In Re: Hira Lal Dixit And Two Ors. vs Unknown

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 1 October, 1954

Coram: Mehr Chand Mahajan, Vivian Bose, Ghulam Hasan, Das

The case titled In Re: Hira Lal Dixit And Two Ors. versus Unknown was listed for hearing on 1 October 1954 before the Supreme Court of India. The judgment was authored by Justice Das and the bench comprised Justices Mehr Chand Mahajan, Vivian Bose and Ghulam Hasan. On 16 September 1954 this Court issued a Rule directing the respondents to appear and show cause why they should not be proceeded against for contempt. The Court considered it necessary to explain the circumstances that led to the issuance of that Rule at the outset of its order. On the cause list for 14 September 1954, two appeals, numbered 182 of 1954 and 183 of 1954, were slated for hearing and final disposal. The first appeal was Saghir Ahmad versus the State of Uttar Pradesh and others, and the second appeal was Mirza Hasan Agha versus the State of Uttar Pradesh and others. In addition, 224 writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution raising the same questions were also placed on the same day’s cause list. All the appellants and petitioners were engaged in transporting passengers and goods by motor buses or lorries on various routes under licences issued by the State of Uttar Pradesh. Where a route passed into or through the State of Delhi, the licence was counter‑signed by the Delhi authorities. Some of these transport operators had originally been granted permanent permits by the Regional Transport Authority. Pursuing a policy of nationalising road‑transport business, the State of Uttar Pradesh issued declarations under section 3 of the Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Act, 1950. Those declarations stated that road‑transport services on certain routes should be run by the State Government. The State Government also published schemes of road‑transport services under section 4 of the same Act. The State began serving notices to licence holders ordering them to cease plying buses on the specified routes.

Those declarations stated that road‑transport services on certain routes should be run by the State Government. The State Government also published schemes of road‑transport services under section 4 of the same Act. To implement its policy, the State began serving notices to licence holders ordering them to cease plying buses on the specified routes. The appellant then applied to the Allahabad High Court for a writ of mandamus directing the State Government and its Minister of Transport to withdraw the declaration made under section 3. The appellant also sought an order that the State refrain from further action under sections 4 and 5 and not interfere with the operation of the stage carriages, together with other ancillary reliefs. By an order dated 17 November 1953, the Allahabad High Court dismissed those applications. The two petitioners then filed the two appeals in this Court after obtaining a certificate from the Allahabad High Court under article 132(1) of the Constitution. The appellants also obtained orders staying further proceedings until their appeals were finally determined. In view of the Allahabad High Court’s decision, many other persons holding licences for motor stage or contract carriages also approached this Court with applications under article 32 seeking appropriate writs and interim stays.

Many licence holders for motor stage carriages or contract carriages, after the decision of the Allahabad High Court, came directly to this Court with applications under article 32 seeking appropriate writs, and each obtained an interim stay of the proceedings. As previously noted, the two appeals and the numerous writ applications were placed on the cause list for 14 September 1954 for final disposal. The petitioner in one of those writ applications was the respondent, Hira Lal Dixit. On that day the two appeals were called for hearing and were part‑heard. The hearing then continued through the whole of 15 September and 16 September 1954, and concluded on 17 September 1954, when the Court reserved its judgment for consideration. The judgment had not yet been delivered. A large number of persons, apparently the petitioners in the various writ petitions or persons interested in their outcome, were present in the Court on all those dates, because the final decision on the appeals would also determine the result of the writ petitions. On 15 September 1954 a leaflet printed in Hindi, consisting of eighteen pages and titled “Hamara Vahan Vibhag” (“Our Transport Department”), purportedly authored by the respondent Hira Lal Dixit, was distributed within the Court premises. The front page displayed a block photograph of the respondent, and the leaflet contained a foreword said to be written by Sri Krishna Dutt Paliwal. The leaflet gave a graphic description of alleged harassment and indignity that the writer claimed to have suffered from State officers and the then State Minister of Transport in connection with the cancellation and later restoration of his passenger‑bus licence. On page 15, second paragraph, the leaflet included a passage, translated into English by an authorised advocate of this Court, which read: “The public has full and firm faith in the Supreme Court, but sources that are in the know say that the Government acts with partiality in the matter of appointment of those Hon’ble Judges as Ambassadors, Governors, High Commissioners, etc., who give judgments against Government but this has so far not made any difference in the firmness and justice of the Hon’ble Judges.” The Court, having become aware of this leaflet on 16 September 1954, issued the present rule and forwarded a copy of the rule to the Attorney‑General for India. All respondents were duly served. They have filed affidavits and appeared before the Court through their counsel. The respondent Sri Krishna Dutt Paliwal, who wrote the foreword and was present in Court, made a statement through his counsel that he had not read the entire manuscript, had only been told it dealt with the workings of the Transport Control, and that upon learning of the contested passage he expressed remorse. One Devendra Sharma, General Manager of the Sainik Press, Agra, where the leaflet was printed, filed an affidavit on behalf of the press stating that he had not noticed the offending paragraph when the leaflet was given for printing, that he became aware of it only after service of the rule, that he regretted its printing, and that he had no intention of committing contempt of this Court. Through his counsel, the press also tendered an unqualified apology to the Court. In view of the statements made in Court by the counsel of these two respondents, the Court accepted their apologies.

The person who had written the foreword expressed remorse, stating that he apologized to the Court for having authored it. He further declared that he had never known that the pamphlet was meant for public distribution and that he was not involved in its circulation. Devendra Sharma, who was General Manager of the Sainik Press in Agra, filed an affidavit on behalf of the press that had printed the questioned leaflet. In that affidavit he stated that when the leaflets were submitted for printing he had not observed the contested paragraph. He added that his attention was drawn to the paragraph only after the rule was served on him. He expressed sorrow that the paragraph had been printed and asserted that he never intended to commit contempt of the Court. Through his counsel, Sri S. Sukla, Devendra Sharma personally attended court and tendered an unconditional apology to the Court. The Court noted the apologies offered by both the foreword writer and the press manager and, considering these statements, discharged the rule against them. The Court further observed that no further comment was required regarding those two respondents. Counsel for the petitioner Hira Lal Dixit then argued that the disputed passage could not be understood as derogatory or as contempt of the Court. The Court explained that many methods exist to hinder the administration of justice, one of which is publication that scandalises the Court itself. The Court referred to the earlier decision in Brahma Prakash Sharma and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh, which had laid down principles for such scandalising cases. It clarified that the present matter did not involve scandalising the Court, and therefore belonged to a different category of contempt.

The Court then examined whether the language of the offending passage was of a nature that could obstruct the proper functioning of the judiciary. It observed that the leaflet had been authored by a petitioner who already had a writ petition pending on the court’s cause list. The timing of the leaflet’s circulation coincided with the hearing of several appeals, including the petitioner’s own writ petition. The Court noted that the decisions on those appeals would determine the outcome of a number of pending petitions. Consequently, the leaflets were distributed while the matters were actively being considered by the judges. The Court further found that the location of distribution, namely the court premises, was significant because many litigants were present there. The presence of a large number of licence holders in the premises meant that the leaflet could reach a wide audience of interested parties. The Court therefore concluded that the circumstances surrounding the publication raised a likelihood that the passage could interfere with the administration of justice. The Court emphasized that a finding of contempt requires a clear demonstration that the material either scandalises the court or materially obstructs the administration of justice. In the present facts, the Court saw no evidence of scandalisation, and the only possible concern was the potential for disruption due to the timing and venue of the distribution. However, having received unconditional apologies from the foreword author and the press manager, the Court decided to discharge the contempt proceedings against them.

The respondent had denied in his affidavit that the leaflet had been distributed inside the Court premises; however, when the matter was raised for evidentiary proof, the counsel appearing for him did not insist on a denial and instead acquiesced to the proposition that the leaflet indeed had been circulated within the Court building. Consequently, the remaining issue for determination was the intended meaning and purpose of the passage in the leaflet that was alleged to be contemptuous. Counsel for the respondent, Hira Lal Dixit, argued that the contested passage was entirely harmless, merely offering praise to the Court, and that such commendation could not possibly exert any influence on the judges of the August tribunal. The Court was not persuaded that flattery constituted the sole or even the principal motive for drafting or publishing the passage while the appeals were actively being heard. The passage unquestionably opens with a statement of public confidence in the Court, but it is swiftly followed by additional wording introduced by the significant conjunction “but.” The subsequent words convey that informed sources allege the Government behaves with bias in appointing judges to positions such as Ambassadors, Governors, High Commissioners, and similar offices, specifically when those judges render judgments against the Government. The plain meaning of this assertion is that judges who adjudicate against the Government do not receive such prestigious appointments. Implicitly, the passage suggests that judges who decide in favor of the Government are rewarded with these high‑level posts. This portrayal of governmental attitude appears designed to create in the reader’s mind the impression that the Government, by promising attractive future employment, seeks to induce judges to render decisions that align with its interests. The insinuation is reinforced by the ensuing statement that “this has so far not made any difference in the firmness and justice of the Hon’ble Judges.” By linking this clause with the preceding one through the conjunction “but,” the true import of the earlier remarks is highlighted. Taken as a whole, the passage essentially declares: the Government disfavors judges who rule against it while favoring those who decide in its favor with lofty appointments; although such incentives might tempt judges to side with the Government, they have, up to now, not affected the judges’ firmness and sense of justice. The phrase “so far” is particularly noteworthy. The Court therefore questioned what objective lay behind the composition of this passage and what aim was served by distributing the leaflet within the Court premises at a moment when the Court was actively hearing the appeals.

In this case, the Court observed that the offending passage contained a concealed warning. The passage suggested that although the Judges had, up to that point, remained firm and had resisted any temptation to decide cases in favour of the Government in hopes of obtaining high appointments, a decision in favour of the Government on the present occasion would reveal to knowledgeable observers that the Judges had yielded to that temptation and had rendered a judgment anticipating future reward in the form of prestigious appointments described in the passage. The Court held that the purpose of drafting that paragraph and of publishing it at the specific time was clearly to influence the minds of the Judges and to divert them from performing their duties with strict impartiality. Accordingly, the Court found that the passage, together with the timing and location of its publication, tended to hinder or obstruct the proper administration of justice and therefore constituted contempt of the Court. The Court further noted another aspect of the matter. Even if the portion of the leaflet dealing with the Judges were omitted, the remaining content would still amount to serious contempt. The leaflet contained a strong denunciation of the State of Uttar Pradesh, which was a party to the appeal and the petitions, concerning the very issues that were then before the Court. The Court described this not as fair comment on the proceedings but as an attempt to prejudice the Court against the State and to stir public feeling on the question that was pending decision. The manner in which the leaflets were distributed, the language employed, and the timing of their circulation, the Court said, could have only one objective: to try to influence the Judges in favour of the petitioner and others in a similar position. The Court characterized this again as clear contempt. Referring to its earlier decision in Brahma Prakash Sharma and Others v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, the Court reiterated that actual interference with the course of justice is not required; it is sufficient that the offending publication is likely to, or tends to, interfere with the proper administration of law. The Court explained that the insinuations embedded in the passage were derogatory to the dignity of the Court and were calculated to erode public confidence in the integrity of the Judges. Whether the passage is read as excessive flattery of the Judges, as containing the insinuations described, or as part of the leaflet that attacks a party to the pending proceedings, the Court held that each reading is equally contemptuous because the purpose of the writing, and the timing and place of its publication, were intended—or calculated—to deflect the Court from performing its strict duty, either by flattery, a veiled threat, a warning, or any similar means.

The Court noted that the leaflet authored by the respondent created prejudice in the mind of the State. Consequently, the Court expressed a clear opinion that the respondent, Hira Lal Dixit, by drafting the leaflet, particularly the contested passage, and by publishing it at the specified time and place, had committed a gross contempt of this Court. The Court further held that the qualified apology set out in the respondent’s affidavit and reiterated through his counsel could not be regarded as adequate restitution for his misconduct. It was emphasized that the summary jurisdiction exercised by superior Courts in punishing contempt exists to prevent interference with the course of justice and to preserve the authority of law as administered by the Court. This jurisdiction also serves to protect the public interest in maintaining the purity of the administration of justice. The Court described this power as extraordinary and therefore to be employed sparingly. Nevertheless, the Court affirmed that when the public interest demands, it will not hesitate to exercise this power, including imposing imprisonment where a mere fine would be insufficient to address the contemptuous act.

After careful and anxious consideration, the Court concluded that the circumstances of this case warranted the exercise of its contempt jurisdiction and the imposition of imprisonment. The Court stressed that the public must understand that no one may hinder, obstruct, or attempt to hinder the due course of administration of justice without facing consequences. Accordingly, the Court found the respondent, Hira Lal Dixit, guilty of contempt of Court and made the Rule absolute against him. The Court ordered that the respondent be arrested and committed to civil prison to undergo simple imprisonment for a fortnight. In addition, the respondent was directed to pay any costs incurred by the Union of India. The Court issued an order accordingly.