Rajnarain Singh vs The Chairman, Patna Administration Committee, Patna

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 202 of 1953

Decision Date: 21 May 1954

Coram: Vivian Bose, Mehar Chand Mahajan, B.K. Mukherjea, Natwarlal H. Bhagwati

In this case the Supreme Court of India rendered its judgment on 21 May 1954. The matter was styled Rajnarain Singh versus the Chairman, Patna Administration Committee, Patna. The judgment was authored by Justice Vivian Bose and the bench was composed of Justices Vivian Bose, Mehar Chand Mahajan, B.K. Mukherjea and Natwarlal H. Bhagwati. The petition was filed by the petitioner Rajnarain Singh against the respondent who was the Chairman of the Patna Administration Committee. The decision was recorded on the same date, 21 May 1954, and the bench was listed as Bose, Vivian; Mahajan, Mehar Chand (Chief Justice); Mukherjea, B.K.; Bhagwati, Natwarlal H. The reported citation of the case is 1954 AIR 569 and 1955 SCR 290. Subsequent citations of the case appear in numerous law reports, including R 1957 SC 414, F 1958 SC 682, R 1958 SC 909, R 1959 SC 512, RF 1961 SC 4, RF 1963 SC 771, R 1965 SC 1107, MV 1966 SC 693, RF 1967 SC 1048, R 1967 SC 1480, RF 1968 SC 1232, RF 1973 SC 1461, R 1976 SC 714, RF 1979 SC 1475, RF 1980 SC 650, R 1982 SC 1126, RF 1990 SC 560 and others. The statutory provision under consideration was Section 3(1)(f) of the Patna Administration Act 1915 (Bihar and Orissa Act I of 1915) as amended by the Patna Administration (Amendment) Act 1928 (Bihar and Orissa Act IV of 1928). The issue was whether the delegation of legislative power under this section was intra vires, and whether the Governor’s notification dated 23 April 1951, which selected Section 104 of the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act 1922, modified it and extended it to the Patna Administration and Patna Village areas, exceeded the authority conferred by Section 3(1)(f).

The headnote of the judgment explained that an executive authority may be empowered by statute to modify either existing or future laws, but such modification cannot alter any essential feature of the legislation. The court observed that the precise definition of an essential feature cannot be given in general terms, yet it is clear that essential legislative functions include determining legislative policy and formulating it as a binding rule of conduct. Authorized modifications are limited to local adjustments or changes of minor character and must not involve a change of policy or a substantive alteration of the Act. The court held that Section 3(1)(f) of the Patna Administration Act 1915, as amended, was intra vires because any provision of the Bihar Municipal Act 1922 could be applied to Patna, with or without modification, provided that the essential character of the Act was not affected and the policy of the Act remained unchanged. The terms “restriction” and “modification” were to be understood in this restricted sense. Conversely, the court found that the Governor’s notification of 23 April 1951, which incorporated Section 104 of the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act 1922 into the Patna Administration framework in a modified form, was ultra vires. The court reasoned that this action produced a radical change in the policy of the Patna Administration Act and therefore exceeded the authority granted by Section 3(1)(f). The decision applied the principle articulated in In re The Delhi Laws Act 1912 ([1951] SCR 747). The judgment concluded that the notification was invalid for being beyond the statutory power conferred on the Governor.

In this matter, the Court referred to a judgment and order dated 22 December 1952 issued by the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Miscellaneous Judicial Case No 78 of 1952. The appellant was represented by counsel, while the Advocate-General of Bihar, assisted by counsel, appeared for respondent No 2. The judgment of the Court was delivered by Justice Bose. The High Court of Patna had granted the petitioner leave to appeal under article 132(1) of the Constitution because a substantial question of law concerning the interpretation of the Constitution was involved. The appellant, who served as Secretary of the Rate Payers’ Association at Patna, and the other members of his association lived in an area that was originally outside the municipal limits of Patna and therefore not subject to municipal or related taxation. On 18 April 1951, a notification brought that area within the municipal limits and subjected it to municipal taxation. Consequently, the appellant and the persons he represented were required to pay taxes for the period from 1 April 1951 to 31 March 1952. The notifications were issued under sections 3(1)(f) and 5 of the Patna Administration Act of 1915 (Bihar and Orissa Act I of 1915). The appellant contended that those notifications constituted delegated legislation, which he argued was invalid, and he prayed that sections 3(1)(f) and 5 of the Act, which allowed such delegation, be declared ultra vires. To understand the issues raised, it was necessary to examine the historical context dating back to 1911, when the Province of Bihar and Orissa was formed. It was also essential to recognise that the present area called Patna comprised three distinct portions, which the Court arbitrarily labeled Patna City, Patna Administration and Patna Village for the purpose of this judgment; these labels do not correspond to any official or recognised designations, and the boundaries of these portions have varied over time, though they must be regarded as conceptually separate. When the new province was created in 1911, the Bengal Municipal Act of 1884 applied throughout the province. At that time, the portion now termed Patna City was governed by a municipality established under the Bengal Act, and that municipality continued to operate after the province’s formation. The other two portions did not exist as separate entities then, and the territories they now occupy were not subject to any municipal or related jurisdiction. The new province required a new capital, and Patna was selected; as a result the city naturally expanded, prompting further developments described in the following discussion.

In accordance with the usual pattern observed throughout India, a separate area developed apart from the old city and became the site of the new government headquarters. The Legislature of the newly formed State subsequently decided that it would be appropriate to place this distinct area under municipal control and to create a municipality for it instead of attaching it to the existing city municipality. For that purpose, the Legislature enacted the Patna Administration Act of 1915 (Bihar and Orissa Act I of 1915), which was brought into operation on the fifth day of January, 1916. The petitioner challenged two provisions of that Act—section 3(1)(f) and section 5—as well as the notifications issued under those provisions, arguing that they authorised delegated legislation that had caused him injury and had incorrectly subjected him to municipal taxation. Broadly, the Act authorised the Local Government to establish a new municipality, later known as the Patna Administration Committee, to govern the new area that the judgment refers to as Patna Administration. The Act designated this new area by the name “Patna” and set out its boundaries in the schedule annexed to the Act; the area expressly excluded the portions that have been labelled Patna City and Patna Village. The State Legislature did not draft a fresh municipal statute for the new area, nor did it simply extend the Bengal Municipal Act of 1884, which was then in force in the Province, to the whole of the area termed “Patna.” Rather, section 3(1)(f) empowered the Local Government to “extend to Patna the provisions of any section of the said Act” (the Bengal Municipal Act of 1884), subject to any restrictions or modifications that the Local Government deemed appropriate. This clause formed part of the provisions that the petitioner contested. Section 5, also contested, provided that the Local Government could at any time cancel or modify any order made under section 3. Although not directly challenged, section 6(b) was also pertinent; it allowed the Local Government to “include within Patna any local area in the vicinity of the same and defined in the notification.” This clause is referred to because the area later labelled Patna Village was eventually brought under the jurisdiction of the new municipality—the Patna Administration Committee—through a decision taken under this provision. Exercising the authority conferred by the Patna Administration Act, the Local Government created the new municipality and named it the Patna Administration Committee. By a series of notifications—details of which are not the focus here—the Local Government extended selected sections of the Bengal Municipal Act of 1884 to the area identified as Patna Administration. Consequently, up to the year 1922, two municipal entities operated side by side: the Patna City Municipality, which exercised the full force of the Bengal Municipal Act of 1884 over the area called Patna City, and the newly formed Patna Administration Committee, which governed the Patna Administration area with only those portions of the Bengal Act that the Local Government had specifically chosen to apply.

In this case the Patna Administration Committee exercised authority over the newly designated area that the Court refers to as Patna Administration. The Bengal Municipal Act of 1884 did not automatically apply to that area; only those particular sections that the Local Government deliberately selected under the powers granted by the Patna Administration Act of 1915 were given effect there. A third area, which the Court calls Patna Village, remained entirely outside any municipal control. In 1922 the Provincial Legislature enacted the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act, 1922 (Bihar and Orissa Act VII of 1922). That legislation repealed the whole of the Bengal Municipal Act of 1884 and substituted the new 1922 Act in its place. The repeal and substitution operated only in the Patna City area because the Bengal Act had never been fully applied to the Patna Administration area; only the few sections that had been picked out under the 1915 Act were in force there, and those sections constituted, in substance, independent legislation. Consequently, the 1922 Act became operative in Patna City, while the sections of the Bengal Act that had been extended by reference to the Patna Administration Act continued to remain effective in the Patna Administration area. The area known as Patna Village was left untouched by either statute. The Province understandably preferred to rely on its own legislation rather than on the Bengal law, but the statutory framework at that time still restricted the Local Government.

Because the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act of 1922 could not be automatically extended to the Patna Administration area, the Local Government was limited by section 3(1)(f) of the Patna Administration Act of 1915 to extending only those sections of the Bengal Act that had previously been applied, and it could not extend sections of the newer 1922 Act. That limitation arose from the operative provisions of section 3(1)(a), which the Court does not need to examine in detail. To rectify this situation, the Bihar and Orissa Legislature passed an amending statute in 1928, namely the Patna Administration (Amendment) Act of 1928 (Bihar and Orissa Act IV of 1928). That amendment dealt mainly with future extensions. Section 4 of the 1928 amendment provided that any section of the Bengal Municipal Act of 1884 that had been extended to Patna under clause (f) of sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Patna Administration Act would be deemed to continue in force until such extension was expressly cancelled by a notification. Three years later, the Governor cancelled all earlier notifications that had extended portions of both the Bengal Act of 1884 and the Bihar and Orissa Act of 1922 to the Patna Administration area. In their place, by Notification No. 4594 L.S.G. dated 25 April 1931, the Governor selected certain sections of the 1922 Act, modified them where necessary, and extended those modified sections to the Patna Administration area, thereby creating a fresh municipal code for that jurisdiction. However, the new code omitted several important provisions of the 1922 Act, specifically sections 4, 5, 6, 84 and 104, which remained excluded.

The Court observed that after the Notification of 25 April 1931, which replaced the earlier extensions of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1884, several provisions of the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act, 1922 were omitted from the new municipal code for the Patna Administration area; specifically, sections 4, 5, 6, 84 and 104 of the 1922 Act were left out. Nothing further occurred until the year 1951. In the intervening period the Constitution of India became operative on 26 January 1950. The Court noted that prior to the Constitution, the local government exercised its powers under section 3(1)(f) and section 6(b) of the Patna Administration Act, 1915. After the Constitution came into force those powers were transferred to the Governor of Bihar. During this interval the town of Patna expanded, and the area originally known as Patna Village, which had been a mere village, was gradually built up. This village lay adjacent to the Patna Administration area, the two being separated only by a road. The authorities therefore considered that Patna Village should also be placed under municipal jurisdiction. Rather than creating a third municipality, they decided to place the village under the jurisdiction of the Patna Administration Committee and, once again, relied on the Patna Administration Act, 1915 as amended in 1928. On 18 April 1951 a notification was published in the Gazette by order of the Governor of Bihar (Notification No. MVP-45/50-3645 L.S.G., dated 11 April 1951). The notification declared that the area defined therein – namely Patna Village – was to be included within the jurisdiction of the Patna Administration Committee, thereby bringing the village under municipal control. Five days later, the Governor issued another notification (No. M/Al-201-51-406 L.S.G., dated 23 April 1951) selecting section 104 of the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act, 1922, modifying it and extending the modified provision to both the Patna Administration area and Patna Village. The amended section provided that when the Patna Administration Act, 1915 is first extended to any place, the first tax on holdings, latrines or water may be levied from the beginning of the quarter next to the quarter in which the assessment of the tax has been completed in the area to which the Act is extended. The High Court, applying the decision in In re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912, held that the contested sections and the two notifications were within the constitutional competence of the Governor. The matter before this Court concerned only the Patna Village area. The appellant and the persons he represented reside in that area and challenge the validity of the taxes levied upon them after the village was placed under municipal control on 18 April 1951. The Court further noted that the Bengal Municipal Act, 1884 was no longer a law in force in the State of Bihar on that date; it had been fully repealed in 1922 and replaced by the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act, 1922. Moreover, the specific sections of the Bengal Act that had previously been applied to the Patna Administration area were repealed on 25 April 1931 and substituted with selected, and in some cases modified, sections of the Bihar and Orissa Act, 1922.

On the date mentioned, the Bengal Municipal Act of 1884 was entirely repealed and replaced by the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act of 1922. The portions of the 1884 Act that the Local Government had previously selected and applied to the Patna Administration were themselves repealed on 25 April 1931. In their place, the Local Government introduced another set of provisions that it had extracted from the Bihar and Orissa Act of 1922 and subsequently modified where it deemed appropriate. The factual background therefore narrows to the following sequence. In 1928 the Local Government of Bihar and Orissa, an executive authority that operated under the legislative control of the Bihar and Orissa Legislature, was given authority by that Legislature—by virtue of Act I of 1915 as amended by Act IV of 1928—to (i) cancel or amend any existing municipal laws that applied within the Patna Administration area; (ii) extend to that area all or any sections of the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act of 1922, subject to any restrictions or modifications that it considered necessary; and (iii) incorporate into the Patna Administration area other territories that were not yet under municipal control. These powers correspond to the effect of sections 3(1)(f), 5 and 6(b) of the Patna Administration Act of 1915 as amended in 1928. Exercising this authority, the Local Government and subsequently the Governor employed all three powers. On 25 April 1931 the Local Government repealed the existing municipal law in the Patna Administration area—that is, the sections of the Bengal Act of 1884 that had previously been applied there—and replaced them with a new set of laws drawn from the Bihar and Orissa Act of 1922, incorporating the restrictions and modifications it deemed suitable. Later, on 18 April 1951, the Governor added Patna Village to the Patna Administration area. Finally, on 23 April 1951 the Governor introduced a modified version of section 104 of the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act of 1922 into the municipal laws governing the two now-combined areas. The Court first considered whether the notification issued on 26 April 1931 could be challenged by the petitioner. The Court concluded that it could not, because that notification merely provided a fresh municipal code for the Patna Administration area and did not affect the Patna Village area, which was the petitioner’s concern. Since the notification did not impact the petitioner, the Court held that the petition for a declaration regarding that notification could not be entertained. The Court then turned to the notification of 23 April 1951, which did affect the petitioner because it subjected him to taxation. Because this notification was made under section 3(1)(f), the Court said it must examine (i) whether the notification extends beyond the contested portion of the Act and (ii) if it does not, whether section 3(1)(f) itself is beyond the authority granted to the Governor.

The Court observed that section 3(1)(f) of the Act was itself beyond the authority of the legislature, but it first needed to examine the decision rendered in the Delhi Laws Act case, reported in (1) [1951] S.C.R. 747. The Court noted that the earlier judgment had been examined in great detail, resulting in a decision that appeared diffuse; however, when the focus was narrowed to the actual holdings and the reasoning was temporarily set aside, a clear pattern emerged, leaving only a very narrow scope for future controversy. The issues before the Court in that case involved situations where the Central Legislature had authorised an executive authority, acting under its legislative control, to apply, at its discretion, laws to a territory that also fell within the legislative jurisdiction of the Centre. The variations among the cases related to the kind of statutes the executive could select and the extent of any modifications it was permitted to make. The Court summarised the variations as follows: (1) the executive could, without any modification apart from incidental changes such as names and places, apply the whole of any existing Central Act to the new area; this was upheld by a majority of six to one; (2) the executive could select and apply a Provincial Act in similar circumstances; this was upheld by a majority of five to two; (3) the executive could select future Central laws and apply them in the same manner; this was also upheld by a majority of five to two; (4) the executive could select future Provincial laws and apply them similarly; this, too, was upheld by a majority of five to two; (5) the executive could repeal laws already in force in the area and either substitute nothing or substitute other Central or Provincial laws, with or without modification; this was held to be ultra vires by a majority of four to three; and (6) the executive could apply existing laws, whether Central or Provincial, with alterations and modifications, as well as (7) the executive could apply future laws under the same conditions. The opinions on points (6) and (7) were not as uniformly expressed as in the first five categories, requiring a detailed analysis of each judge’s reasoning. The opinion of Chief Justice Kania, found on pages 794-797, was summarised briefly: he held that only Parliament could make modifications in any essential legislative function, namely the determination of legislative policy and its formulation as a rule of conduct. Consequently, he was willing to uphold what he described as “conditional,” “subsidiary,” or “ancillary” legislation, but he refused to allow an executive authority to apply Provincial Acts that the Central Legislature had not considered, as discussed on page 801, and for

In this case, the Court recorded that the then Chief Justice, Mahajan J, adopted a very strict approach. He was willing to allow the delegation of ancillary or ministerial powers, as noted at pages 938 and 946, but he emphasized that Parliament could not delegate its essential legislative functions to any other body, whether State legislatures or executive authorities, except for functions that were truly ministerial in nature. By contrast, three of the Judges took a more liberal stance. Das J held that Parliament could confer on a delegate all the legislative powers it possessed provided that Parliament did not abdicate its own authority and retained the right to recall, modify or correct any action taken by the delegate; this view is recorded at page 1068. Patanjali Sastri J shared the same expansive opinion, as reflected on pages 857, 858 and 870. Fazl Ali J, while not as extreme, nevertheless upheld all the statutes that were challenged in that case. He observed at page 830 that the legislature normally performs its primary legislative function itself, but it may employ external agencies to the extent necessary for tasks it cannot perform or finds inconvenient, that is, for matters ancillary to and necessary for the effective exercise of legislative power. Regarding the power to modify law, he explained at page 846 that the authority to introduce necessary restrictions and modifications is incidental to the power to apply or adapt the law, and such modifications must remain within the framework of the Act without altering its identity, structure or essential purpose. He added that although the power to modify involves discretion to make suitable changes, it would be futile to grant an authority the power to adapt a law without also granting it the power to make appropriate adjustments.

The Court further reported that two other Judges took an intermediate position. Mukherjea J asserted that essential legislative functions cannot be delegated and, on pages 982-984, defined the essential legislative function as the determination of legislative policy and the formal enactment of that policy into a binding rule of conduct. He explained at page 1000 that once the policy is defined with sufficient precision and definiteness, the court has no further concern with its merits; the policy merely needs to give clear guidance to the executive officer responsible for implementation. Concerning the term “modification,” he argued that it does not involve any change of policy but is limited to alterations that preserve the Act’s policy while adapting it to local conditions, a point he elaborated on pages 1008-1009 as “local adjustments or changes of a minor character.” Bose J agreed with this limitation, stating at page 1121 that delegation cannot extend to altering essential particulars of existing laws. However, he qualified his answer at page 1124, explaining that the power to “restrict and modify” does not grant authority to make essential changes; rather, it is confined to minor alterations necessary to apply an Act designed for one area to another and to harmonise it with the existing laws of the State.

In this passage the Court examined the meaning of the term “modification.” The Judge observed that, in his view, “modification” does not signify any alteration of the underlying policy of the statute. Rather, it is limited to changes of a character that preserve the policy of the Act while allowing adjustments that suit local conditions, where the executive government acts as the judge of those adjustments. The Court further clarified that such modifications are confined to “local adjustments or changes of a minor character.” At another point, another Justice expressed that the power to delegate cannot extend to “altering the essential particulars of laws which are already in force in the area in question.” Nevertheless, that Justice added a qualification: the authority to “restrict and modify” does not convey the power to make essential changes. It is limited to minor alterations that are necessary to make an Act designed for one area applicable to another, to harmonise it with existing state law, or to delete portions intended solely for a different area. To change the essential character of an Act or to vary its material particulars, the Court held, is to legislate, and such legislative power, according to all authorities, cannot be delegated by a Legislature that is not absolutely free. The Court then summarized the prevailing view that an executive authority may be authorised to modify either existing or future statutes, but only insofar as the modification does not affect any essential feature of the law. What precisely constitutes an essential feature cannot be stated in general terms, and there was some divergence of opinion in the earlier case, but the Court agreed that an essential feature cannot involve a change of policy. Turning to the specific notification dated 23 April 1951, the Court noted that the notification was challenged on many grounds. For the purposes of the present case, the Court held that the Governor’s action of subjecting the residents of the Patna Village area to municipal taxation without complying with the procedures required by Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act of 1922 transgressed an essential feature of that Act. The 1922 Act applied to the whole of Bihar and Orissa, and one of its essential features is that no municipality competent to levy tax may be imposed on a locality without giving its inhabitants an opportunity to be heard and to object. Sections 4, 5 and 6 provide a statutory guarantee of that right. Consequently, the local government is under a mandatory statutory duty imposed by the Act to listen to objections and to consider them before reaching a decision. The Court concluded that this requirement reflects a legislative policy embodied in Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Act.

It was held that the matter could not be dismissed as trivial and it could not be left to an executive authority to disregard the guarantee that the Legislature had solemnly provided. To allow such a disregard would amount to altering the policy of the statute, and, as the majority in the Delhi Laws Act case(1) observed, a delegated authority does not have the power to make that kind of change. Nevertheless, the notification in question would not be ultra vires so long as it remained within the scope of powers granted by a valid law. Consequently, it became necessary to examine the validity of section 3(1)(f) in the light of the decision in the Delhi Laws Act case. The first step was to determine precisely what section 3(1)(f) authorises. After its amendment the provision performs two functions. First, it gives the delegated authority the power to select any section of the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act of 1922 and to extend that section to the area identified as “Patna”. Second, it authorises the Local Government, and subsequently the Governor, to apply the selected section subject to such “restrictions and modifications” as they deem appropriate.

In the Delhi Laws Act case(1) a majority of four to three held that the following provision was constitutionally valid: “The Provincial Government may … extend with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit … any enactment which is in force in any part of British India at the date of such notification.” The judgment of Mukherjea and Bose JJ., whose votes were decisive, stated that not only could an entire enactment be extended with modifications, but also a part of an enactment could be extended. That principle was applied in Burah’s case(1), which formed the basis of the majority’s reasoning (see Mukherjea J. at page 1000 and Bose J. at pages 1106 and 1121). Mukherjea and Bose JJ. gave a narrow interpretation to the words “restriction” and “modification”, and because their views formed the greatest common agreement among the seven judges, their interpretation was treated as the Court’s decision. The present case differs from the earlier case only in that the earlier authority allowed the extension of an entire enactment or a part of it, whereas here the statute permits the selection of any individual section. Selecting a section is equivalent to applying a part of the Act, and applying a part constitutes a modification. Since the earlier decision allowed a part of an Act to be extended, it follows logically that an individual section, or several sections, may be selected and applied, as was done in Burah’s case(1). Similarly, because the whole or a part of an Act may be modified, a single section may also be modified. However, just as a modification of the whole Act may not be used to bring about an essential change in the Act’s policy, a modification of a part of the Act may not be permitted to achieve the same result. If that principle were not observed, the policy of the legislation could be circumvented by picking out portions of an Act, with or without modification, to effect a fundamental change in the Act as a whole.

The Court observed that the rule articulated in the earlier judgment could be avoided by extracting only selected parts of a statute, whether those parts were left unchanged or were modified, if such extraction caused a fundamental alteration of the Act as a whole. Consequently, the Court held that whenever a particular section of a law is chosen for application, the selection—whether the section is amended or not—must be carried out in a way that does not bring about any change in the policy of the legislation or any essential transformation of the Act when considered in its entirety. Subject to this limitation, the Court found that section 3(1)(f) of the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act, 1922, is intra vires, meaning that any one or more sections of that Act may be singled out and applied to the municipality of Patna so long as the selection does not produce an essential change in the statute or modify its policy. The Court then examined the notification dated 23 April 1951 and concluded that, in its view, that notification produced a radical shift in the policy of the Act. Because of this radical shift, the Court said the notification went beyond the authority conferred by section 3(1)(f) and therefore was ultra vires. The Court further noted that it was unnecessary to consider the validity of section 5 of the 1915 Act, which was also challenged, because no action taken under that provision had injured the appellant and consequently the appellant could not dispute its validity. As a result, the Court held that the appeal succeeded. Specifically, the Court declared two points: first, that section 3(1)(f) remains intra vires provided that the terms “restriction” and “modification” are interpreted in the narrow sense explained earlier; and second, that the 23 April 1951 notification is ultra vires. The Court stated that it need not address the validity of the 25 April 1931 notification or of section 5, as those questions did not arise. Finally, the Court ordered the respondents to pay the appellant’s costs in both the present proceedings and the earlier High Court proceedings, and the appeal was allowed.