Jumuna Prasad Mukhariya And Others vs Lachhi Ram And Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 156 of 1954

Decision Date: 28 September 1954

Coram: Vivian Bose, Mehar Chand Mahajan, B.K. Mukherjea, Ghulam Hasan

In the matter Jumuna Prasad Mukhariya and others versus Lachhi Ram and others decided on 28 September 1954, the Supreme Court of India heard an appeal filed under special leave. The judgment was authored by Justice Vivian Bose, and the bench also comprised Justices Mehar Chand Mahajan, B. K. Mukherjee and Ghulam Hasan. The citation for the decision is 1954 AIR 686 and 1955 SCR 608, with several subsequent citations noted. The central question involved the constitutionality of sections 123(5) and 124(5) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 in relation to article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. Appeal No. 156 of 1954 was brought by special leave against the order dated 24 December 1953 issued by the Election Tribunal of Gwalior, Madhya Bharat, in election petition No. 263 of 1952. The appellant, identified as an elector, sought the setting aside of the elections of the first and second respondents, who had been returned as successful candidates from the double-member constituency of Bhilsa in Madhya Bharat. The petitioner appeared to be acting on behalf of the sixth and seventh respondents, as one of the reliefs prayed for was that those respondents be declared duly elected in place of the first two respondents. The Tribunal accepted the petitioner's case, declared the elections of the first two respondents void, and held that the sixth and seventh respondents had been duly elected. The Tribunal’s findings concerning the first respondent centred on the publication of several pamphlets containing statements labelled (a), (b), (c), (e), (f) and (g). The Tribunal concluded that those statements were false, that the first respondent did not himself believe them to be true, and that the statements attacked the personal character and conduct of the sixth respondent. The Tribunal further held that the statements were reasonably calculated to prejudice the electoral prospects of the sixth respondent. These findings were challenged before this Court. Counsel for the appellants argued that the statements constituted an attack on the public and political character of the sixth respondent and therefore fell within the permissible scope of political criticism. The Court indicated that it would not pass a detailed examination of the pamphlet content because the appeal was a special appeal and the primary question was whether a tribunal of reasonable and unbiased men could have reached the conclusions it did. After hearing portions of the pamphlets, the Court expressed the view that the Tribunal’s conclusion was one that a judicial mind could reasonably reach, and therefore declined to examine the matter further. The Court noted that, under the law, the Tribunal’s decision is intended to be final, and the Court’s jurisdiction is limited to intervening only where a glaring error has caused a substantial miscarriage of justice. The Court accepted that the findings of the Tribunal established a major corrupt practice by the first respondent under section 123(5) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The next finding related to the second respondent.

For the appellants, the learned counsel argued that the statements made in the pamphlets were attacks on the public and political character of the sixth respondent and that such attacks constituted a legitimate form of political criticism. The Court indicated that it would not review that contention in detail because the matter before it was a special appeal, and the only issue for consideration was whether a Tribunal composed of reasonable and unbiased persons could lawfully reach the conclusion that it had reached. After hearing excerpts from some of the pamphlets, the Court expressed the view that the Tribunal’s conclusion was one that could be arrived at by judicial minds exercising reasonable judgment. Consequently, the Court declined to examine the matter further in the context of the special appeal.

According to the law, the decision rendered by the Tribunal is intended to be final. Although this finality does not remove the Court’s jurisdiction, the Court stated that it would intervene only where a clear error of law has produced a substantial miscarriage of justice. On the findings of the Tribunal, the Court noted that a major corrupt practice by the first respondent, who is also the first appellant, was established under section 123(5) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Regarding the second respondent, identified as appellant No. 2, the Tribunal found that he had made a systematic appeal to Chamhar voters, urging them to vote for him on the basis of his caste, and that the evidence, including leaflets labelled “N” and “O,” supported this conclusion. The Court described this conduct as a minor corrupt practice under section 124(5) of the same Act.

Both sections 123(5) and 124(5) had been challenged on the ground that they were ultra vires article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The appellants further contended that article 245(1) prohibited the enactment of laws that infringe the Constitution and that these sections interfered with a citizen’s fundamental right to freedom of speech. The Court rejected these arguments, observing that the provisions did not forbid a person from speaking. Rather, they prescribed specific conditions that must be observed by anyone who wishes to become a member of Parliament. The Court explained that the right to stand as a candidate and to contest an election is not a common law right but a special right created by statute, and therefore it can be exercised only in accordance with the statutory conditions. The Court further held that the chapter on Fundamental Rights does not affect a statutory right of this nature, and that the appellants possessed no fundamental right to be elected members of Parliament. If they desired to be elected, they were required to comply with the statutory rules. Moreover, the Court clarified that the impugned sections did not restrict the exercise of free speech outside the electoral framework.

The Court concluded that the challenged provisions were intra vires. In addition to the foregoing findings, the Tribunal had determined that both appellants had committed an illegal practice within the meaning of section 125(3) by issuing a leaflet and a poster that did not bear the name of the printer. The Court characterized this as a pure question of fact. It reiterated that the consequence of committing any corrupt practice is the voiding of the candidate’s election under section 100(2)(b). The Court emphasized that it was unnecessary to demonstrate that the election result was materially affected, because clause (b) operates independently and merely requires proof that a corrupt practice occurred, which the Tribunal had already found as a fact.

In the matter before the Court, the Tribunal had held that proving the occurrence of a corrupt practice was sufficient to invoke the statutory consequence of voiding an election. The Tribunal therefore found that the first appellant had engaged in a corrupt practice and, on that basis, declared his election void. The Tribunal also concluded that the second appellant, identified as respondent No 2, had committed both a minor corrupt practice and an illegal practice, and that these acts had materially affected the result of the election. Although the second appellant challenged this finding, the Court noted that the Tribunal’s determination that a minor corrupt practice had occurred was clear and unambiguous. Consequently, the second appellant’s case fell within clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 100. The relevant provision, as quoted, states: “if the Tribunal is of opinion- (a) that the election of a returned candidate has been procured or induced or the result of the election has been materially affected, by any corrupt or illegal practice the Tribunal shall declare the election of the returned candidate to be void.” Because the Tribunal found as a matter of fact that the second appellant’s election was procured by a corrupt practice, his case satisfied the first alternative contemplated by clause (a). The Court therefore held that it was unnecessary to examine whether the third alternative might also apply. The Court affirmed that the Tribunal was correctly justified in declaring both the first and second appellants’ elections void.

The remaining respondents before the Court were the fourth and fifth respondents, namely Ramsahai and Sunnulal, who had been declared duly elected by the Tribunal under section 101(b). The Court expressed the view that the Tribunal’s conclusion was erroneous. For the Tribunal to set aside those elections, it must be established that, “but for the votes obtained by the returned candidate by corrupt or illegal practices…such other candidate would have obtained a majority of the valid votes.” The constituency in question was a double-member constituency. The votes recorded were: Jamuna Prasad Mukhariya (respondent No 1) received 13,669 votes; Keshav Shastri (respondent No 3) received 1,999 votes; V. N. Sheode (respondent No 4) received 1,350 votes; and Ram Sabai (respondent No 6) received 12,750 votes. The Tribunal noted that the difference between respondents 1 and 6 was 919 votes, apparently intending to demonstrate a close contest. From this observation, the Tribunal inferred that “considering the scandalous nature of the false statement regarding respondent No 6 and the mode of systematic appeal on the basis of caste made by respondent No 2, we have no doubt in our minds that respondent No 1 got more votes simply because of corrupt practices and if these corrupt practices had not been there respondent No 6 undoubtedly would have obtained a majority of valid votes.” The Court found this inference to be speculative and unsupported by any factual basis, concluding that no reasonable mind could accept such a conclusion. Accordingly, the Court set aside the Tribunal’s declaration that respondents 6 and 7 had been duly elected.

In reviewing the material that had been set out above, the Court observed that the record contained no explanation as to why the majority of voters who had supported the first respondent would have preferred the sixth respondent and consequently ignored the third and fourth respondents. The Court noted that an exactly similar line of reasoning had been applied to the situation involving the seventh respondent, who was a Scheduled Caste candidate. The voting figures in that case were recorded as follows: Chaturbhuj Jatav (Respt. No. 2) received twelve thousand four hundred and fifty-two votes, Hira Khusla Chamar (Respt. No. 5) received six hundred and one votes, and Sunnulal (Respt. No. 7) received ten thousand eight hundred and eighty-nine votes. The Court further stated that, once again, there was no factual basis for concluding that those who had voted for the second respondent would, had they not done so, have chosen the seventh respondent instead of the fifth respondent. Consequently, the Court set aside that portion of the Tribunal’s order. As a result, the appeal was dismissed insofar as it challenged the Tribunal’s declaration that voided the election of the two appellants, but the appeal succeeded to the extent that it contested the part of the order that declared the sixth and seventh respondents to have been elected. In view of these findings, the Court ordered that no costs would be awarded in either Court. The order was thus entered accordingly.