Kripal And Ors. vs State Of Uttar Pradesh

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 25 February, 1954

Coram: Jagannadhadas J.

In this matter, the Supreme Court considered two separate appeals that challenged a judgment of the Allahabad High Court dated 8 May 1953. Both appeals originated from a criminal trial conducted before the Sessions Judge of Muzaffarnagar, in which three respondents—identified as the appellants—were tried together with ten additional persons for offences alleged under Section 148, Section 302, and Section 323 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. The Sessions Judge acquitted the ten co‑accused of all the charges, but rendered a different verdict for the three appellants. Specifically, the Court acquitted them of the charge under Section 302, while simultaneously convicting them of murder under Section 304(1) and of voluntarily causing hurt under Section 323 read with Section 34. Consequently, the two appellants whose cases were recorded as Criminal Appeal No. 37 of 1953—Kripal and Bhopal—received sentences of five years’ rigorous imprisonment together with a monetary fine of one hundred rupees each. The third appellant, who was the subject of Criminal Appeal No. 77 of 1953—Sheoraj—was sentenced to four years’ rigorous imprisonment and was also ordered to pay a fine of one hundred rupees. Both the convicted appellants and the State lodged separate appeals. The appellants contested the convictions and the sentences imposed upon them, whereas the State appealed solely against the trial court’s decision to acquit the same three individuals on the charge of murder under Section 302. The High Court dismissed the appellants’ appeal but, on the State’s appeal, set aside the acquittal on the murder charge, thereby convicting the three appellants of that offence. Following this reversal, the High Court imposed death sentences on the two appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 37 of 1953 and sentenced the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 77 of 1953 to transportation for life. The appeal filed by the two appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 37 of 1953 invoked Article 134(1)(a) of the Constitution, which authorises a further appeal to this Court when a High Court, on review, overturns an acquittal and imposes a death sentence. The appeal filed by the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 77 of 1953 arises from the same High Court order and was entertained by this Court under special leave to appeal pursuant to Article 136 of the Constitution.

The factual background of the prosecution’s case concerned two separate incidents that occurred almost simultaneously on the morning of 16 May 1949 in the village of Kakrala, situated within the jurisdiction of Khatauli police station, Muzaffarnagar district. The first incident took place at a location known as Milakwala well, while the second occurred at a place called Dhakolas. In the Milakwala well incident, a person identified as Jiraj was killed; in the Dhakolas incident, a person named Indraj lost his life. Both victims were brothers and the sons of an individual named Chandan, who subsequently lodged the First Information Report with the police. The investigation revealed that the three appellants—Kripal, who was a cousin, and his brothers Bhopal and Sheoraj—were present at the scene of the Milakwala well incident. At the time of the occurrence, the appellants were engaged in agricultural work in a field that lay adjacent to the well. The deceased Jiraj owned a neighbouring field, situated at a slightly lower elevation relative to the well, where he cultivated sugarcane. For the purpose of harvesting that day’s crop, Jiraj had employed two labourers, namely Man Singh and Sher Singh. As the three appellants, together with the two labourers, proceeded towards Jiraj’s field, the labourers moved ahead of Jiraj. While traversing the area, the two labourers were required to pass close to the side of Milakwala well where the three appellants were actively working, thereby bringing all parties into close proximity shortly before the fatal events unfolded.

It was established that the three appellants, together with the two other deceased brothers, were all descended from a common ancestor, although they belonged to different branches of the family. Because of this kinship, serious disagreements had arisen among them concerning the partition of certain properties. According to the prosecution, on the morning of 16 May 1949, at about seven o’clock, the three appellants—Bhopal and Sheoraj who were brothers, and their cousin Kripal—were working in a field that included a well known as Milakwala well. The deceased Jiraj owned a lower‑lying field near the well where he cultivated sugarcane. For the work of harvesting the cane that morning, Jiraj had hired two labourers, identified as Man Singh and Sher Singh. The three appellants, the two labourers, and Jiraj were all moving toward Jiraj’s field, the labourers being slightly ahead of Jiraj. As the labourers approached the side of Milakwala well where the appellants were engaged in work, the appellants stopped them, learned that they intended to work for Jiraj, and verbally abused them, ordering them to work for themselves instead. The labourers ignored the admonition and continued forward for about thirty to forty paces. At that point the three appellants rushed at the labourers and began striking them with the spear handles held by Bhopal and Kripal and with a lathi carried by Sheoraj. Jiraj arrived at the scene, questioned the appellants about the assault on his labourers, and succeeded in halting the beating. In response, the three appellants turned their violence against Jiraj; they struck him, causing him to fall and die instantly at the spot. The two labourers, Man Singh and Sher Singh, rushed to Jiraj’s aid but were again assaulted by the appellants, who defended themselves with lathis. During the disturbance, Ram Chandra, the brother‑in‑law of the two labourers, arrived from behind to assist in the labour and, upon seeing the confrontation near the well, became frightened and fled back toward the village. He was pursued by Bhopal and Sheoraj. While being chased, Ram Chandra encountered Indraj, Jiraj’s brother, who was emerging from the village; Ram Chandra informed Indraj that Jiraj had been killed and that the labourers had been beaten by the appellants. Another witness, Bhanwar Singh, who was also on his way to Jiraj’s field, observed the attack on Jiraj and returned to the village to notify several villagers about the incident. Subsequently, while Bhopal and Sheoraj continued chasing Ram Chandra, they met Indraj at a place called Dhakolas, located about one and a half furlongs from Milakwala well on the route to the village.

At the Milakwala well the three appellants, together with ten other persons who were present there, were armed with lathis and spears and launched an attack on Indraj and on several persons who had rushed to the spot from the village after receiving information about the disturbance. In the ensuing clash Indraj and four additional individuals sustained injuries; the injuries inflicted on Indraj were severe and, within a short period, he succumbed to them. According to the prosecution narrative, the facts comprised two separate incidents: the first occurring at the Milakwala well and the second at a place called Dhakolas. The first incident involved only the three appellants, whereas the second incident involved those three appellants along with ten additional persons. During the first incident Jiraj was killed and the two labourers, Man Singh and Sher Singh, suffered injuries. In the second incident Indraj received mortal injuries and four others—Tulshi, Munshi, Bhanwar Singh and Lal Singh—sustained minor injuries. The prosecution treated both episodes as part of a single transaction and consequently placed all thirteen accused on joint trial on two charges, one under Section 148 of the Indian Penal Code and the other comprising Sections 302 and 323 taken with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, both charges being framed against all thirteen individuals.

The learned Sessions Judge, after examining the evidence related to the Dhakolas episode, found it unsatisfactory and therefore acquitted the ten persons whose involvement was alleged only in that episode. He accepted the prosecution evidence concerning the Milakwala well incident and convicted the three appellants who were present there. He held that the three were guilty only under Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, not under Section 302, and sentenced them accordingly. Regarding the Milakwala well episode, the prosecution case was reinforced not merely by the testimonies of the two injured labourers, Man Singh and Sher Singh, but also by the statements of five additional persons who were working in nearby fields and witnessed the occurrence. The defence advanced by the appellant Kripal asserted that he was not present at the scene but was in a different village; he called two witnesses to support this claim. Appellants Bhopal and Sheoraj admitted their presence at the occurrence but contended that there was only one incident, not two as alleged by the prosecution. According to their version, they and a Tilak Brahmin were working at the Milakwala well when the two deceased individuals, together with eight others—constituting ten of the originally accused—approached the site armed with lathis and spears and challenged them to a fight, after which they acted in self‑defence against the aggressive attack.

In this case, the Court observed that the appellants claimed they had acted in self‑defence against an aggressive assault by the prosecution’s party, and that during the ensuing scuffle both Jiraj and Indraj had received fatal injuries from members of their own group. Both the trial Court and the Sessions Court had accepted the prosecution’s evidence regarding this incident and had rejected the appellants’ defence as unsubstantiated and false. Counsel for the appellants argued before the Court that the prosecution witnesses were unreliable and that their testimony was not sufficiently safe to support the convictions. To advance this contention, counsel examined the statements of all the relevant eye‑witnesses and highlighted, in his view, serious contradictions and omissions in the statements recorded under Section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Court noted, however, that this portion of the prosecution’s evidence had been concurrently accepted by both lower courts and that no sufficient reason was shown to depart from those findings.

The principal thrust of counsel’s argument was that the prosecution’s case, which attributed the murder of Indraj to a separate incident at a place called Dhakolas located one and a half furlongs from the Milakwala well, represented a false and deliberate shifting of facts intended to undermine the appellants’ claim of private defence. Counsel urged that if, as alleged, ten of the thirteen persons originally charged had in fact participated in the incident at the Milakwala well, then the defence of the two remaining appellants—that they were acting solely in private defence and that the two brothers had died only due to accidental blows from their own companions—would become plausible. Consequently, counsel claimed that the prosecution’s evidence relating to the Milakwala well incident, which omitted this crucial aspect, was highly suspect and should be rejected. In support of this allegation, counsel relied upon the First Information Report filed by Chandan, the father of the deceased brothers, and the dying declaration of the deceased Indraj. The Court noted that a reading of these two documents did not expressly indicate the occurrence of two distinct incidents, yet their contents were not inconsistent with the possibility of two separate events.

Nevertheless, the Court held that, irrespective of whether the incidents took place solely at the Milakwala well or at another location, the overall probabilities and the comparison of injuries sustained by both sides rendered the defence improbable. According to the defence theory, the three appellants had to confront a group of at least eight persons—comprising the two deceased brothers and six others who were injured. Yet it was the larger group that suffered two deaths, while only two members of the appellants’ side sustained very minor injuries, as evidenced by the medical certificates. The Court found this scenario unlikely and observed that there was no evidential basis for an incitement that would cause eight persons on the prosecution side to gather near the Milakwala well that morning with the purpose of attacking the three appellants. Consequently, the Court expressed no hesitation in affirming the concurrent findings of both lower courts regarding the events at the Milakwala well and in rejecting the appellants’ defence as false. The Court then turned to the remaining issue of identifying which of the three appellants bore criminal liability and the specific offences attributable to each. The learned Sessions Judge, while holding all three appellants responsible for causing the death of Jiraj, had opined that they could be convicted solely under Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code, read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, on the ground that no evidence existed of any pre‑concerted or predetermined plan.

The Court observed that, according to the medical certificates, only two of the accused sustained very minor injuries, while the prosecution side reported eight persons allegedly present near Milakwala well that morning. The Court found this disparity unlikely and noted that the evidence did not reveal any recent provocative incident that could explain why such a large group would gather with the intention of attacking the three appellants. Consequently, the Court expressed no hesitation in accepting the concurrent findings of both the Sessions Court and the High Court regarding the events at Milakwala well. The Court therefore concluded that the defence advanced by the accused was untenable and must be rejected as false.

The remaining issue, as identified by the Court, was to determine which of the three appellants bore criminal liability and under what specific offence each should be charged. The learned Sessions Judge had held all three appellants responsible for the death of Jiraj and had opined that they could be convicted only under Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code in conjunction with Section 34, on the basis that there was no evidence of a pre‑concerted or predetermined plan to kill Jiraj. The Sessions Judge further explained that the blows were inflicted during a sudden fight, in the heat of passion, without any undue advantage or cruelty. The learned Judges of the High Court affirmed that a distinct prior plan is not a prerequisite for liability; rather, a common intention to achieve a particular result may arise spontaneously among several persons, depending on the facts and circumstances. They stressed that the question whether the participants acted with simultaneous independent intentions or with a shared consensus to bring about a specific outcome must be decided on the evidence. Accordingly, the Court examined the precise testimony accepted by the lower courts. The High Court had summarised the eyewitness accounts, stating that the three appellants were working at Milakwala well that morning. When they saw Man Singh and Sher Singh passing by, they inquired about their destination, were told the men were heading to harvest Jiraj’s sugarcane field, and then abused them, demanding that they work for the appellants instead. After the two labourers ignored the demand and continued walking, the appellants pursued them, covering a distance of about thirty to forty paces, and began beating them. Bhopal and Kripal struck with the handles of the spears they held, while Sheoraj used a lathi. Jiraj subsequently arrived at the scene.

When Jiraj arrived at the scene and demanded that the appellants stop beating his labourers, the appellants continued their assault. Sheoraj struck Jiraj on the legs with his lathi, causing Jiraj to fall. While Jiraj was on the ground, Kripal stabbed him near the ear with his spear. Subsequently, Bhopal stabbed Jiraj on the left jaw with his spear, then placed his legs on Jiraj’s chest and withdrew the spear blade from the jaw. The blade came out at the moment Jiraj died. The evidence clearly showed that the three appellants shared a common intention to beat Man Singh and Sher Singh, and they each used the weapons they held – the spear handles for Bhopal and Kripal and the lathi for Sheoraj – to strike the two labourers. The injuries sustained by Man Singh and Sher Singh, as recorded in the medical certificates, were only simple wounds. Regarding the deceased Jiraj, the first blow was Sheoraj’s strike on the legs, which caused him to fall; the second blow was Kripal’s spear thrust near the ear; the third blow was Bhopal’s spear thrust on the left jaw. In addition, Bhopal’s act of pressing his legs onto Jiraj’s chest and extracting the spear blade coincided with Jiraj’s death.

The post‑mortem report on Jiraj’s body listed only two injuries. The first injury was a penetrating wound measuring two‑and‑three‑quarters inches in breadth and one‑and‑half inches in length, which entered through the mouth and cut through the left jaw. The second injury was a punctured wound half an inch in diameter located half an inch above the left ear. The examining doctor testified that the first wound had traversed the skull cavity and mouth, lacerating the brain membrane, and that death resulted from the brain’s failure to function due to this injury. The doctor expressly stated that the deceased must have died immediately from the first injury. Considering the nature of this wound, it could only have been caused by Bhopal’s stab to the left jaw while Jiraj was lying down. The second wound, described as a simple puncture without penetration, corresponded to the wound inflicted by Kripal’s spear near Jiraj’s ear. The lathi strike by Sheoraj on the legs did not produce any visible injury. Evaluating the sequence of assaults, the specific body parts targeted by Kripal and Sheoraj, and the actual outcomes, it was difficult to ascribe an intention to kill to either of them. Moreover, it was unreasonable to infer that the appellants’ original common intention to beat the two labourers suddenly transformed into a common intention to kill Jiraj when he intervened. Consequently, the view of the High Court that a common intention to kill could be attributed to the three appellants could not be upheld. The only common intention that could be assigned to all three appellants concerning the assault on Jiraj was the shared purpose to beat him with the weapons they possessed, which were capable of causing grievous injury.

The blow alleged to have been delivered by Sheoraj did not result in any observable injury. Having considered the order in which the assaults occurred, the specific parts of the body that were targeted by Kripal and by Sheoraj, and the actual outcomes of those assaults as described above, the Court found it difficult to attribute a purpose to kill the deceased to either of them. Moreover, the Court held that it was not reasonable to assume that, in the heat of the moment, the common intention of the three appellants—originally limited to beating two labourers—suddenly transformed into a shared intention to kill Jiraj when he intervened in the fight. Consequently, the Court could not sustain the High Court’s conclusion that a common intention to kill could be imputed to all three appellants. The only common intention that can be ascribed to the trio, with respect to the assault on Jiraj, is the shared plan to beat him using the weapons they possessed, weapons that were capable of causing serious injury. On that basis, all three appellants are liable for an offence under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code for their assault on Jiraj, whereas only Bhopal is liable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code for the homicide. Accordingly, the convictions of Kripal and Sheoraj under Section 302 must be set aside, while the conviction of Bhopal under that section is to be upheld.

Regarding the punishment of Bhopal, counsel argued that his act was merely accidental, arising from a sudden quarrel and a moment of heated emotion, and urged the Court to accept the Sessions Judge’s view that the act was performed without pre‑meditation and without taking undue advantage of the situation. The Court, however, was not persuaded. Although Bhopal’s act may not have been pre‑planned in the sense of lying in wait to kill Jiraj, it was evident that when he found Jiraj lying helpless on the ground, a pre‑existing hostility prompted him to finish the man. The stabbing was brutal and fatal, indicating a deliberate intention. Therefore, the Court found no reason to deviate from the High Court’s order of imposing the death sentence on Bhopal. For Kripal and Sheoraj, the Court affirmed the sentences of five years and three years of rigorous imprisonment respectively for their convictions under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code. The convictions of all three appellants under Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code, relating to the assault on Man Singh and Sher Singh, were also upheld. The fines imposed on Kripal and Sheoraj in connection with that charge were retained, while the fine imposed on Bhopal for the same offence was set aside.

In this case the Court affirmed that the custodial sentences imposed on the accused with respect to the offence punishable under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code were to continue to operate. However, the Court expressed the view that it was unnecessary to impose an additional separate term of imprisonment on the accused identified as Bhopal for the same conviction, since the existing punishment already addressed the liability arising from that charge. Accordingly, the Court ordered that the monetary fine that had been levied exclusively against Bhopal be set aside and that no such fine should remain in force against him. In the concluding part of its judgment, the Court recorded that both of the appeals filed by the respondents were dismissed, but the dismissal was subject to the modifications just described, namely the maintenance of the earlier sentences on the other accused and the cancellation of the fine that had applied only to Bhopal.