Babul Chandra Mitra vs Chief Justice and Ors. Judges Of Patna High Court

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Writ Petition (civil) 345 of 1952

Decision Date: 11 March 1954

Coram: B.K. Mukherjea, N.H. Bhagwati, B. Jagannadhadas, S.R. Das, T.L. Venkatarama Ayyar

The case was styled Babul Chandra Mitra versus Chief Justice and the other Judges of the Patna High Court. The petition was numbered Writ Petition (civil) 345 of 1952 and was decided by a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India on 11 March 1954. The bench comprised Justice B. K. Mukherjea, Justice N. H. Bhagwati, Justice B. Jagannadhadas, Justice S. R. Das and Justice T. L. Venkatarama Ayyar. The judgment was reported in AIR 1954 SC 524 and was authored by Justice B. K. Mukherjea. The petitioner, Babul Chandra Mitra, sought relief against the refusal of the Patna High Court to admit him to the roll of advocates despite his alleged compliance with all the requirements laid down in the Bar Council Rules of that High Court. The petitioner's grievance centred on the High Court’s refusal to grant enrolment without assigning any reason for the refusal. In addressing this grievance, the Court examined the proviso to Section 9(1) of the Indian Bar Councils Act, which expressly provides that the rules made under that section “shall not limit or in any way affect the power of the High Court to refuse admission to any person at its discretion.” The Court observed that the matter was wholly a question of the discretionary power of the High Court and that no statutory duty was imposed on the Court to enrol persons who satisfied the prescribed conditions. Consequently, the Court concluded that the petitioner could not validly compel the High Court either to grant enrolment or to refrain from exercising its discretion, because such an order would be beyond the powers conferred upon the Supreme Court under the relevant statutory scheme.

The petitioner's counsel, Mr Ghose, further contended that the proviso to Section 9(1) of the Indian Bar Councils Act was void insofar as it conflicted with the fundamental right of freedom of trade and profession guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, and that the proviso was not protected by the qualification clause of Article 19(6). The Court began its analysis by noting that Section 8 of the Indian Bar Councils Act provides that no person has a right to practice in any High Court unless his name is entered in the roll of advocates of that Court as maintained under the Act. Section 9 empowers the Bar Council, with the sanction of the High Court, to frame rules governing the admission of persons as advocates. However, the Court emphasised that the proviso to Section 9(1) unequivocally retains an overriding discretionary power in the High Court to refuse admission to any applicant, notwithstanding the existence of such rules. The Court held that vesting such discretion in the High Court, even in an unfettered form, did not constitute an unreasonable restriction. It further observed that some authority must inevitably possess the discretion to admit or refuse advocates, and that no other body besides the High Court itself could be considered a suitable repository for that power. Accordingly, the Court found that the discretionary power granted to the High Court was constitutionally permissible and did not infringe upon Article 19(1)(g), and therefore the proviso could not be struck down as ultra vires the Constitution.

In this case the petitioner, Mr Ghose, contended that even if the power to admit advocates was properly vested in the High Court, it would be unreasonable for the Court to exercise that power without first giving the applicant an opportunity to respond to the allegations that had led the Court to refuse his enrolment. The Court responded that the rule under discussion did not mandate that the High Court act without any notice to the person whose application was to be rejected. In practice, the Court normally gave notice to the applicant when his enrolment request was being considered and allowed him a chance to explain any adverse material that might be before the Court. Consequently, the Court could not hold the rule to be per se unreasonable or void.

The matter therefore narrowed to the specific question of whether, in the circumstances of this particular case, the High Court had exercised its discretion in a manner that violated the principles of natural justice. After reviewing the case history and the affidavits filed by both parties, the Court was unable to find that the petitioner’s claim was justified. The petition before the Court was the fifth application in a series that began in 1938. The petitioner had previously made three separate applications to be enrolled as a pleader of the District Court, each of which had been dismissed. According to the affidavit of the opposite party, the application filed in October 1939 was heard in chambers by two learned judges and later considered by a Full Court. A third application was filed in 1943, in which the petitioner submitted a detailed explanation of the reasons he believed had influenced the judges to reject his earlier pleas. This application was recorded as Miscellaneous Judicial Case No 103 of 1943 and was subsequently withdrawn on 7 February 1944. In 1946 the petitioner made his first application for enrolment as an Advocate under the Indian Bar Councils Act, but that application was also withdrawn. The present application was filed on 9 October 1950, circulated to the Full Court, and referenced the minutes of all the earlier applications. In connection with those minutes the Chief Justice remarked that there was no reason to modify the previous order, an observation that was endorsed by the majority of the judges. Acting in accordance with that majority view, the Court rejected the present application.

The Court observed that the earlier decision of the full Bench had resulted in the rejection of the applicant’s petition for enrolment as an Advocate. The Court then framed the question of whether, after the passage of many years and the attendant change of circumstances, the applicant’s continued association with his brother – who had been convicted of a criminal offence – could still be regarded as a disqualification that stood in the way of his admission to the Bar. The Court recognised that this issue could invite divergent views and that a difference of opinion on this point was certainly possible. The Court refrained from stating that the High Court lacked the authority to revisit the question should it deem necessary to do so. However, the Court also declined to hold that the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 9 of the Indian Bar Councils Act was void on the ground that it imposed an unreasonable restriction on the freedom to practice a profession, trade, or calling guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Likewise, the Court found no basis to conclude that the discretion exercised in this case violated the principles of natural justice. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the application and made no order as to costs.