State of Rajasthan vs Mewar Textile Mills Ltd., Bhilwara

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 103 of 1952

Decision Date: 17 March, 1954

Coram: Ghulam Hasan, Mehar Chand Mahajan, B.K. Mukherjea, Vivian Bose

The case was titled State of Rajasthan versus Mewar Textile Mills Ltd., Bhilwara and was decided on 17 March 1954. The judgment was delivered by Justice Ghulam Hasan, with Justices Mehar Chand Mahajan, B. K. Mukherjea and Vivian Bose sitting on the bench. The petitioner was the State of Rajasthan and the respondents were Mewar Textile Mills Ltd., Bhilwara together with other parties. The citation for the decision is reported as 1954 AIR 396 and 1954 SCR 1229. The statutory provision in issue was section 7(3)(a) and (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as amended by section 34 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, and the question was whether the expression “a Judge of a High Court and a District Judge” includes a judge who had served in the former State of Jodhpur. The headnote recorded that the Court held that the phrase does indeed encompass a High Court judge and a District Judge from the erstwhile Jodhpur State. The matter was a civil appeal, numbered 103 of 1952, filed under article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution of India against a judgment and order dated 10 August 1951 rendered by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur, whose members were Justices Wanchoo and Bapna. The appeal arose from a miscellaneous civil application, numbered 21 of 1951, filed by the Advocate-General of Rajasthan, who represented the appellant. No counsel appeared on behalf of the respondents.

The judgment, written by Justice Ghulam Hasan, explained that the appeal was premised on a certificate that the Rajasthan High Court had granted under article 133(c) of the Constitution, challenging a decision of that High Court in a writ petition under article 226. The writ petition had held that the appointment of Shri Sukhdeo Narain as an Industrial Tribunal member was invalid and had ordered that all actions taken by him under section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, be declared null and void. The Court was informed that Shri Sukhdeo Narain had already ceased to serve on the Industrial Tribunal, rendering the appeal technically moot. Nevertheless, the Advocate-General, appearing for the State of Rajasthan, urged the Court to determine the validity of the appointment because the issue could affect other awards rendered by tribunals constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act. Accordingly, the Court proceeded to decide the point. The central question was whether Shri Sukhdeo Narain’s appointment was invalid on the ground that he did not satisfy the qualifications prescribed for a tribunal member under section 7(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The relevant provision, quoted in the judgment, stated that when a tribunal consists of a single member, that member must be a person who is or has been a judge of a High Court, or a person who is or has been a District Judge. The Court then turned to the statutory application of the Industrial Disputes Act in Rajasthan, which had been effected by the Rajasthan Adaptation of Central Laws Ordinance, 1950, issued by the Rajpramukh on 24 January 1950, thereby extending section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act to the State. Shri Sukhdeo Narain had been appointed on 9 October 1950 by a government notification that described him as a retired judge of the High Court of the erstwhile Jodhpur State, appointed to adjudicate an industrial dispute involving Mewar Textile Mills Ltd., Bhilwara. The respondents had contested this appointment, alleging that the terminology “a Judge of a High Court and a District Judge” did not include a retired judge of the former Jodhpur State. The Court’s analysis focused on interpreting that terminology in the context of the amendment and the legislative intent, ultimately leading to its holding on the matter.

In this case, the Court examined the provision of section 7(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, which provides that the sole member of a tribunal, or where there are two or more members the chairman, must be a person who—(a) is or has been a Judge of a High Court; or (b) is or has been a District Judge. The Industrial Disputes Act was extended to Rajasthan through the Rajasthan Adaptation of Central Laws Ordinance, 1950 (Ordinance IV of 1950) promulgated by the Rajpramukh on 24 January 1950. By that adaptation, the provisions of section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act became applicable within the territory of Rajasthan. On 9 October 1950, the Government of Rajasthan issued a notification appointing Shri Sukhdeo Narain, a retired Judge of the High Court of the former Jodhpur State, as the sole member of an Industrial Tribunal to adjudicate an industrial dispute relating to Mewar Textile Mills Ltd., Bhilwara, Rajasthan. The respondent challenged the appointment, arguing that the phrase “a Judge of a High Court” in section 7(3) refers only to a Judge of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan established under the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949. Since Shri Sukhdeo Narain had been a Judge of the High Court of the erstwhile State of Jodhpur and not of the Rajasthan High Court, the respondent contended that he did not satisfy the qualification under sub-paragraph (a). The High Court accepted this objection and held the appointment invalid. The respondent also submitted that, even if Shri Sukhdeo Narain failed to meet the requirement of sub-paragraph (a), he could nevertheless satisfy the requirement of sub-paragraph (b) because he had previously served as a District Judge. The High Court rejected this alternative argument as well. In support of its decision, the High Court noted that the United State of Rajasthan was formed on 7 April 1949 and that the United State of Matsya merged with it on 15 May 1949. Section 5 of Ordinance No. IV of 1950 provides that, for the purpose of applying any Central law to Rajasthan, references to courts, public offices, Judges, Magistrates, officers or authorities shall be deemed to refer to the corresponding bodies in Rajasthan, unless there is a repugnancy. The Court interpreted the term “Rajasthan” in Ordinance I of 1949 as referring to the United State of Rajasthan and consequently held that the judges and officers mentioned in section 5(ix) must be those serving the United State of Rajasthan. Accordingly, the High Court concluded that Shri Sukhdeo Narain could not be considered a District Judge within the meaning of sub-paragraph (b) of section 7(3), and therefore his appointment as the Industrial Tribunal was invalid.

The Court noted that the High Court had declared Shri Sukhdeo Narain’s appointment as an Industrial Tribunal under section 7(3)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act to be invalid. The Court observed that the appeal could be decided on a single ground because the relevant statute, the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act XLVIII of 1950, had come into force on 20 May 1950 and, by virtue of its section 34, amended the Industrial Disputes Act XIV of 1947 as shown in the Schedule. The amendment inserted the provision that the Industrial Disputes Act extended to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Since Shri Sukhdeo Narain was appointed on 9 October 1950, his appointment occurred after the Industrial Disputes Act had become applicable to Rajasthan. Consequently, the Court held that it was unnecessary to rely on the provisions of Ordinance IV of 1950 to determine the validity of the appointment. The argument based on section 34 of Act XLVIII of 1950 had been raised before the High Court when the application for leave to appeal was heard, and the State had contended that, in view of section 34, the provisions of the Rajasthan Adaptation of Central Laws Ordinance 1950, specifically section 5 subsections (vii) and (ix), were either amended or repealed. The High Court had observed that even if this argument had been raised in appeal, it would not have altered the outcome.

The learned Advocate-General, appearing for the State, submitted that after the extension of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 to Rajasthan by section 34 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act XLVIII of 1950, the Act’s provisions stood amended and could no longer be read subject to section 5 of the Rajasthan Adaptation of Central Laws Ordinance IV of 1950. The Court found merit in this contention. It explained that the effect of section 34 was to bring the territorial application of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 to the entire nation, Rajasthan included, with the sole exclusion of Jammu and Kashmir. Accordingly, the expressions “a Judge of a High Court” and “a District Judge” used in sections 7(3)(a) and 7(3)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 must now be understood to include a Judge of the High Court and a District Judge in the former State of Jodhpur. There was therefore no room to apply section 5 of Ordinance IV of 1950, which confined the terms to judges of the Rajasthan High Court and district judges within Rajasthan as defined in that Ordinance. On this basis, the Court held that Shri Sukhdeo Narain’s appointment was perfectly valid and consequently set aside the order of the High Court.

In the final order, the Court stipulated that no costs were to be awarded in the proceedings. The reason given for this direction was that the respondent had not been represented by any counsel at the time the order was pronounced. Because the respondent was absent and without legal representation, the Court concluded that imposing a cost order would be inappropriate. The judgment therefore stated that the matter would proceed without any cost liability attached to either party. In addition, the Court recorded the identity of the individual who had appeared on behalf of the appellant. The document specified that the agent acting for the appellant was identified as R. H. Dhebar. No further commentary on the agent’s role or qualifications was provided; the record simply noted the name as the representative of the appellant in the case. This concluding portion of the judgment therefore combined two procedural points: the waiver of costs due to the respondent’s lack of representation, and the naming of the appellant’s agent as R. H. Dhebar.