Hari Shanker Prasad Gupta vs Sibban Lal Saksena
Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.
Court: Supreme Court of India
Case Number: Appeal (civil) 157 of 1954
Decision Date: 28 September 1954
Coram: B.K. Mukherjea, V. Bose, G. Hasan, M.C. Mahajan, S.R. Das
The Election Tribunal of Gorakhpur had declared the election of Hari Shanker Shankar Gupta void under section 100(2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 (XLIII of 1950) because of major corrupt practices as defined in section 123(8). The petition asserted that the appellant had employed a very large number of persons who were serving under the Government of the State of Uttar Pradesh. Although the Tribunal examined each separate allegation in detail, the Court considered that a single representative case would be sufficient to illustrate the point. Among the many individuals alleged to have been used as polling agents and canvassers was a man identified as Mangal Das, who held the position of Mukhia. The Tribunal concluded that Mangal Das not only acted as a polling agent but also canvassed on behalf of the appellant. Counsel for the appellant, Mr Chatterji, contested that finding, but the Tribunal’s determination remained clear.
The Tribunal’s record showed that the Chairman and Shri Sukhdeo Prasad first reported that “Ram Chander Prasad has… stated on oath that he had seen Mangal Das Mukhia actually canvassing for respondent 1 (appellant here) at Rajmandi polling station on the polling day.” Later they recorded that “Sri Diryodhan Parsad (P.W. 3) actually saw Mangal Das, … Mukhia of Jarrar canvassing for respondent 1 during this election period.” Their conclusion on this portion of the evidence was: “We hold therefore that Sri Kishen Das & Mangal Das Mukhias … worked as polling agents and as canvassers for respondent 1.” Mr Chatterji referred to an earlier passage in which the Tribunal stated, “We therefore come to the conclusion that the petitioner has proved in this case that Mangal Das Mukhia … worked as polling agent of respondent 1,” and argued that the Tribunal had assumed that a polling agent was automatically a canvasser. The Court clarified that this inference was incorrect. In the quoted passage the Tribunal was merely rebutting the appellant’s contention that Mangal Das was not even his polling agent. After examining the evidence, the Tribunal affirmed that Mangal Das was indeed a polling agent and, based on the testimony of two witnesses, also acted as a canvasser.
The evidence further established that Mangal Das was a Mukhia. The Registrar, Girish Chander, of Qannungo Maharajganj produced the register of Mukhias kept in accordance with the provisions of the Land Records Manual, which showed that Mangal Das had been appointed Mukhia of Jarar on 15-12-1947 and continued to hold that office. Extracts from the applicable Rules, framed to implement section 45 of the Criminal Procedure Code, were also produced. These Rules require the appointment of a village headman by the District Magistrate and provide for his dismissal by the same authority. Although locally known as Mukhias, the official designation in the Rules is “village headman.” The Tribunal had examined the meaning of the phrase “serving under the Government of any State” used in section 123(8) at length. The Court found further analysis unnecessary because the explanatory note to that provision expressly expands the definition to include “a village headman or any other village officer, by whatever name he is called.” Since it was proved that Mangal Das was a village headman and, in any event, a village officer, he fell within the definition, and the appellant’s act of permitting him to canvass constituted a major corrupt practice.
The evidence demonstrated that Mangal Das had been appointed as the Mukhia of Jarar on 15-12-1947 and that he continued to occupy that office at the relevant time. The Court was shown extracts from the statutory Rules that prescribe how the registers of such officers are to be maintained. These Rules were framed to give effect to Section 45 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which requires that a village headman be appointed and sets out the duties of that officer. Under the Rules the appointment of a village headman is made by the District Magistrate, who also has the power to dismiss the officer. Although locally these officers are commonly called Mukhias, the Rules designate them formally as village headmen. The Tribunal had examined at length the meaning of the expression “serving under the Government of any State” found in Section 123(8). The Court considered such detailed analysis unnecessary because the explanation annexed to the provision expressly widens the definition to include “a village headman or any other village officer, by whatever name he is called.” Since it was proved that Mangal Das was a village headman and, in any event, a village officer, he fell within that definition. Accordingly, the appellant’s act of permitting him to canvass on his behalf constituted a major corrupt practice under Section 123(8). That finding therefore required a declaration under Section 100(2)(b) that the appellant’s election was void. The contention that Mangal Das could not be said to be in the service of the State because he received no payment from the State was rejected; the Court noted that receipt of salary is not the test prescribed by the definition. What the definition demands is that the person be a headman employed by the State, and Mangal Das satisfied that requirement. No other point needed to be discussed. The appeal therefore failed and was dismissed, with the appellant ordered to pay costs.