Madan Mohan Singh vs State Of Uttar Pradesh

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 7 May 1954

Coram: B.K. Mukherjea, Ghulam Hasan

In this case the Court noted that the appeal had been brought before it on a special leave petition and that it challenged a judgment of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court dated 27 November 1951. That judgment had set aside, on appeal, an order of acquittal granted to the appellant by the First Class Magistrate, Mr. Srivastava, of Meerut. The High Court had substituted the order of acquittal with a conviction under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code and had sentenced the appellant to rigorous imprisonment for eighteen months.

The appellant was identified as an Excise Inspector employed by the Government of Uttar Pradesh and was serving in the Baghpat Circle of Meerut at the time the alleged offence occurred. The complainant, Ghammanlal, was a licensed retailer of liquor and narcotic drugs operating in the same locality. At the relevant time Ghammanlal and his brothers possessed licences for ten shops, of which seven were authorised to sell liquor and three to sell drugs. According to the prosecution narrative, on 22 March 1948 Ghammanlal submitted an application to the appellant requesting that the appellant recommend to the authorities that he be allowed to draw fifty gallons of liquor and two seers of ganja from the bonded warehouse and godown in preparation for the upcoming Holi festival. The prosecution alleged that the appellant recommended only eight gallons of liquor and four chhataks of ganja and, while making that recommendation, demanded a bribe that Ghammanlal had already promised to pay. The bribe was said to be calculated at five per cent of the total value of the contract for the shops.

The Court further explained that the excise shops had been scheduled for auction about two weeks earlier, on 8 March 1948. Although Ghammanlal had submitted higher bids for some of those shops, his offers were rejected on the ground that the appellant claimed Ghammanlal was a habitual defaulter in payment matters. Consequently, a large shop for which Ghammanlal had offered a bid of Rs 32,000 was awarded to another purchaser at a considerably lower price. On the following day, 23 March 1948, Ghammanlal travelled to Meerut to draw liquor from the warehouse. While there he encountered his associate Balwant Singh, who was aware of the appellant’s demand for a bribe from Ghammanlal. Balwant Singh advised Ghammanlal to approach the Anti-Corruption Department and lodge a complaint against the appellant.

Acting on that advice, Ghammanlal and Balwant Singh proceeded to the Anti-Corruption Department at approximately eleven o’clock in the morning. They were received by the Under-Officer, Arshad Ali, who informed them that they would have to wait because the Deputy Superintendent of Police had not yet arrived. The two men then went to the Collectorate, where they again met the appellant. Ghammanlal pleaded with the appellant to recommend a larger quantity of liquor. The appellant responded that he would be prepared to recommend a greater amount only if the demanded bribe was paid.

In the course of the investigation, the appellant demanded a bribe from Ghammanlal after Ghammanlal had been promised liquor, and Ghammanlal assured that he would pay the money once he had taken the liquor from the godown. Accordingly, the original application for eight gallons of liquor, which had already been sanctioned, was torn up and a new application was filed; this time the appellant recommended twenty-four gallons and specified a bribe of one rupee per gallon. The complainant together with his associate Balwant Singh left the premises, promising to remit the money within three hours. They proceeded to the Anti-Corruption Department where they met the Under Officer, Arshad Ali, and the Deputy Superintendent of Police, and narrated the conversation they had had with the appellant. Ghammanlal declared that he would pay a bribe of fifty rupees and handed that sum in currency notes to Arshad Ali; the Deputy Superintendent recorded his statement and the officers devised a trap to catch the appellant. The District Magistrate was then approached, and he issued a slip to Mr Burney, a First Class Magistrate, directing that the notes be signed by the Additional District Magistrate and that the appellant be arrested while accepting the bribe. Because the Additional District Magistrate was unavailable, the District Magistrate himself signed the notes. Acting on these instructions, Mr Burney visited the Anti-Corruption Department, prepared a list of the serial numbers of the notes, and a party was assembled comprising Mr Burney, Ghammanlal, Balwant Singh, Under Officer Arshad Ali, Inspector Raghubir Dayal, and other staff members. When they arrived at the appellant’s house, Ghammanlal and Mr Burney entered the interior while the remaining participants concealed themselves outside. Mr Burney, dressed in different attire, was introduced by Ghammanlal as his brother or cousin, and he asked the appellant to register his name in the Binauli shop. According to the prosecution narrative, Ghammanlal then requested the appellant to settle his accounts; the appellant examined Ghammanlal’s register and demanded payment of forty-eight rupees on several items, which Ghammanlal handed over, and the appellant placed the notes on the windowsill. After Ghammanlal stepped outside and gave a signal, the concealed party rushed in, Mr Burney revealed his identity, collected the notes from the sill, and recorded the statements of both Ghammanlal and the appellant. A search of the appellant’s house yielded no incriminating material, and on the same day Mr Burney submitted a report on the trap to the District Magistrate. Following the police investigation, the appellant was charged under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code and tried before Mr Srivastava, a First Class Magistrate of Meerut. The appellant pleaded not guilty, denying that he had ever demanded or accepted any bribe, and argued that Ghammanlal bore a hostile attitude toward him because the appellant had previously complained against Ghammanlal to the Excise Officer and Assistant Excise Commissioner, which resulted in Ghammanlal being barred from bidding for a major shop and having his higher bid rejected, thereby giving him a motive to fabricate a false complaint with the assistance of Balwant Singh, an ex-convict and close friend.

In the facts presented, the accused, who held the position of Excise Officer and Assistant Excise Commissioner, was precluded from submitting bids for the large shops that were to be auctioned on 8 March 1948. Although Ghammanlal made a higher bid, his offer was not accepted and the shop for which he had bid was awarded to another participant at a considerably lower price. Consequently, Ghammanlal developed a strong feeling of resentment toward the accused, whom he blamed for the loss of his business. To exact revenge and to implicate the accused in a bribery offence, Ghammanlal, together with Balwant Singh—described as an ex-convict and a close associate—filed a false complaint with the Anti-Corruption Department, persuading the department that the accused had indeed demanded a bribe from him. The accused asserted that he was well acquainted with Mr Burney, a Magistrate responsible for the Nazarat and the Arms Act Department, and that he could not possibly confuse Burney with a brother or cousin of Ghammanlal. On 23 March, Ghammanlal visited the accused’s residence accompanied by Mr Burney. The accused greeted Burney, offered him tea and other refreshments, and after a short interval Ghammanlal removed a sum of money from his pocket and placed it on the window-sill. Immediately thereafter, he hurried out while coughing, and members of the Anti-Corruption Department who had been waiting outside entered the room. Burney then prepared a list and compelled the accused to sign it. In his statement, the accused plainly recounted that Ghammanlal had taken money from his pocket, laid it on the window-sill, and that the accused was unaware of the exact amount. The defence further argued that, in accordance with a circular issued by the Excise Department, the accused was collecting contributions from all licensed liquor shops in his jurisdiction for a refugee fund, the subscription being fixed at Rs 10 per shop. Ghammanlal, who owned seven shops, therefore owed Rs 70, of which he had already paid Rs 22 on 3 February 1948, leaving a balance of Rs 48. The defence claimed that Ghammanlal placed the Rs 48 on the window-sill with the intention that the accused would accept it as payment of the outstanding subscription. Six witnesses were examined for the prosecution and eleven for the defence. After assessing the totality of the evidence, the trial Magistrate concluded that the prosecution had failed to establish the accused’s guilt and consequently acquitted him. The State of Uttar Pradesh challenged the acquittal by filing an appeal to the High Court under Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The appeal was heard by a bench consisting of

In that case, the Bench composed of Justice Shankar Saran and Justice Desai allowed the appeal. They set aside the trial magistrate’s order of acquittal and entered a conviction of the accused under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code, imposing a term of rigorous imprisonment of eighteen months. The High Court had refused to issue a certificate to the accused under Article 134(c) of the Constitution; nevertheless, the Supreme Court granted special leave to appeal, and the matter therefore came before it. The appellant’s counsel, Mr Gopal Singh, raised two principal questions. First, he argued that the prosecution had proceeded without a proper or valid sanction, as required by Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, and that the initiation of the proceedings was therefore illegal and beyond jurisdiction. Second, he contended that the High Court had erred in its approach, alleging that the learned judges had ignored the principles that should govern an appellate court when setting aside an acquittal in a criminal matter, had misread the evidence, and had failed to consider the material facts on which the trial court had based its decision. Regarding the first ground, the State did not dispute that a sanction was necessary to commence prosecution against the appellant. Section 6(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act required that such sanction be issued by the authority competent to remove the accused from his post. In the present circumstances, that authority was the Excise Commissioner. The prosecution produced a copy of a letter, marked Exhibit P-10, which communicated to the Collector of Meerut the Excise Commissioner’s sanction to prosecute the accused. The letter, dated November 1948 and addressed to the Collector, referred to a wireless message dated 4 September 1948 concerning the alleged acceptance of illegal gratification by Sardar Mohan Singh Ahluwalia, Excise Inspector of Circle V Baghpat, District Meerut, and stated that the Commissioner sanctioned the prosecution and placed the officer under suspension pending trial. The letter was signed by R D Dikshit, identified as the Personal Assistant to the Excise Commissioner. The appellant’s counsel challenged the validity of this sanction on two bases. First, he asserted that the sanction was not legally sufficient because it was not signed by the Excise Commissioner himself but only by his Personal Assistant. Second, he argued that the letter, which appeared to be a reply to the Collector’s wireless message, did not demonstrate that the sanction was given in relation to the specific facts constituting the alleged offence.

In examining the first submission raised by the appellant’s counsel, the Court found that it did not merit serious consideration. The witness identified as Mr R Dikshit, who served as the Personal Assistant to the Excise Commissioner, was called as a prosecution witness and produced an additional document marked Ex P-11. This document was described as the draft of the letter whose copy appeared as Ex P-10, and the witness asserted that the draft bore the signature of the Excise Commissioner beneath the word “approved”. Although the Court expressed some doubt that this format necessarily constituted a proper sanction—suggesting that the signature might merely indicate approval of the draft’s correctness—it declined to adopt a purely technical approach. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the sanction could be regarded as having been issued by the Excise Commissioner himself.

The second contention advanced by the appellant’s counsel was deemed to possess considerable merit. Citing the Privy Council’s pronouncement in Gokul Chand Dwarkadas v The King, AIR 1948 PC 82 at p. 84, the Court reiterated that the onus of establishing that a valid sanction had been obtained rests upon the prosecution. This burden includes demonstrating that the sanctioning authority considered the specific material facts upon which the prosecution intended to rely. Such facts may appear expressly on the face of the sanction or may be proved by extraneous evidence. In the present matter, the alleged offence’s material facts were absent from the face of the sanctionary letter Ex P-10. Consequently, the prosecution was required to adduce additional evidence showing that those facts had been placed before the Excise Commissioner. The prosecution failed to meet this requirement. When questioned, Mr Dikshit (PW 6) responded that a detailed account of the case had been forwarded to the Commissioner and was kept in a confidential file at his office, which he declined to produce. The Court regarded this refusal as a deliberate withholding of evidence that could have demonstrated the Commissioner’s consideration of the relevant facts. Accordingly, the sanction was held to be defective, and a defective sanction cannot confer jurisdiction upon the court to try the case. The appeal therefore succeeded on this ground alone. Nevertheless, the Court chose to record its view on the second ground as well, observing that the High Court’s reasoning on the merits appeared plainly untenable. It cannot be disputed that the

In this appeal the Court observed that a High Court, when it is hearing an appeal against an order of acquittal, possesses the full authority to re-examine the evidence that has been placed on record and to form its own conclusions based on its own assessment of that evidence. Nevertheless, the Court pointed out that the proper exercise of this power was articulated by the Privy Council in the case of Sheo Swarup v. Emperor and was reaffirmed by this Court in the more recent decision of Narayan Ittiravi v. State of Trav-Co. According to those authorities, while exercising its appellate jurisdiction the High Court must invariably accord appropriate weight to several fundamental considerations. First, it must give due regard to the trial court’s appraisal of the credibility of the witnesses. Second, it must uphold the presumption of innocence that favours the accused, a presumption that is not diminished merely because the accused was previously acquitted. Third, the accused is entitled to the benefit of any doubt that may arise from the evidence. Fourth, the appellate court should be reluctant to disturb factual findings that were made by a trial judge who had the advantage of personally observing the witnesses. After listening to counsel for both parties and after a meticulous examination of the case record, the Court concluded that the judges of the High Court failed to keep these essential rules and principles of criminal justice in mind. Consequently, their judgment was found to be defective because it ignored and misappreciated material facts presented in evidence and because it did not give the requisite weight to the findings on which the trial court’s decision had been based.

The Court then turned to the substance of the offence alleged under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code. That provision defines the offence as the act by a public servant of obtaining or accepting, as a motive or reward, any gratification that is not lawful remuneration, for either performing or refraining from performing an official act, or for showing favour or disfavour to any person, or for rendering any service or disservice to that person. The initial issue for consideration was to determine the motive or the reward that underpinned the payment of Rs 48 as an illegal gratification by the complainant and its acceptance by the accused. According to the complainant’s testimony before the Magistrate, the accused had demanded, as a bribe, five per cent of the amount that the complainant earned from contracts relating to the Excise shops, and the complainant had promised to pay that amount. In his direct examination, the complainant asserted that the accused repeatedly demanded this money and that he had consequently promised to pay after the Holi festival. The prosecution further stated that on 22 March 1948, the complainant, Ghammanlal, applied to the accused for a supply of fifty gallons of liquor and two seers of ganja in anticipation of the upcoming Holi festival, but the accused authorised only eight gallons of liquor and four chhataks of ganja. The complainant maintained that no bribe was demanded by the accused at the time the recommendation was made. The record therefore reveals the factual backdrop against which the allegation of an illegal gratification under Section 161 must be examined.

On 23 March 1948, Ghammanlal, accompanied by his friend Balwant Singh, proceeded to the Anti-Corruption Department to lodge a complaint against the accused. They arrived at approximately 11 a.m., but an employee named Arshad Ali informed them that they would have to wait because the Deputy Superintendent of Police had not yet arrived. After leaving the department, the two men went to the Collectorate where they met the accused. Ghammanlal appealed to the accused to obtain a recommendation for a larger quantity of liquor. The accused consented, and when Ghammanlal made a fresh petition, the accused raised the sanctioned supply from eight gallons to twenty-four gallons. According to Ghammanlal’s testimony, the accused then demanded a bribe calculated at a specific rate for each gallon of liquor he was recommending. Ghammanlal claimed that the original petition, which had authorized eight gallons, was torn apart and the torn pieces were kept by the accused in his pocket. Later that same afternoon, Ghammanlal and Balwant returned to the Anti-Corruption Department, where they agreed to set a trap to catch the accused in the act of demanding money. The prosecution argued that the accused demanded bribes from Ghammanlal first for services related to securing licences for his shops and second for the favour shown in recommending the supply of liquor and other drugs from the warehouse.

The trial magistrate examined these allegations and, on solid grounds, found that Ghammanlal’s version could not be accepted as true on either point. The magistrate held that, based on the actual facts, there was no occasion for the accused to demand a bribe nor for the complainant to promise payment. Regarding Ghammanlal’s claim of paying five per cent of the contract sum, the magistrate observed that the complainant had not pursued this issue with any seriousness. It was further noted that the alleged bribe paid to the accused was not connected with the licences. The trial court conclusively ruled that the accused could not have demanded a bribe for any action concerning the Excise licences, as he had, in fact, acted to the complainant’s detriment. The assistant commissioner of Excise, who testified for the defence, stated that he had been present at Meerut during the auction of the Excise shops. He recounted that the accused had complained to him about four contractors, including Ghammanlal and his brothers, labeling them as habitual defaulters and undesirable persons. The assistant commissioner verified this claim with the Naib Tahsildar, and despite Ghammanlal’s objections, he

It was observed that the complainant was prohibited from bidding for any large shop, and, given this circumstance, the Court found it difficult to accept that the accused could legitimately demand bribes from Ghammanlal or that Ghammanlal could promise any sum to obtain a benefit concerning those contracts. The Court then turned to the issue of alleged illegal gratification claimed as a reward for recommending supplies of liquor and other intoxicants from the warehouse. The trial Magistrate had relied on a Government circular, identified as Exhibit D-17 and proved by Abdul Jabbar (Documentary Witness 4), which imposed restrictions on the issuance of excisable articles for March 1948 by fixing a quota based on the average monthly consumption for the preceding eleven months. Under that circular, Ghammanlal was entitled to draw liquor up to the prescribed quota without needing any recommendation from the accused. Consequently, the trial Magistrate concluded that there was no necessity for the complainant to offer any bribe. The High Court, however, dismissed the trial Magistrate’s discussion and findings in a summary fashion. The High Court remarked that the learned Magistrate was again in error in holding that there was no occasion for Ghammanlal to pay a bribe to the respondent, noting that the Magistrate had relied on the circular fixing the quota for each licensee. The High Court stressed that, irrespective of whether Ghammanlal could obtain liquor from the warehouse within the quota without a recommendation, the fact remained that a recommendation had been made by the respondent. With respect to the alleged payment of five per cent of the contract money, the High Court observed that it found no substance in the Magistrate’s argument that the respondent could not demand any bribe from Ghammanlal, especially after the respondent had allegedly wronged Ghammanlal a fortnight earlier by causing his bids for larger shops to be rejected. The Court stated that when the respondent had no right to demand a bribe, the issue of having previously wronged Ghammanlal did not arise. The Court expressed difficulty in appreciating the logic of those observations, acknowledging that a public officer has no authority to demand any bribe, yet emphasizing that when a public officer is tried before a criminal court for alleged illegal gratification, the existence of any motive for the payment or acceptance of a bribe is a material fact that must be considered. Assuming, however, that there is nothing inherently improbable about the appellant demanding bribes from Ghammanlal for recommendations concerning liquor supply, the truth or falsity of the complainant’s narrative can be resolved only through a proper examination of the evidence presented by the prosecution. The trial Magistrate noted in his judgment that, in the first statement (Exhibit P-3) made by Ghammanlal to Mr. Burney immediately after the accused’s arrest, Ghammanlal alleged that the accused had demanded eight annas per gallon of liquor for a recommendation made on 23 March 1948.

In the testimony recorded by the trial magistrate, the complainant Ghammanlal initially stated that the accused demanded a sum of Rs 24 for 48 gallons of liquor that had previously been recommended, together with a charge of Rs 7⁄8 for twelve chhataks of ganja, bringing the total amount claimed to be due to Rs 47⁄8. The complainant did not mention any demand or promise of payment related to excise licences in that first statement. Later, in a statement made on 13 April 1948 to the police under Section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code and reproduced as Exhibits D-5 and D-6, Ghammanlal recounted that an excise inspector had prohibited him from bidding for a liquor shop at Baraut. Although a bid of up to Rs 32,000 had been offered, the shop was ultimately auctioned for Rs 26,500 in the name of another individual. Because of this outcome, the inspector was displeased with Ghammanlal and ceased to recommend him for liquor. Accordingly, Ghammanlal claimed that, instead of the usual fractional annas, the accused had recommended a bribe of twenty-four gallons of liquor at a rate of Rs 2 per gallon. In his deposition before the magistrate, Ghammanlal asserted that the bribe had been demanded at a rate of Re 1 per gallon, which he expressed as a demand of Rs 24 for twenty-four gallons of liquor. He further alleged that an additional Rs 10 had been demanded for opium, Rs 7⁄8 for ganja, and another Rs 7 for previous dues. The inclusion of the Rs 10 for opium and the Rs 7 for earlier dues was new and had not been mentioned in his earlier statements, and the three statements given on three separate occasions were mutually inconsistent. The High Court, however, made a broad observation that any discrepancies in these statements did not affect the issue at hand, an approach the Supreme Court described as wholly incorrect. The Court emphasized that such inconsistencies were material and relevant for assessing the credibility of the complainant and determining whether his evidence could be relied upon. The trial magistrate, having heard the complainant, concluded definitively that Ghammanlal was speaking untruthfully from beginning to end, and the Supreme Court found no basis to deem that finding improper. The next point examined was whether the accused knew Mr Burney beforehand and, if so, whether it was probable that the accused would accept a bribe in Burney’s presence. The magistrate recorded that the accused had established beyond doubt that he was well acquainted with Shri Burney well before the incident, and that there was no reason to think the accused could have mistaken Shri Burney for Ghammanlal’s cousin or nephew, especially since Shri Burney’s appearance had not changed. The magistrate noted that Shri Burney had admitted to being in charge of the Nazarat, that monies of the Nazarat were disbursed in his presence and bearing his signature, and that entries in the Nazarat registers for the year 1947-48 showed many vouchers signed by the accused, indicating that the accused had received money as excise rewards in Shri Burney’s presence on numerous occasions. Moreover, Shri Burney, who also served as Arms Officer, endorsed licences for guns and pistols after inspecting the arms and comparing serial numbers, and the accused had appeared before him to obtain a licence for his pistol and his father’s gun, as shown in Exhibits D-1 and D-2 bearing Shri Burney’s signature. Finally, the courtroom of Shri Burney was situated close to that of the Excise Magistrate, and the accused frequently attended that court for his excise matters, giving him ample opportunity to see Shri Burney, who testified that he had only changed his clothing while his facial features remained unchanged.

The record showed that the Nazarat registers for the year 1947-48 contained entries identified as Exhibit D-3 and Exhibit D-4, and that many of the vouchers in those entries bore the accused’s signature. The money recorded in those vouchers was said to have been handed to the accused as excise rewards in the presence of Shri Burney, who was then in charge of the Nazarat and whose signature also appeared on the documents. The evidence therefore indicated that the accused had received money on numerous occasions while Shri Burney was present, which implied that the accused must have recognized him. In addition, Shri Burney held the position of Arms Officer and was responsible for endorsing licences for guns and pistols after examining the weapons and comparing serial numbers. The accused was reported to have appeared before Shri Burney to obtain a licence for his own pistol and for a firearm belonging to his father; these licences were identified as Exhibits D-1 and D-2 and also carried Shri Burney’s signature. Moreover, the courtroom in which Shri Burney presided was located in close proximity to that of the Excise Magistrate, and the accused frequently attended that courtroom for his excise cases, providing him with further opportunities to see Shri Burney. Shri Burney himself testified that he had only altered his clothing and that his facial features remained unchanged. The trial Magistrate, after a careful examination of all this material, concluded that the accused undoubtedly knew Shri Burney well before the incident and that there was no basis for mistaking him for a relative of Ghammanlal, even if Shri Burney had altered his attire. The High Court expressed surprise at this finding, stating that there was “no substance in the defence of the respondent that he knew Shri Burney well” and questioning how the Magistrate could have determined such knowledge “beyond doubt.” The High Court further observed that the mere fact that Shri Burney might have signed the arm licence or been present when excise rewards were given, or that the two courtrooms were adjacent, did not necessarily prove that the respondent could recognise Shri Burney even if he were disguised. It suggested that the respondent might have seen a face resembling Shri Burney’s when Ghammanlal introduced him as his cousin, without necessarily suspecting the true identity. The present Court found these observations unhelpful and held that the Magistrate’s finding was reasonable and supported by undisputed facts. There was no justification for the High Court to interfere with that finding of fact. Once it was established that the accused had known Shri Burney prior to the events in question, the prosecution’s case was fundamentally weakened. The Court then turned to another material issue raised by the accused’s evidence: that a sum of Rs 48 was owed to the accused by the complainant as the balance of a subscription to a refugee fund, which the accused was collecting under directions from his departmental head. The Court noted that the defence did not assert that the accused knew the Rs 48 taken from the complainant’s pocket was being paid as the subscription balance, nor that the accused accepted the money as such. Rather, the defence suggested—an assertion the Magistrate accepted—that Ghammanlal had promised to contribute Rs 70 for the seven licensed shops owned by him and his brothers, as his share of the refugee fund. Ghammanlal had already paid Rs 22 on 3 February 1948, leaving Rs 48 still due. The Court observed that Ghammanlal handed over Rs 48 on 23 March 1948, not Rs 50, even though Rs 50 notes were in circulation, raising the question of why the exact balance, rather than a higher denomination, was presented.

It was observed that the complainant’s subscription to the refugee fund was being collected by the accused under directives from the head of his department. The defence did not claim that the accused knew that the sum of Rs 48, which the complainant withdrew from his pocket and placed before the accused, represented the balance of the subscription alleged to be due, nor did it assert that the accused accepted the money in that character. The defence suggested, and the Magistrate accepted, that Ghammanlal had promised to pay Rs 70 in respect of the seven licensed shops held by him and his brothers as his contribution to the refugee fund. According to that suggestion, Ghammanlal had already paid Rs 22 on 3 February 1948 and Rs 48 remained outstanding. The reason why Ghammanlal produced Rs 48 from his pocket when he met the accused on 23 March 1948, rather than Rs 50 despite the District Magistrate having marked notes of that value for payment, was that payment of Rs 48 would lead the accused to accept the money under the impression that it was merely the balance of the subscription, thereby avoiding any suspicion. The High Court appeared to assume that the entire plea of the accused was that he had received the money as the balance of the subscription owed by the complainant. The learned Judges of the High Court did not accept the accused’s account that Ghammanlal had promised Rs 70 or had actually paid Rs 22 on the earlier date. In reaching that conclusion, the High Court failed to consider the material facts on which the trial Magistrate had based his finding and overlooked the admissions made by the prosecution during the hearing. Although the High Court noted that the accused might have been collecting subscriptions, it held that this did not imply that Ghammanlal had agreed to pay Rs 70. It was pointed out that the accused had obtained three receipt books, identified as D-37, D-38 and D-39, from the Excise Office. The payment of Rs 22 by Ghammanlal was documented by five counter-foil receipts: four receipts of Rs 5 each bearing numbers 4501 to 4504 in Exhibit D-38, and one receipt of Rs 2 numbered 575 in Exhibit D-39. Ghammanlal admitted that he had paid Rs 20, not Rs 22, and that the payment had been made at Lohara Sarai, but he did not produce the four receipts he acknowledged receiving. The Magistrate recorded in his judgment that the authenticity of the receipts had not been challenged by the prosecution; however, the High Court described the receipt for Rs 2 as forged and, despite Ghammanlal’s possible false statement, rejected the defence narrative.

In this matter the Court observed that the allegation made by the accused that he had handed over the money at Lohara Sarai could not be accepted as true. The Court further expressed that, in its view, the approach adopted by the High Court was erroneous from the very beginning. It noted that the High Court had failed to apply the principles that had been set out earlier, principles which it was required to keep in mind when it was considering an order of acquittal. The Court also held that the reasons relied upon by the High Court for overturning the assessment of evidence made by the trial Magistrate, who had heard and recorded the evidence, were, in the Court’s opinion, wholly inadequate and unsubstantial. Consequently, the Court concluded that the appeal ought to be allowed. Accordingly, the judgment rendered by the High Court was set aside and the decree of the trial Magistrate was restored. The Court directed that the accused be released by granting an acquittal.