Sardar Soma Singh And Others vs The State Of Pepsu And Union Of India
Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.
Court: Supreme Court of India
Case Number: Petition No. 325 of 1953
Decision Date: 11 March, 1954
Coram: Mehar Chand Mahajan, B.K. Mukherjea, Vivian Bose, Ghulam Hasan, Das, Sudhi Ranjan
Sardar Soma Singh and others filed a petition against the State of Pepsu and the Union of India, and the case was decided on 11 March 1954 by the Supreme Court of India. The judgment was authored by a bench that included Mehar Chand Mahajan, B.K. Mukherjea, Vivian Bose and Ghulam Hasan, while additional references in the record list the bench as consisting of Justice Das, Justice Sudhi Ranjan, Justice Mahajan (Chief Justice), Justice Mehar Chand, Justice Mukherjea, Justice B.K., Justice Bose, Justice Vivian and Justice Hasan.
The parties were identified as petitioner Sardar Soma Singh and others and respondents the State of Pepsu and the Union of India. The judgment was delivered on 11 March 1954 and is reported in the law reports as 1954 AIR 311 and 1954 SCR 955, with subsequent citations in later reports such as R 1962 SC 191 (16) and R 1968 SC 331 (14). The central question before the Court concerned the Constitution of India, article 286(3), and whether the Patiala and East Punjab States Union General Sales Tax Ordinance, 2006 (No. XXXIII of 2006), promulgated on 6 November 1949, was ultra vires the Constitution.
The headnote of the decision states that the Ordinance was held not to be ultra vires article 286(3). The Court explained that clause (3) of article 286 envisions a law made after the Constitution came into force, because it requires the law to be enacted by a “Legislature of a State” that exists under the Constitution.
The case was presented under original jurisdiction as Petition No. 325 of 1953, filed under article 32 of the Constitution for the enforcement of fundamental rights. Counsel for the petitioners included S.P. Sinha appearing with Bakshi Man Singh. For the first respondent, the State of Pepsu, the Solicitor‑General for India, C.K. Daphtary, appeared with J.N. Kaushal, accompanied by P.G. Gokhale. For the second respondent, the Union of India, the same Solicitor‑General, C.K. Daphtary, appeared with Porus A. Mehta and P.G. Gokhale.
Justice Das delivered the judgment of the Court. The short issue raised in the petition was whether the Patiala and East Punjab States Union General Sales Tax Ordinance, 2006, having been promulgated on 6 November 1949, became void by operation of the Constitution when it commenced. Article 286(3) of the Constitution was read as follows: “No law made by the Legislature of a State imposing, or authorising the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of any such goods as have been declared by Parliament by law to be essential for the life of the community shall have effect unless it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent.”
The Essential Goods (Declaration and Regulation of Tax on Sale or Purchase) Act, 1952 (Central Act No. LII of 1952) had declared certain commodities essential for the life of the community. In the schedule to that Act, item 8 covered “all cloth, woven on handlooms, coarse and medium cotton cloth made in mills or woven on power looms.” Section 3 of the same Act dealt with the regulation of tax on such essential goods. The petitioners, who were dealers in coarse and medium cotton cloth, argued that because these commodities were declared essential, they should not be subject to sales tax under the Ordinance, and they contended that Section 3 of the 1952 Act conflicted with article 286(3). The Court found no substance to that contention, observing that Section 3 was consistent with article 286(3) and there was no inconsistency between the statutory provision and the constitutional clause. Consequently, the petitioners remained liable to tax under the Ordinance No. XXXIII of 2006.
The Court explained that the Essential Goods (Declaration and Regulation of Tax on Sale or Purchase) Act, 1952 contained a provision which read: “sale or purchase of essential goods: No law made after the commencement of this Act by the Legislature of a State imposing, or authorising the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of any goods declared by this Act to be essential for the life of the community shall have effect unless it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent.” The petitioners, who dealt in coarse cloth and medium cotton cloth, argued that because these commodities had been declared essential for the life of the community, they could not be liable to pay sales tax on them. The petition asserted that section 3 of Act LII of 1952 directly contravened article 286(3) of the Constitution. The Court found that this contention lacked substance. It observed that section 3 was fully consistent with article 286(3) and there was no inconsistency between the statutory provision and the constitutional article. The petitioners were, however, being taxed under Union General Sales Tax Ordinance XXXIII of 2006, a law that had been continued in force by article 372 of the Constitution. The Court examined whether the Ordinance fell foul of article 286(3) or had been altered, repealed or amended by a competent authority. It held that section 3 of the 1952 Act did not affect the Ordinance because the Ordinance had not been made after the commencement of that Act. The only remaining issue was whether the Ordinance conflicted with clause (8) of article 286. The Court noted that clause (8) contemplated a law made by a State Legislature created by the Constitution, a law that would have to be reserved for the President’s consideration and obtain his assent. Since the Ordinance was a pre‑Constitution law continued by article 372, it could not be subject to the reservation and assent requirement. Consequently, the Court saw no need to opine on the validity of any post‑Constitution law made before the 1952 Act came into operation. Finding the petition without merit, the Court dismissed it with costs. The petition was dismissed. The petitioners were represented by an agent named Sardar Singh, while the respondent’s side was represented by an agent identified as R. H. Dhebar.