Shibban Lal Saksena vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh and Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Petition No. 298 of 1953

Decision Date: 3 December 1953

Coram: B.K. Mukherjea, Natwarlal H. Bhagwati

In this case the petitioner Shibban Lal Saksena filed a petition against the State of Uttar Pradesh and others on 3 December 1953. The matter was heard by a bench of the Supreme Court consisting of Justice B K Mukherjea, Justice Natwarlal H Bhagwati and Justice B K Mukherjea. The citation of the decision is reported as 1954 AIR 179 and 1954 SCR 418, with subsequent references appearing in various law reports such as 1957 SC 164, 1966 SC 740, 1966 SC 1078, 1967 SC 295, 1967 SC 908, 1968 SC 1303, 1968 SC 1509, 1969 SC 43, 1970 SC 852, 1972 SC 739, 1974 SC 183, 1974 SC 255, 1975 SC 90, 1975 SC 134, 1976 SC 1207, 1979 SC 1925, 1984 SC 211, 1984 SC 444, 1984 SC 1334, 1987 SC 1748 and 1988 SC 1835. The statutory framework involved the Preventive Detention Act of 1950, as amended by Acts XXXIV of 1952 and LXI of 1952. Sections 3(1)(a) and 11 of that Act were central to the dispute. The detention order issued against the petitioner specified two grounds, one falling under sub-clause (ii) and the other under sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of section 3(1). When the matter came before the Government for action under section 11, the Government chose to confirm the detention on the basis of the ground in sub-clause (ii) but revoked the detention with respect to the ground in sub-clause (iii). The Court examined whether such a partial confirmation and partial revocation was permissible. The Court held that the original order made under section 3(1)(a) could not be sustained when one of its stated grounds was found to be non-existent. The Court explained that allowing the remaining ground to uphold the order would amount to substituting an objective judicial test for the subjective satisfaction of the executive authority, which contradicted the legislative purpose of the statute. The Court further noted that if one of the two grounds is irrelevant or wholly illusory, the entire detention order becomes void. The judgment referred to the decision in Keshav v. The King-Emperor and reiterated the settled principle that the power to issue a detention order under section 3 depends entirely on the satisfaction of the appropriate authority, and that the sufficiency of the grounds, provided they have rational probative value and are not extraneous, cannot be challenged except on grounds of bad faith.

In the discussion of the ground of mala fides, the Court referenced State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya (2). Section 11 of the Preventive Detention Act prescribes the steps the Government must take after an Advisory Board submits its report. The provision states that if the Board, in its opinion, finds sufficient reason to detain a person, the Government may confirm the detention order and may continue the detention for a period it deems appropriate. Conversely, if the Board concludes that there is no sufficient reason for detention, the Government is obligated to revoke the detention order. In the present case the Government chose to confirm the detention order while simultaneously revoking it under one of the sub-clauses of section 3(1)(a) of the Act, an action that the statute does not contemplate. The Court then recorded the original jurisdiction of the petition, identified as Petition No. 298 of 1953, filed under article 32 of the Constitution of India seeking a writ of habeas corpus. Counsel for the petitioner and counsel for the respondent were mentioned, and the judgment was delivered by Justice Mukherjea. The petition challenged the detention of Shibban Lal Saksena, who was alleged to be unlawfully held in the District Jail at Gorakhpur. The petitioner had been arrested on 5 January 1953 by order of the District Magistrate of Gorakhpur, an order that expressly directed his detention under sub-clauses (ii) and (iii) of clause (a) of section 3(1) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, as amended. On 7 January, the grounds of detention were communicated to the detainee in compliance with section 7 of the Act. The communicated grounds appeared to be of a two-fold nature, corresponding to the categories set out in sub-clause (ii) and sub-clause (iii) of section 3(1)(a). The first ground alleged that, in speeches delivered at Ghugli on certain dates, the petitioner urged cane growers not to supply sugarcane to the mills and to withhold supplies, thereby interfering with the essential supply of sugarcane to the community. The second ground alleged that, by employing certain expressions quoted in the communication, the petitioner incited cane growers and the public to violence, challenged established authority, defied lawful orders and directions issued by the Government and its officers, and consequently gravely prejudiced public order. The petitioner submitted his representation against the detention order on 3 February 1953, after which his case was considered by the Advisory Board constituted under section 8 of the Act at its sitting in Lucknow on 23 February, during which he was heard in person.

In the present case the petitioner filed a representation against the detention order on 3 February 1953. His representation was taken up by the Advisory Board that had been constituted under section 8 of the Preventive Detention Act. The Board met at Lucknow on 23 February 1953 to consider the petition. During that sitting the Board gave the petitioner a personal hearing, after which it prepared and submitted its report. Following receipt of the Board’s report, the Government of Uttar Pradesh issued a communication to the petitioner on 13 March 1953. That communication, issued on behalf of the State, informed the petitioner that the Government, exercising its authority under section 11 of the Preventive Detention Act, had confirmed the detention order against him pursuant to sub-clause (ii) of section 3(1)(a) of the Act and had sanctioned the continuation of his detention either until further orders were made or for a maximum period of twelve months counted from the date of his detention. The second paragraph of the same communication stated: “The detenue may please be informed that the Advisory Board did not uphold his detention under sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act. Government have therefore revoked his detention under this sub-clause.” Subsequently the petitioner approached this Court by filing an application under article 32 of the Constitution. Counsel appearing in support of the petition, identified only as the petitioner’s counsel, contested the legality of the detention order on two principal grounds. The first contention was that, based on the grounds served upon the petitioner under section 7 of the Preventive Detention Act, it was apparent that the detaining authority had relied on two separate grounds to deprive the petitioner of his liberty: the first ground being that his activities were prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies essential to the community, and the second ground being that his conduct was injurious to the maintenance of public order. However, the communication dated 13 March 1953 indicated that the first ground did not, in fact, exist as a factual basis, and that the Government of Uttar Pradesh had in effect revoked the detention order on the basis of sub-clause (iii) of section 3(1)(a) of the Act. In view of this, the petitioner’s counsel argued that the original detention order could not stand, because if the authority had detained the petitioner on two grounds and one of those grounds was subsequently admitted to be nonexistent or irrelevant, the entire order would be vitiated; the mind of the detaining authority could not be said to have been influenced by a non-existent ground. The second contention raised by counsel was that the particulars supplied to the petitioner in relation to the second ground were manifestly inadequate, partial, and therefore failed to enable him to make an effective representation against the detention order. The Court immediately observed that the second contention was not persuasive. While acknowledging that the adequacy of the particulars conveyed to a detenue under the provision embodied in article 22(5) of the Constitution is a justiciable issue, the Court stated that the particulars in the present case were not so deficient as to fall short of the constitutional requirement, and consequently found no substance in the second ground of challenge.

The Court observed that the question of whether Article 22(5) of the Constitution is justiciable depended on the test of whether the particulars given to a detenu were sufficient to enable him to make an effective representation. After examining the material, the Court was not convinced that the particulars supplied to the detenu in the present case were inadequate or fell short of the constitutional requirement. Consequently, the Court held that there was no substance in the contention that the particulars were insufficient.

The Court then turned to the first contention raised by counsel, which it considered to raise an important point worthy of careful consideration. The Court recalled that it had repeatedly held that the power to issue a detention order under section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act rested entirely on the satisfaction of the authority specified in that section. The Court explained that the sufficiency of the grounds on which that satisfaction was based could not be challenged in a court of law so long as those grounds possessed rational probative value and were not extraneous to the purpose of the legislative provision, except where the order was passed in bad faith. Moreover, the Court stated that a court was not even competent to inquire into the truth of the facts mentioned as grounds of detention in the communication to the detenu under section 7 of the Act.

However, the Court found the factual situation in this case to be somewhat unusual. The Government, in its communication dated 13 March 1953, had plainly admitted that one of the grounds on which the original detention order had been passed was unsubstantial or nonexistent and therefore could not constitute a valid ground of detention. The Court was therefore called upon to decide whether, in such circumstances, the original order made under section 3(1)(a) of the Act could continue to stand. The Court concluded that the answer could be only negative.

The Court noted that the detaining authority had relied on two grounds to detain the petitioner. It held that it could not determine whether those grounds were good or bad, nor could it assess the manner or extent to which each ground had operated on the mind of the authority and contributed to the satisfaction on which the order was based. To hold that the remaining ground alone was sufficient to support the order would, in the Court’s view, amount to substituting an objective judicial test for the subjective decision of the executive authority, a step contrary to the legislative policy underlying the statute.

In its reasoning, the Court explained that when one of several grounds on which a detention order is based is irrelevant, wholly illusory, or unsubstantial, the entire order is vitiated. The Court referred to the principle recognised by the Federal Court in Keshav Talpade v. The King-Emperor, which it found to be sound and applicable to the present facts. The Court also cited State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya, [1951] S.C.R. 167, for the proposition that the sufficiency of the grounds cannot be challenged except on a ground of mala-fides.

In this case the Court observed that the order which the Government claimed to issue under section eleven of the Preventive Detention Act did not comply with the requirements of that provision. Section eleven specifies the exact steps that the Government must follow after the Advisory Board has furnished its report. When the Board is of the view that there exists a sufficient reason to detain a particular individual, the statute authorises the Government to confirm the detention order and to continue the detention for such period as it deems appropriate. Conversely, if the Board concludes that no sufficient reason exists for the detention, the statute obliges the Government to revoke the detention order without delay. The Court found that, contrary to this statutory scheme, the Government in the present matter both confirmed the detention order and at the same time revoked it by invoking one of the sub-clauses of section three paragraph one sub-clause (a) of the Act. This dual action is not contemplated by section eleven, which permits only a single definitive decision either to confirm or to cancel the order. The Court further noted that nothing in the law prevents the Government from issuing a fresh detention order if it so wishes, provided it follows the proper procedure. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the order dated five January 1953, made under section three paragraph one sub-clause (a) of the Preventive Detention Act, was invalid and that the petitioner’s detention was unlawful. The application was therefore allowed, the petitioner was directed to be released, and the petition was marked as allowed. The petitioner was represented by an agent, and the respondent was represented by an agent.