Kapur Singh vs State Of Pepsu

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 15 September 1954

Coram: Bhagwati, J.

In this case, the Court noted that special leave had been granted to the appellant, but the leave was confined solely to the question of the sentence imposed. The factual background recorded that roughly one year before the incident in question, Bachan Singh, who was the son of the deceased, had caused a severe injury to the leg of Pritam Singh, the son of the appellant, an injury that eventually required amputation of that leg. From that time onward, the appellant bore a grudge against both the father and the son, and he waited for an opportunity to exact revenge. Such an opportunity arose on 30 September 1952 when the appellant met the deceased. The appellant, together with his accomplice Chand Singh, carried out the attack. Chand Singh seized the deceased by the head, while the appellant struck the deceased repeatedly with a heavy wooden club, delivering eighteen separate injuries to the arms and legs. It was significant that none of the injuries struck any vital part of the body. After the assault the appellant fled, whereas Chand Singh was later convicted of an offence punishable under Section 302 and sentenced to transportation for life, a sentence that the High Court affirmed. The appellant was subsequently apprehended, tried, and also convicted under Section 302. The learned Sessions Judge imposed the death penalty on the appellant, subject to confirmation by the High Court, and the High Court subsequently confirmed that death sentence. The Court observed that the primary motive for the appellant’s conduct was vengeance for the injury inflicted on his son by Bachan Singh. The evidence indicated that the appellant intended the blows to the arms and legs to be so severe as to require amputation of both arms and both legs of the deceased, thereby exacting a form of retribution rather than intending to kill outright. The absence of any wound to a vital organ suggested that the appellant’s purpose was not direct murder but the infliction of grievous injuries that he must have known were likely to cause death because of their number and seriousness. Accordingly, the Court concluded that, given the circumstances, the appropriate charge should have been under Section 304(1) for culpable homicide not amounting to murder, rather than under Section 302 for murder. Consequently, the Court altered the conviction from Section 302 to Section 304(1) and set aside the death sentence, substituting it with a sentence of transportation for life.