Thakur Raghubir Singh vs Court Of Wards, Ajmer, And Another

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Petition No. 29 of 1953

Decision Date: 15 May, 1953

Coram: Mehr Chand Mahajan, B.K. Mukherjea, Ghulam Hasan, Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, B. Jagannadhadas

In this matter the petitioner was Thakur Raghubir Singh, who challenged the actions of the Court of Wards in Ajmer together with another respondent. The petition was filed before the Supreme Court of India and was decided on the fifteenth day of May in the year 1953. The case was recorded under the citation 1953 AIR 373 and also appears as 1953 SCR 1049. The judgment was authored by Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan, who was joined by Justices B K Mukherjea, Ghulam Hasan, Natwarlal H Bhagwati and B Jagannadhadas. The bench that heard the petition therefore consisted of Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan together with the four colleagues mentioned. The parties were recorded as petitioner Thakur Raghubir Singh and respondents the Court of Wards, Ajmer and an additional party. The petition was presented under article 32 of the Constitution of India seeking an order for the restoration of the petitioner’s estate and such other relief as the Court might deem appropriate.

The legal controversy centered on the interaction of several statutory provisions. Section 112 of the Ajmer Revenue and Land Records Act, identified as Act XLII of the year 1950, declared that any landlord who habitually infringed the rights of his tenants under that Act would be deemed a “landlord who is disqualified to manage his own property.” That declaration was made notwithstanding any contrary provision in section 7 of the Ajmer Government Wards Regulation of 1888, commonly referred to as Regulation I of 1888. The Ajmer Government Wards Regulation, in sections 6 and 7, empowered the Court of Wards, after obtaining prior sanction of the Chief Commissioner, to assume the superintendence of the property of any landholder who was found to be disqualified to manage his own property. The petitioner’s estate had been placed under the superintendence of the Court of Wards on the basis of these provisions, and he contended that this action violated his fundamental rights under the Constitution, specifically the freedoms guaranteed by article 19(1)(f) and the protective provisions of article 31-A. The central issue for determination was whether the combined operation of section 112 of the 1950 Act and sections 6 and 7 of the 1888 Regulation amounted to a reasonable restriction on the petitioner’s constitutional rights or whether it amounted to an invalid encroachment.

The Court examined the effect of the statutory scheme and concluded that the operative result of the combined provisions was that the Court of Wards possessed the unfettered discretion to, on the basis of its own subjective judgment, take over the management of the property of any landlord who habitually violated tenant rights. The Court held that this discretionary power could not be subjected to scrutiny or control by an ordinary civil court. Consequently, the Court found that the operation of section 112 of the Ajmer Revenue and Land Records Act, when read together with sections 6 and 7 of the Ajmer Government Wards Regulation, directly infringed the petitioner’s fundamental right to practice any lawful profession, trade, or business as guaranteed by article 19(1) of the Constitution. Because the statutory scheme effectively removed the petitioner’s right without a reasonable or proportionate justification, the Court declared that portion of the law void to the extent that it conflicted with the constitutional guarantee.

The Court observed that the provisions of section 112 could not be considered a reasonable restriction imposed in the interest of the general public on the right guaranteed by article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. The reason for this conclusion was that the provisions entirely negated the said right by making its enjoyment contingent solely upon the arbitrary discretion of the executive authority. Consequently, the right could be denied at the whims of the executive, which is inconsistent with the concept of a reasonable restriction. The Court further held that section 112 was not given validation by article 31-A of the Constitution because it did not constitute “a law providing for the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein or for the extinction or modification of any such rights” as contemplated by article 31-A. In interpreting the term “modification” within article 31-A, the Court clarified that it refers only to a change in the substantive proprietary right of a citizen, such as its extinguishment, and does not extend to a mere temporary suspension of the right to manage an estate, whether for a definite period or indefinitely.

The original jurisdiction for this matter was Petition No. 29 of 1953, filed under article 32 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner sought an order directing the Court of Wards, Ajmer, to refrain from exercising superintendence over his istimrari estate and other properties, and to restore possession and management of those assets to him. Representations were made on behalf of the appellant and the respondents by counsel designated respectively as counsel for the appellant and counsel for the State. The petition was dated 15 May 1953, and the judgment was delivered by Justice Mahajan. The case arose from a claim that the petitioner’s fundamental rights under article 19(1)(f) were being infringed. The petitioner owned an istimrari estate in the State of Ajmer, a right derived from an istimrari sanad granted to his ancestor in 1875. This estate conferred upon him a life interest subject to certain duties prescribed by the Ajmer Land and Revenue Regulation of 1877. On 18 September 1952, the Deputy Commissioner of Ajmer, acting as the Court of Wards established under the Ajmer Government Wards Regulation of 1888, took possession of the estate and assumed its superintendence. The Deputy Commissioner claimed authority under sections 6 and 7 of the Regulation read in conjunction with section 112 of the Ajmer Tenancy and Land Records Act, 1950 (Act XLII of 1950). Consequently, the petitioner filed a writ of mandamus, or a similar order, seeking a direction that the Court of Wards restore possession of the estate and desist from continuing its superintendence. The order dated 18 September 1952 was challenged on the ground that it was void and ineffective because the statutory provisions relied upon were alleged to be in conflict with Part III of the Constitution, thereby infringing and curtailing the petitioner’s rights guaranteed by article 19(1)(f).

Section 112 of Act XLII of 1950 formed one of a series of seven provisions placed in Chapter X of that Act, a chapter titled “Compensation and Penalties.” The provision set out a penalty for a landlord who habitually infringed the rights of a tenant. It stated that, notwithstanding any provision of section 7 of the Ajmer Government Wards Regulation, 1888 (I of 1888), a landlord who repeatedly violated tenant rights would be deemed “a landlord who is disqualified to manage his own property” within the meaning of section 6 of the same Regulation, and that his property could be placed under the superintendence of the Court of Wards. The immediately preceding provision, section 110, declared that if a landholder or his agent extracted any arrears or unreasonable demands from a tenant, such conduct would be treated as an offence of extortion under the Indian Penal Code, Act XLV of 1860. In the same manner that section 110 classified an illegal levy as a penal offence, section 112 categorized a landlord who habitually infringed tenant rights as a person disqualified from managing his own property, thereby subjecting his estate to takeover by the Court of Wards pursuant to section 6 of the Regulation. The Court’s analysis described this mechanism as a novel device intended to punish repeat offenders by employing the regulatory framework established for the administration of Government Wards in Ajmer-Merwara.

The effect of section 112, read together with section 6 of Regulation I of 1888, was that the Court of Wards could, at its own discretion, assume control over the property of any landlord identified as habitually infringing tenant rights. Such assumption required the prior approval of the Chief Commissioner, a sanction that itself rested entirely upon the Commissioner’s discretionary judgment. Section 27 of the Regulation expressly provided that any discretion exercised by the Court of Wards or the Chief Commissioner under the Regulation could not be examined by any civil court. During the proceedings, the Attorney-General for the State of Ajmer conceded that neither Act XLII of 1950 nor Regulation I of 1888 contained a specific mechanism for determining whether a particular landlord was habitually infringing tenant rights. Consequently, the determination depended solely on the subjective assessment of the Deputy Commissioner, the Commissioner, or the Chief Commissioner, and that assessment was insulated from judicial review in civil courts. The Court noted that the contention that the combined operation of section 112 of the Act and the Regulation infringed the petitioner’s fundamental right to hold and dispose of his estate under article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution was well-founded, and it required no further elaborate discussion.

The learned Attorney-General for the State of Ajmer contended that neither Act XLII of 1950 nor Regulation I of 1888 contained any procedure for deciding whether a particular landlord habitually infringed the rights of his tenants. Under Regulation I of 1888, the Court of Wards could assume superintendence of the property of a disqualified proprietor solely on the basis of a subjective determination made by the Deputy Commissioner, the Commissioner or the Chief Commissioner, and that discretion could not be challenged in any civil court. The Attorney-General asserted that Act XLII of 1950 said nothing on the matter. The judgment held that the proposition that the provisions of section 112 of Act XLII of 1950, when read with Regulation I of 1888, violated the petitioner’s fundamental right guaranteed by article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution was well-founded and required no elaborate discussion. The petitioner’s right to hold the istimrari estate and to dispose of it was abridged by the Court of Wards’ action authorized under those provisions. His right to manage the estate and to enjoy possession of it was suspended indefinitely, persisting until the Court of Wards chose to withdraw its superintendence. During the period of suspension the petitioner could receive only those sums of money for his expenses that the Court of Wards, at its discretion, elected to allow. Consequently, the provisions of section 112 of Act XLII of 1950 clearly curtailed the petitioner’s fundamental right under article 19(1)(f) and were, to that extent, declared void.

The Attorney-General argued for the validity of section 112 on three grounds. First, he maintained that the question of whether a landholder habitually infringed the rights of his tenants did not depend on the opinion of the Court of Wards and could instead be raised and contested in a civil court. He pointed out that the section contained no language, such as “in its opinion,” which would ordinarily indicate that a matter rested on the subjective judgment of an authority and was therefore immune from civil adjudication. The judgment found this contention unsubstantiated. As previously noted, Act XLII of 1950 provided no mechanism for determining the existence of habitual infringement, and this omission was appropriate because section 112 was merely declaratory. It declared a landlord to be under a disability and suffering from an infirmity. That declaration became operative and effective only when the Court of Wards, in its discretionary power, decided to assume superintendence of the proprietor’s property. Hence, the determination of habitual infringement and the consequent deprivation of possession were settled by the Court of Wards’ subjective decision, leaving the landlord without recourse to a civil court on those questions.

When the Court of Wards, acting in its discretion, elects to assume superintendence of the property belonging to a landlord, the decision is effectively made by the Deputy Commissioner, the Commissioner, or the Chief Commissioner who believes that the landlord should be deprived of possession of his own property. Such a determination operates to the disadvantage of the landlord, yet the landlord is barred from contesting the exercise of this discretion because the provisions of section 27 of Regulation I of 1888 expressly prevent any challenge. Consequently, the subjective determination of the Court of Wards settles both the question of whether a particular individual habitually infringes the rights of his tenants and the question of whether his property should be taken over by the Court of Wards. The landlord therefore has no avenue to approach a civil court on either of these matters. The Attorney-General was unable to point to any clause in the Court of Wards Act or in Act XLII of 1950 that would permit a landlord, who has been declared a habitual infringer, to seek judicial review of the Court of Wards’ determination in a civil forum. On the contrary, the language of Regulation I of 1888 makes clear that such recourse is unavailable.

The Attorney-General further argued that the provisions of section 112 constitute reasonable restrictions on the right guaranteed by article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution and that these restrictions serve the public interest. The Court found this argument unsound. Section 112 of Act XLII of 1950 is penal in nature; it is designed as a punishment for a landlord who habitually infringes his tenants’ rights. The punishment consists of placing the landlord under the control of the Court of Wards and subjecting him to the stringent provisions of Regulation I of 1888. A law that prescribes a penalty for misconduct cannot be characterised as a restriction on a fundamental right, a point even the Attorney-General conceded. Moreover, it is difficult to regard such a provision as a reasonable restriction because it deprives a person of possession of his property for an indefinite period based solely on the subjective opinion of an executive officer, without allowing the affected individual any right to challenge the determination in a civil court. Such a deprivation cannot be described as “reasonable” under article 19(5) of the Constitution, and therefore section 112 cannot be sustained as a valid restriction on the right guaranteed by article 19(1)(f). The Attorney-General also contended that section 112 might be upheld by the curative provisions of article 31-A, a point that will be considered separately.

The Court examined the contention that section 112 of Act XLII of 1950 could be saved by the curative provisions of article 31-A of the Constitution. Article 31-A is designed to protect statutes that would otherwise violate the fundamental right provided in article 31(2), but its operation is limited to legislation that deals with the acquisition of estates or rights therein, or with the extinguishment or modification of such rights. The provision states, “Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Part, no law providing for the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein or for the extinguishment or modification of any such rights shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by any provisions of this Part.” The Court noted that Section 12 of Act XLII of 1950 was enacted to regulate the relationship between landlords and tenants and therefore did not constitute a law for the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights in those estates. It also did not provide for the extinguishment or modification of such rights. The Attorney-General emphasized the term “modification” in article 31-A, arguing that it could include a temporary suspension of the right to manage an estate. However, the Court held that within the context of article 31-A the word “modification” refers only to a substantive change in the proprietary right, such as its extinguishment, and cannot extend to a mere suspension, whether definite or indefinite, of the right to manage property. Historically, article 31-A was intended to complement article 31(2) and has no relevance to the provisions of section 112 of the Act.

Consequently, the Court concluded that section 112 of Act XLII of 1950 is not saved by either clause (5) of article 19 or by article 31-A of the Constitution. The provision clearly infringes the petitioner’s fundamental right guaranteed under article 19(1)(f). In view of this infringement, the Court directed that the petitioner be restored to possession of his estate. Accordingly, the Court ordered the Court of Wards, Ajmer-Merwara, which is constituted under the Ajmer Government Wards Regulation I of 1888, to refrain from exercising superintendence over the petitioner’s istimrari estate and the other properties that had been taken into its possession, and to return possession of those properties to the petitioner. The petitioner was awarded costs of the petition, and the petition was allowed. The Court noted the agents appearing for the petitioner and the respondents.