Kalishanker Das And Another vs Dhirendra Nath Patra And Others
Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.
Court: Supreme Court of India
Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 108 of 1952
Decision Date: 21 May 1954
Coram: B.K. Mukherjea, Vivian Bose, Ghulam Hasan
In the matter titled Kalishanker Das and another versus Dhirendra Nath Patra and others, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 21 May 1954. The opinion was authored by Justice B.K. Mukherjea and the bench was composed of Justices B.K. Mukherjea, Vivian Bose and Ghulam Hasan. The case is reported in the 1954 AIR 505 and in the 1955 Supreme Court Reporter at page 467. The issue concerned the nature of a Hindu widow’s estate under Hindu law, specifically whether any vested right could arise in the widow during her lifetime, who the actual reversioner was, and whether a claim could be made through a presumptive reversioner who preceded the actual reversioner. The Court set out a well-established Hindu law principle that no person acquires a vested right in the widow’s property while she remains alive, and that the ultimate reversioner may not rely on a claim through any intermediate person who has already acted. The Court explained that a Hindu widow’s interest in property inherited by her does not resemble the equitable estate recognized in English law, and that such an English-law analogue cannot be invoked against a bona-fide purchaser for value without notice. Accordingly, a Hindu widow possesses only a qualified proprietorship, and she may alienate that interest only when a legal necessity exists; the limitations on her alienation powers are inseparable from her estate. Where legal necessity exists, the widow may convey an absolute title to another person. In the absence of legal necessity, any transferee acquires merely the widow’s estate, which is not an indefeasible life estate because it may terminate upon events such as the widow’s remarriage or adoption, in addition to her death. The Court held that when a purchaser from a Hindu widow demonstrates that a legal necessity justified the transfer, the purchaser is fully protected, even if the necessity arose from the widow’s own mismanagement of the limited estate. Moreover, even where actual necessity is absent, if the purchaser proves that a representation of necessity was made and that, after conducting bona-fide inquiries, he was reasonably satisfied that such necessity existed, the validity of the sale does not depend on the actual existence of legal necessity. Conversely, if no necessity existed in fact and the purchaser cannot establish that he made bona-fide inquiries and was satisfied about the alleged necessity, the transfer is not void; however, the transferee obtains only the widow’s estate, which does not prejudice the reversioner’s interest. The Court referred to several authorities, including Debi Prasad Chowdhury v. Golap Bhagat (I.L.R. 40 Cal. 721), Rangasami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden (46 I.A. 72), Bajrangi v. Manokarnika (35 I.A. 1), The Collector of Masulipatam v. Cavaly Venkata (8 M.I.A. 529) and Hunoomanpersaud Pandey v. Musammat Babooee Munraj Koonweree (6 M.I.A. 393). The judgment formed part of a civil appellate jurisdiction, namely Civil Appeal No. 108 of 1952, which arose from an appeal against the judgment and decree dated 29 March 1950 of the High Court, which itself affirmed a decree of the Subordinate Judge, Fourth Court, Alipore, in Title Suit No. 70 of 1941.
The Court of Judicature at Calcutta heard an appeal arising from Original Decree No 121 of 1945, which itself stemmed from a decree dated 22 December 1944 issued by the Subordinate Judge at Alipore in Title Suit No 70 of 1941. Counsel N C Chatterjee, assisted by C N Laik, D N Mukherjee and Sukumar Ghose, represented the appellants, while counsel S P Sinha, accompanied by B B Haldar and S C Bannerji, appeared for respondents numbered one to three. The judgment was delivered on 21 May 1954 by Justice M Ukherjee. The appeal was entertained on a certificate granted by the High Court of Calcutta under article 133(1) of the Constitution and challenged a judgment and decree of a Division Bench of that High Court dated 29 March 1950, which had affirmed, on further appeal, the orders of the Subordinate Judge, Fourth Court, Alipore, in the same Title Suit No 70 of 1941. The parties before the Court were the heirs and legal representatives of the original defendant numbered three in the first suit; that suit had been commenced by the plaintiffs-respondents to recover possession of the disputed property by establishing their title as reversionary heirs of one Haripada Patra, whose mother Rashmoni had acquired the property in the limited rights of a Hindu female heir after Haripada’s death. To understand the issues raised on this appeal, the Court set out the material facts in chronological order. The property in dispute was identified as premises No 6, Dwarik Ghose’s Lane, located in the suburbs of Calcutta, and it undeniably formed part of the estate of Mahendra Narayan Patra, a Hindu inhabitant of Bengal who owned considerable lands. Mahendra Narayan Patra died on 17 April 1903, leaving his widow Rashmoni, two infant sons born to her—Mohini Mohan and Haripada—and a grandson, Ram Narayan, who was the son of Mahendra’s predeceased son Shyama Charan. Shyama Charan had been born to Mahendra’s first wife, who had died during his lifetime. On 17 February 1901, Mahendra executed a will that made certain religious and charitable dispositions and, subject to those, directed that his properties be divided among his infant sons Mohini and Haripada and his grandson Ram Narayan, with Ram Narayan appointed as executor of the will. After Mahendra’s death, Ram Narayan applied for probate of the will, obtained the probate on 6 October 1904, and assumed management of the estate. He soon acquired extravagant and immoral habits and incurred heavy debts. The majority of the properties were mortgaged to a person identified as Kironsashi, who, after obtaining a decree on the mortgage, applied for the sale of the mortgaged properties. In response, Rashmoni, acting on behalf of her infant sons, instituted a suit against both the mortgagee and the mortgagor and succeeded in obtaining a declaration that the mortgage decree could not bind the infants’ shares in the properties left by their father; this declaration was rendered on 31 March 1909. Subsequently, on 13 August 1909, the two infant sons...
In this case the two infant sons of Mahendra, namely Mohini and Haripada, were represented by their mother Rashmoni, who acted as their next friend. Rashmoni instituted a suit before the Subordinate Judge at Alipore, recorded as Title Suit No. 45 of 1909, seeking administration of the estate left by Mahendra together with a partition and an accounting in accordance with Mahendra’s will. On 14 August 1909 the Court appointed Baroda Kanta Sarkar, the Sheristadar of the Alipore District Judge’s Court, as receiver of the estate, a nomination that both parties accepted. The receiver immediately took possession of the properties that formed the subject of the litigation. The Court’s record indicated that the receiver’s management was neither proper nor advantageous to the interests of Mahendra’s two sons. Mahendra himself had left no liabilities; any debts that arose had been contracted by Ram Narayan for his own immoral and extravagant expenditures. Nevertheless, the receiver proceeded to obtain large sums of money on ex-parte orders issued by the Court, ostensibly to discharge the debts incurred by Ram Narayan, debts that did not bind the plaintiffs. Concerned that a prolonged suit and continued possession by the receiver would further prejudice the minors, Rashmoni, on behalf of the children, entered into a compromise with Ram Narayan and filed a Solenama on 13 June 1910. The compromise stipulated that the disputed properties were to be held in divided shares among the three parties, with specific allotments detailed for each; the portion allotted to Haripada was set out in schedules “Gha” and “Chha” annexed to the compromise petition. The compromise also provided that the receiver would be discharged upon submitting his final accounts. The property that is the subject of the present suit had been allotted, under the Solenama, to Haripada’s share. On the very day the compromise was filed, Rashmoni applied for the receiver’s discharge. The Court ordered the receiver to file his final accounts within one month, or as soon as practicable, after which a discharge order could be issued, and directed that, because the suit had been settled by compromise, the receiver should cease collecting rents and profits from the estate from that date onward. However, a later order dated 23 June 1910 modified this directive, directing the receiver to remain in possession of the estate until he received payment of his ordinary commission and allowances and until the parties either deposited in Court the sums borrowed by the receiver under court orders or, alternatively, furnished adequate indemnity for those amounts. Following these developments, Rashmoni, on behalf of her minor sons, filed two successive applications before the Subordinate Judge.
In this case the Subordinate Judge was approached for permission to raise, by way of mortgage of a portion of the estate, the sum of money required to free the estate from the control of the receiver. The first application for such a mortgage was turned down, but a second application was allowed after it was brought to the Judge’s attention that the receiver was trying to discourage prospective lenders, who had been approached on behalf of Rashmoni, from extending any loan to her. On 16 January 1911 the younger son of Rashmoni, Haripada, died, and under Hindu law his interest in the estate passed to his mother as his heir. Subsequently, on 28 January 1911 the Subordinate Judge recorded an order stating: “The receiver has filed a statement showing the amount due to him up to the end of the current month. This claim amounts to Rs 20,950-2-6 pies only. The parties may deposit the sum on or before 1 February next in Court and, upon such deposit, the receiver will be discharged and possession of the estate of the late Mahendr Narayan Patra will be handed over to the parties.” On that very same day Mohini executed a mortgage, designated as Exhibit M-1, in favour of Suhasini Dasi. By this mortgage he hypothecated the properties allotted to his share as well as his future interest as reversion to Haripada’s share, thereby securing an advance of Rs 30,000. The loan was stipulated to bear interest at the rate of 18 percent per annum. It is noteworthy that among the properties covered by the mortgage were two premises, namely No. 15/1 and No. 16 Chetlahat Road, which had already been sold, and the mortgagor had no title to them at the date of the mortgage. On 1 February 1911 Mohini deposited in Court the sum of Rs 2,0,950-2-6 pies, which was the amount claimed to be due to the receiver, and by an order passed on that date the Court directed that the estate be released from the receiver’s hands. After the release of the estate, a petition was filed on behalf of the plaintiffs on 15 February 1911, praying that the loans said to have been contracted by the receiver should not be satisfied out of the money deposited in Court, because those borrowings had been obtained not for the protection of the estate but solely for the personal benefit of the defendant, Ram Narayan, and for the purpose of paying his own creditors. The plaintiffs contended that the receiver had not raised the loans in good faith after giving proper notice to the plaintiffs, but had relied on ex-parte orders obtained from the Subordinate Judge while concealing material facts. The Court rejected this application on 23 February 1911. Following that rejection the plaintiffs filed another petition asking that payment of the monies due to the creditors be made, except for the amount necessary to satisfy one creditor named Rakhal Das.
The Court ordered that the order of the Subordinate Judge be stayed until the following Monday because the plaintiffs intended to approach the High Court against that order. The Court approved this request, and on 2 March the High Court issued directives that the monies in question should be detained in Court pending further orders. Subsequently, on 29 May 1911 the High Court ruled on the plaintiffs’ petition. In that judgment the learned judges expressed strong criticism of the appointment of the Sheristadar of the Court as receiver of the estate. They also blamed the Subordinate Judge for granting ex-parte orders that allowed the receiver to raise loans without any investigation and condemned the receiver for borrowing money for the personal benefit of Ram Narayan, the defendant, rather than for the protection of the estate. The High Court consequently ordered a full and proper investigation of the receiver’s accounts to be carried out by a Commissioner, and it appointed a Vakil of the High Court to oversee that investigation. After a prolonged enquiry the Commissioner submitted a report, which the High Court accepted. In its final orders, issued on 23 July 1913, the High Court held that the plaintiffs were not liable to pay any money to the receiver. It directed the receiver to pay Rs 6,708 to the plaintiffs, ordered that the plaintiffs should receive Rs 4,084 from Ram Narayan, required the defendant to pay Rs 19,124 to the receiver, and made the receiver personally liable for the loans he had incurred.
During the period that the High Court’s investigation of the accounts was proceeding, Rashmoni together with her son Mohini executed a security bond, identified as Exhibit E-1, on 1 August 1911. The legal effect of that document became pivotal to the decision of this case. By that bond, which was executed in favour of Suhasini Dasi, the mortgagee in the mortgage bond of Mohini, Rashmoni purported to hypothecate all the properties that she had inherited as heir of Haripada, thereby offering them as additional security for the loan of Rs 30,000 that had already been advanced to Mohini under the original mortgage. The bond specifically mentioned that two properties situated in Chetla, although already sold, were still included in Mohini’s mortgage. The bond further recorded that the mortgagee, upon discovering this fact, was about to institute legal proceedings against the mortgagor. Consequently, the bond was executed primarily to ward off those threatened proceedings and to remove any apprehension on the part of the mortgagee concerning the sufficiency of the security. The bond also stated that the estate of Haripada, as held by his mother, had benefited from a deposit of Rs 20,950 in Court by Mohini Mohan, which was part of the Rs 30,000 borrowed on the mortgage, and that Mohini had expended the remaining amount of the loan for other purposes.
The sum borrowed under the mortgage was applied by Mohini toward clearing certain debts of Rashmoni herself and to meet the litigation and other expenses of both of them. Mohini died shortly thereafter on 8 November 1911. Several years later, on 13 October 1917, Suhasini instituted a suit for enforcing the mortgage and the accompanying security bond against Rashmoni and the heirs of Mohini. The court passed a preliminary decree on compromise on 24 September 1918, and the decree was made final on 25 July 1919. The final decree was subsequently put to execution, and on 15 September 1919 the disputed property, together with other properties, was offered for sale. The property was purchased by Annada Prasad Ghose for a consideration of Rs 13,500. On 14 November 1919, Bhubaneswari, wife of Ram Narayan, filed Title Suit No. 254 of 1919 as guardian of her infant sons, seeking to challenge the validity of the mortgage decree obtained by Suhasini and the execution sale. That suit concluded on 6 July 1921, when the plaintiff withdrew her claim. Later, on 5 September 1922, Annada Ghose borrowed Rs 10,000 from Sarat Kumar Das, who was the original defendant No. 3 in the earlier suit and the father of the present appellants, and by way of an equitable mortgage deposited the title deeds of property No. 6, Dwarik Ghose Lane with the lender. On 14 September 1925, Annada conveyed the same property to the mortgagee Sarat Kumar Das for a price of Rs 15,500.
Rashmoni died on 8 June 1939. Approximately one year later, on 15 July 1940, the three sons of Ram Narayan—who became the reversionary heirs of Haripada after Rashmoni’s death—commenced the present suit before the Subordinate Judge at Alipore, seeking possession of the disputed property. They alleged that the security bond executed by Rashmoni lacked legal necessity, and therefore the execution sale of the mortgage and the later conveyance to Sarat Kumar Das could only transfer Rashmoni’s right, title and interest, without affecting the plaintiffs’ reversionary rights. Several other persons were impleaded as defendants, and a number of issues were raised that are not relevant to this appeal. The matter before this Court concerns the dispute between the plaintiffs on the one side and defendant No. 3 on the other, focused on three questions: (1) whether the security bond (Ex. E-1) executed by Rashmoni together with Mohini was executed out of legal necessity and thus binding on the reversioners of Haripada after Rashmoni’s death; (2) whether Mohini’s participation, as the presumptive reversioner at the time, rendered the bond binding on the actual reversioner after Rashmoni’s death; and (3) whether any consent by the presumptive reversioner created a presumption of legal necessity, and if so, whether that presumption was rebutted by the evidence produced in the case.
The Court considered three principal questions. First, it examined whether the presumption of legal necessity, which was said to arise from the execution of the security bond, had been rebutted by the evidence presented by the parties. Second, it addressed whether the title of defendant No I was protected, given that he was a stranger purchaser who had acquired the property at an execution sale after conducting proper enquiries and obtaining legal advice. Third, it evaluated the overall validity of the security bond in the circumstances of the case.
The trial Judge, in a judgment dated 22 December 1944, resolved all of these issues in favour of the plaintiffs and decreed the suit. The defendant appealed to the High Court, where the trial Judge’s decision was affirmed. Subsequently, the heirs of defendant No 3 approached this Court, and counsel appearing for the appellants restated the three points that had been raised in the lower courts on their behalf.
Regarding the first issue, both the trial Judge and the High Court held that there was absolutely no legal necessity justifying the execution of the security bond by Rashmoni in favour of Suhasini. Counsel for the appellants emphasized that an imperative necessity existed for the plaintiffs to recover their father’s estate from the receiver, noting that the receiver’s debts were increasing daily. They pointed out that, on 28 January 1911, the Court had issued a peremptory order stating that the properties could be released only if the plaintiffs deposited Rs 20,950 and some annas on or before 1 February 1911. To comply with that order, the appellant, Mohini, allegedly had no alternative but to borrow money on a mortgage of his properties before the 1 February deadline.
It was further submitted that because Haripada had died only a few days earlier, Rashmoni could not have joined in executing the mortgage. However, as Haripada’s heir, Rashmoni was allegedly liable for half of the amount required to be deposited in Court. Counsel argued that this liability was not merely moral but legal, since Mohini could have sought contribution from Rashmoni to the extent that Haripada’s estate benefited from the deposit. Consequently, the execution of the security bond was portrayed as an act that benefitted Haripada’s estate.
The Court found these contentions, although appearing plausible at first glance, to be wholly without substance. It observed that the money borrowed by Mohini, or the amount deposited by him in Court, did not and could not have benefited Haripada’s estate at all. Investigations ordered by the High Court later revealed that nothing was due to the receiver from the estates of Haripada or Mohini. Moreover, both brothers were entitled to receive a substantial sum from the receiver. The trial Judge therefore concluded that there was no urgent necessity to borrow money for releasing the estate, and that the alleged legal necessity for the security bond was unsupported by the evidence.
In this case, the Court observed that it was Mohini who, in a state of great haste, executed the mortgage, and that his sole purpose appeared to be securing possession of the properties for himself. The Court considered that at the time it might have been impossible to ascertain the true condition of the receiver’s accounts, and consequently a prudent person could have thought it advisable to obtain a loan in order to avert what was perceived as a danger to the estate. The Court noted that this line of reasoning could perhaps explain Mohini’s decision to borrow money on 28 January 1911, but it could not justify Rashmoni’s execution of a security bond seven months later as an act of prudent management compelled by legal necessity or by any benefit to the estate of her deceased son. The Court then pointed out that the total sum borrowed by Mohini amounted to Rs. 30,000, of which only Rs. 20,950 was required to be deposited with the Court. The security bond contained a statement that the balance of the borrowed money had been spent by Mohini to discharge certain debts of Rashmoni and to meet litigation and household expenses of both parties; the Subordinate Judge found this representation to be false. The Court further recorded that, on the basis of the facts, Rashmoni had no occasion to incur any debts for litigation costs or for any other purpose.
The Court emphasized that the most critical issue to examine was the situation that actually existed at the time the security bond was executed. It observed that even if the release of the estate might have been regarded as desirable, such release had already been achieved by Mohini through his own borrowing of money. Consequently, the only possible obligation of Rashmoni was to reimburse Mohini to the extent that his deposit had conferred any benefit on Haripada’s estate. The High Court correctly noted that Rashmoni did not execute the bond in order to raise money to pay her share of the deposit, and that no necessity whatsoever existed at that moment to raise such funds. The Court recalled that, by an order of the High Court on the revision petition filed by Mohini and his mother against the Subordinate Judge’s order dated 23 February 1911, the entire amount deposited in Court on 1 February 1911, except for a small sum paid to a creditor with the consent of both parties, was retained in Court. The High Court disposed of the revision case on 29 May 1611 and directed that a Commissioner be appointed to investigate the receiver’s accounts. The Court also reiterated that it had previously censured the conduct of both the receiver and the Subordinate Judge, and had plainly indicated that the monies borrowed by the receiver were not borrowed for the benefit of the plaintiffs.
The Court acknowledged that the accounts of the receiver were still pending investigation, yet it questioned the necessity for Rashmoni to execute a security bond after the High Court had issued the order previously described. Rashmoni had mortgaged every property that had been allotted to Haripada as his share, using that mortgage as additional security for the entire loan of Rs 30,000, even though no part of that loan was liable to be satisfied from Haripada’s estate. In the Court’s view, the sole purpose of executing that security bond was to protect Mohini, who faced the threat of legal action from his creditor because a non-existent property had been included in the mortgage deed. Rashmoni undoubtedly acted at the behest of Mohini and for his benefit, and it was possible that she was motivated by maternal affection to shield her son from a perceived danger, real or imagined. Nevertheless, the Court held that such an act could not be regarded, even hypothetically, as a prudent measure undertaken by a Hindu female heir for the protection of the estate of the last male holder. Accordingly, the Court affirmed that the findings of the subordinate courts were proper and constituted a concurrent factual finding that should not be disturbed. The second argument raised by counsel concerned whether Mohini’s participation with his mother in executing the security bond made the transaction binding on the actual reversioner, given that Mohini was, at the date of the transaction, the presumptive reversioner of Haripada’s estate. The Court observed that there was no real controversy on the legal principle applicable to this situation. The alienation in question was by way of mortgage, so the notion of surrender did not arise. Because Mohini, as the immediate reversioner, joined in executing the bond, his consent to the transaction was evident. Such consent, the Court explained, gave rise to a presumption that the mortgage was executed out of legal necessity or that the mortgagee had acted after a proper and bona-fide enquiry and was satisfied that such necessity existed. However, that presumption was rebuttable, and the actual reversioner could establish that there was, in fact, no legal necessity and that the mortgagee had not undertaken a proper and bona-fide enquiry. The Court concluded that the lower courts had correctly applied the law and, after evaluating the evidence, had determined that the presumption arising from the reversioner’s consent was indeed rebutted by the factual findings. Counsel for the petitioner then relied heavily on a document purported to be a deed of declaration executed by Ram Narayan on 5 October 1918. At that time Mohini had died, and Ram Narayan was the immediate reversioner to Haripada’s estate. By that deed Ram Narayan declared, among other matters, that the debts incurred by Rashmoni were for
The Court observed that the deed in question was addressed to Bangshidari Ghosh and Keshav Dutt, who were other purchasers of the properties belonging to Mohini and Haripada. The deed did not constitute a representation to the auction purchaser Annada Prasad Ghose nor to the father of the present appellants, because those individuals were not involved at the time the deed was executed. At best, the document could be seen only as an admission by a presumed reversioner and its value could not exceed the consent expressed by Mohini, who had acted as a co-executant of the security bond. Consequently, the deed could not bind the actual reversioner in any manner. Counsel for the appellant attempted to rely on observations from the case of Bajrangi v. Monokarnika, arguing that since the present appellants were the sons of Ram Narayan, any admissions made by their father would bind them as well. The Court noted that a passage at the end of the judgment in Monokarnika’s case appeared to support this argument, quoting: “The appellants who claim through Matadin Singh and Baijnath Singh must be held bound by the consent of their fathers.” However, the Court referred to a later pronouncement of the Privy Council in Rangasami Gounden v. Nachippa Gounden, which clarified that the quoted words should not be interpreted to mean that a father’s consent would operate proprio vigore and bind the sons. The Privy Council observed that such a proposition conflicted with established principles and authority, noting the settled doctrine of Hindu law that no one acquires a vested right while a widow is alive and that the eventual reversioner cannot claim through anyone who preceded him. Because the sons of Ram Narayan assert their claim as heirs of Haripada and not as heirs of their father, any admissions made by Ram Narayan could not bind them, and the appellant’s contention on that basis was rejected. The third and final contention raised by counsel was that the appellant, being a stranger who had purchased the property in good faith, for valuable consideration, after making thorough inquiries and obtaining proper legal advice, should not be affected by any defect in title arising from the absence of legal necessity. The Court found this argument to be based on a misconception of the legal position of an alienee of a Hindu widow’s property, emphasizing that the interest of a Hindu widow in the property she inherits bears no analogy to an equitable estate.
The Court explained that the rule recognized in English law, which protects a bona-fide purchaser for value without notice, cannot be applied when the property in question is the estate of a Hindu widow. From ancient times, the estate of a Hindu widow has been described as a qualified proprietorship, meaning that her power to alienate the property is limited to situations where a justifying necessity exists, and those restrictions are an integral part of her estate (2). When a legal necessity is established, the widow may convey an absolute title to another person, transferring full ownership of the property that is vested in her. However, if there is no legal necessity, the person who receives the transfer obtains only the widow’s estate, which does not even constitute an indefeasible life estate (1) 46 I.A. 72 at 83-84. As noted in The Collector of Masaulipatam v. Cavaly Venkata, S.M.I.A. 529, the widow’s estate may terminate not only on her death but also upon other contingencies such as remarriage or adoption.
The Court further observed that if a purchaser from a Hindu widow succeeds in showing that there was a legal necessity for the transfer, the purchaser is fully protected, even if the necessity arose because of the limited owner’s own mismanagement. Moreover, even when factual necessity is absent, the purchaser may still be protected if it is proved that there was a representation of necessity and that, after making bona-fide enquiries, the purchaser was satisfied that such necessity existed. The Privy Council, in Hunooman Persaud Panday’s case, held that the actual existence of a legal necessity is not a condition precedent to the validity of the sale.
Consequently, the Court held that where no actual necessity exists and the purchaser cannot demonstrate that he made bona-fide enquiries and was satisfied of the necessity, the transfer is not void; rather, the transferee obtains only the widow’s estate in the property. This limited interest does not affect the rights of any reversioner. In the present matter, the alienation took the form of a mortgage. Both the trial court and the appellate court found that no legal necessity justified the execution of the security bond. The mortgagee failed to prove either a representation of legal necessity or that she had satisfied herself through bona-fide enquiries that such necessity existed.
The High Court’s finding on this point was quoted by the Court: “In the present case, there is no scope for an argument that there was such representation of legal necessity or that on bona-fide enquiry the alienee satisfied herself that there was such a necessity, for, as I have already pointed out, the security bond itself states that it was executed in consideration of benefits already received and with a view to induce Suhasini to forbear from proceeding against Mohini. There is no representation in the bond that the alienation was made to secure any benefit to the estate, to avert any danger to the estate, or for any other legal necessity. Whatever enquiries the appellants may have made …”
In this case the Court observed that the reference to “M.I.A.” would provide no benefit to the parties because the alienation in question did not bind the entire estate but was limited solely to the estate of the widow named Rashmoni. The Court agreed that the view expressed by the High Court was entirely appropriate. On the basis of that finding the Court held that the security bond could operate only upon the interest that belonged to Rashmoni’s estate, and that only this limited interest was transferred at the mortgage sale. Consequently the Court said that the subsequent purchaser could not claim to have acquired any right that was greater than the right held by his predecessor; the question of whether the purchaser had paid the purchase money in good faith or had obtained proper legal advice was irrelevant to the determination of his title. The Court therefore concluded that, in its opinion, the decision of the High Court was correct. As a result the appeal was ordered to stand dismissed, and the Court directed that costs be awarded against the appellant. The final disposition recorded that the appeal was dismissed.