R. M. Seshadri vs The District Magistrate, Tanjore, And...

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 192 of 1952

Decision Date: 1 October 1954

Coram: Ghulam Hasan, Mehar Chand Mahajan, B.K. Mukherjea, Vivian Bose

The matter before the Court was titled R. M. Seshadri versus the District Magistrate, Tanjore, and another. The judgment was delivered on 1 October 1954 by a bench of the Supreme Court of India consisting of Justice Ghulam Hasan, Justice Mehar Chand Mahajan, Justice B. K. Mukherjea and Justice Vivian Bose. The judgment was authored by Justice Ghulam Hasan. The petition was filed by the appellant, R. M. Seshadri, who was the owner of a permanent cinema theatre. The respondents were the District Magistrate of Tanjore and an additional respondent. The case was cited as 1954 AIR 747 and 1955 SCR 686, with subsequent citations in later reports. The issues involved the constitutional validity of conditions imposed on the licence granted to the cinema owner under section 8 of the Cinematograph Act of 1918, and whether those conditions violated the fundamental right guaranteed by article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. The appellant challenged two notifications issued by the State of Madras—G. O. M.I.S. 1054 dated 28 March 1948 and G. O. M.I.S. 3422 dated 15 September 1948—purporting to exercise powers under the said Act. The appellant appeared in person, while the respondent was represented by counsel for the Government of India. An intervener, the Union of India, was also represented by counsel for the Government of India.

The appellant owned a cinema theatre named Sri Brahannayaki situated at Tiruthuraipundi in the Tanjore District. He held a licence issued by the District Magistrate of Tanjore that became effective on 5 September 1950 and was valid until 4 September 1951. The licence was granted for one-year periods and could be renewed annually. The appellant objected to certain conditions stipulated in the licence, which were imposed by the District Magistrate pursuant to the two aforementioned notifications. The conditions included a requirement that, at each performance, the licencee must exhibit one or more approved films of a length and duration as directed by the Provincial or Central Government, and a special condition requiring the licencee to exhibit at the commencement of each performance not less than 2 000 feet of one or more approved films. The appellant sought relief from the Madras High Court under article 226 of the Constitution, requesting an order directing the District Magistrate to delete the contested conditions. The High Court dismissed the petition, and the appellant appealed to this Court under article 132(1) of the Constitution. The Court held that condition 4(a) and the special condition 3 imposed unreasonable restrictions on the licencee’s right to conduct his business and were therefore void, as they infringed the fundamental right guaranteed to the appellant under article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.

The State of Madras had issued two notifications, namely G. O. Mis. 1054, Home, dated 28 March 1948, and G. O. Mis. 3422, dated 15 September 1948, which it said were made under the authority granted by section 8 of the Cinematograph Act 1918. The conditions that were challenged by the appellant were set out in those notifications. Condition 4(a) required the licence-holder to exhibit at each performance one or more “approved films” of such length and for such length of time as the Provincial Government or the Central Government might, by a general or special order, direct. Condition 4(b) mandated the licence-holder to obey any directions issued by the Provincial Government, again by a general or special order, concerning the manner in which the approved films were to be shown during any performance. The accompanying explanation defined “Approved Films” as cinematograph films that had been approved for the purpose of the condition by the Provincial Government or the Central Government. A special condition, numbered 3, further required the licence-holder to exhibit at the beginning of each performance not less than 2,000 feet of one or more approved films.

The appellant filed a petition in the High Court of Judicature at Madras under article 226 of the Constitution, seeking an order directing the District Magistrate of Tanjore to delete the aforesaid conditions from his licence and requesting the State of Madras to rescind the two notifications. He argued that the conditions were ultra vires, exceeding the powers of the licensing authority, and that they violated his freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by article 19(1)(a) as well as his right to carry on trade or business under article 19(1)(g). The High Court rejected both of these contentions, holding that the conditions were reasonable and served the interests of the general public. The High Court thereafter granted leave to appeal to this Court.

In the appeal before this Court, the appellant, who represented himself, raised two principal points. First, he contended that the notifications and the conditions they imposed were beyond the competence of the Government of Madras and the District Magistrate. Second, he maintained that, even assuming the authorities were competent, the conditions did not constitute reasonable restrictions within the meaning of article 19(6) because they lay outside the scope of the Cinematograph Act. The Court observed that the appeal could be decided on the second ground. It noted that the Madras Cinematograph Rules of 1933 had been amended by notification G. O. Mis. 1054, Home, dated 28 March 1948, exercised under the powers conferred by section 8 of the Cinematograph Act 1918, and that the impugned conditions had been inserted in place of condition 4 in licence Form A. Section 8, the Court explained, authorises the State Government to make rules for giving effect to the provisions of the Act. The preamble of the Act, the Court said, states that its object is to make provisions for regulating exhibitions under the Cinematograph Act. While the Court did not delve into whether the Act contemplated the exhibition of educational or instructional films or whether a cinema licence-holder could be compelled to show such films, it framed the issue for further consideration as whether the impugned conditions amounted to “reasonable restrictions” within article 19(6).

In this case the Court considered whether the licensing conditions that required a cinema licence holder to exhibit certain films could be said to constitute reasonable restrictions under article 19 (6) of the Constitution. The Court defined “approved films” as those that are either produced directly by the Government or purchased by the Government from private producers. Because private producers lack the facilities to market their films, the Government buys the films from them and then charges the cinema licencees a hire fee for the right to show those films. Condition 4(a) of the licence required the licencee, at each performance, to exhibit one or more approved films of whatever length and for whatever duration the Provincial Government or the Central Government might direct. The condition did not specify either the length of the film or the period of time for which it could be shown, thereby giving the Government an unrestricted discretion to compel the licencee to exhibit a film of any length. The Court noted that a typical film exhibition lasts about two hours and fifteen minutes, and that, in the absence of any guiding standards, the Government could require the licencee to show approved films whose length might consume the entire allotted time for a performance or a substantial portion of it. Likewise, because the condition omitted any limit on the duration of exhibition, the Government could obligate the licencee to exhibit an approved film for one and a half hours or even for the full two-hour period. The Court observed that the condition, as drafted, provided no principled guidance to the licensing authority and could, in effect, lead to the loss or complete extinction of the cinema business. Such a condition, expressed in extremely broad terms, would operate harshly on cinema operators and could not be regarded as a reasonable restriction; rather, it resembled an outright imposition. Moreover, the condition did not require that the approved films be of an educational or instructional nature intended for social or public welfare. Consequently, the Court held that condition 4(a), in its present form, amounted to an unreasonable restriction on the licencee’s right to carry on his business and therefore had to be declared void as violative of the appellant’s fundamental right under article 19 (1)(g). The Court also examined special condition 3, which obliges the licencee, at the start of each performance, to exhibit not less than 2,000 feet of one or more approved films. The Court found that this requirement too was open to objection because it sets a minimum length without indicating any maximum, thereby granting the Government unfettered discretion that could unjustifiably interfere with the licencee’s business.

The Court noted that, according to the information presented, a film having a length of two thousand feet would require roughly twenty minutes of exhibition time when shown. It further calculated that this duration would constitute approximately one seventh of a full performance whose total length was presumed to be two hours and fifteen minutes. The Court said that it was unnecessary to decide whether fixing a maximum length of two thousand feet would be reasonable, because the provision specified that figure only as a minimum. Consequently, the Court observed that the Government could require the licensee to exhibit a film of ten thousand or twelve thousand feet, thereby displacing the film the licensee intended to show within the allotted time. The Court pointed out that because no maximum length was prescribed, the authority's discretion remained unlimited and unchecked, which would inevitably result in an unjustifiable intrusion upon the licensee's right to conduct his business. Accordingly, the Court held that the condition in question was equally objectionable and therefore had to be struck down. The Court allowed the appeal, declaring that condition four sub-a and special condition three, as worded, were void and had no effect against the appellant's fundamental right under article nineteen one g of the Constitution. The Court stated that it would not express any view on the appellant's first contention. Finally, the Court ordered that the appellant should be awarded costs against the respondent both in this Court and in the lower Court, and that the appeal was allowed.