Gopal Krishna Potnay vs Union Of India and Anr

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Appeal (civil) 184 of 1953

Decision Date: 25 January, 1954

Coram: M.C. Mahajan, B.K. Mukherjea, S.R. Das, V. Bose, Ghulam Hasan

In the matter titled Gopal Krishna Potnay versus Union of India and another, the Supreme Court rendered its judgment on the twenty-fifth day of January in the year nineteen fifty-four. The case was recorded as civil appeal number one-eighty-four of nineteen fifty-three, with the petitioner identified as Gopal Krishna Potnay and the respondents as the Union of India and an additional party. The bench hearing the appeal consisted of Chief Justice M C Mahajan together with Justices B K Mukherjea, S R Das, V Bose and Ghulam Hasan. The opinion of the Court was authored by Justice S R Das and is reported in the All India Reporter as AIR 1954 SC 632.

The principal issue before the Court was an appeal against a decree that the plaintiff had obtained in a suit seeking a declaration that the order removing him from his railway employment, issued by the Chief Administrative Officer of the East Punjab Railway at Delhi on the thirtieth of June nineteen forty-nine and communicated to him on the fourth of July the same year, was wrongful, ultra-vires, illegal and void, and that consequently he remained a valid employee entitled to continue service. The trial court had granted the decree in favour of the plaintiff; however, the East Punjab High Court, on the appellant’s appeal, reversed that decision and dismissed the suit. The present appeal to the Supreme Court was entertained on a certificate issued by the East Punjab High Court pursuant to Article 133 of the Constitution.

According to the factual record, the plaintiff entered railway service in the year nineteen eighteen. In March of nineteen forty-five he was appointed as Railway Sectional Officer within the Delhi Special Police Establishment. In June of nineteen forty-eight, the Inspector General of the Special Police Establishment resolved to revert the plaintiff to the East Punjab Railway service. Accordingly, the plaintiff assumed charge of the office of Divisional Superintendent of the East Punjab Railway at Ferozepore Cantonment on the thirtieth of June nineteen forty-eight, but was immediately placed under suspension. That suspension continued until the nineteenth of August nineteen forty-eight, after which he was reinstated on the twentieth of August, the period of suspension being treated as leave. On the thirtieth of June nineteen forty-nine, the Chief Administrative Officer of the East Punjab Railway exercised his special powers and issued an order, marked as Exhibit D-8, effecting the removal of the plaintiff from service in accordance with the terms of his agreement. The order was conveyed to the plaintiff by a letter, Exhibit D-14, dated the first of July nineteen forty-nine, which stated that, pursuant to the order passed by the Chief Administrative Officer of the Railway at Delhi, and in exercise of the special powers vested under paragraph 1708 RI, the plaintiff was being given one month’s pay in lieu of notice of discharge, effective from the fourth of July nineteen forty-nine. The plaintiff challenged this order on the thirtieth of July nineteen forty-nine, arguing that it contravened section 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935. No contention was raised that the plaintiff had never executed a service agreement that would permit removal on one month’s notice. The Railway Board dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal in November nineteen forty-nine, after which the plaintiff instituted the suit that ultimately gave rise to the present appeal.

The plaintiff, on 3 October 1950, instituted the suit that presently stands before this Court. The trial Court examined the evidence and concluded that the defendant had failed to establish that the plaintiff had ever executed a service agreement. Because no such agreement was proven, the trial Court held that there was no basis for discharging the plaintiff on a month’s notice without first preparing a charge-sheet and giving him an opportunity to respond. Accordingly, the trial Court granted a decree in accordance with the prayer made by the plaintiff. The defendant appealed this decree, and the High Court reviewed the matter. The High Court found that the defendant had sufficiently proved the existence of a service agreement, set aside the trial Court’s decree, and dismissed the suit.

The facts regarding the plaintiff’s employment were not in dispute. He had joined the Railway service at Lahore and, at the time of his discharge in June 1949, he was a non-pensionable, non-gazetted Railway servant. Following the partition of India, most of the documents relating to the plaintiff remained in Lahore and were not obtained from the authorities in Pakistan. In this situation the defendant sought to introduce secondary evidence to demonstrate that a service agreement had been executed and to show its terms. None of the defence witnesses claimed personal knowledge that the plaintiff had signed such an agreement; nevertheless their testimony indicated that, under the applicable rules, every Railway servant was required to enter into a service agreement. This requirement was also acknowledged by J. N. Khanna, who was recorded as a witness. The evidence further showed that the agreements were to follow the form prescribed in the rules and consistently contained a clause allowing termination by either party on one month’s notice. However, some defence witnesses testified that the rules were not always observed and that on occasion employees failed to execute the required documents because of oversight. Relying on this testimony, the trial Court held that the evidence did not conclusively establish that the plaintiff had executed a service agreement, and therefore its observation appeared reasonable at that stage. Nevertheless, the record also contained other material indicating that the plaintiff must have signed a standard-form agreement. The discharge order had been issued under paragraph 1708 XI, whose proviso permits the authorities to remove a non-pensionable, non-gazetted Railway servant in accordance with the agreement without following the procedural safeguards of the rules. In his testimony, the plaintiff, who served as a Head Clerk, admitted that he was fully familiar with the relevant rules and regulations. He had appealed to the Railway Board, limiting his arguments to legal points and never asserting that he had not entered into a service agreement—a contention he would certainly have raised had it been true.

The plaintiff subsequently filed an application seeking payment of gratuity, and in the document identified as Exhibit D-9 he recorded that his service termination was described as “discharged in terms of agreement,” relying on that description to support his gratuity claim. During the hearing, counsel representing the plaintiff argued that the record contained no proof that Exhibit D-9 had actually been filed by the plaintiff himself, and the Court found that argument to lack any substantive merit. While the plaintiff was being examined, he requested that the defendant produce certain documents, and he subsequently offered several of those documents into evidence. Among the documents that the plaintiff asked for and that the defendant produced was an item labeled Exhibit D-9, which the Court identified as the plaintiff’s own application for full gratuity payment. Considering these circumstances, the plaintiff could not be permitted to claim that the exhibited document was not his own gratuity application, especially since he had made no effort to place on the record any separate application requesting that document be admitted in support of his case. Moreover, the applicable Rules numbered 1504 and 1505 expressly provide that no gratuity may be paid to a Railway servant who has been dismissed or removed on grounds of misconduct unless such payment is authorized by the controlling officer. Consequently, the plaintiff’s claim for gratuity rested on his allegation that he had been discharged pursuant to the terms of his service agreement rather than on any finding of misconduct. The records show that the plaintiff actually received gratuity in the amount of Rs 3,150 on the basis that he was discharged under his service agreement, and he also obtained one month’s salary in lieu of notice as stipulated in clause 3(a) of that agreement. In light of the facts discussed above, together with the additional facts recorded in the High Court’s judgment, there is no lingering doubt that the High Court was fully justified in concluding that the defendant had sufficiently demonstrated that the plaintiff had executed a service agreement. Assuming that the plaintiff did execute such an agreement, there is no indication that the agreement deviated from the standard form prescribed in the service rules. Accordingly, the plaintiff cannot validly complain that a charge-sheet was never prepared against him or that no disciplinary proceedings were initiated. In the Court’s view, the remaining issues raised in the pleadings need not be examined further. Accordingly, the judgment of the High Court is affirmed, and the appeal is dismissed with costs.