Chamru Budhwa vs State Of Madhya Pradesh
Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.
Court: Supreme Court of India
Case Number: Not extracted
Decision Date: 24 May, 1954
Coram: Bhagwati
Chamru Budhwa versus State of Madhya Pradesh was decided on 24 May 1954 by the Supreme Court of India, and the judgment was authored by Chief Justice Bhagwati. The matter came before the Court on special leave, and the sole question for determination was whether the offence attributable to the appellant fell within the ambit of Section 302 or Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellant, together with his father Budhwa and his brother Damru, had been charged with the murder of a man identified as Tiharu, who was a cousin of Budhwa. According to the prosecution, on the night of 26 May 1951, around the time of the evening meal, an exchange of abusive language erupted between the deceased and the three accused. The prosecution alleged that the three accused proceeded to the courtyard of the deceased while brandishing lathis. During the confrontation, Damru is said to have thrown a lathi at the deceased, prompting the latter to exclaim that he had been struck and to take a step or two toward the accused. The appellant then purportedly struck the head of the deceased with his own lathi. The blow caused the deceased to fall and sustain a head injury that began to bleed. After the fall, Budhwa is said to have delivered an additional blow, after which all three accused fled back to their house.
The injury to the head inflicted by the appellant was later found to be fatal, and both the trial court and the appellate court concluded that the appellant was guilty under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The medical expert’s opinion was that the head injury caused by the appellant was sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death; the expert further explained that such an injury would ordinarily require the use of a heavy blunt weapon applied with moderate force, or a lighter weapon of the same kind applied with great force. Consequently, the Court held that the appellant must have intended the actual consequences of the blow he delivered, and it was sufficient to infer that he possessed knowledge that the bones of an elderly man are brittle and likely to break. This combination of intention and knowledge was deemed adequate to sustain a conviction for murder under Section 302. The appellant did not plead any of the exceptions enumerated in Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. Nevertheless, the Courts below recorded that a severe exchange of abuses had taken place prior to the incident, that the temperature of the dispute had risen, and that both parties had left their respective houses in a state of anger, during which the appellant dealt the fatal blow with his lathi. Although these circumstances did not bring the case within the first exception to Section 300, it appeared that the crime…
In this case the Court observed that the killing was not the result of any planning or pre-meditation. It occurred during a sudden fight that was ignited by a sudden quarrel and was carried out in the heat of passion. The Court further noted that the appellant did not take any undue advantage over the deceased, nor did he act in a cruel or unusual manner. Because of these circumstances the Court held that the incident fell within Exception 4 to Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. Accordingly, the offence was classified as culpable homicide not amounting to murder. As a consequence, the Court concluded that the appellant could not be convicted of an offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.
The Court then turned to the question of whether the appellant’s liability fell under the first part or the second part of Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code. It observed that the fatal injury was inflicted by a single blow on the head of the deceased, as alleged by the prosecution. The Court considered that this act might not have been performed with the intention of causing death or causing bodily injury that is likely to cause death. While the Court recognized that the appellant acted with knowledge that death was a probable result of his action, it found that there was no intention on his part to cause death or such grievous injury within the meaning of Part II of Section 304. Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal to the extent that it set aside the conviction under Section 302 and the sentence of transportation for life. Instead, the appellant was convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304 Part II of the Indian Penal Code and was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for a term of seven years.