Ravanna Subanna vs G.S. Kaggeerappa

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 21 May 1954

Coram: B.K. Mukherjea

In this case, the Court noted that the appeal had reached the Supreme Court on a special leave basis and challenged a judgment of the Division Bench of the Mysore High Court dated 2 February 1953. That High Court judgment had reversed an order dated 10 October 1952 issued by the Sub-Judge of Tumkur, who was acting as Election Commissioner in Election Miscellaneous Case No 1 of 1952-53. The Court observed that the factual background of the dispute was concise and largely undisputed. An election for the Town Municipal Councillorship of Gubbi, a town in the State of Mysore, had been conducted in March 1952. The appellant, Ravanna Subanna, and the respondent, G.S. Kaggeerappa, had been the only two candidates contesting the seat. During the scrutiny of nomination papers, the respondent objected to the appellant’s nomination on the ground that the appellant was then holding an office of profit under the Government as Chairman of the Gubbi Taluk Development Committee, and therefore was disqualified under Section 14 of the Mysore Town Municipalities Act, 1951. The objection was overruled, and both candidates proceeded to poll. After voting, the appellant was declared elected. Consequently, the respondent filed an election petition before the Sub-Judge, Tumkur, seeking to set aside the appellant’s election on the basis that the appellant was a disqualified candidate within the meaning of Section 14(1)(A)(a)(iii) of the Act, and also praying that, as the sole rival, he should be declared duly elected. The Sub-Judge, by his order dated 10 October 1952, dismissed the petition, holding, inter alia, that the appellant, as a non-official Chairman of the Taluk Development Committee, received only a nominal fee of Rs 6 per sitting and therefore did not occupy an office of profit as contemplated by Section 14 of the Act.

The respondent then appealed the Sub-Judge’s decision to the High Court of Mysore, where the matter was heard by a Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Medapa and Justice Vasudevamurthy. By the judgment dated 2 February 1953, the High Court allowed the appeal, reversed the Election Commissioner’s order, set aside the appellant’s election, and declared the respondent to be duly elected. The propriety of that judgment was the issue brought before this Court. The appellant advanced three principal contentions. First, it was argued that the election petition filed by the respondent was legally misconceived and that the appropriate remedy, if any, lay in an appeal to the Government, which alone possessed the authority to decide questions of disqualification under Section 14 of the Act. Second, the appellant contended that, on the established facts, he did not hold an office of profit under the Government and therefore was not disqualified from being elected a Councillor. Third, the appellant maintained that even assuming his election could be set aside, the Act required a fresh election to be conducted, and therefore the High Court could not lawfully declare the respondent to be the duly elected candidate.

In this case the appellant argued three separate points. First, he maintained that the election petition filed by the respondent was fundamentally misconceived and could not be sustained in law. He asserted that any relief the respondent might seek should be obtained by filing an appeal to the Government, which he said was the sole authority empowered to decide and issue definitive orders on questions of disqualification of candidates under Section 14 of the Act. Second, the appellant contended that, based on the facts admitted by both sides, he did not hold an office of profit under the Government and therefore was not disqualified from being elected as a Councillor. Third, the appellant submitted that even if his election were to be set aside, the provisions of the Act required that a fresh election be conducted; consequently, the High Court could not lawfully declare the respondent to be the duly elected candidate. Regarding the first ground, counsel for the appellant placed strong reliance on Section 14 of the Act and argued that the provisions of Section 14 and those of Section 20 of the Act operate in a mutually exclusive manner. He explained that the basis on which the respondent challenged the validity of the appellant’s election falls directly under Section 14 and must be dealt with in accordance with that section alone, and that such a challenge cannot be presented as an election petition under Section 20.

Section 14 of the Act is intended to address the general disqualifications applicable to a person seeking to become a Councillor. Sub-section (1) of this section lists the various grounds that would render a person ineligible to be chosen as, or to serve as, a Councillor. One of the enumerated grounds is that the person holds an office of profit under the Government of India or under any State listed in the First Schedule to the Constitution. After setting out these disqualification grounds, Sub-section (1) provides that “If any person is elected as a councillor in contravention of these provisions, his seat shall be deemed to be vacant.” A proviso to this provision adds that “Nothing in this section shall invalidate the election, if the disqualification is such as could have been brought to the notice of the Returning Officer at the time of or before the scrutiny of the nomination papers and has not been so brought to his notice.” Sub-section (2) deals with situations where a disqualification arises after a person has already been elected as a Councillor. Sub-section (3) then states: “If any question or dispute arises whether a vacancy has occurred under this section, the orders of the Government shall be final for the purpose of deciding such question or dispute.” Turning to Section 20 of the Act, it is evident that this provision is designed to prescribe the procedure for an enquiry into the validity of an election by the Election Commissioner. Sub-section (1) of Section 20 sets out the initial framework for how such enquiries are to be initiated.

Section 20 of the Act prescribed the time limit and the person authorized to present an election petition. Sub-section 2 described the nature of the order that the Election Commissioner could pass, stating that the Commissioner might confirm the declared result, amend it, or set the election aside. Clause (a) of Sub-section 3 provided that if the Election Commissioner was satisfied that a candidate had committed any corrupt practice, the Commissioner would declare that candidate disqualified both for the election in question and for any fresh election conducted under Sub-section 2, and would set aside the election of that candidate if he had been returned. Clause (b) stipulated that where Clause (a) was inapplicable and the validity of the election was contested between two or more candidates, the Election Commissioner, after scrutinising and computing the votes cast for each candidate, would declare the candidate with the greatest number of valid votes to be duly elected. Sub-section 4 defined what constituted a corrupt practice. Sub-section 5, which was material to the present case, held that if the election’s validity was challenged solely on the ground of an error by the officer or officers responsible for implementing the rules made under Clause (b) of Sub-section 2 of Section 208, or on the basis of an irregularity or informality not caused corruptly, the Election Commissioner was not empowered to set aside the election. An explanatory note clarified that the term “error” did not include any breach, omission, or non-compliance with the provisions of the Act or its rules that materially affected the election result. The learned counsel for the appellant correctly observed that the alleged disqualification fell squarely within Section 14 of the Act. According to the respondent, the appellant had been elected a Councillor in violation of the disqualification provisions of Section 14, and therefore his seat should be deemed vacant under that section. Because this objection had been raised before the Returning Officer, the rival candidate could not be barred from raising the issue; however, counsel argued that the only authority competent to resolve such a dispute was the Government, whose decision was final pursuant to Sub-section 3 of Section 14. It was further noted that Section 20 did not enumerate the grounds on which an election petition could be filed to set aside an election. The language of Clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-section 3 appeared to limit petitions to allegations of corrupt practice or vote-computation irregularities, leading counsel to assert that the sole remedy available to a person aggrieved by a lack of qualification in the returned candidate was to approach the Government under Section 14(3), and that an election petition under Section 20 was not maintainable in such circumstances.

In this case, the Court observed that when a person claims that the returned candidate lacked the requisite qualification, the appropriate remedy is to approach the Government under Section 14(3) of the Act; an election petition under Section 20 cannot be maintained. The Court noted that, prima facie, this argument has merit. It referred to the wording of Section 14, which provides that if a person is elected as a Councillor in violation of the disqualification provisions contained in that section, the seat of the returned candidate is deemed vacant. That language indicates that the election becomes void automatically and does not require setting aside by a petition under Section 20. Further, the Court observed that once a vacancy arises and Section 14(3) designates the Government as the final authority to decide such disputes, it would be unreasonable to allow the same issue to be pursued before the Election Commissioner under Section 20, because that could create conflicting decisions by two authorities. The respondent’s counsel argued that Section 14(3) only applies to disqualifications that arise after the election, not to those existing beforehand, and therefore the Government’s power to issue orders is limited to the former situation. The counsel also submitted that the expression “any non-compliance with the provisions of this Act” in the Explanation to Section 20(5) is broad enough to cover an initial disability of a candidate who was not qualified to be elected as a Councillor. The Court examined this first contention and found that the language of Section 14(3), specifically the phrase “whether a vacancy has occurred under this section,” appears to cover both antecedent and subsequent disqualifications. The Explanation to Section 20(5) creates a difficulty, and the Court noted that the various parts of that section seem not to have been drafted with adequate care. To harmonise Section 20 with Section 14, the Court considered that either a narrow construction of Section 14(3) or a restricted reading of Section 20(5) would be required, or else one would have to assume that the remedies under the two sections are cumulative, an assumption the Court regarded as unreasonable. However, the Court concluded that it was unnecessary to resolve this doctrinal question because the appeal succeeded on the second ground raised by the appellant—that he was not subject to any disqualification and therefore was not ineligible to be

In this case, the Court examined whether, at the material time, the appellant occupied any office of profit under the Government. It was not contested that the appellant, at the time he filed his nomination paper and also when the election was held, was serving as the Chairman of the Gubbi Taluk Development Committee. Consequently, the issue was narrowed to the question of whether that chairmanship constituted an office of profit within the meaning of Section 14(1)(A)(a)(iii) of the Act. The Court explained that, in plain terms, an office of profit must be a position held under the Government to which some form of pay, salary, emolument, or allowance is attached. The term “profit” implies a pecuniary advantage; while the exact quantum of any gain is not decisive, the amount of money that a person receives in connection with the office may be relevant in determining whether the office truly carries profit.

The Court described the Taluk Development Committee as part of a scheme for reorganising rural development. The Committee functions as an advisory body composed of ten members and is presided over by a non-official Chairman. The Chairman does not perform any executive duties; those responsibilities are vested entirely in the Taluk Magistrate, who acts as the ex-officio Secretary of the Committee, with a Special Revenue Inspector serving as Assistant Secretary. The Chairman’s role is limited to presiding over meetings that are convened by the Secretary in consultation with him. According to the Committee’s rules, the Chairman is entitled to a fee of six rupees for each sitting that he attends. From the facts presented, the Court inferred that this fee is intended merely to defray the Chairman’s out-of-pocket expenses incurred in attending the meetings, rather than to constitute remuneration or profit. The Court further observed that it was not the intention of the Government, which created these Taluk Development Committees to be staffed exclusively by non-officials, that the positions of Chairman or members should carry any profit or remuneration.

The High Court, when deciding the matter against the appellant, had placed great emphasis on Section 2 of the Mysore Legislature (Prevention of Disqualifications) Act 1951. That provision states that a person shall not be disqualified for being chosen as, or for being, a member of the Mysore Legislature solely because he holds any of the offices of profit listed in the schedule to the Act. Item 2 of that schedule specifically mentions “the Chairman, Director or member of any committee or board appointed by the Government.” The Court noted that this clause does not necessarily mean that every office described in the schedule must be regarded as an office of profit regardless of whether any profit is actually attached to it. The purpose of the provision, the Court held, appears to be to grant an exemption to holders of offices of certain descriptions, allowing them to enjoy this exemption even if, otherwise, they might be considered as holding offices of profit. In other words, the statute seeks to protect individuals occupying particular offices from disqualification, not to declare those offices automatically profit-bearing.

The section provides that persons holding certain offices listed in the schedule, including the Chairman or a member of a committee or board appointed by the Government, shall not be disqualified from being chosen as a member of the Legislature solely because they hold an office of profit. The Court does not interpret that the provision automatically classifies every office mentioned in the schedule as an office of profit regardless of whether any profit is actually attached to it, nor does it suggest that, but for this provision, the holders of those offices would be ineligible to be chosen as legislators. The purpose of the section appears to be to give an exemption to persons who hold offices of certain descriptions, and the effect is that they will enjoy this exemption even if, in other circumstances, they might be considered holders of offices of profit. Consequently, it cannot be argued that a Chairman or a member of a Government committee who serves solely in an honorary capacity without any remuneration would nevertheless be deemed to hold an office of profit under the wording of the section. The Court believes that the provision was introduced out of abundant caution and nothing more. Accordingly, the Court finds the High Court’s view to be incorrect and holds that the appellant was not occupying any office of profit under the Government at the relevant time, and therefore he was fully entitled to be chosen as a Councillor under the Mysore Town Municipalities Act. The appeal is allowed, the judgment of the High Court is set aside, and the judgment of the Sub-Judge, Tumkur, is restored. The appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal. Because the Court has declared the appellant’s election to be valid, the third point raised by the appellant does not need to be considered.