Rattan Anmol Singh And Another vs Atma Ram And Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeals Nos. 213A and 213B of 1953

Decision Date: 21 May 1954

Coram: Vivian Bose, B.K. Mukherjea, B.K. Aiyyar, T.L. Venkatarama

In the matter titled Rattan Anmol Singh and Another versus Atma Ram and Others, the Supreme Court of India rendered its judgment on 21 May 1954. The bench that heard the case consisted of Justices Vivian Bose, B. K. Mukherjea, Aiyar and T. L. Venkatarama. The petitioners were Rattan Anmol Singh and another individual, while the respondents were Atma Ram and others. The judgment was reported in the law reports as 1954 AIR 510 and 1955 SCR 481, and it has subsequently been cited in several later decisions, including F 1956 SC 140 (2), R 1959 SC 93 (15-16), E R 1960 SC 1049 (16), R 1970 SC 110 (4) and E 1973 SC 178 (9). The statutory framework central to the dispute was the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (XLIII of 1961), specifically sections 2(1)(k), 33(1) and 33(2), 36(2)(d) and 36(4), together with the Representation of the People (Conduct of Elections and Election Petitions) Rules, 1951, rule 2(2). The factual controversy concerned a nomination paper that had been subscribed by a proposer and a seconder who were illiterate; they had placed thumb-marks in place of signatures and those thumb-marks had not been attested. The core issue was whether such attestation was a mandatory formality, at what stage it must be completed, and whether a failure could be cured at the scrutiny stage. The Court held that under section 33(1) each nomination paper must be subscribed by a proposer and a seconder, and where the individuals are illiterate the thumb-marks must be attested in the manner prescribed by rule 2(2). The Court explained that signing, whenever required, must strictly follow the Act and that where a signature cannot be written, the authorization must be effected as per the Rules. It further observed that attestation is not a mere technicality within the meaning of section 36(4); it is an essential requirement that must exist at the time of presentation of the nomination. Consequently, a complete omission of attestation could not be validated later at the scrutiny stage, just as a candidate’s total failure to sign could not be cured thereafter. Section 36 was described as mandatory, directing the Returning Officer to refuse any nomination that fails to comply with any provision of section 33. The judgment arose from civil appeals numbered 213A and 213B of 1953, which were filed by special leave against the order dated 24 June 1953 of the Ludhiana Election Tribunal in Election Petition 153 of 1952. The Solicitor-General for India, C. K. Daphtary, appeared for the appellant in appeal 213A, while counsel for the respondents and other parties were also listed. The judgment of the Court was delivered by Justice Bose, concluding the Court’s analysis of the validity of the nomination paper and the statutory requirements governing attestation.

Two appeals were filed against the decision of the Election Tribunal at Ludhiana. The election concerned two seats in the Punjab Legislative Assembly. The constituency was a double-member constituency, with one seat open to any candidate and the other seat reserved for a Scheduled Caste. The first respondent, Atma Ram, had stood for the reserved seat, but his nomination was rejected by the Returning Officer at the scrutiny stage, and consequently he could not contest the election. The candidates who were declared successful were Rattan Anmol Singh, who was the appellant in Civil Appeal No 213-A of 1953, for the general seat, and Ram Prakash, who was the appellant in Civil Appeal No 213-B of 1953, for the reserved seat. After his nomination was turned down, Atma Ram filed an election petition. The Election Tribunal, by a majority of two to one, decided in his favour and declared the whole election void. Both Rattan Anmol Singh and Ram Prakash appealed this judgment. The principal issue before the Court was whether the Returning Officer was correct in rejecting the petitioner’s nomination papers. The facts that led to the rejection were as follows: the Rules required that each nomination paper be “subscribed” by a proposer and a seconder. The petitioner submitted four nomination papers, and in each case the proposer and the seconder were illiterate and therefore placed a thumb-mark instead of a signature. However, these thumb-marks were not attested. The Returning Officer held that without attestation the thumb-marks were invalid and consequently rejected the papers. The Court therefore had to determine whether the Returning Officer was right to hold that lack of attestation rendered the nomination papers invalid. In addition, a subsidiary question arose: assuming that attestation was indeed required by the Rules, does an omission of the required attestation constitute a technical defect of an unsubstantial character that the Returning Officer must disregard under section 36(4) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (XLIII of 1951)?

Section 33(1) of the Act required each candidate to “deliver to the Returning Officer… a nomination paper completed in the prescribed form and subscribed by the candidate himself as assenting to the nomination and by two persons referred to in sub-section (2) as proposer and seconder.” Sub-section (2) further provided that any person whose name was registered in the electoral roll could act as proposer or seconder and could subscribe as many nomination papers as there were vacancies to be filled. The controversy therefore centred on the meaning of the word “subscribed,” which the Act had not defined. The prescribed nomination form referred to in subsection (1) of section 33 was set out in Schedule II and contained the following fields: “9. Name of the proposer; 12. Signature of the proposer; 13. Name of the seconder; 16. Signature of the seconder.” The Oxford English Dictionary listed thirteen shades of meaning for “subscribe,” most of which were obsolete or rarely used. The two meanings relevant to the present matter were: (1) to write one’s name or mark on, originally at the bottom of a document, especially as a witness or contesting party; and (2) to sign one’s name to signify assent or adhesion, that is, to attest by signing. The first meaning was described as “rare,” while the second represented the modern usage and was also one of the meanings given to the word “sign,” namely “to attest or confirm by adding one’s signature; to affix one’s name to a document.” Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, third edition, explained that “subscribe” means to write under something in accordance with prescribed regulations where any such exist, but that the term may sometimes be construed, as in the attestation of a will, to mean “to give assent to, or to attest.” It also noted that subscription is a method of signing, though not the only method, and that a stamped or other mechanical impression of a signature could be acceptable for election papers. These authorities indicated that the word “subscribe” could be employed in various senses to indicate different modes of signing, and that it could include thumb-marks as a form of assent.

The Court examined the meanings of the word “subscribe” as set out in leading dictionaries. The Oxford English Dictionary records two principal senses. The first, described as rare, is “to write (one’s name or mark) on, originally at the bottom of a document, especially as a witness or contesting party; to sign one’s name to.” The second, which is the modern meaning, is defined as “to sign one’s name to; to signify assent or adhesion by signing one’s name; to attest by signing.” The latter definition aligns with one of the meanings given to the word “sign,” namely “to attest or confirm by adding one’s signature; to affix one’s name to a document.” The Court also referred to the third-edition Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, which states: “Subscribe. (1) ‘Subscribe’ means to write under something in accordance with prescribed regulations where any such exist.” Although this is the strict primary meaning, the dictionary observes that the term may sometimes, for example in the attestation of a will, be construed as “to give assent to, or to attest” or “written upon.” In addition, the dictionary notes that “(3) ‘Subscription is a method of signing; it is not the only method’; a stamped, or other mechanical impression of a signature is good, in the case of electioneering papers.” From these authorities, the Court concluded that the word can be employed in various senses to indicate different modes of signing and that it includes the placement of a mark. The General Clauses Act further provides that “‘sign’ with reference to a person who is unable to write his name, includes ‘mark’,” subject to there being nothing repugnant in the subject or context of the Act. Accordingly, the Court identified the crux of the issue as whether, under the Representation of the People Act, the terms “sign” and “subscribe” carry the same meaning and whether either term may encompass the making of a mark. The Tribunal’s majority held that the two words are not used in the same sense because the Act gives a special meaning to the word “sign” but none to “subscribe.” Consequently, the Tribunal reasoned that “subscribe” must be given its ordinary meaning, which is to “sign” in the ordinary way, not in the special way prescribed by the Act, and that under the General Clauses Act the ordinary meaning includes making a mark. The Court disagreed with this reasoning, stating that it was fallacious. It noted that the General Clauses Act does not define “subscribe” any more than the Representation of the People Act, and that if it is improper to exclude the special meaning attached to “sign” in the Representation Act because “sign” is defined and “subscribe” is not, it is equally improper to import the special definition of “sign” from the General Clauses Act, which also defines only “sign.” Moreover, the subject and context of the Representation of the People Act demonstrate that the writing of a signature and the making of a mark are to be treated differently. The learned counsel

For the respondent, counsel examined the Act and highlighted that the term “subscribe” appears only in Chapter I of Part V, which deals with the nomination of candidates, whereas the word “sign” is used throughout the remainder of the statute. The counsel could not determine the reason for this selective usage, but agreed with the argument of the Solicitor-General that the Legislature possibly intended to emphasize that the proposer and the seconder are not merely attesting to the candidate’s signature on the nomination form; rather, they are actively presenting the individual as a suitable candidate for election and are prepared to vouch for that person. Moreover, the counsel observed that the candidate’s signature signifies more than a simple verification of the factual correctness of the information on the form; it also conveys the candidate’s assent to his own nomination. The Solicitor-General’s view seemed persuasive, particularly because Section 33 refers to “a nomination paper completed in the prescribed form and subscribed by the candidate himself as assenting to the nomination.” Irrespective of that interpretation, it is clear from the nomination form itself that signatures are required. The definition of “sign” further demonstrates that the Legislature attached special importance to protecting illiterate persons who cannot write their names, requiring that their signatures be formally authenticated in a prescribed manner to guard against misrepresentation and fraud. In effect, the statute provides a special protective shield for such persons, similar to the way ordinary law protects vulnerable groups. Section 2 of the Act is labeled an interpretation clause and provides, among other things, that “‘sign’ in relation to a person who is unable to write his name means authenticate in such manner as may be prescribed,” unless the context requires otherwise. Consequently, wherever the element of signing must be incorporated into any provision of the Act, it must be interpreted in accordance with that definition. Whether “subscribe” is merely a synonym for “sign” or whether it carries an additional implication of a particular assent, the requirement of signing must still be satisfied; the schedule confirms this by mandating certain signatures. Accordingly, the Court is of the opinion that whenever a signature is required, it must be executed strictly in line with the Act’s requirements, and if a person is unable to write a signature, it must be authorized in the manner prescribed by the Rules. The Court does not decide whether this places excessive emphasis on the authorization process, but it is undisputed that the matter is treated as one of special significance and that a special provision exists to address such cases. Hence, the Court considers it bound to give full effect to this legislative policy.

In this case the Court observed that the term “subscribe” can denote either the act of signing or the act of placing a mark, and that the word is capable of being employed in both senses. Accordingly, the Court held that it must give effect to the general policy of the Act by maintaining the same distinction between signing and making a mark that the Act itself draws in the definition of “sign.” Although the Act does not provide a definition of “subscribe,” the Court found that when the Act is read in its entirety together with the form set out in the second schedule, the word can only be understood to refer to the making of a signature. The Act expressly explains how the various kinds of “signature” are to be effected, and consequently the Court must give effect to that provision. In the situation where a person is unable to write his name, the Act requires that his “signature” be authenticated in the manner prescribed. The prescribed manner is contained in rule 2(2) of the Representation of the People (Conduct of Elections and Election Petitions) Rules, 1951, which provides that a person who cannot write his name shall, unless the rules expressly state otherwise, be deemed to have signed an instrument or other paper if he places a mark on that instrument in the presence of the Returning Officer, the presiding officer, or any other officer designated by the Election Commission, and that officer, having satisfied himself of the person’s identity, attests the mark as being that person’s mark. From this provision the Court concluded that attestation in the prescribed manner is mandatory for proposers and seconders who are unable to write their names. The four nomination papers under consideration were not signed by the proposers and seconders in the ordinary manner of writing their names, and because the marks placed on those papers were not attested, they did not satisfy the special signing requirement prescribed by the Act. Since the papers were not signed either by writing or by a duly attested mark, they could not be said to have been “subscribed,” because to subscribe necessarily imports a signature, and the Act recognises only the types of signatures it expressly defines for the purpose of signing. Consequently, the Court determined that none of the four nomination papers contained a valid signature of either a proposer or a seconder. Accordingly, the Returning Officer was bound to reject the papers under section 36(2)(d) of the Act on the ground of non-compliance with section 33, unless the Officer could have relied on the exception in section 36(4). The Court noted that the latter provision was not applicable in the present circumstances.

The Court considered the statutory provision that the Returning Officer shall not reject any nomination paper on the ground of any technical defect which is not of a substantial character. The issue, therefore, was whether the requirement of attestation constituted merely a technical or unsubstantial condition. The Court held that it could not be treated as such. When law mandates a particular formality, that formality cannot be ignored and its substantive purpose must be fulfilled. In the present context, the substance lay in the Returning Officer’s satisfaction at a specific moment that the person making a mark in lieu of a signature was correctly identified. The Court noted that if the Returning Officer had omitted the attestation due to an inadvertent slip, and if it could be proved that he was nevertheless satisfied at the appropriate time, the omission might be characterised as an unsubstantial technicality because the essential element of his satisfaction would still be present. However, the Court found it impossible to accept that the law, which requires the officer’s satisfaction at a particular time, could be dispensed with altogether. It observed that the attestation requirement was as necessary and as substantial as attestation in the execution of a will or a mortgage and was on the same footing as the subscription required of the candidate himself. Where there is no signature or mark, the form must be rejected and the absence cannot be dismissed as a mere technical defect. The Court emphasized that the “satisfaction” of the Returning Officer prescribed by the rules was not a lesser or optional requirement. Turning to the question of whether attestation could be compelled at the scrutiny stage, the Court accepted that no attempt had been made at the presentation stage to satisfy the Returning Officer regarding the identity of the proposers and seconders, although evidence showed an attempt was made at scrutiny. The Returning Officer denied this, but the Court held that even if identities could have been proved to his satisfaction at that later stage, it would have been too late because the attestation and the officer’s satisfaction must exist at the presentation stage; a total omission of this essential feature could not be validated subsequently, just as a candidate’s failure to sign could not be cured later. Section 36 was described as mandatory, obliging the Returning Officer to refuse any nomination where there has been any failure to comply with any provision of section 33. The Court clarified that the Returning Officer’s only jurisdiction at the scrutiny stage is to examine whether nominations are in order and to hear and decide objections. He cannot at that stage remedy essential defects or allow them to be remedied, even though he is not to reject a nomination on a non-substantial technical defect.

In this matter the Court explained that the Returning Officer may reject a nomination on the ground of a technical defect only when that defect does not have a substantial effect, but the officer does not have the power to correct such a defect. The officer is required to leave the nomination untouched. The Court further clarified that if a defect is merely technical and does not affect the essential content of the nomination, the defect is of no consequence and does not invalidate the paper. On the other hand, if the defect is not merely technical, the officer is not permitted to remedy it at the scrutiny stage because the officer’s jurisdiction at that stage is limited to checking whether the nominations are in order and to hearing and deciding objections, not to fixing essential flaws. Applying this principle, the Court agreed with the Chairman of the Election Tribunal that the Returning Officer had correctly rejected the nomination papers that were before him. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeals, ordered that the costs of the proceedings be awarded, and set aside the Election Tribunal’s order which had declared the elections of the two successful candidates to be wholly void. The Court also dismissed the election petition, ordering that costs be awarded to the prevailing party. In sum, both appeals were allowed, the Tribunal’s void-election order was reversed, and the election petition was dismissed with costs.