Sital Das vs Sant Ram And Ors.

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 8 April 1954

Coram: B.K. Mukherjea, Ghulam Hasan

Sital Das versus Sant Ram and others was decided on 8 April 1954 by the Supreme Court of India. The opinion was authored by Justice B.K. Mukherjea, who sat with Justice Ghulam Hasan on the bench. The matter before the Supreme Court was an appeal against a judgment and decree of a Division Bench of the Punjab High Court dated 30 April 1952. That High Court decision had reversed, on appeal, a decree of the Subordinate Judge, First Class, Jullundur, dated 31 May 1948, which had been rendered in Suit No 131 of 1947. For the purpose of the present appeal, the material facts may be summarised as follows. A Thakardwara, which is a religious institution of the Ram Kabir sect of Hindu Bairagis, was located at mouza Jamsher in the Jullundur district. The last Mahant of that Thakardwara was a man named Kishore Das, whose death occurred on 4 April 1945. On 31 March 1945, merely four days before his death, Kishore Das executed a lease of 645 kanals of land that formed part of the endowment. The lease was for a term of ten years, was granted in favour of the first and second respondents, and required an annual rental of only Rs 1,500. The present appeal arose from a suit filed by Sital Das, who is the appellant before this Court, in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, First Class, Jullundur on 2 January 1946. In that suit Sital Das named the two lessees as defendants and sought recovery of possession of the leased lands. He asserted that after the death of Kishore Das he had been lawfully appointed Mahant of the Thakardwara and that the lease executed by Kishore Das was illegal and void. His grounds included the contention that the lease was a colourable transaction, was executed without consideration and lacked any legal necessity. Although Sital Das admitted that he was not a disciple of the deceased Mahant Kishore Das, he claimed authority to act as Mahant on the basis that he had been duly appointed by the “Bhek” of the assembly of Bairagi Mahants of the same order, together with the “Sewaks” or worshippers of the Thakardwara itself.

In the original plaint, two additional persons were joined as co-plaintiffs alongside Sital Das. The first was Mahant Hira Das, who represented himself as the head of a Bairagi institution at Sahri, alleged to be the parent institution of the disputed Thakardwara. The second co-plaintiff was Sadhu Ram Das, identified as the spiritual teacher of Sital Das and a member of the same spiritual fraternity as Kishore Das. Paragraph 4 of the plaint disclosed that these two individuals had obtained the consent of the Advocate-General under section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code to institute a suit under that provision concerning the properties of the Jamsher Thakardwara, which they claimed had been improperly alienated by Kishore Das. The purpose of joining them as co-plaintiffs was to ensure that, should the Court determine that Sital Das was not a validly appointed Mahant, the other two co-plaintiffs would be able to continue the proceedings as interested parties in the endowments against the lessees.

In this case the plaintiff Sital Das had joined two additional co-plaintiffs because, if the court were to decide that Sital Das had not been validly appointed as Mahant, the other two plaintiffs would still be able to pursue the suit as interested parties in the religious endowments against the lessees. On 28 March 1946 the trial judge observed that plaintiff No 1 was claimed to be the lawfully appointed Mahant and therefore plaintiffs 2 and 3 could not simultaneously assert the same rights as plaintiff 1. The judge warned that such a joinder of parties was likely to create confusion and obstruct the trial, and consequently ordered that the plaint be amended either to place plaintiff No 1 alone as claimant or to join plaintiffs 2 and 3 together as claimants. Following that direction the plaint was amended, the names of plaintiffs 2 and 3 were stricken from the record, and the amended plaint was filed on 17 April 1946. On the same day, 28 March 1946, defendants 1 and 2 filed their written statements. Their defence was structured around three main allegations. First, they contended that the true legal Mahant and administrator of the Jamsher Thakardwara after the death of Kishore Das was not Sital Das but Ishar Das, and that Ishar Das therefore needed to be made a party to the suit, rendering the suit instituted by Sital Das untenable. Second, they argued that Sital Das had not been appointed Mahant by the ‘Bhek’ as alleged, and that, not being a disciple of the preceding Mahant, he possessed no authority to claim such an appointment. Third, they challenged the validity of the lease that Sital Das sought to set aside, asserting that the lease had been executed for lawful consideration and legal necessity and was consequently binding on the institution.

The proceedings took another turn on 24 July 1946 when a copy of a registered will, purportedly executed by Kishore Das four days before his death, was produced before the Subordinate Judge. That will purported to name Ishar Das and Lachman Das, described as Kishore Das’s two disciples, as joint managers of the Thakardwara after his demise. In response, the Subordinate Judge ordered that Ishar Das and Lachman Das be added as defendants so that the suit could be determined in their presence. The order was acted upon on the very same day, and the plaintiff filed an amended plaint impleading Ishar Das and Lachman Das as defendants 3 and 4. A new paragraph was inserted in the amended plaint stating that, even if any will or wills had been executed by Kishore Das, such documents were alleged to be fictitious and collusive, and that the deceased Mahant had no authority to make testamentary dispositions of his rights as Mahant, nor could such dispositions affect the plaintiff’s rights.

In the suit, the plaintiff contended that the will executed by the deceased Mahant in favour of defendants three and four was fictitious and collusive, asserting that the Mahant possessed no authority to make any testamentary disposition of his rights as Mahant and that such a disposition could not affect the plaintiff’s rights. On 26 October 1946, the added defendants Ishar Das and Lachman Das filed their written statements, pleading that the plaintiff, not being a ‘chela’ of the deceased Mahant, was ineligible for appointment as Mahant and that the ‘Bhek’ could not and did not appoint him. The defendants maintained that the will left by Kishore Das was a valid and genuine document that appointed his two disciples as his successors, alleging that Ishar Das, as the senior ‘chela’ of Kishore Das, was installed by the public, the ‘Bhek’ of the ascetics and according to the desire of the deceased Mahant as the superior in the ‘Gaddi’, and that the necessary ceremonies were performed, thereby placing the Thakardwara under his possession and management. On the basis of these pleadings, several issues were framed, of which issues 1 and 4 were material. Issue 1 concerned the plaintiff’s title as a validly appointed Mahant of the institution and his competency to maintain the suit. Issue 4 questioned whether Ishar Das, defendant 3, was a valid ‘chela’ of the deceased Mahant and whether he had been duly appointed as successor by the Mahant or the ‘Bhek’, or was otherwise entitled to succeed. Issues 2 and 3 related to the validity and binding character of the lease executed by Kishore Das in favour of defendants 1 and 2 and its liability to be challenged by the plaintiff. The trial judge, in his judgment dated 31 May 1948, decided all the issues in favour of the plaintiff. He held that, according to the custom prevailing in the institution, the ultimate authority to appoint a Mahant rested with the ‘Bhek’ and the ‘Sewaks’, irrespective of whether the claimant was a ‘chela’ or otherwise spiritually connected with the last incumbent. The judge found that the plaintiff, Sital Das, was a spiritual collateral of the late Kishore Das and qualified as a ‘Bhatija chela’. Accordingly, the plaintiff was found to have been duly appointed Mahant by both the ‘Bhek’ of the Bairagi ascetics and the ‘Sewaks’ of the temple. Regarding Ishar Das, the judge held that his original name was Ujagar Singh, that he had never been a ‘chela’ of the late Mahant, nor had he renounced worldly life, and that no proper evidence showed he had been appointed Mahant by the ‘Bhek’ or the ‘Sewaks’. On these findings, the learned Subordinate Judge allowed the plaintiff’s claim and passed a decree in his favour as prayed for.

The trial court had accepted the plaintiff’s claim and issued a decree in his favour as prayed for. The defendants then filed an appeal before the Punjab High Court, which was heard by a Division Bench comprising Justice Khosla and Justice Harnam Singh. The appeal was restricted to the matters identified as issues 1 and 4 in the lower court proceedings. The two learned judges reached a conclusion that differed from the trial court’s finding. They held that the plaintiff, Sital Das, was unable to demonstrate that he was a spiritual descendant of the deceased Mahant, and that the evidence did not establish that the gathering held at Jamsher on 23 July 1945, at which the plaintiff claimed to have been appointed, constituted a proper meeting of the “Bhek” and the “Sewaks.” Because the plaintiff could not prove his entitlement to the office of Mahant on those grounds, the High Court concluded that he had failed to establish a valid appointment. Accordingly, the judges allowed the appeal and dismissed the plaintiff’s suit, noting that it was unnecessary to consider the remaining issues raised in the plaint. The plaintiff subsequently approached this Court, seeking to overturn that decision on the basis of a certificate issued by the High Court pursuant to Article 133 of the Constitution read with sections 109 and 110 of the Civil Procedure Code. The principal dispute before this Court centers on whether, following the death of Kishore Das, the right to the Mahantship of the contested Thakardwara passed to the plaintiff or to defendant No. 3. Established law holds that succession to the Mahantship of a Math or religious institution is governed by the custom or usage of that particular institution, unless the founder of the endowment has prescribed a specific rule of succession. As articulated by the Judicial Committee in Genda Puri v. Chhatar Puri (13 Ind App 100 at p. 105), the determination of who is entitled to succeed as Mahant must be based on the institution’s custom and practice, which must be proved by testimony, and the claimant must show that he is entitled under that custom to recover the office and its associated lands and property; a mere weakness in the title of the current occupant does not aid the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s pleading contends that, according to Bairagi custom, when a Mahant dies the individual appointed by the “Bhek” of the Bairagis together with the “Sewaks” or worshippers of the institution is the only person who may be recognised as a duly appointed Mahant and may exercise the functions of that office. The plaint does not specify whether the “Bhek” and the “Sewaks” have unrestricted authority to appoint any person of their choosing, or whether their appointment power is confined to disciples of the former Mahant or to those claiming a spiritual connection with him.

In this case the Court observed that Defendant No 3, in his written statement, rested his claim to the Mahantship upon an appointment made by Kishore Das as his successor by will, an appointment that he alleged had been ratified by the ‘Bhek’ of the Bairagis on the seventeenth day after the demise of the last Mahant. The position advanced by him suggested that succession was limited to a ‘chela’ of the deceased Mahant, that a Mahant could nominate during his lifetime a successor from among his own ‘chelas’, and that the ‘Bhek’ or the assembly of Sadhus served merely as a confirming authority that validated the wishes expressed by the former Mahant. On the question of custom, the plaintiff examined several Bairagi Mahants as witnesses, and the lower courts had relied upon their evidence. Mahant Hira Das, identified as C/P W 1 and head of the Bairagi shrine at Sahri, testified that among the Bairagis the custom was that on the death of the last Mahant his ‘chela’ succeeded, and if no ‘chela’ existed, the ‘Bhatija chela’ or ‘Gurubhai’ would succeed; the ‘Bhek’ and the ‘Sewaks’ made the appointment by applying Tilak to the elected person. Another witness, Brahm Das (C/P W 2), associated with a Bairagi institution, stated that after a Guru his ‘chela’ was appointed Mahant and, in the absence of a ‘chela’, the Gaddi was given to a ‘Bhatija chela’, and that any other able person could be given the Gaddi, with the ‘Bhek’ and the ‘Sewaks’ responsible for the appointment. Balack Das, a further Bairagi Mahant, affirmed that on a Mahant’s death his able ‘chela’ was appointed, and if the ‘chela’ was not able, another person such as a ‘Gurubhai’, ‘Bhatija chela’ or ‘Pota chela’ would be appointed; he emphasized that the appointment always came from the line of the last incumbent and that the ‘Bhek’ and the ‘Sewaks’ were the appointing authority. Only one plaintiff witness, Ram Charan (P W 3), who claimed to be the Mahant of Doaba Mandal, went further to state that on the demise of the last Mahant the ‘Bhek’ and the worshippers could appoint any successor, whether a ‘chela’ or not. The Court noted that the plaintiff himself did not support this broader view, expressly declaring in his deposition that the custom required an able ‘chela’ to be appointed, and if none existed, a person would be selected from the ‘Bans’ or the spiritual family, which includes ‘Gurubhai’, ‘Bhatija chela’ and ‘Pota chela’. In the Court’s opinion the custom proven to exist in this Bairagi institution regarding succession to Mahantship required that the ‘Bhek’ of the Bairagis and the worshippers together appointed the successor, but that the appointment had to be made from the disciples of the deceased Mahant, if any, and failing disciples, a person could be chosen from the spiritual kindred such as a ‘Gurubhai’, ‘Bhatija chela’ or ‘Pota chela’.

The Court explained that the established custom for appointing a Mahant in this Bairagi institution requires that the Bhek of the Bairagis together with the worshippers of the temple select the successor. However, the successor must be chosen from among the disciples of the deceased Mahant if any such disciples exist. In the absence of any disciple, the appointment may be made from the Mahant’s spiritual relatives, which include individuals described as a “Gurubhai,” a “Bhatija chela,” or a “Pota chela.” The defendants’ position is partially correct in that a disciple of the Mahant, if present, holds the primary right to be appointed, provided he is not proven to be disabled. Nevertheless, it is inaccurate to assert that only a disciple is eligible to become Mahant; otherwise, when a Mahant dies without leaving a “chela,” no appointment could be made at all. The Court further noted that Mahantship is not hereditary in the sense that a Mahant’s “chela” automatically succeeds to the office upon the Mahant’s death. Rather, the right to become Mahant can be acquired only through appointment, and the authority to make such an appointment lies with the “Bhek” and the “Sewaks.” This principle has been judicially recognized in the decision of Jiwan Das v. Hira Das, AIR 1937 Lah 311 (B), which dealt with a similar succession dispute concerning the Mahantship of a shrine of the Ram Kabir Bairagis. Accordingly, the Court identified the first issue to be resolved: whether Kishore Das, at the time of his death, left any disciple of his own. If it is established that Ishar Das was a “chela” of Kishore Das, then the plaintiff, who admittedly is not a “chela” of Kishore Das, would be ineligible for appointment as Mahant, and even a nomination by the “Bhek” and the “Sewaks” could not confer upon him the legal rights of Mahant. Conversely, if Ishar Das was not a “chela,” the Court must then consider whether the plaintiff qualifies as a “Bhatija chela” or a spiritual agnate of Kishore Das, as the plaintiff alleges, and secondly, whether the plaintiff was validly appointed by the “Bhek” and the “Sewaks.” Regarding the question of Ishar Das’s status as a “chela,” the trial court’s finding favored the plaintiff and opposed defendant No. 3, although the High Court left that issue undecided. The High Court, however, arrived at conclusions different from those of the trial judge on the remaining two points. The Court indicated that it would examine these three points sequentially, and only if they are decided in the plaintiff’s favour would it then need to determine whether the lease granted by Kishore Das to defendants 1 and 2 constituted a valid lease that binds the endowment. The discussion of the first point, concerning the plaintiff’s case, follows.

In this matter the plaintiff asserted that Ishar Das was never a disciple, or “chela”, of Kishore Das and further maintained that Kishore Das had no disciple at all. By contrast the defendants contended that both Ishar Das and Lachman Das were disciples of Kishore Das at the time of his death. It is noteworthy that Lachman Das did not give any testimony in this case; his participation was limited to formally joining the written statement filed by Ishar Das and supporting the latter’s case, without any further involvement in the litigation. Apart from the limited assertions of a few witnesses called by the defendants that both Ishar Das and Lachman Das were disciples of the late Mahant, the record contains no documentary or testimonial material that establishes the background of Lachman Das or indicates when, if ever, he became a disciple of Kishore Das. Regarding Ishar Das, the Subordinate Judge, after considering the entire evidence, concluded definitively that he was not a disciple of Kishore Das. Because the High Court did not record any finding on this particular issue, the present Court found it necessary to examine whether the trial judge’s conclusion was proper and supported by the evidence presented.

Ishar Das, in his deposition, stated that his original residence was in Mannan and that he left his home when he was five or six years old, after being initiated as a disciple by Kishore Das, and thereafter lived with Kishore Das at the Thakardwara in Jamsher continuously. The plaintiff’s witnesses, without serious dispute from the defendants, identified Ishar Das as the same individual known as Ujagar Singh, whose father was Ganga Singh, a resident of Mannan. To demonstrate that Ishar Das never abandoned his family home, the plaintiff introduced the Khasra-Girdawari records of village Mannan (Exhibit P-7) covering the Kharif season of 1938 through the Rabi season of 1946. These records show parcels of land under the personal cultivation of Ujagar Singh and Kartar Singh as co-sharers, both described as sons of Ganga Singh. While the defendants argued that such Khasra records do not enjoy a presumption of correctness, the Court recognized them as relevant evidence admissible under section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, and they supported the plaintiff’s contention that, contrary to an ascetic lifestyle, Ishar Das (or Ujagar Singh) was actively engaged in agricultural cultivation alongside his brother and nephews during the years 1938 to 1946. During cross-examination, Ishar Das denied personally cultivating his lands, yet he simultaneously acknowledged joint ownership of his paternal properties with his nephews. Counsel for the plaintiff, Mr Achhru Ram, submitted that even a person who has taken religious vows may retain his name in revenue records, a point that the Court considered in evaluating the evidence.

The Court observed that such a conclusion was unlikely because Ishar Das was said to have renounced worldly life in 1908 when he was only five or six years old. The revenue documents, on the other hand, were prepared almost thirty years after that alleged renunciation, indicating a considerable time gap. Any remaining doubt on this point, the Court held, was removed by the production of a ration card issued to Ujagar Singh in 1946. The ration card identified Ujagar Singh as the head of a family of nine members and displayed his thumb impression, indicating that he was actively receiving supplies. Evidence from the cloth-shop owner, identified as PW 7, included a cash memo showing that on 7 December 1946 Ujagar Singh, son of Ganga Singh of Mannan, purchased cloth worth Rs 17 1⁄5 paisa. Further testimony came from PW 12, who operated a government depot for kerosene, oil and sugar in Mannan, and who recounted that Ujagar Singh had bought kerosene and sugar from the depot on several occasions. The depot register entries, which were marked as exhibits PW 12/1 and PW 12/2, corroborated the purchases of kerosene and sugar by Ujagar Singh. In addition, PW 12 testified that Ujagar Singh was actively engaged in zemindari duties as well as cultivation activities in the village of Mannan. Collectively, these documents and testimonies demonstrated that Ujagar Singh was engaged in ordinary economic and agricultural affairs well after the alleged renunciation of Ishar Das.

The Court noted that entry into a recognised religious order ordinarily generally requires formal rites and initiation ceremonies. However, no evidence was produced to show that any such ceremony had taken place when Ishar Das adopted the Bairagi way of life. The defendants sought to establish that Ishar Das was a disciple, or ‘chela’, of Mahant Kishore Das by relying heavily on two documents. They asserted that both documents were wills executed by Kishore Das, one dated 1911 and the other dated 31 March 1945, the latter being only four days before his death. The earlier document, if authenticated, would directly support the defendants’ claim because it reportedly records that Kishore Das took Ishar Das as his chela in 1908. It further states that, upon the testator’s demise, Ishar Das would succeed as Mahant of Thakardwara, thereby inheriting the leadership. However, the Court found that the original 1911 will had not been produced, nor had any certified copy of that will been presented. The version appearing in the record was a printed translation of a copy of a registered will dated 7 October 1911, supposedly executed by Mahant Kishore Das. That translation lacked any exhibit mark and was not corroborated by any witness testimony presented during the hearing. Moreover, the judgments of the lower courts did not refer to this document even incidentally, indicating that it had not been considered. The Court also observed that, assuming such a will existed and had already appointed Ishar Das as Mahant, there was no logical reason for Kishore Das to execute a second will. Especially given that the second will was made only four days before his death, the Court found no conceivable motive for its execution. Consequently, the Court deemed the alleged wills unreliable and insufficient to establish Ishar Das’s status as a disciple or successor.

Just before Kishore Das’s death the document in question appeared on the record, and the Court was unable to determine how it had been introduced. Counsel for the petitioner, Mr Achhru Ram, contended that because the document was older than thirty years, a statutory presumption under section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act should apply. The Court found that contention altogether unavailing because the language of section 90 requires that the particular document about which the presumption is sought be produced, not merely a copy. Even if a copy were admissible as secondary evidence under section 65 and showed more than thirty years’ age, only the signatures authenticating that copy could be presumed genuine; the copy could not raise a presumption that the original had been duly executed, as held in Basant Singh v. Brij Raj Saran Singh, AIR 1935 PC 132. In the present case no foundation had been laid for admitting secondary evidence under section 65, nor could the copy be treated as secondary evidence within the meaning of section 63. Consequently, the Court held that the alleged 1911 will of Kishore Das had not been proved and that the translated copy produced should be excluded from consideration.

Regarding the will allegedly executed by Kishore Das a few days before his death, the Court agreed with the trial judge that the petitioner had not proved Kishore Das was unconscious at the time of execution, yet the circumstances surrounding the execution and the contents of the document did not warrant any evidential value. The will was signed only a few days before Kishore Das’s death, on the same day that the lease challenged in this suit was executed in favour of defendants 1 and 2. Sant Ram, one of the lessees, was admitted to be Kishore Das’s agent and was managing the Thakardwara properties on his behalf. Ishar Das, in his deposition, also acknowledged Sant Ram as his agent and, in his written statement, aligned himself with the lessees, making no challenge to the lease’s validity. These facts led the Court to infer that Ishar Das was effectively a creature of Sant Ram; being Kishore Das’s nephew, Ishar Das may have been persuaded by Sant Ram to be appointed, together with Lachman Das, as a manager after Kishore Das’s death. It was noted that the will did not appoint Ishar Das as Mahant, the term “Mahant” not appearing anywhere, and that both Ishar Das and Lachman Das were named only as joint managers.

The Court observed that the only advantage claimed by the defendants was the description in the will of Ishar Das as a “chela” of Kishore Das; however, given the surrounding circumstances, this description alone carried little weight. The Court found the testimony of Ishar Das himself to be unreliable. He asserted that he had lived continuously in the Thakardwara since his initiation many years earlier, yet he could not identify the occupants of the adjacent houses. He claimed to have performed the “Kirya Karam,” the final rites of Kishore Das, but he was unable to explain what those rites entailed, recalling only that his head, beard, and moustaches were shaved as part of the ceremony. The Court noted a glaring inconsistency: the photograph produced by Ishar Das, purported to show the gathering of the “Bhek” and the “Sewaks” on the day of his appointment, depicted him with long hair, a beard, and moustaches, even though the shaving ceremony was said to have occurred four days earlier. Several witnesses were examined by both parties on this issue. The plaintiff’s witnesses, who were Sikh Jat by birth, testified that Ishar Das never became a Bairagi and was never adopted as a “chela” by Kishore. In contrast, the defendants’ witnesses asserted that he was indeed a “chela” and had lived with Kishore Das. The Court held that oral evidence of this nature could not be heavily relied upon. Relying on the documentary evidence previously referenced, the Court concurred with the Subordinate Judge that the plaintiff had failed to prove that Ishar Das was a “chela” of Kishore Das or that any “chela” existed at the time of Kishore’s death. Consequently, the Court found it unnecessary to address the further question of whether Ishar Das had been appointed a Mahant by the “Bhek” and the “Sewaks,” as alleged by him.

The Court then identified the issues that required further examination: first, whether the plaintiff, Sital Das, was eligible for appointment as Mahant of the Thakardwara in accordance with the customary practice of the institution; and second, whether such an appointment had actually taken place. The Court reiterated that the authority to appoint a successor Mahant rested with the “Bhek” and the “Sewaks,” but that such an appointment could be made only of a person who was a disciple of the preceding Mahant or, in the absence of a direct disciple, a person who was spiritually connected with the former Mahant. The Court explained that entry into a religious order is generally treated as a civil death. An individual who becomes an ascetic severs all ties with his natural family and, upon being adopted by his preceptor, becomes, in effect, a spiritual son of that preceptor. This transformation establishes a spiritual family parallel to a natural family, with other disciples of the same guru regarded as brothers and co-disciples of the guru regarded as uncles.

In this matter, the Court explained that within a monastic order the other disciples of a Guru are treated as brothers, and those who study under the same Guru but belong to a different generation are considered as uncles, thereby forming a spiritual family that mirrors the relations of a natural family. The plaintiff contended that he was a “Bhatija chela” of Mahant Kishore Das, asserting that he was a fourth-generation descendant of Ram Krishna Das, through whom Kishore Das also traced his spiritual lineage. Kishore Das admittedly accepted that he was a disciple of Behari Das, whose own Guru, Chetan Das, had been a disciple of Ram Krishna Das. Conversely, the narrative stated that Ram Krishna Das also had another disciple named Brahm Das; the disciple of Brahm Das was Mangal Das, who served as the Guru of Sadhu Ram Das, and the plaintiff Sital Das was admittedly a disciple of Sadhu Ram. If this version of the spiritual genealogy were accepted as true, there could be no dispute that Sital Das would rank as a “Bhatija chela,” that is, a spiritual collateral, of Kishore Das. The trial judge found this story credible and, in support of his decision, relied upon the evidence offered by the plaintiff together with the testimony of several Mahant witnesses whom the plaintiff had examined. The trial judge also placed reliance on a judgment marked as Exhibit P-3, which had been rendered in Civil Suit No. 24 of 1912 by the Sub-ordinate Judge of Jullundur, wherein Kishore Das and a Vidya Das appeared as plaintiffs and Mangal Das, described as the spiritual grandfather of Sital Das, was named as a defendant. The High Court, however, rejected the plaintiff’s case on this point, basing its rejection on two principal grounds. First, the learned judges held that the evidence produced by the plaintiff failed to establish that Ram Krishna Das was the common spiritual ancestor of both Kishore Das and the plaintiff. Second, the High Court concluded that the judgment embodied in Exhibit P-3 was not admissible under any provision of the Indian Evidence Act, and therefore could not be relied upon. In the present view, neither of those grounds was found to be persuasive. Two of the Mahant witnesses examined by the plaintiff affirmed in their depositions that Sital Das was the “Bhatija chela” of Kishore Das. They identified several of the spiritual forebears of both individuals, although Ram Krishna Das was not expressly named as the shared spiritual ancestor. Mahant Hira Das, in his deposition, stated: “Sital Das is not a ‘chela’ of Kishore Das. He is his ‘Bhatija chela’...............Kishore Das was ‘chela’ of Behari Das. Behari Das was the ‘chela’ of Chetan Das............The Guru of Chetan Das was Ram Krishna Das.” According to this witness, Ram Krishna Das was the spiritual forebear of Kishore Das, but he did not specifically affirm that Ram Krishna Das was also a spiritual ancestor of Sital Das, and no evidence suggested that the question had been put to him. Nonetheless, the witness unequivocally declared that Sital Das was a “Bhatija chela” of Kishore Das. Mahant Balak Das (C/P.W. 3) likewise stated that Sital Das is the “Bhatija chela” of

In the testimony of Mahant Balak Das, it was stated that the Guru of Sital Das was Sadhu Ram, but the witness was unable to identify who served as the Guru of Sadhu Ram or who was the Guru of Kishore Das. The plaintiff, however, provided a much more detailed account in his own deposition, declaring, “I am ‘Bhatija chela’ of Mahant Kishore Das. Behari Das was the Guru of Kishore Das. The name of my Guru was Sadhu Ram. Sadhu Ram’s Guru was Mangal Das. The Guru of Mangal Das was Brahm Das. The Guru of Behari Das was Chetan Das. The Guru of Chetan Das was Ram Krishna Das.” From this narrative the plaintiff sought to establish that Ram Krishna Das was the spiritual ancestor of both himself and Kishore Das. The only point of omission was that the plaintiff did not expressly state that Ram Krishna Das was also the Guru of Brahm Das. The Court considered that this minor gap in the evidence, which had been heavily emphasized by the learned High Court judges, could be supplied by reference to the judgment recorded as Exhibit P-3. It is noteworthy that the referenced judgment originated in a suit filed by two plaintiffs, namely Kishore Das and Vidya Das, whose purpose was to set aside a property alienation effected by Mangal Das, who held the office of Mahant of a Thakardwara in Jullundur. Mangal Das was acknowledged to be the Guru of Sadhu Ram Das, who in turn was the disciple of the plaintiff. The succession to the Mahant’s office, which is the subject of the present dispute, pertained to Kishore Das, who, together with Vidya Das, claimed the right to challenge Mangal Das’s alienation on the basis that they were spiritual collaterals of Mangal Das. In his judgment, the Subordinate Judge of Jullundur produced a pedigree illustrating the relationship between Kishore Das and Vidya Das on one side and Mangal Das on the other, tracing the connection through the common ancestor Ram Krishna Das. The Court agreed with the High Court that, because there was no evidence showing who had originally prepared this pedigree upon which the Subordinate Judge relied, it could not be treated as an admission made by Kishore Das, whose claim Ishar Das bases his own title. Consequently, the pedigree could not be considered an admission within the meaning of section 21 of the Indian Evidence Act. Nevertheless, the Court held that the judgment itself could be admissible under section 13 of the Evidence Act as a transaction in which Kishore Das, the source of Ishar Das’s alleged title, asserted his right as a spiritual collateral of Mangal Das and obtained a decree. That decree also recognized Kishore Das’s entitlement to file the suit in his capacity as such a collateral. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the judgment could be received as evidence, even though it does not constitute conclusive proof and must be weighed together with the oral evidence presented in the case.

It was held that although the judgment is not conclusive and must be evaluated for its true value, it may nevertheless be employed to support the oral testimony presented in the case. The Court observed that this portion of the plaintiff’s narrative had not been contested by the defendants in their evidence. Consequently, based on the evidence recorded, the Court concluded that it was fully established that Sital Das was a spiritual collateral of Kishore Das.

Turning to the issue of whether the plaintiff had been appointed Mahant by the ‘Bhek’ of the Bairagis and the ‘Sewaks’ of the Thakardwara, the Court found that the High Court’s decision was founded upon a misapprehension of the record. A detailed chronology of events from the death of Kishore Das on 4 April 1945 to the alleged election of Sital Das as Mahant on 23 July 1945 was contained in a register kept by Mahant Ram Charan Das (exhibit P.W. 3) and proved by him. Ram Charan Das, a Shri Mahant and head of a Bairagi Thakardwara at Nakodar, belonged to the allied Ram Thamman order rather than the Ram Kabir sect, but was undisputedly a Shri Mahant of the Ramanand Doaba Mandal, a Mandal of Jullundur Bairagis. A witness for the defendants, Mathura Das, admitted that in the absence of a Shri Mahant of the plaintiff’s own ‘Sampradaya’, Ram Charan was competent to confer the turban, i.e., to appoint a Mahant. According to Ram Charan Das’s deposition, corroborated by entries in the register (P.W. 3/2), Kishore Das died on 4 April 1945; the ‘Chautha’ ceremony was performed by Mahant Hira Das of Sahri Thakardwara, and on 16 April 1945 the ‘Kirya Karam’ was solemnised. Hira Das then carried Kishore Das’s remains to Hardwar for immersion in the Ganges. On 17 July 1945 Hira Das submitted a petition to the Mandal seeking immediate appointment of a Mahant to avoid leaving the ‘Gaddi’ vacant, noting that Hira Das himself was a candidate for the office. Subsequently, on 23 July 1945, the ‘Bhek’ of the Bairagis and the ‘Sewaks’ convened at the Jamsher Thakardwara and appointed the plaintiff Sital Das as Mahant. The record indicated that Sital Das had been a Sadhu from childhood, faced no complaints, and that ten or twelve local Bairagi Mahants were present at the gathering.

According to the record, a large number of worshippers were present at the ceremony. After the Havan, the ritual involving the Pagri, which is a turban, was carried out, and the entire congregation touched the Pagri before Hira Das fastened it onto the head of Sital Das. There existed a complete written record of these proceedings, and the document bore the signatures of the worshippers who were present; the Court did not find any reason to doubt its authenticity. In addition to Ram Charan Das, three other Bairagi Mahants, who had been examined by the plaintiff, gave full support to the account of the events. One of these Mahants was Hira Das of the Sahri institution; he had performed the last rites of Kishore Das and had taken a leading role in the subsequent actions that followed. After reviewing all of the evidence, the learned Subordinate Judge concluded that the plaintiff’s version of the facts was correct and that Sital Das had been validly appointed as Mahant at the meeting that was held on 23 July 1945. The High Court, however, reached a different conclusion and rejected the view adopted by the Subordinate Judge. The judges of the High Court held that the gathering on 23 July 1945 was not a proper meeting of the ‘Bhek’ and the ‘Sewaks’ who were authorised to appoint a Mahant of the Jamsher Thakardwara. They first observed that Ram Charan Das, who had presided over the meeting, did not belong to the Ram Kabir sect, which traditionally owned the Thakardwara in dispute, but instead belonged to another sect known as Ram Thamman. The second observation made by the High Court was that no formal notice of the meeting had been sent to the parent institution at Jaipur or to the Bairagis who lived in the locality concerned. The third point raised was that the three Bairagi Mahants who had been examined on behalf of defendant No. 3 had certainly not been invited to the meeting. Finally, the High Court opined that the assembly had not given proper consideration to the claim made on behalf of Ishar Das, who had been named as the successor in the last will of Kishore Das. In the present opinion, none of these reasons was found to be persuasive. It was noted at the outset that there was no evidence to establish that the head institution of the particular sect was situated at Jaipur; the only statement made by Ram Charan Das was that a ‘Gaddi’ of the Ram Kabir Math also existed at Jaipur. Conversely, the plaintiff produced evidence showing that the head institution was located at Sahri, where Hira Das served as Mahant and where he had personally performed the funeral rites of Kishore Das and had taken a leading part in the subsequent proceedings. It was acknowledged that Ram Charan Das belonged to the Ram Thamman sect, but this sect was also a Bairagi order allied to the Ram Kabir tradition. Moreover, Ram Charan Das was recognised as the Shri Mahant of the Doaba Mandal, and the testimony of the defendants’ own witnesses demonstrated that he was highly respected by all the Bairagis and was considered suitably qualified to confer the Pagri upon the newly appointed Mahant.

In this case the Court observed that the three Mahants who gave testimony in favour of defendant No 3 and claimed that they had taken part in appointing him as Mahant at a meeting held on the seventeenth day after the death of Kishore Das might not have spoken truthfully. The Court noted that even if those three Bairagi Mahants had indeed participated in appointing Ishar Das as Mahant, there was no evidence that they were present at the gathering convened on 23 July 1945. Setting aside the testimony of those three Mahants, the Court turned to the evidence presented by the plaintiff, which demonstrated that ten to twelve Bairagi Mahants from the locality, together with a large number of Sewaks, were present at the meeting held on 23 July 1945. Consequently the Court concluded that the majority of the Bairagis had participated in the appointment of the plaintiff as Mahant. The Court further noted that it had not been informed of any customary practice within the institution requiring the issuance of formal invitations for such meetings, and none of the witnesses called by the defendants addressed the matter of formal notices preceding the appointment of defendant No 3. On the basis of the material before it the Court held that the decision of the Subordinate Judge was correct and that it preferred that decision to the view expressed by the learned Judges of the High Court. Accordingly the Court affirmed that Sital Das, the plaintiff, was eligible for appointment as Mahant and that he had indeed been appointed by the Bhek and the Sewaks assembled at Jamsher Thakardwara on 23 July 1945.

Having made these findings the Court proceeded to examine whether the lease granted in favour of defendants 1 and 2, which was contested in this suit, was founded on legal necessity and thereby binding on the institution. The Court observed that defendants 1 and 2 had produced no evidence to support their position and had made no effort to demonstrate whether, in view of the profits ordinarily derivable from the property, the rent stipulated in the lease was reasonable. Moreover the lessees had avoided giving evidence and under these circumstances the Court was compelled to hold that they had failed to meet the burden of proof that rested upon them to show that the transaction represented a prudent act of management by the Mahant within his competence. In view of these conclusions the Court affirmed that the view adopted by the Subordinate Judge was correct. Consequently the appeal was allowed, the judgment and decree of the High Court were set aside and the judgment and decree of the trial court were restored. The plaintiff was awarded costs against defendants 1 and 2 for all the courts.