Budhan Choudhry And Other vs The State Of Bihar

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 83 of 1953

Decision Date: 2 December 1954

Coram: Mehar Chand Mahajan, B.K. Mukherjea, Vivian Bose, Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, B. Jagannadhadas, S. K. Das, C. P. Sinha, Reuben C. J.

In Budhan Choudhry and others v. State of Bihar, the Supreme Court delivered its judgment on 2 December 1954. The bench that heard the matter comprised Chief Justice Mehar Chand Mahajan, Justice B.K. Mukherjea, Justice Vivian Bose, Justice Natwarlal H. Bhagwati and Justice B. Jagannadhadas, together with Justices Das, Sudhi Ranjan, Aiyyar and T.L. Venkatarama. The case was reported in the 1955 AIR 191 and the 1955 S.C.R. (1) 1045. The Court examined the constitutionality of Section 30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898) in the light of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, which forbids class legislation but permits reasonable classification for legislative purposes. The Court explained that a permissible classification must satisfy two conditions: first, the classification must rest on an intelligible differentia that distinguishes the members of the group from those left out; second, that differentia must have a rational connection to the object sought to be achieved by the statute. The Court noted that the basis of classification may be geographical, occupational or any other appropriate factor, but there must be a clear nexus between the basis and the legislative aim. The Court further observed that Article 14 condemns discrimination not only by substantive law but also by procedural law, and that the Constitution does not guarantee unanimity of decisions nor immunity from erroneous actions of courts or executive agencies. Accordingly, the Court held that Section 30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not offend the guarantee of equality under Article 14. In reaching this conclusion, the Court referred to several earlier decisions, including Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India ([1950] S.C.R. 869), State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara ([1951] S.C.R. 682), State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar ([1952] S.C.R. 284), Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra ([1952] S.C.R. 435), Lachmandas Kewalram Ahuja v. State of Bombay ([1952] S.C.R. 710), Qasim Razvi v. State of Hyderabad ([1953] S.C.R. 581), Habeeb Mohamad v. State of Hyderabad ([1953] S.C.R. 661), State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh ([1953] S.C.R. 254), as well as the foreign authorities Yick Wo v. Peter Hopkins ([1886] 118 U.S. 356; 29 L.Ed. 220) and Snowden v. Hughes ([1944] 321 U.S. 1; 88 L.Ed. 497). The judgment was issued under the criminal appellate jurisdiction, being Criminal Appeal No. 83 of 1953, filed under Article 132(1) of the Constitution. The appeal challenged the judgment and order dated 25 August 1953 of the Patna High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 410 of 1951. Counsel for the petitioner, identified as B.K. Saran and M.M. Sinha, appeared for the appellants.

For the appellants, counsel appeared, while M. C. Setalvad, the Attorney‑General for India, assisted by R. C. Prasad, represented the respondent. The judgment was pronounced on 2 December 1954 and was delivered by Justice Das. The matter before the Court was an appeal from a decision of the High Court of Judicature at Patna that presented a substantial question of law concerning the interpretation of the Constitution of India. The appeal originated from a criminal proceeding that had taken place in the district of Hazaribagh, State of Bihar. The police investigation into the offences alleged against the appellants culminated on 4 June 1951 when a challan was presented before the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate. The Sub‑Divisional Magistrate issued an order directing that “the record be sent to the Deputy Commissioner, Hazaribagh for transferring it to the file of the Special Magistrate for trial.” When the record reached the Deputy Commissioner, he examined the order‑sheet of the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate, withdrew the previous direction, and ordered that the file be transferred to the jurisdiction of Mr. S. F. Azam, a first‑class Magistrate, who was to exercise the powers conferred by section 30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the purpose of disposing of the case.

Mr. S. F. Azam then conducted the trial of the appellants under the authority of section 30 of the Criminal Procedure Code on charges framed under sections 366 and 143 of the Indian Penal Code. Both appellants were found guilty of each offence and were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for five years under section 366 of the Penal Code; no separate sentence was imposed for the conviction under section 143. The appellants subsequently filed an appeal in the High Court of Judicature at Patna. That appeal was heard by a two‑judge bench comprising Justices S. K. Das and C. P. Sinha. A disagreement emerged between the two judges regarding the constitutionality of section 30 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Justice S. K. Das held that the impugned provision did not create any discrimination or inequality among persons similarly situated and therefore did not offend the equal‑protection clause of the Constitution. In contrast, Justice C. P. Sinha opined that the provision violated article 14. The matter was then referred to the Chief Justice, Reuben, who, agreeing with Justice Das, concluded that section 30 did not transgress article 14. The Chief Justice affirmed the convictions but reduced the sentences imposed.

Following the High Court’s decision, the appellants applied for and were granted a certificate under article 132(1) of the Constitution, thereby permitting the present appeal to the Supreme Court. The counsel for the appellants reiterated before this Court, as had been argued before the High Court, that the fundamental rights of the appellants under article 14 had been infringed. Their specific grievance was that the trial had been conducted before a magistrate exercising powers under section 30 rather than before a Court of Session. The appellant’s counsel emphasized that a section 30 magistrate is statutorily required to try the case in the capacity of a magistrate and must, therefore, follow the warrant procedure, which differs from the procedure applied by a Sessions Court.

In the present matter, the magistrate who exercises powers under section 30 is required to follow the warrant procedure, which is distinct from the procedure applicable to a Court of Session. The grievance asserted by the appellants is that a trial before a Sessions Judge offers a considerably greater advantage to the accused because the accused first benefits from the commitment proceedings conducted by a magistrate and subsequently receives a trial before the Sessions Judge assisted by a jury or assessors. It has not been seriously contested before this Court that, notwithstanding the possibility that a Sessions Judge may impose a punishment heavier than the maximum that a section 30 magistrate is authorized to impose, the overall benefit to the accused derived from a trial before a Sessions Judge outweighs the benefit of a trial before a magistrate operating under the warrant procedure. Consequently, the Court must examine whether this apparent distinction amounts to a violation of the equal protection guarantee enshrined in article 14 of the Constitution.

The Court noted that article 14 has been examined in several earlier decisions, including Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. The Union of India, The State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara, The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of Sau‑rashtra, Lachmandas Kewalram Ahuja v. The State of Bombay, Qasim Razvi v. The State of Hyderabad, and Habeeb Mohamad v. The State of Hyderabad. Because of the extensive pronouncements in those cases, the Court found it unnecessary to undertake an exhaustive discussion of the meaning, scope, and effect of article 14. The Court reiterated the established principle that while article 14 prohibits class legislation, it does not preclude reasonable classification for legislative purposes. For a classification to be constitutionally permissible, two criteria must be satisfied: first, the classification must be based on an intelligible differentia that distinguishes the persons or things placed in the group from those excluded; second, that differentia must have a rational nexus to the objective that the statute seeks to achieve. Such classifications may be grounded on various bases, such as geography, objects, occupations, or similar factors, but a clear link between the basis of classification and the purpose of the enactment must exist. Moreover, the Court emphasized that article 14 forbids discrimination not only in substantive law but also in procedural law. Accordingly, the challenge to the validity of the appellants’ trial must be assessed in light of the principles articulated in the Court’s earlier jurisprudence. The Court also observed that the Code of Criminal Procedure provides four distinct modes of trial: (i) trial of sessions cases, (ii) trial of warrant cases, (iii) summary trials, and (iv) trials before a High Court and a Court of Session, each governed by its own procedural regime.

In this matter, the Court explained that the various modes of trial prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure include the trial of sessions cases, warrant cases, summary trials and trials before a High Court or a Court of Sessions, each having its own procedure. The Court then turned to Section 28 of the Code, which is located in Chapter III dealing with “Powers of Courts.” The provision reads: “28. Subject to the other provisions of this Code, any offence under the Indian Penal Code may be tried—(a) by the High Court, or (b) by the Court of Session, or (c) by any other Court by which such offence is shown in the eighth column of the second schedule to be triable.” The Court also examined Section 30, as currently worded, which states: “30. In Assam, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Oudh, Madhya Bharat, Hyderabad, Mysore, Patiala and East Punjab States Union and Rajasthan, in all Part C States and in those parts of the other States in which there are Deputy Commissioners or Assistant Commissioners the State Government may, notwithstanding anything contained in section 28 or section 29, invest the District Magistrate or any Magistrate of the first class, with power to try as a Magistrate all offences not punishable with death.” Furthermore, Section 34 was quoted, which limits the sentencing authority of a magistrate specially empowered under Section 30: “34. The Court of a Magistrate, specially empowered under section 30, may pass any sentence authorised by law, except a sentence of death or of transportation for a term exceeding seven years or imprisonment for a term exceeding seven years.” The Court observed that the opening words of Section 28—“subject to the other provisions of this Code”—indicate that Section 28 and the second schedule are subordinate to the remaining provisions of the Code, including those of Section 30. Moreover, the language of Section 30 itself expressly declares that its provisions will operate “notwithstanding anything contained in section 28 or section 29.” Consequently, the Court concluded that the rules in Section 28 and the eighth‑column schedule must yield to the authority conferred by Section 30. However, the learned Attorney‑General did not argue that Section 30 completely nullifies or replaces Section 28 and the schedule so that, in the territories specified, magistrates empowered under Section 30 become the sole tribunals competent to try every offence not punishable by death, to the exclusion of all other courts listed in the schedule. The Court noted that if such an extreme position were true, there would be no question of discrimination, because the magistrate’s court would then be the only forum for trying those offences. The Attorney‑General’s actual claim was less sweeping. The Court explained that the effect of the State Government’s investment of a District Magistrate or any first‑class Magistrate with power under Section 30 is to create an additional court in which all offences not punishable by death may be tried, rather than to eliminate the jurisdiction of the courts mentioned in Section 28 or the second schedule.

The effect of the State Government’s exercise of authority under section 30 is to make offences that are not punishable by death triable before an additional magistrate. In practical terms, the exercise of that authority inserts, as if in a new entry in the eighth column of the second schedule, a magistrate who has been empowered to act as a court for all offences that do not carry the death penalty. The Court then considered whether this insertion creates any inequality before the law and whether it conflicts with the guarantee of equality enshrined in article 14. Section 30, however, authorises the State Government, in certain designated areas, to invest either the District Magistrate or any magistrate of the first class with the power to try, as a magistrate, every offence that is not punishable by death. This provision operates on an obvious classification: the power may be conferred only upon specified magistrates who are situated in particular localities, and it applies only to offences that are not capital offences. The Legislature is understood to have recognised and appropriately appreciated that the needs of the people may differ from one region to another, and therefore a classification based on geographical or territorial considerations is permissible. An illustration of such territorial classification is found in the Abducted Persons (Recovery and Restoration) Act, 1949, which was examined by this Court and upheld as valid in The State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh (1). Both S. K. Das, J., and the learned Chief Justice, in their separate judgments, referred to circumstances such as the distance between the place where an offence occurs and the headquarters where the Court of Session sits, the infrequent sittings of the Court of Session, the inconvenience of producing witnesses from remote interior areas, and the difficulty of locating a sufficient number of suitable persons to act as jurors or assessors in backward or out‑of‑the‑way places. All of these factors render the classification reasonable. In this sense, the provision of section 30 does not create any discrimination. The provision merely authorises the State Government to invest certain magistrates with the power to try all offences that are not punishable by death, and that authority may be exercised only in the places specified by the statute. Consequently, whenever the State invests any magistrate with powers under section 30, any person who commits an offence that is not punishable by death and that would otherwise be triable by a Court of Session under section 28 read with the second schedule becomes also liable to be tried before the section 30 magistrate. The risk of such liability falls equally on every person who commits such an offence, and therefore the provision itself does not discriminate. Nevertheless, counsel for the appellants argued, relying on the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Yick Wo v. Peter Hopkins (1), that even when a law is fair on its face and impartial in its operation, it may still be unconstitutional if it is administered by a public authority with an “evil eye” and an “unequal hand,” thereby creating illegal discrimination between persons in similar circumstances and violating their rights.

In the present matter, the contention was raised that, although the statutory provision itself might not be discriminatory, it could nonetheless be employed in a manner that created inequality before the law. The argument asserted that police officers might refer one accused of an offence punishable under section 366 to a magistrate empowered by section 30, while sending another accused of the same offence to a magistrate who possessed the authority to commit the accused directly to the Court of Session. The court indicated that such an allegation required careful and detailed examination, because the ultimate determination of the forum for trial depended on the judicial discretion exercised by the magistrate, not on the arbitrary choice of the executive or police.

When a case charging an individual under section 366 of the Indian Penal Code, which is triable by a Court of Session according to the second schedule, was presented before a magistrate empowered under section 30, the magistrate was not compelled to try the case himself. Section 34 limited the sentencing power of a section 30 magistrate, and if, after recording evidence and before framing a charge, the magistrate concluded that the maximum penalty he could impose would be insufficient to achieve justice, he could invoke section 347 and refer the accused to the Court of Session. Thus, the decision as to whether the accused would be tried by the section 30 magistrate or by the Court of Session was a matter of the magistrate’s own judicial discretion, not an executive directive. Conversely, if the police forwarded an accused under section 366 to a magistrate lacking section 30 authority, that magistrate could examine the charge sheet and relevant documents and, if convinced that the case warranted trial before a section 30 magistrate, could forward the matter to the District Magistrate with recommendations for action under section 528 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This exact procedure was followed in the instant case. Alternatively, the magistrate could proceed under section 208 to take evidence, and after completing the evidence‑taking phase, could judicially decide whether to continue under section 209 or section 210. If the magistrate determined that the ends of justice required commitment of the accused to the Court of Session, he would frame a charge and apply sections 210 to 213. If, however, the magistrate was satisfied that the ends of justice would be met by trial before a section 30 magistrate possessing the appropriate jurisdiction, he could report the matter to the District Magistrate and the

The District Magistrate, exercising his discretion, could withdraw the case to himself under section 528 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Once the case was withdrawn, the District Magistrate was entitled either to investigate the matter personally, to conduct a trial himself, or to refer the case for enquiry or trial to any other magistrate who possessed the competence to try the offence. This arrangement created two distinct stages at which judicial discretion was exercised. The first stage occurred when the magistrate before whom the accused had originally been sent for enquiry applied section 209 to decide whether to commit the accused to a higher court. The second stage arose when the District Magistrate, acting under the authority of section 528, made his own determination regarding the further course of the proceedings.

Consequently, the ultimate decision as to whether an individual charged under section 366 should be tried before a Court of Session or before a section 30 magistrate did not rest on the whims or personal preferences of the police or the executive branch of government. Instead, it depended on the proper and lawful exercise of judicial discretion by the magistrate who considered the case. The Court noted that discrimination could, in theory, be perpetrated by any of the three organs of the State – the legislature, the executive, or the judiciary – and that article 14 of the Constitution prohibited any State action that denied equal protection of the laws. However, the Court also reminded that, as expressed by Justice Frankfurter in Snowden v. Hughes, the Constitution does not guarantee uniformity of decisions nor shield the State from merely erroneous actions by courts or executive agencies. A judicial determination must necessarily be based on the specific facts and circumstances of each case, and an appearance of unequal application of the law does not automatically constitute denial of equal protection unless it is shown to be intentional and purposeful discrimination, as explained by Chief Justice Stone in the same case. In the present matter, the Court found no suggestion or evidence that any intentional or purposeful discrimination had been shown by the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate, the District Magistrate, or the section 30 magistrate who eventually tried the accused. Moreover, the Court emphasized that the discretion exercised by judicial officers is not arbitrary; higher courts retain the power to review orders of subordinate courts. Given these principles, the Court concluded that there was no basis for finding capricious discrimination by the tribunals. Aligning with the views of Justice S. K. Das and Chief Justice Reuben, the Court held that no violation of the fundamental right under article 14 had been established, and consequently dismissed the appeal.