Rananjaya Singh vs Baijnath Singh and Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 73 of 1954

Decision Date: 29 September, 1954

Coram: Mehar Chand Mahajan, B.K. Mukherjea, Vivian Bose, Ghulam Hasan

In the matter styled Rananjaya Singh versus Baijnath Singh and Others, the Supreme Court delivered its judgment on 29 September 1954. The bench that heard the appeal comprised Justice Mehar Chand Mahajan, Justice B. K. Mukherjea, Justice Vivian Bose, Justice Ghulam Hasan and the Chief Justice. The case was recorded as Civil Appeal No 73 of 1954 and arose on special leave from the order dated 11 February 1954 of the Election Tribunal at Allahabad, which had been issued in Election Petition No 252 of 1952. The appellant, Rananjaya Singh, was represented by counsel appearing for him, while the first respondent, Baijnath Singh, was represented by counsel appearing for the respondent. The official citation of the decision is 1954 AIR 749 and 1955 SCR 671; subsequent citation references include R 1971 SC 267 (33), R 1971 SC 1295 (16, 18, 85), R 1975 SC 308 (12, 14), RF 1975 SC 2299 (117, 492, 495, 501), D 1985 SC 1133 (6, 11), F 1987 SC 1577 (19) and R 1989 SC 1737 (11). The judgment concerned the application of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (Act XLIII of 1951), specifically sections 77, 123(7) and 124(4). The headnote explained that section 123(7) requires that, for a practice to be deemed corrupt, any excess expenditure must be incurred or authorised by the candidate or his agent, and the employment of additional persons must also be by the candidate or his agent. The charge against the appellant alleged that the manager, assistant manager, twenty Ziladars of Amethi and their peons and orderlies had worked for the appellant in connection with the election. The Election Tribunal had held that, although the estate belonged to the appellant’s father, the appellant, being the heir apparent and actually looking after the estate on behalf of the elderly proprietor, could be said to have “virtually” his own servants and that these servants were therefore employed for payment by the appellant. The Court found this reasoning untenable because section 77 of the Act merely speaks of persons who may be employed for payment without specifying by whom they are employed, whereas the essence of a corrupt practice under section 123(7) is that the candidate or his agent must be the one who authorises the extra expenditure and employs the extra persons. Consequently, the Court concluded that the appellant could not be held guilty of a corrupt practice under section 123(7) nor of any minor practice under section 124(4) of the Act. The decision also referred to the precedent set in Joseph Forster Wilson and Another v Sir Christopher Furness (as reported in O’Mally & Hardcastle’s Report of Election Cases, page 1). The judgment was delivered by Justice DAB J‑Kunwar Rananjaya Singh, the appellant before the Court, who is the son of Raja Bhagwan Bux Singh of Amethi.

Rananjaya Singh was the son of Raja Bhagwan Bux Singh of Amethi. He contested the election to the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly from the Amethi (Central) constituency and was returned as the successful candidate. The polling for that election was held on 31 January 1952. The result of the poll was announced on 6 February 1952 and the declaration of the winner was later published in the Uttar Pradesh State Gazette on 26 February 1952.

The respondent, Baijnath Singh, who had been one of the unsuccessful candidates, filed an election petition challenging the validity of the appellant’s election. In addition to Baijnath Singh, three other candidates who had also been defeated were impleaded as respondents. The petition alleged that the appellant, together with servants of his own household and those of his father as well as other dependents and agents, had committed a series of corrupt practices. The specific allegations included the payment of bribes, the exercise of undue influence over voters, the publication of false and defamatory statements, and the concealment of election‑related expenditures. The particulars of these accusations were set out in the petition and its accompanying schedules. The prayer made in the petition was that the Court set aside the appellant’s election and declare the petitioner, Baijnath Singh, to be duly elected in his place.

The appellant was the sole respondent to the petition. In his written statement he denied each and every charge of corrupt practice that had been levelled against him. He also filed a petition of recrimination, seeking to challenge the conduct of the respondent during the same election. The respondent denied the allegations made against him in the recrimination petition. Altogether fifteen distinct issues were framed for determination: eight issues arose from the election petition itself and seven issues arose from the petition of recrimination.

The tribunal that was constituted to hear the election petition examined all seven issues that stemmed from the petition of recrimination and dismissed that petition, thereby finding in favour of the appellant on each of those points. The appellant did not contest the correctness of those findings before the present Court, and consequently no further discussion of them is required.

With respect to the issues that arose from the main election petition, the tribunal found in favour of the appellant on issues numbered 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7. However, the tribunal decided against the appellant on issue number 3. Issue number 3 asked three questions: (a) whether respondent No. I had employed for the election a greater number of persons than was authorised by law; (b) whether respondent No. I had incurred the expenditure shown in the list described as “Heads of other concealed expenditures”; and (c) whether the respondent had exceeded the prescribed limit of election expenditure.

The questions framed in issue 3 were derived from paragraph 6 of the election petition and from the list of particulars set out in Part III of the accompanying schedule. The particulars in Part III were organised under two principal heads, each head containing several specific items. The first head dealt with persons alleged to have been employed on payment in numbers far exceeding the limit prescribed by law and whose remuneration was not reflected in the return of election expenses. The second head comprised alleged concealed expenditures of other kinds. The tribunal held in favour of the appellant on all the items of charge contained in both heads of Part III, except for items (ii) and (iii) of the first head. Item (ii) alleged that all

In this case the tribunal observed that the paid Ziladars of the Amethi estate, numbering about twenty, together with their peons and orderlies, had performed work for the appellant, and that the manager and the assistant manager of that estate had also rendered services to him. The tribunal concluded that the aggregate number of individuals falling within these two categories substantially exceeded the number of persons that may be lawfully employed in connection with an election, and that the salaries payable to them for the period during which they worked for the appellant, when added to the election expenses already admitted, would cause the total expenditure to surpass the maximum amount permissible for contesting a single‑member constituency. Consequently, the tribunal held that the appellant was guilty of the corrupt practice defined in section 123(7) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and therefore was liable to be dealt with under sections 100(2)(b) and 145 of the same Act. The tribunal further found that because the expenses incurred for these additional persons and the amount spent beyond the authorized limit had not been disclosed in the appellant’s return of election expenses, the appellant also committed the minor corrupt practice specified in section 124(4) of the Act, making him liable under sections 100(2)(a) and 145. As a result of these findings, the tribunal, acting on the general issue numbered 8, declared the appellant’s election to be void. The appellant, having been unseated, filed the present appeal with the special leave of the Supreme Court. Section 77 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, prescribes that the maximum scales of election expenses and the numbers and descriptions of persons who may be employed for payment in connection with an election shall be as may be prescribed. Regarding the maximum expense, rule 117 provides that no expense shall be incurred or authorised by a candidate or his election agent in relation to the conduct and management of an election in any one constituency of a State in excess of the maximum amount specified for that constituency in Schedule V. For a single‑member constituency in Uttar Pradesh, the amount specified in that schedule is only Rs 8,000. Rule 118 further stipulates that no person other than, or in addition to, those specified in Schedule VI shall be employed for payment by a candidate or his election agent in connection with an election. Schedule VI permits, at all elections, one election agent, one counting agent, one clerk and one messenger. In addition, it allows one clerk and one messenger for every 75,000 electors, one polling agent and two relief agents for each polling booth, and one messenger at each polling booth. The tribunal held that any contravention of the provisions of section 77 read together with rules 117 and 118 and Schedules V and VI constitutes a corrupt practice punishable under the Act.

In this matter, the Court explained that section 123(7) defines a corrupt practice only when the excess election expenditure is incurred or authorised by a candidate or his election agent, and when the employment of additional persons is likewise carried out by the candidate or his agent. The charge brought against the appellant alleged, among other things, that the manager, the assistant manager, twenty Ziladars of the Amethi estate, together with their peons and orderlies, had performed work for the appellant in connection with the election. The tribunal had concluded, and the Court regarded this conclusion as erroneous, that although the estate was owned by the appellant’s father, the appellant, being the heir‑apparent and the person who actually managed the estate on behalf of his elderly father, could treat those estate servants as if they were his own servants and could therefore regard them as having been employed for payment by the appellant.

The learned counsel appearing for the respondent openly admitted that he could not support the tribunal’s finding on that point. Nevertheless, he argued that the language of section 77, which speaks of persons “who may be employed for payment,” does not specify by whom such employment or payment must be made. He contended that if the number of persons working for payment in connection with the election exceeds the maximum number prescribed in Schedule VI, the situation falls squarely within the mischief that the relevant statutory provisions and rules aim to prevent, irrespective of who actually employed or paid them. While it is true that section 77 uses the phrase “who may be employed for payment” without naming the employer, the Court emphasized that the essential element of a corrupt practice under section 123(7) is that the employment of extra persons and the incurring or authorising of excess expenditure must be done by the candidate or his agent. Accordingly, rules 117 and 118 must be interpreted in light of this definition. These rules echo the wording of section 123(7) by prohibiting the employment of persons other than, or in addition to, those listed in Schedule VI, and by forbidding the incurring or authorising of expenditure exceeding the limit in Schedule V, both actions to be undertaken by a candidate or his agent. Consequently, section 77 must be read in a manner consistent with section 123(7) and with rules 117 and 118. In reaching this conclusion, the Court found the observation of Phillimore J. in the case of Joseph Porster Wilson and Another v Sir Christopher Furness to be especially relevant. There can be no doubt that, in the eyes of the law, those additional persons were employed by the appellant’s father and were paid by the father; they were neither employed nor paid by the appellant. Therefore, the facts do not bring the case within the ambit of section 123(7) and, by extension, it cannot be said to fall within section 124(4). It was, in effect, a scenario wherein the father assisted his son in the electoral process, but the individuals in question remained the father’s employees, not the appellant’s.

In this case the father helped his son with the election. The individuals who assisted were employees of the father and received their wages from him for work on the estate. At the father’s request they helped the son in matters related to the election, although they had no legal obligation to do so. The Court considered whether the law treated this situation differently from a scenario where the father gave those employees a paid holiday and they voluntarily helped the appellant with his election. The Court found that there was no difference. It was clear that, with respect to the appellant, those persons were neither employed nor paid by him. For the appellant they were merely volunteers. The respondent’s counsel acknowledged that employing volunteers does not place the candidate within the mischief of the definition of corrupt practice found in section 123(7). The counsel nevertheless argued that such an interpretation would run contrary to the spirit of the election laws, because wealthy friends or relatives could give a candidate an unfair advantage over a poorer opponent. The Court observed that the spirit of the law is a vague guide and cannot be given effect where it conflicts with the plain language of the statutory provisions and the rules made under them. If the ordinary grammatical meaning of the provisions caused an injustice by disadvantaging poorer candidates, the remedy lay with Parliament, not with the Court. The Court also referred to O'Mally and Hardcastle’s Report of Election Cases, page I at page 6, in support of its view. After examining the relevant provisions of the Act, the rules, and the arguments presented, the Court concluded that the appellant could not be held guilty of any corrupt practice under section 123(7) in the present circumstances. Consequently, because the appellant had not incurred any expenditure beyond what he disclosed in his election‑expense return, he could not be said to have concealed any expenditure and therefore could not be liable for a minor corrupt practice under section 124(4). Since the Court had already determined that the extra persons were not employed or paid by the appellant, it was unnecessary for the appeal to decide whether the salaries of a candidate’s own servants, when used in the election, should be treated as election expenses and shown in the return; the Court therefore declined to express an opinion on that issue. No further points were raised, and the Court allowed the appeal, ordered costs, and dismissed the allegations of corrupt practice.