthan was created by merging the former States of Bikaner, Jaipur, Jaisalmer and Jodhpur together with the former Union of Matsya. Following this amalgamation three Ordinances—Number XXVII of 1948 and Numbers X and XV of 1949—were issued by the former State of Rajasthan to deal with the administration of State Jagirs. Under the authority conferred by those Ordinances the former State assumed management of the Jagirs, including the Jagir of Bedla. After the final formation of the State of Rajasthan in May 1949 the Ordinances continued to operate in a portion of the area that now constitutes Rajasthan. Consequently, jagirs situated in that portion fell under state administration, whereas jagirs located in the rest of the territory remained in the hands of the private jagirdars.

On 4 January 1951 the respondent, the owner of the Bedla Jagir, filed a petition under article 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the three Ordinances. The respondent argued that the Ordinances were beyond the constitutional powers of the State and therefore void under article 13(1) read with articles 14 and 31. Two principal grounds were raised. First, the respondent claimed that the Ordinances infringed articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution because they denied equality before the law and equal protection of the laws, and because the State had taken possession of his property without providing compensation. Second, the respondent contended that the Ordinances discriminated against the jagirdars of the former State of Rajasthan, which was formed in 1948, while leaving untouched the jagirdars of the states that were later integrated. The State responded that a jagir was a grant made by the ruler and held at his pleasure; it reverted to the ruler upon the death of the holder and could be regranted only after the ruler recognized the succession. Accordingly, the rights of jagirdars were non-heritable, non-transferable and could not be partitioned among heirs. The State therefore submitted that even if the jagir was taken over, the jagirdar was not entitled to compensation under article 31(2). It further argued that the Ordinances merely transferred the management of the jagirs to the Government and did not deprive the jagirdars of ownership, so article 31(2) was inapplicable, and that there was no discrimination prohibited by article 14. The High Court, after examining the submissions, held that the provisions of Ordinances X and XV of 1949 were not void under article 31(2) or article 19(1)(f). However, the Court concluded that section 8-A, which had been introduced in Ordinance XXVII of 1948 by section 4 of Ordinance X of 1949 and subsequently amended by section 3 of Ordinance XV of 1949, was void because it violated article 13(1) read with article 14.

The High Court had held that Ordinance No. X of 1949 and the amendment to section 8-A effected by section 3 of Rajasthan Ordinance No. XV of 1949 were void under article 13(1) of the Constitution read together with article 14. On that basis, the Court allowed the petition and ordered that the State could not collect rent from the tenants of the Bedla Jagir that was held by the respondent. That judgment was delivered on 11 December 1951. Since that date the State of Rajasthan has enacted legislation that abolished Jagirs throughout its territory, but the issue remained significant for the respondent because it pertained to his right to receive rent, even if only for a brief interval. On appeal, the Attorney General, appearing for the State of Rajasthan, contended that the High Court’s conclusion that the amended provision of section 8-A was violative of article 14 was erroneous. Before addressing the merit of that contention, the Court found it necessary to set out briefly the relevant provisions of the Ordinances involved. Ordinance No. I of 1948, titled the United State of Rajasthan Administration Ordinance, 1948, had been promulgated on 28 April 1948 by the Rajpramukh of Rajasthan to provide for the administration of the United State of Rajasthan after its formation. Subsequently, on 26 July 1948, Ordinance No. XXVII of 1948, known as the United State of Rajasthan Jagirdars (Abolition of Powers) Ordinance, 1948, was issued by the Rajpramukh. That Ordinance abolished the judicial powers of the Jagirdars and the executive powers related to the judiciary, vesting those powers in the Government. Section 8 of that Ordinance authorised the Government to make orders necessary to give effect to the provisions and purposes of the Ordinance and to exercise the powers enumerated therein. Section 8-A was later introduced by Ordinance X of 1949, the United State of Rajasthan Jagirdars (Abolition of Powers) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1949, and it provided, in substance, that “without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions, the revenue which was heretofore collected by Jagirdars shall henceforward be collected by and paid to the Government; the Government will after deducting the collection and other expenses pay it to the Jagirdar concerned.” Section 3 of Ordinance No. XV of 1949, the United State of Rajasthan Jagirdars (Abolition of Powers) (2nd Amendment) Ordinance, 1949, amended section 8-A by inserting after the word “Revenue” the words “Including taxes, cesses and other revenue from forests.” It was not disputed that when the State of Rajasthan was created in April and May 1949, Jagirdars in only part of the present territory were prevented from collecting their rents, whereas Jagirdars in the areas that had formerly formed the States of Jaipur, Bikaner, Jaisalmer, Jodhpur and the Matsya Union did not face such a disability. It appeared that, in the former United State of Rajasthan, provisions concerning Government management of Jagirs and the right to collect revenues already existed, whereas no comparable provision was present in the former princely states that later merged into Rajasthan.

The Court observed that the disparity between the Jagirdars of different parts of the present State of Rajasthan did not arise from any intrinsic feature of the impugned Ordinances but rather from the fact that, at the time of integration in April and May 1949, Jagirdars in one portion of the territory were already subject to a disability concerning the management of their Jagirs, whereas those in the former States of Jaipur, Bikaner, Jaisalmer, Jodhpur and Matsya Union were not affected at all. This situation created a discrimination that, however undesirable, could not be remedied until the Constitution became operative on 26 January 1950. At that stage article 13 of the Constitution declared that every law existing in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of the Constitution, to the extent that it was inconsistent with the provisions of Part III, would be void. Consequently, it became necessary to examine whether the impugned provision, which was discriminatory on its face, fell foul of article 14, which commands that the State shall not deny any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws. The Court noted that such an apparent discrimination could be justified only if it rested upon a reasonable classification. It reiterated the settled principle that a valid classification must bear a rational and just relation to the subject matter of the legislation. Applying this test, the Court found that the discrimination derived from no discernible classification and was therefore manifestly unreasonable and arbitrary. The Court explained that the State could have justified the differential treatment by showing a substantial distinction, for example that the Jagirdars in the area subject to the disability were materially different from those in the other areas. The State might have argued, as the learned Attorney-General suggested, that the difference was geographical because the Jagirs in the specific area were governed by distinct tenure laws, forming a separate class. However, the Court observed that no such ground was ever advanced before the High Court, nor was any attempt made to substantiate it with evidence. In the absence of any allegation supported by proof, the Court could not accept that the Jagirdars of the particular area to which the respondent belonged were differently situated from other Jagirdars. Moreover, the preambles of the Ordinances did not indicate that the conditions in the former State of Rajasthan warranted imposing a disability on its Jagirdars, while conditions in the other States precluded such a measure. The Court therefore concluded that the impugned classification lacked any rational basis.

The Court observed that the Ordinance which removed the police, judicial and administrative powers of the Jagirdars in matters of revenue and forests was not open to any objection; however, the Court found no justification for the Ordinance, by means of section 8-A, to deprive the Jagirdars of the rent-collection authority to which they were legally entitled. In agreement with the High Court, the Court held that there was no real or substantial distinction that could explain why Jagirdars in one particular area of Rajasthan should continue to be treated unequally in comparison with Jagirdars in other parts of the State. Consequently, the Court concluded that no rational basis for any classification or differentiation had been established. Accordingly, section 8-A of the impugned Ordinance, as amended, was declared to be a clear violation of the respondent’s right under article 14 of the Constitution and was ordered to be declared void. The Court further stated that the decision in Frank J. Bowman v. Edward A. Lewis(1) cited by the learned Attorney-General on behalf of the State was inapplicable to the present facts and circumstances. The Court explained that, under the Constitution and statutes of Missouri, citizens residing in one hundred and nine counties possessed an unrestricted right of appeal to the State Supreme Court, whereas citizens living in four counties in the eastern part of the State and those residing in the City of St. Louis were denied that right of appeal. It had been argued that this arrangement conflicted with the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Chief Justice Bradley held that the equality clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protected persons against unjust discrimination by a State but did not address territorial or municipal divisions within a State. He further remarked that if a Mexican State were acquired by treaty and merged with an adjoining State or part of a State in the United States, the new State could lawfully permit the Mexican legal system to continue in one portion while applying the common law in another portion, an arrangement justified on municipal considerations rather than on any distinction of persons or classes. The Court observed that the passage relied upon by the learned Attorney-General did not advance his argument, noting that in the present case there was no question of preserving old laws and judicature in one part while applying different law in another, and that nothing had been shown to indicate any peculiarity or special feature justifying such differentiation.

In this matter, the Court examined the claim that the Jagirs of the former State of Rajasthan were treated differently from the Jagirs that later became part of the present United State of Rajasthan. The Court observed that after the new State was created there was no occasion on which the powers of Jagirdars in a disfavoured area were withdrawn while those in the rest of the territory were left untouched. The Court distinguished the decision in Ramjilal v. Income-tax Officer, Mohindargarh (1) on the ground that that case relied on the principle that “pending proceedings should be concluded according to the law applicable at the time when the rights or liabilities accrued and the proceeding commenced,” a principle that the Court described as a reasonable classification of the assess­ees permissible under the equal protection clause. The present case, the Court held, did not involve such a classification. The Court also considered the authority cited in The State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh and Another (2). In that case the Abducted Persons (Recovery and Restoration) Act of 1949 was held not to be unconstitutional under article 14 because it applied only to the States listed in section 1(2) and the classification was based on geography. The Court noted that the Muslim abducted persons identified in those States formed a single class with a common interest in protection, and their inclusion in the definition of abducted persons could not be described as discriminatory.

The learned Attorney-General further referred to two decisions of the Rajasthan High Court: Thakur Madan Singh v. Collector of Sikar (3) and an unreported judgment dated 10 November 1953, In re Raja Hari Singh v. Rajasthan. The Attorney-General argued that the Bench had not adhered to the view expressed in the judgment under appeal. The Court examined the records of those cases and found that the earlier decision was distinguished from the present case because a reasonable basis for classification existed in the former, whereas no such basis existed here. The Court explained that, before Jaipur State merged into the United State of Rajasthan, District Boards had been established in Jaipur. Those Boards continued after the formation of the new State, while the other former States had no District Boards. The argument that the Jaipur District Boards Act violated article 14 was rejected. The Court held that the existence of District Boards in Jaipur served the welfare of all classes within Jaipur, which had reached a higher stage of development than many other States, and that removing the benefits of local self-government would have been a retrograde step for the people of the former Jaipur State. The Court also noted the observations of Justice Bradley in support of this reasoning.

In the case of Frank J. Bowman v. Edward A. Lewis, the learned Chief Justice, while discussing the situation in the Mexican State, referred with approval to the decision that is presently before the Court. The reference was made to illustrate how a similar principle had been applied in a previous judgment. The matter that is now under consideration involved an attack on certain provisions that were alleged to be discriminatory, specifically those contained in the Mewar Tenancy Act and the Land Revenue Act. Under those statutes, the rates of rent had been fixed by the Board of Revenue and the Government, and the Jagirdars claimed that the fixed rates were detrimental to their interests. The Jagirdars therefore challenged the validity of those Acts by filing a petition under article 226. It appears that comparable tenancy and land-revenue legislation did not exist in the other parts of Rajasthan.

The High Court, in its decision, held that the petitioners had failed to demonstrate the absence of any similar tenancy or land-revenue laws elsewhere in the State. The Court observed that the impugned Acts were intended to improve the economic condition of the cultivators in Mewar and therefore could not be characterized as discriminatory merely because no analogous legislation existed in the remaining regions of Rajasthan. The Court explained that the disparity between the two areas did not justify withdrawing progressive and ameliorative measures that benefited the people of a particular region, nor did it require that the State be reduced to the level of less-developed areas. The judgment further noted that the Bench, rather than reversing its earlier view, adhered to it and expressly distinguished the present case on the basis of its special facts. Consequently, having considered the arguments and the authority cited, the Court held that the High Court’s view was correct. The appeal was therefore dismissed with costs, and the decision of the lower Court was affirmed. Counsel for the appellant was instructed to bear the costs.