Ramjanam Singh vs The State Of Bihar

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 2 November, 1954

Coram: B.K. Mukherjea, Bose, J.

In the matter of Ramjanam Singh versus The State of Bihar, decided on 2 November 1954 by the Supreme Court of India, the judgment was recorded by Justice Bose and written by the author identified as B K Mukherjea, who also constituted the bench. The appellant, Ramjanam Singh, had been charged under Section 161 of the Penal Code in conjunction with Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, on the allegation that he had accepted a bribe. The trial magistrate had originally acquitted him of the charge, but the High Court reversed that decision on appeal, convicted him, and imposed a sentence of one year of rigorous imprisonment. The Supreme Court subsequently granted him special leave to appeal.

At all relevant times, the appellant served as a Sub‑Inspector of Police and was the officer in charge of the Dinapore Police Station. In that capacity he was conducting an investigation into alleged dacoity offences against a complainant named Sitaram Dusadh, identified as witness 2, under Sections 395 and 399/402 of the Indian Penal Code. The prosecution narrative asserted that during the investigation the appellant demanded a sum of one hundred rupees for himself and an additional twenty‑five rupees for his Assistant Sub‑Inspector, proposing that the money would secure the dropping of the proceedings against the complainant. According to that version, on 17 October 1951 the appellant was offered the amount of one hundred rupees and he accepted it.

The Court indicated that a detailed examination of the factual background was necessary, beginning with the events that supposedly led to the alleged acceptance of the bribe. It identified three related police investigations, designated as Dinapore Case No 21 (8) 51, Dinapore Case No 19 (8) 51, and Khagaul Case No 9 (7) 51. For ease of reference the Court abbreviated these as Cases 21, 19, and 9 respectively. Certain facts were admitted as part of the record. In the first half of August 1951 the police received information concerning the commission of a dacoity within the jurisdiction of the Dinapore Police Station. Consequently, Cases 19 and 21 were entered: Case 19 was registered for dacoity under Section 395 of the IPC, while Case 21 was registered under Sections 399 and 402 for preparation for the commission of a dacoity and for assembly for that purpose. One of the suspects named Sitaram Dusadh, a resident of Khagaul, as a participant. Acting on that information, the Assistant Sub‑Inspectors of Khagaul and Dinapore arrested Sitaram Dusadh on 17 August 1951 and placed him in custody at the Dinapore Police Station in connection with both investigations. He was then handed over to the appellant, who was the Sub‑Inspector at Dinapore, and was detained in the police lock‑up at that station.

On the following day, 18 August 1951, another Sub‑Inspector of Dinapore, identified as R Nath, forwarded the detainee to the Sub‑Divisional Officer at Dinapore, recommending that he not be released on bail. Nevertheless, two days later, on 20 August 1951, the detainee was released on bail in respect of Case 21. A few days after that release, the police required the detainee to participate in an identification parade. To facilitate this, they obtained an order for his re‑arrest and detention from the Sub‑Divisional Officer overseeing the cases, and the order was dated 29 August 1951. Despite the issuance of that order, the subsequent actions concerning the detainee’s custody were not completed as expected, leading to further procedural developments that were later examined by the Court.

According to the order sheet in Case No. 19, the accused named Sitaram Dusadh (P. W. 2) was not taken into custody until 17 September 1951. The sheet records that the two accused were ordered to be taken into custody on that day, but notes that they had not been detained as requested by the Sub‑Inspector of Dinapore because they were already on bail in another case and had appeared before the court that day. The following day, 18 September 1951, the accused was again released on bail. Although Mr Dusadh later recalled the release as having taken place on 21 September 1951, the court verified the correct date as 18 September 1951 from the official order sheet.

The narrative then reaches a contentious point. Mr Dusadh testified that when he was arrested on 17 September 1951, the appellant told him he had not seen him after his earlier release on bail and suggested that he should see him. The implication drawn from this remark was that the appellant was hinting at a payment that might secure his release. However, at the time of the alleged remark Mr Duseth was already in custody, under the direct control of the appellant, and therefore was not a free individual who could approach the officer at will. The appellant could have summoned or questioned him at any time he chose. Moreover, in cross‑examination Mr Duseth, when referring to an incident on 3 October 1951, stated unequivocally, “Except on that day I had no talk with the S. I. of Police accused or with any other police officer about the bribe.” Considering both statements together, the court concluded that no invitation for a bribe was made and that the appellant did not utter any such suggestion.

A further significant fact, admitted by both parties, was disclosed by the Deputy Superintendent of Police of Dinapore (P. W. 7). He testified that around the same period the appellant reported to him that he had received information from an informant indicating that a conspiracy was being plotted in Khagaul against him and other police officers, apparently linked to the two dacoity cases under investigation in Dinapore. It is evident that police officers who strive to dismantle a large dacoit gang inevitably become unpopular with the gang, its sympathisers, and those who support it, regardless of whether the suspected individuals are innocent. Consequently, the appellant’s fear of impending trouble could not be dismissed as unfounded. He communicated this apprehension to his superior precisely when he was arranging the identification parade that would involve the suspects, including Mr Duseth.

Returning to Mr Duseth’s testimony, he reported that two days after his release—making the date 20 September 1951—he went to the Dinapore Police Station and confronted the Assistant Sub‑Inspector, asking why he was being repeatedly arrested despite his claim of innocence. The appellant was present in the station at that time, but neither party requested a meeting, and no suggestion of a bribe was made by anyone. If the appellant’s alleged remark on 17 September 1951 had indeed been a hint toward a bribe, no effort was undertaken by any side to pursue it. This version of events differs from a letter Mr Duseth sent to the Anti‑Corruption Department on 17 October 1951, in which he claimed the Assistant Sub‑Inspector told him that the appellant had asked the Assistant Sub‑Inspector why Mr Duseth approached him “empty‑handed.” That allegation was not repeated during evidence, and Mr Duseth again emphasized in cross‑examination that, apart from the incident of 3 October 1951, he had no discussion with the Sub‑Inspector concerning any bribe.

On the day that would have been 20‑9‑1951, Sitaram Dusadh, identified as witness 2, went to Dinapore Police Station and met the Assistant Sub‑Inspector of Police. He asked the officer why he was being arrested repeatedly despite his claim of innocence. At that time the appellant was also present in the police station, but none of the parties asked to see each other, and no suggestion or hint of a bribe was made by anyone. The court noted that even if the appellant had indeed spoken to the witness on 17‑9‑1951, as the witness alleged, and if his words had been intended as a hint, none of the parties acted on it or pursued the matter further. The testimony given by the witness differed from a letter he later sent to the Anti‑Corruption Department on 17‑10‑1951. In that letter the witness claimed that the Assistant Sub‑Inspector told him the appellant had asked why he had approached the officer “empty‑handed.” This version of events was not repeated in the oral evidence, and the witness was emphatic during cross‑examination that, except for the occasion of 3‑10‑1951, he had never spoken to the Sub‑Inspector or any other police officer about a bribe. Consequently, the court held that it could rely only on the evidence sworn under oath in the witness box and not on the statements made in the letter.

After protesting his innocence to the Assistant Sub‑Inspector on 20‑9‑1951, the witness went to his friend Hiralal Parnat, identified as witness 5, and recounted what he had told the officer. Hiralal Parnat advised him to meet the Sub‑Inspector personally, request the officer to “do the needful,” and warned that he was being severely harassed by the police, adding that he should settle any demand for money if it arose. From this sequence of events the court observed that the first genuine suggestion of a bribe originated from Hiralal Parnat, not from any police officer, a point that gained importance when considered alongside the appellant’s earlier complaint to his superior, the Deputy Superintendent of Police (witness 7), that individuals in Dinapore were conspiring against him. The court then examined the background of Hiralal Parnat. Although he described himself as a businessman, he was in fact a journalist who boasted of considerable local influence, claiming access to senior Congress leaders and ministers of the province. He displayed an unusually keen interest in the dacoity case involving Sitaram Dusadh, stating that collections of Rs 200‑250 had been made locally to support the defence, while asserting that he had not participated in those collections. He admitted attending several court hearings and, on one occasion, contributed Rs 5 towards the defence, and on another occasion paid his own railway fare as well as that of the witness.

Hiralal Parnat acknowledged that he used his own funds to travel to the hearings that were being held for the dacoity prosecutions. He further stated that on one occasion he not only covered his own railway fare but also paid the railway fare of Sitaram Dusadh. In addition, Parnat expressed that he felt great distress at the arrest of Sitaram Dusadh and that he was considerably irritated by the conduct of the police, because he believed that Sitaram was innocent of the accusations levelled against him. The record shows that Parnat’s irritation manifested itself in the form of a suggestion to Sitaram that he should approach the appellant and propose a bribe, a recommendation that had not been made by anyone else up to that point. The narrative proceeds by marking the date of twenty September as the day when Parnat gave this advice, and moves forward to twenty‑second September when Sitaram Dusadh reported that he had acted on his friend’s suggestion. On that day Sitaram went to the police station, met the Assistant Sub‑Inspector and the appellant, and the appellant allegedly asked for a bribe in a forthright manner, stating that in similar cases people normally paid between one thousand and two thousand rupees to the police. Following this encounter, Sitaram returned to Hiralal Parnat and related what had transpired; however, neither Sitaram nor Parnat disclosed what further counsel Parnat may have provided after hearing the appellant’s request.

The Court then turned to a series of events that both parties accepted as factual. On twenty‑seventh September 1951 the investigating officer handling the Khagaul case numbered nine directed that certain accused persons, including Sitaram Dusadh who was then out on bail, should be detained in connection with the Dinapore case numbered twenty‑one. The magistrate complied with this direction on twenty‑ninth September 1951, ordering the accused to be taken into custody, and on that same day Sitaram Dusadh was arrested again, this time in the Khagaul matter. The record makes clear that the appellant had no involvement in this second arrest. Also on twenty‑ninth September a senior superintendent of police submitted a report in Dinapore case twenty‑one indicating that, after review, only four of the accused could justifiably be charged, and that most of the remaining accused would be required in case nineteen. Sitaram Dusadh was not listed among the four charge‑sheetable individuals. This report was subsequently initialed by the appellant on fifteenth October 1951, evidencing that the police had, as early as twenty‑seventh September, recommended that Sitaram Dusadh be discharged in case twenty‑one. An identification parade held on thirtieth September 1951 in case nineteen resulted in no witness positively identifying Sitaram Dusadh. Consequently, on that same day the appellant sent a report to the Sub‑Divisional Officer recommending Sitaram’s release in that case because there was no evidentiary basis to retain him, although the appellant noted that Sitaram might still be required in the Khagaul matter, which was outside the appellant’s jurisdiction. Thus, in both Dinapore cases the police, assisted by the appellant, advised the magistrate that Sitaram Dusadh should be discharged.

It was unlikely that a person who had demanded a bribe of one thousand rupees on 22‑9‑1951 would behave in the manner described, because that sum was precisely the amount he is said to have asked for. The recommendation concerning the accused was presented to the Sub‑Divisional Officer on 1‑10‑1951, and the officer indicated that it would be examined on the scheduled date of 18‑10‑1951. However, on that very same day, 1‑10‑1951, the Sub‑Divisional Officer granted bail to Sitaram Dusadh in the Khagaul matter (Case No. 9) and also released him, either on that day or on the following day, in the two Dinapore proceedings (Cases Nos. 19 and 21). Consequently, Sitaram Dusadh was out of custody by 2‑10‑1951. The Court considered it implausible that Sitaram Dusadh, who would have been present in Court while under arrest, was unaware on the 1st and 2nd of October of the reasons for his bail and of the appellant’s recommendation for his discharge, especially since the recommendation had been made openly in Court. Turning to the testimony of Sitaram Dusadh, he recounted that after being released—whether on the 1st or the 2nd—he proceeded to the Dinapore Police Station on 3‑10‑1951 accompanied by Hiralal Parnat (PW 5). There, he alleged that the appellant demanded a bribe ranging from one thousand to two thousand rupees, but finally settled for one hundred rupees for himself and twenty‑five rupees for the Assistant Sub‑Inspector. The witness stated, “and it was agreed between me and Mm that I would be let off if I paid the same amounts to him.” Sitaram Dusadh claimed he protested, and that the appellant warned him that refusal to pay would result in imprisonment. Hiralal Parnat, who was with him, testified during examination‑in‑chief that he told the appellant they would arrange the payment. However, when cross‑examined, both witnesses retracted their earlier statements, emphatically denying any agreement to pay and asserting that they had flatly refused. Sitaram Dusadh further explained that he initially spoke with the Assistant Sub‑Inspector for about two minutes about the demanded bribe, which he rejected, with Hiralal Parnat present. He then entered the room where the appellant was situated and told the appellant, “I will not pay the bribe to him… I never agreed to pay any bribe nor was there any intention in my mind to pay it to the accused or to any police officer.” Hiralal Parnat, PW 5, was equally insistent in his denial. He first contradicted his earlier testimony, stating, “I did not take any part in the said talk or in the said transaction,” and then added, “PW 2 Sitaram Dusadh had told in my presence during the course of the talk that he would not pay the amount as bribe under any circumstances.” Having reached this point, the witnesses’ emphatic refusal was clear and unambiguous.

In this case, the Court observed that after Sitaram Dusadh (P. W. 2) emphatically refused to pay any bribe, he and his companion returned to their homes and no further discussion took place. Consequently, no appointment was arranged and no date, time, place or method of payment for any alleged bribe was ever fixed. The Court noted that, standing alone, such evidence would be difficult for any tribunal to accept. The record showed that the appellant had been instructed by his superior officer to conduct the investigation and that he performed his duties in the ordinary course of service. There was no evidence of any harassment by the appellant, and the moment the witnesses failed to identify P. W. 2 at the parade, the appellant immediately recommended their discharge from the only two cases he was handling. Between 17‑August‑1951 and 20‑September‑1951 there was no hint or suggestion of a bribe from any police officer. The notion of a bribe originated with Hiralal Parnat (P. W. 5). Around the same period the appellant reported to his superior that an intrigue was being plotted against him by persons seeking to trouble him because of the investigations he was conducting. On 22‑September‑1951, Sitaram Dusadh and Hiralal Parnat went of their own initiative to the police station, without any invitation and without any intention of offering a bribe, despite advice allegedly given by P. W. 5 on 20‑September. Unexpectedly a demand for a bribe was made, as if in answer to the thoughts of P. W. 5, but the demand was firmly rejected and the two men immediately left the station and returned home. The learned trying Magistrate examined their testimony in detail and articulated strong reasons for concluding that their evidence was unreliable.

The Court then proceeded to assess the remaining evidence. Sitaram Dusadh (P. W. 2) claimed that on or about 11‑October‑1951 the appellant sent a head constable to summon him, but this allegation was absent from the first‑information‑report filed on 17‑October‑1951 and was not relied upon by either Court, so it was disregarded. On 15‑October‑1951 the appellant initialed the senior Superintendent’s recommendation that Sitaram Dusadh could not be reasonably charge‑sheeted in Case No. 21. Two days later, on 17‑October‑1951, Sitaram Dusadh, accompanied by Hiralal Parnat (P. W. 5), approached K. N. Chatterjee (P. W. 1) of the Anti‑Corruption Department, after which events unfolded rapidly. Whether this speed was due to the perceived influence of P. W. 5, who boasted connections with senior Congress leaders and Ministers, or the inherent efficiency of the local officials, the process was described as “hustled.” Chatterjee testified that Hiralal Parnat had arrived early in October to complain that the appellant was harassing his friend Sitaram Dusadh and implicating him in several dacoity cases with the intention of extorting money. Chatterjee instructed him to bring Sitaram Dusadh to him for further examination.

In this case the Court observed that it was puzzling that Hiralal Parnat had not taken Sitaram Dusadh to meet Chatterjee before the date of 17‑10‑1951 nor had he suggested that a complaint be lodged. Sitaram Dusadh testified that prior to that date he had never approached any officer of the Anti‑Corruption Department at any location and that no one had asked him to file a report about the matter. On the morning of 17 October, at about 8 a.m., both Sitaram Dusadh (P.W. 2) and Hiralal Parnat (P.W. 5) went to K. N. Chatterjee (P.W. 1). Chatterjee examined Sitaram Dusadh and promptly escorted both men in his jeep to Mukherjee, the Deputy Secretary of the Anti‑Corruption Department (P.W. 3). Mukherjee then examined Sitaram Dusadh, obtained a written statement from him, and instructed Chatterjee to “do the needful in the matter” and to contact the District Magistrate of Patna for the deputation of a magistrate. This instruction was carried out and I. K. Saran (P.W. 4) was deputed as magistrate. Following the usual formalities concerning the numbering of the notes to be used in the trap, the party departed at about 5 or 6 p.m. for the Dinapore Police Station, travelling in a car and a jeep. Sitaram Dusadh and Hiralal Parnat accompanied Magistrate Saran in his car, while Mukherjee and Chatterjee followed in the jeep. Mukherjee (P.W. 3) assigned Hiralal Parnat the task of discovering the whereabouts of the appellant and ascertaining when the appellant would receive the money. Hiralal Parnat discovered that the appellant was attending a meeting of the Socialist Party in the D. A. V. School, dressed in plain clothes. Consequently, the officials changed into civilian attire and proceeded to the school. Sitaram Dusadh and Hiralal Parnat seated themselves close to the appellant, and the three officers blended with the crowd, with Chatterjee and Magistrate Saran staying a short distance behind Mukherjee.

Shortly after taking their seats while the meeting was still in progress, Sitaram Dusadh recounted that he went to the Sub‑Inspector of Police, saluted the officer and was asked to wait, after which he returned and sat again in the same place. Chatterjee (P.W. 1) added that he observed Sitaram Dusadh offering something to the appellant. When the meeting concluded and the assembled crowd began to disperse through the single exit, Sitaram Dusadh and Hiralal Parnat approached the appellant; Hiralal Parnat described the proximity as “in close contact,” while Sitaram Dusadh measured it as “one span.” The three officials also closed in on them. Chatterjee testified that they were “just behind” and that no one stood between the officials and the appellant. Mukherjee asserted that he was “immediately behind” Chatterjee, and Magistrate Saran stated that he followed “one step” behind the appellant, with Mukherjee two steps behind. The Court noted that the parties argued about the amount of light at the location where the money exchange allegedly took place. Hiralal Parnat (P.W. 5) testified that there was no bulb light at the spot where the money was handed over nor in its immediate vicinity, only lighting near the gate or where the meeting’s president sat, but that the illumination was sufficient for all faces to be visible. Magistrate Saran (P.W. 4) swore that there was adequate light for him to see the notes, as he was immediately behind the accused at that time, and he further declared that the Sub‑Inspector of Police glanced backward briefly, after which he saw Sitaram Dusadh passing G. G. notes in the left hand of the accused, who quickly placed them in the left lower pocket of his kurta. The Court observed that the appellant was acquainted with at least two of these officers, rendering the circumstances evident.

The Court observed that the issue of illumination at the venue was material. The witness Hiralal Parnat, identified as PW 5, testified that there was no bulb or any source of light at the specific spot where the money was handed over, and that no light was present in the immediate vicinity. He added that illumination existed only near the gate and at the seat occupied by the President of the meeting, yet he affirmed that the available light was sufficient for every face to be seen. The witness Saran, identified as PW 4, swore that the lighting was adequate for him to recognise the notes while he stood immediately behind the accused at the relevant moment. The Court inferred that, if the witnesses’ statements are correct, the overall lighting must have been enough for individuals to identify each other. Saran further recounted that the Sub‑Inspector of Police glanced backward for a short time, after which Saran observed Sitaram Dusadh passing the G G Notes into the left hand of the accused, who promptly placed the notes into the lower left pocket of his kurta.

The Court noted that the accused was acquainted with at least two of the officers present, and therefore it was logical for him to act with caution before accepting the bribe and to look behind him to confirm the identities of the officials. The Court found it difficult to accept the proposition that the accused could fail to recognise officers who were only one or two paces behind him, because the officers’ disguises did not conceal their faces. In a crowd, facial recognition at such a short distance outweighs any clothing concealment. Regarding the actual transfer of the money, the Court recorded that Sitaram Dusadh testified that, as they were departing, the accused asked whether he had brought the money; upon receiving an affirmative reply, the accused directed him to move to his left side and place the money in his left hand. The Court regarded this request as curious, since the accused had previously, together with another witness, refused to receive any bribe and had earlier recommended the discharge of the two officers on the ground that no evidence existed against them. Moreover, the Court noted that the accused must have been aware that the officers also knew of his recommendation, given that Sitaram Dusadh had been released on bail pursuant to the police recommendations recorded in open court on 1‑10‑1951.

The Court further observed that another unusual element was the signal allegedly given by Hiralal Parnat, PW 5, who lit a bidi to indicate that the money had been handed over. The Court found this behaviour strange if the three officials were indeed only one or two paces behind the accused. Additionally, the Court recorded that both Sitaram Dusadh and Hiralal Parnat fled the scene immediately after the notes changed hands; Sitaram could not explain his sudden departure, and Hiralal described their exit as occurring “without any rhyme or reason.” The Court concluded that these circumstances rendered the entire episode highly abnormal and required no further elaboration to demonstrate that the incident was atypical.

In the present matter, the Court observed that the accused, Sitaram Dusadh, had taken no action between 3‑10‑1951, the date on which the alleged demand for a bribe was said to have been made, and 17‑10‑1951, the date on which the alleged payment was said to have been effected, yet on the 17th of October the sequence of events accelerated with great rapidity. The Court found it noteworthy that the appellant had recommended the discharge of the officials in open Court on 1‑10‑1951 and that, on the same occasion, the Magistrate had fixed the subsequent hearing for 18‑10‑1951. The Court inferred that a further postponement of the matter by even a single day might have caused the opportunity to be lost. The Court then turned to the substance of the prosecution’s case, noting that it did not constitute a conventional “trap” for a person who was already demanding a bribe, but rather amounted to a deliberate attempt to entice the accused into committing an offence after his overt refusal had been emphatically affirmed by the Court. The Court emphasized that, irrespective of any alleged criminal disposition, a person retains the right to expect that law‑enforcement officials, who are the custodians of the law, will not deliberately provoke or tempt him beyond his capacity of endurance to break the law. While recognising that the use of agents provocateurs may sometimes be unavoidable in uncovering corruption, the Court distinguished between inducing a willing offender who is already prepared to act and inciting an individual to commit an act that the Court has definitively prohibited. The Court observed that even the most upright persons may experience moments of weakness, and that the worst individuals may repent and find inner strength to reject wrongdoing; society and the State therefore have a duty to protect such resolve rather than to rekindle a criminal impulse that has already been extinguished. In this regard, the Court referred to the principles laid down in Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh (A). Finally, the learned trying Magistrate was noted to have disbelieved the narrative that a demand was made on 3 October, concluding instead that the notes had been planted on the appellant as part of a well‑planned conspiracy. The Magistrate suggested that the officials had been misled by Hiralal Parnat (PW 5) and that, in their eagerness to trap the appellant, they had acted without sufficient care in their conduct and statements.

There was no doubt that the investigation that followed contained numerous irregularities, and even the High Court was compelled to describe at least one aspect of its conduct as “unfortunate.” The present case involved the High Court’s interference with an earlier acquittal. The legal principles governing such interference had been stipulated repeatedly in earlier decisions, including Narayan Ittiravi v. State of Travancore‑Cochin, Wilayat Khan v. U. P. State, Surajpal Singh v. The State, and Sheo Swarup v. King‑Emperor (AIR 1934 PC 227). No modification of those principles was being sought here. Nevertheless, the presumption of innocence continued to apply, and the fact that a higher court had expressed doubt about or had disbelieved the evidence served to strengthen the position of the accused. Accordingly, the High Court was required to provide compelling reasons for overturning the benefit of the doubt that had already been granted by the lower tribunal.

In examining the allegation that a demand of Rs 1,000 had been made and that only Rs 100 had ultimately been accepted, the learned trial magistrate had twice emphasized that both witnesses Sitaram Dusadh (PW 2) and Hiralal Parnat (PW 5) had, under cross‑examination, categorically rejected the notion of any such demand. The High Court did not engage with this finding; instead it merely suggested that, even if Sitaram Dusadh might have been unwilling to pay, the appellant could perhaps later compel payment. That observation missed the central issue. The witnesses, after initially indicating that a settlement had been reached, later returned to an unequivocal position that no agreement had ever existed. The High Court, referring to two other similar contradictions concerning the same incident, concluded that the inconsistencies must have been the result of either a slip by the witnesses or an error in recording their statements. It observed that, in the case of Hiralal Parnat, “it cannot seriously be urged that he meant to go back in this fashion on the very story which he had come into the witness box to support,” and similarly for Sitaram Dusadh, “as I have observed in the case of Hiralal, there is nothing to suggest that Sitaram was going back on the case that he had made out from the very beginning.” However, the magistrate who had taken and heard the testimonies did not perceive any such slip and relied upon the witnesses’ statements with great firmness. The Supreme Court was unable to regard the magistrate’s assessment lightly, nor could it dismiss as trivial the circumstance that the appellant had previously recommended that Sitaram Dusadh be discharged from two separate dacoity cases, a fact that the High Court had accepted.

The Court observed that the High Court appeared to have been influenced primarily by the view that the three official witnesses could not be disbelieved. The High Court, however, had not considered that even responsible officials might act with excessive zeal. For example, the Court referred to the testimony of Chatterjee, identified as P. W. 1. In his evidence he stated, “After a while I noticed that Sitaram Dusadh went and approached the said S. I. of Police and tendered to him something.” The Court noted that neither Sitaram Dusadh nor Hiralal Parnat, who were directly involved, corroborated any such tender. The only statement recorded from Sitaram Dusadh was, “I went to the S. I. of Police and saluted Mm and told Mm that I had come on which he asked me to wait.” The Court reasoned that if this witness could imagine a completely fictitious tender that never occurred, he could equally have imagined witnessing the handing over of the notes. The Court then turned to the testimony of Saran, identified as P. W. 4, who declared, “At the time P. W. Sitaram gave the notes to the accused they looked folded up……I swear that there was sufficient light for me to see that they were notes as I was immediately behind the accused at that time.” The Court considered this description exaggerated, observing that in a large crowd the notes could not have been displayed so conspicuously without alerting the appellant.

The Court further identified an additional point on which the High Court had erred. The High Court had asserted, “There is, besides, another consideration, namely, that if we are to believe these witnesses they were immediately behind Ramjanam Singh and close to him. He would, therefore, be unlikely to see them unless he turned round and looked directly behind him. In the circumstances of the case before us it is extremely unlikely that he would do so. He would not want to make himself conspicuous.” The Court respectfully disagreed, stating that a person in such circumstances would be precisely inclined to turn and look, in order to avoid being caught. Moreover, Saran (P. W. 4) testified that the appellant indeed “looked backwards”, not merely with a fleeting glance but “for a while”, before taking the notes. In the Court’s view, the High Court had failed to overturn the finding of the trying Magistrate that the matter involved a careful conspiracy against the appellant, in which the notes were planted on him, and that the three Government officials had been misled by Sitaram Dusadh and Hiralal Parnat. The Court concluded that the officials’ zeal had exceeded their discretion, leading them to fabricate facts that they believed to be true.

The Court observed that the alleged incident must have taken place and that it apparently prompted the officials to modify their testimonies just enough to render, in their own view, the facts they presented in the witness box appear incontrovertible. However, the Court clarified that it was not expressing a view that this narrative represented the actual truth, because determining factual truth was not within its jurisdiction in this matter. The sole question before the Court was whether the High Court had correctly applied the principles that govern an appeal against an acquittal. After careful consideration, the Court concluded that the explanations offered by the High Court did not satisfy the stringent requirement needed to overturn the acquittal. The Court emphasized that the robust presumption of innocence owed to the accused, coupled with the numerous doubts arising from the many circumstances previously detailed, had not been overcome or displaced. Consequently, the Court decided to allow the appeal and to set aside both the conviction and the sentence that had been imposed.