Nar Singh And Another vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 4 of 1952

Decision Date: 05/05/1954

Coram: Vivian Bose, B.K. Mukherjea, Ghulam Hasan

In this matter the Supreme Court of India considered an appeal filed by Nar Singh and another individual against the State of Uttar Pradesh, with the judgment rendered on 5 May 1954. The bench comprised Justices Vivian Bose, B.K. Mukherjea and Ghulam Hasan. The case was reported as 1954 AIR 457 and 1955 SCR 243, with subsequent citations including 1955 SC 778, 1956 SC 181, 1956 SC 411, 1956 SC 757, 1958 SC 22, 1960 SC 289, 1965 SC 1467 and 1989 SC 653. The factual background involved twenty-four persons who had originally been tried under sections 302, 149 and related provisions of the Indian Penal Code. After the trial, only three individuals were convicted by the High Court. By mistake the High Court sustained the conviction of one of those three, identified as “N,” although it had intended to acquit him. The High Court later informed the Government of this error; the Government consequently issued an order remitting the sentence erroneously imposed on N and directed his release.

Subsequently, N together with the other two convicted persons filed applications under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution of India seeking a certificate that would protect them from the stigma of a murder conviction. The High Court granted a certificate to N on the ground that the certificate would prevent future prejudice. Regarding the other two convicts, the High Court also issued certificates, reasoning that the constitutional provision referred to “a case” and that the only case before it was the appeal in its entirety, thereby feeling bound to grant certificates to all. The Supreme Court examined this reasoning and held that the High Court’s view was erroneous because the term “case” in Article 134(1)(c) pertains to each individual’s case, not to the appeal as a collective. The Court further observed that the High Court had misdirected itself concerning the two other convicts, failing to exercise the discretion vested in it and mistakenly believing that it either possessed no discretion or that its discretion was fettered. Consequently, the Supreme Court, exercising its general supervisory jurisdiction over all courts in India, found it necessary to intervene.

Finally, the Supreme Court concluded that the appeal must fail because the certificates under Article 134(1)(c) were wrongly granted, and, given the surrounding facts, the matter did not constitute a suitable case for the grant of special leave under Article 136(1). In reaching its decision the Court referred to precedents such as Subhanand Chowdhury v. Apurba Krishna Mitra, Banarsi Parshad v. Kashi Krishna, Radhakrishna Ayyar v. Swaminatha Ayyar, Radha Krishn Das v. Rai Krishn Chand, Swaminarayan Jethalal v. Acharya Devendraprasadji, Bhagbati Dei v. Muralidhar Sahu and Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram.

Criminal Appeal No 4 of 1952 was filed under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution of India. The appeal sought special leave from a judgment and order dated 7 May 1951 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Appeal No 350 of 1950. That High Court decision arose from a judgment and order dated 9 March 1950 of the Additional Sessions Judge, Etah, in Sessions Trials Nos 127 of 1949 and 10 of 1950. Counsel for the appellant was S P Verma and counsel for the respondent was C P Lal. The judgment of the Supreme Court was delivered by Justice Bose on 5 May 1954. In the original trial twenty-four persons, including the two appellants, were tried for offences punishable under sections 148, 307/149 and 302/149 of the Indian Penal Code. Sixteen of those accused were acquitted, leaving eight convicted. On appeal before the High Court, a further five persons were acquitted, and the convictions that were upheld pertained only to the two appellants, Nar Singh and Roshan Singh, together with a third accused identified as Nanhu Singh. The High Court, however, misread the evidence and confused Nanhu Singh with Bechan Singh. The court intended to convict Bechan Singh and acquit Nanhu Singh, but instead it acquitted Bechan Singh and convicted Nanhu Singh. Upon discovering this error, the High Court judges promptly informed the State Government, which issued an order remitting the sentence that had been wrongly imposed on Nanhu Singh and directing his immediate release.

The mistaken conviction of Nanhu Singh, together with the upheld convictions of Nar Singh and Roshan Singh, led the three men to apply under Article 134(1)(c) for a certificate of special leave. The High Court correctly granted a certificate in the case of Nanhu Singh because, although his sentence had been remitted and he had been released, his conviction—including a murder charge—remained on his record, and the court reasonably feared that the stigma of that conviction could prejudice him in future circumstances. In contrast, the High Court found no justification for issuing a certificate for Nar Singh and Roshan Singh. Nevertheless, the High Court judges, in the Supreme Court’s view, erroneously believed they were compelled to grant a certificate because Article 134(1)(c) refers to a “case.” The Supreme Court held that the term “case” in that provision must be understood as referring to the case of each individual person, not to the appeal taken as a whole. This interpretation applies even if the trial had been conducted by the High Court itself, and it is especially appropriate on appeal, where several persons may join in a common memorandum of appeal but each appeal constitutes a separate “case” for the purposes of the article. The court emphasized that each convicted individual may choose whether to appeal, and therefore the notion of a single collective “case” does not govern the grant of a certificate under Article 134(1)(c).

In this case the Court explained that a joint memorandum cannot be treated as a single “case” for the purpose of Article 134(1)(c). If the High Court had intended to refer to the whole matter as a single case, it would have been necessary to include even those persons who were acquitted, so that the entire proceeding could be examined. The Supreme Court clarified that this is not the meaning of the term in the context of the constitutional provision and held that the High Court’s interpretation was erroneous. After the certificate was issued, the petitioner did not file an appeal, and only the two convicted individuals appeared before this Court. Had those two individuals approached this Court independently and filed a petition for special leave under Article 136, their petitions would have been dismissed at the outset because there was nothing distinctive in their situations to warrant such leave. The evidence against them was clear, and following the usual rule the Court would have rejected the petitions in limine. Nonetheless, counsel for the convicts argued that, since a certificate had been obtained, the Supreme Court had become a regular appellate court and was therefore obligated to hear their cases both on facts and on law. They relied on a decision of the Federal Court in Subhanand Chowdhary v. Apurba Krishna Mitra. The Court refused to apply that judgment, observing that it concerned Section 205 of the Government of India Act, 1935, a different subject matter, and it did not employ the same language as the constitutional provision at issue.

The Court further stated that it possesses general powers of judicial superintendence over all courts in India and serves as the ultimate interpreter and guardian of the Constitution, with a duty to ensure faithful observance of its provisions and to expound them where necessary. Article 134(1)(c) employs the same language as Article 133(1)(c), and a certificate is required under Article 133(1) in each of the four cases discussed. However, the mere grant of a certificate does not bar this Court from examining whether the grant was proper and whether the prerequisite conditions were satisfied. For clause (c) of both Articles 133(1) and 134(1), the sole condition is the discretion of the High Court, but such discretion is judicial and must be exercised according to well-established principles that govern these matters, as articulated in Banarsi Parshad v. Kashi Krishna. Moreover, a certificate must plainly demonstrate that the discretion conferred was actually invoked and exercised, as required by Radhakrishna Ayyar v. Swaminatha Ayyar and Radha Krishn Das v. Rai Krishn Chand. When discretion is properly exercised following established lines, there is ordinarily no ground for interference except on very strong reasons, as indicated in Swaminarayan Jethalal v. Acharya Devendraprasadji and Bhagbati Dei v. Muralidhar Sahu.

In reviewing the order, the Court observed that the High Court had misdirected itself by treating its discretionary power as either already limited or altogether absent, a view that conflicted with established principles explained in earlier judgments such as (1) [1940] F.C.R. 31, (2) 28 I.A. 11 at 13, (3) 48 I.A. 311 at 34, (4) 28 I.A. 182 at 183, (5) A.I.R. 1946 P.C. 100, 102 and (6) A.I.R. 1943 P.C. 106, 108. The Court held that when a lower court mistakenly believes its discretion is fettered, the superior Court must either remit the matter back for proper exercise of discretion or decide the issue itself, as articulated in Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram (1). These well-known rules governing discretion apply with equal force to certificates issued under article 134(1)(c) as to any other discretionary act of a superior Court. The learned High Court judges, in the present case, concluded that they had no option available to them. By misinterpreting the law, they failed to exercise the discretion vested in them. Their judgment made it clear that, had the law permitted any discretionary relief, they would have denied the certificate because they found nothing exceptional in the appellants’ situations, stating, “Ordinarily no certificate can be granted to them as there is nothing of an exceptional nature in their cases.” Accordingly, the Court held that the certificate had been wrongly granted to the appellants and that their petition should be dealt with as an application for special leave under article 136(1). From that perspective, the Court found that the matter did not constitute a proper case for special leave. The High Court’s findings that more than five persons had participated in the attack and that eyewitnesses could identify the two appellants were accepted. The fact that only two members of the attacking group were positively identified did not diminish the credibility of the finding that the assault involved more than five individuals. Consequently, the invocation of section 149 of the Indian Penal Code was justified, and the convictions were upheld. The Court saw no reason to interfere with the sentences imposed. It noted that a group of persons attacked sleeping victims at two o’clock in the morning, that at least one assailant was armed with a gun or pistol, that one victim was shot dead, another faced an attempted murder, and the band subsequently looted the victims’ property. The sentences of two years’ imprisonment, four years’ imprisonment and transportation were deemed not excessive and therefore required no review. The appeal was consequently dismissed, and the order of the High Court was affirmed.