Kunjilal And Another vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 73 of 1953

Decision Date: 8 October 1954

Coram: Ghulam Hasan, Natwarlal H. Bhagwati

In this case the Supreme Court of India rendered its judgment on 8 October 1954 in the matter of Kunjilal and another versus the State of Madhya Pradesh. The judgment was authored by Justice Ghulam Hasan and the bench comprised Justice Ghulam Hasan together with Justice Natwarlal H. Bhagwati. The petitioners were identified as Kunjilal and another, while the respondent was the State of Madhya Pradesh. The official citation for the decision is 1955 AIR 280 and 1955 SCR (1) 872. The case involved the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, Act V of 1898, specifically sections 403(1) and 403(2). The appellants had been convicted for offences under sections 392 and 332 of the Indian Penal Code for exporting contraband goods that were prohibited under section 7 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946. The appellants argued that they had earlier been prosecuted under section 70 of the same Essential Supplies Act, were convicted by a magistrate, and subsequently acquitted by the Additional Sessions Judge at Sagar. They contended that because this acquittal was not recorded before the High Court, they could not be retried for the same offence under section 403(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, nor could they be tried again on the same facts for any other offence pursuant to sections 236 or 237 of the Code. The Court held that sections 236 and 237 did not apply, and that subsection (2) of section 403 provided the correct answer, because the appellants were not being tried for the same offence contemplated by subsection (1) but for a distinct offence as envisaged by subsection 2.

The criminal appellate jurisdiction for this matter arose from Criminal Appeal No. 73 of 1953. Special leave to appeal had been granted by an order dated 30 January 1953, permitting review of the High Court of Judicature at Nagpur’s judgment and order dated 12 November 1952 in Criminal Revision No. 399 of 1951. That revision stemmed from the judgment and order dated 26 March 1951 of the Court of the Magistrate at Sagar in Criminal Case No. 44 of 1950. Counsel for the appellant was referred to in the record as counsel for the appellant, while counsel for the respondent was identified as counsel for the respondent. The judgment was delivered on 8 October 1954 by Justice Ghulam Hasan, who noted that the appeal was filed under article 136 of the Constitution against an order of the High Court of Judicature at Nagpur.

In this matter the two appellants, Kunjilal and his son Deopal, who was seventeen years old, were prosecuted in the Court of the Magistrate at Sagar under sections 392 and 332 of the Indian Penal Code. The trial court sentenced Kunjilal to one year of rigorous imprisonment for the offence under section 392 and imposed a fine of five hundred rupees for the offence under section 332. The same fine of five hundred rupees was imposed on Deopal. Both convictions were affirmed on appeal, but the appellate court reduced Kunjilal’s imprisonment to six months of rigorous imprisonment and lowered his fine to three hundred and fifty rupees. The appellate court also bound Deopal over under section 562 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, set aside his imprisonment, and reduced his fine under section 332 to two hundred and fifty rupees. The appellants then challenged these orders by filing a revision before the High Court of Nagpur, which dismissed the revision. The factual backdrop involved a prohibition under section 7 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, which forbade the export of certain essential items, including rice and ghee, from Madhya Pradesh to another State.

On 1 March 1949 three bullock‑carts owned by the appellants, loaded with bags of rice and tins of ghee, attempted to cross the Dhasan River at the Madhya Pradesh‑Uttar Pradesh border. Head Constable Abdul Samad, acting on information received, reached the spot, seized the prohibited goods and escorted the carts back to Shahgarh in Madhya Pradesh. While the carts were being taken to a jungle near Shahgarh, the two appellants are alleged to have assaulted the head constable and to have taken the seized property to the house of Paltu Bania at Bagrohi. Consequently, they were charged under sections 332 and 392 of the Indian Penal Code for voluntarily causing hurt to a public servant in the discharge of his duty and for robbing the officer of the goods he had seized. The appellants denied the allegations, contending that the goods were destined for a place called Baraitha within Madhya Pradesh and that they had not assaulted the constable. The magistrate found that both offences were proved, accepted the prosecution’s evidence regarding the assault and the export of contraband, and gave weight to the supporting medical evidence. Accordingly, the magistrate convicted the appellants and imposed the sentences previously described. The learned Additional Sessions Judge at Sagar, agreeing with the magistrate’s findings, rejected the appellants’ claim that the carts were bound for Baraitha, noting that the route to Baraitha did not involve crossing the Dhasan River. He held, however, that the carts had been intercepted on the opposite bank of the river after they had crossed the Madhya Pradesh border, but that the seizure was nevertheless lawful. This finding was challenged in the revision before the High Court, where the appellants contended that the seizure had occurred beyond the limits of Madhya Pradesh and was therefore illegal.

In this case, the Court examined the allegation that the seizure occurred beyond the border of the State of Madhya Pradesh and was therefore illegal. The Court considered whether the carts were situated within Madhya Pradesh at the time of apprehension and evaluated the evidence presented. Evidence was accepted showing that the carts were seized while they floated in the middle of the river. The cart‑men then asked the Head Constable for permission to move the carts to the opposite bank for a meal. The Head Constable granted the request, the cart‑men took a short break to eat, and after the meal the carts were returned to their original position. Based on this record, the Court held that the carts had been captured before crossing into Uttar Pradesh and therefore the seizure was lawful and proper under the circumstances. Consequently, the original convictions were upheld, but the sentencing was reduced in accordance with the observations previously indicated by the Court. The Court further observed that, in a petition for Special Leave to Appeal under Article 136, the appellants could not reopen questions or seek to overturn the findings of fact made by the lower courts. Such findings were therefore binding on the appellate Court, and it was submitted that the prosecution had failed to prove the required mens rea under Section 392 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellants argued that they honestly believed they were transporting the goods to a destination within Madhya Pradesh when they were seized in mid‑stream. The Court rejected that argument, noting that the route actually taken by the appellants did not lead to Baraitha or any other location in Madhya Pradesh but proceeded toward Uttar Pradesh. The appellants also contended that they had previously been prosecuted under Section 7 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946. They further argued that the Magistrate’s conviction had been set aside by the Additional Sessions Judge, Sagar, on 31 October 1952. They argued that, because that judgment was not placed before the High Court, Section 403(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure barred any further prosecution for the same offence. It also barred prosecution for any other charge arising from the same facts. The Court examined whether Sections 236 and 237, which deal respectively with uncertainty as to the specific offence and with conviction for an offence not originally charged, were applicable. It concluded that neither Section 236 nor Section 237 was relevant to the present controversy. The Court relied on Section 403(2), which permits a person who has been acquitted or convicted of one offence to be tried later for a distinct offence. The wording of that sub‑section provides a complete answer to the appellants’ submission.

The Court noted that the language of section 235, subsection (1) allowed for “a separate charge might have been made against him on the former trial.” It clarified that the appellants had not been retried for the very same offence contemplated by section 403(1). Instead, they had been subjected to prosecution for a different and distinct offence, which fell within the ambit of subsection (2) of section 403. The Court then turned to the substantive charges under sections 332 and 392 of the Indian Penal Code. In order to uphold those charges, it first examined whether the seizure of the property in question had been lawful and whether it had been carried out by a public servant acting in the performance of his official duties. After determining that the seizure was indeed lawful, the Court identified the next issue to be resolved: whether the appellants had committed the offence of robbing the Head Constable of the goods that had been lawfully seized, and whether they had voluntarily inflicted hurt upon him while he was discharging his duties as a public servant. The Court observed that the lower courts had reached a unanimous conclusion on both of these points, finding the appellants guilty of the alleged robbery and of causing hurt. Accordingly, the Court held that the contention raised by the appellants lacked any merit. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the order of the lower court was affirmed.