Satish Chandra Anand vs The Union Of India

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Petition No. 201 of 1952

Decision Date: 13 March 1953

Coram: Vivian Bose, M. Patanjali Sastri, B.K. Mukherjea, Ghulam Hasan, Natwarlal H. Bhagwati

In this case the petitioner Satish Chandra Anand filed a petition under article 32 of the Constitution of India on 13 March 1953 seeking relief against the Union of India. The judgment was delivered by a bench composed of Justice Vivian Bose, Justice M. Patanjali Sastri, Justice B.K. Mukherjea, Justice Ghulam Hasan and Justice Natwarlal H. Bhagwati. The petitioner had been employed by the Government of India on a five-year contract in the Resettlement and Employment Directorate of the Ministry of Labour. When that contract was due to expire the Government offered him a new appointment on a temporary basis for the period of the Resettlement and Employment Organisation, subject to the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949, rule 5, which allowed either party to terminate the contract by giving one month’s notice. The petitioner accepted the offer and continued in service under those temporary terms, but was later given one month’s notice of termination and his services were ended. The petitioner claimed that his fundamental rights under articles 311, 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution had been infringed and therefore invoked article 32(1) for relief. The Court examined each provision. Regarding article 311 the Court held that it applied only to cases of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, none of which were present; the termination was merely the ordinary conclusion of a contractual relationship under the express terms of rule 5, and therefore article 311 was not attracted. Concerning article 14 the Court observed that the petitioner had not been singled out for differential treatment, that he was not discriminated against and that he was not denied any legal protection available to persons similarly situated, so article 14 did not apply. With respect to article 16(1) the Court noted that the petitioner was not denied equal opportunity in matters of appointment or employment because the temporary appointment was offered on the same conditions to all persons to whom the Government extended such an offer, and consequently article 16(1) was also inapplicable. The Court further stated that the State may enter into contracts of temporary employment and impose special terms in each case provided those terms do not conflict with the Constitution, and that persons who voluntarily accept those terms and enter into the contract are bound by them, as is the State. Accordingly the petition was dismissed. The case is reported as 1953 AIR 250, 1953 SCR 655 and has been cited in later decisions including R 1954 SC 369 (pages 15-16), RF 1957 SC 886 (page 5), E&F 1958 SC 36 (pages 27-28, 33, 39-40), R 1958 SC 232 (page 18), F 1958 SC 905 (page 6), RF 1961 SC 177 (page 11), R 1963 SC 602 (page 4), RF 1964 SC 600 (pages 34, 42, 45, 127, 134, 148), R 1964 SC 1585 (page 11), RF 1971 SC 1516 (page 7), RF 1973 SC 2641 (page 21), RF 1975 SC 2045 (page 6), RF 1976 SC 1766 (page 14), RF 1976 SC 2547 (pages 8-9), RF 1982 SC 1107 (page 30), F 1985 SC 551 (page 29). The relevant constitutional provisions were articles 14, 16 and 311 of the Constitution of India, 1950, and the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949, rule 5.

The Court explained that a person who voluntarily accepts the conditions laid down in a contract and enters into that contract becomes legally bound by those conditions, and the State, being a party to the same contract, is likewise bound to observe its terms. Accordingly, both the employee and the State must comply with the contractual provisions that were mutually agreed upon.

The petition was originally filed under article thirty-two of the Constitution, seeking enforcement of the petitioner’s alleged violations of fundamental rights under articles fourteen and sixteen (1). The petition was numbered two hundred and one of the year nineteen fifty-two. Counsel for the petitioner was engaged, while the Attorney-General for India, assisted by another counsel, represented the respondent. The judgment was delivered on the thirteenth day of March, nineteen fifty-three, by Justice Bose. The petitioner personally argued his case at length before the Court. Shortly before the draft judgment was prepared, the petitioner submitted an application requesting a rehearing and permission to file additional documents. That application was denied. Undeterred, the petitioner returned on a later date and sought leave to be represented by an agent and to appear through counsel, claiming that his own personal advocacy had not allowed him to achieve justice. It is noted that the petitioner had originally hired an agent but dismissed that agent prior to the hearing when he chose to appear in person. The Court granted the request for representation, and the counsel re-argued the matter, although no further procedural steps were taken after that re-argument.

The factual background is as follows. In October nineteen forty-five, the petitioner was appointed by the Government of India on a five-year contractual basis to work for the Directorate General of Resettlement and Employment, which was part of the Ministry of Labour. His appointment resulted from selection by the Federal Public Service Commission. After a brief period of practical training, he was posted in January nineteen forty-six to Jabalpur, where he assumed the role of Manager of the Sub-Regional Employment Exchange. He was subsequently confirmed in that posts. The original contract of service was scheduled to expire in nineteen fifty. Prior to the expiry, the Government of India extended a new offer, conveyed in a letter dated thirtieth June, nineteen fifty, proposing to retain the petitioner beyond the termination of his contract under the conditions specified in that letter. The letter stated, among other matters, that on termination of his contract he would be permitted to remain in his post temporarily for the duration of the Resettlement and Employment Organisation and that his service would thereafter be governed by the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, nineteen forty-nine, unless he became a permanent Government servant. The petitioner was asked to inform the Ministry of Labour whether he accepted these terms, and he acknowledged that he accepted the offer and continued in service. Although it was argued that he might be considered a permanent servant, the Court observed that he remained a contract employee and that the nature of the work—Resettlement and Employment—was itself temporary, thereby bringing the Temporary Service Rules into operation. Rule 5(a) of those rules, which is relevant to the case, provides that a temporary Government servant who is not in quasi-permanent service may have his service terminated at any time by a written notice given either by the servant to the appointing authority or by the appointing authority to the servant. The notice period shall be one month unless a different period is mutually agreed. The petitioner did not fall within the definition of quasi-permanent service, and there was no agreement altering the one-month notice requirement. Consequently, under the contractual term embodied in rule 5, his services could be terminated by one month’s written notice. Such notice was served on the twenty-fifth of November, nineteen fifty, informing the petitioner that his service would cease one month later, on the first day of December, nineteen fifty.

The Court explained that Rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949, provides that a temporary Government servant who is not in quasi-permanent service may be terminated at any time by a written notice. The notice may be issued either by the servant to the appointing authority or by the appointing authority to the servant. Rule 5(b) further stipulates that the period of such notice shall be one month, unless the Government and the servant have mutually agreed to a different period. The term “quasi-permanent service” is defined within the Rules, and it was held that the petitioner did not fall within that classification. It was an undisputed fact that no agreement existed between the petitioner and the Government concerning a notice period other than the one-month term prescribed by the Rule. Consequently, the one-month notice provision, which formed part of the petitioner’s contract of further service, made his employment liable to termination upon giving one month’s written notice. Accordingly, a notice of termination was served on 25 November 1950, informing the petitioner that his services would conclude at the expiry of one month from 1 December 1950.

The Court noted that extensive issues had been raised during the arguments. It added that, had the matter not been re-argued, the Court would, for the petitioner’s benefit, have addressed the contentions in greater detail than was now required, given the appearance of counsel. The petition was filed under Article 32(1) of the Constitution, which necessitates a showing that a fundamental right has been infringed. The petitioner contended that his rights under Articles 14 and 16(1) were violated, and he further claimed that the protections afforded by Article 31(1) had been denied because he was dismissed or removed from service without the safeguards that article provides. The Court held, however, that Article 31(1) was inapplicable because the petitioner’s situation did not constitute a dismissal, a removal, or a reduction in rank; rather, it represented the ordinary termination of a contract pursuant to a contractual notice clause. The Court observed that services in India have historically received statutory guarantees against arbitrary dismissal or reduction in rank. Under Section 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935, such safeguards were limited to dismissal and reduction in rank. The present Constitution added a third safeguard—removal from service. To distinguish “dismissal” from “removal,” reference must be made to the rules governing civil services, as mandated by Article 313 of the Constitution. Part XII of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, relating to Conduct and Discipline, contains Rule 49, which enumerates seven penalties for indiscipline or misconduct, namely censure, suspension, reduction in rank, removal from service, and dismissal from service, among others. The Court concluded that, given the contractual nature of the termination, none of the constitutional safeguards applicable to dismissal or removal were triggered, and therefore no violation of the petitioner’s fundamental rights occurred.

In the 1935 legislation only two of the seven possible penalties were regarded as sufficiently serious to warrant statutory safeguards, and those two were reduction in rank and dismissal from service. The Constitution subsequently introduced a third category to the list of protected penalties. Rule 49, which explains the distinction between the categories, first identifies “removal from service” as a sanction that does not disqualify a person from future employment, and then it identifies “dismissal from service” as a sanction that ordinarily does disqualify a person from future employment. An explanatory note to the rule further states that the discharge of a person engaged under a contract, when carried out in accordance with the terms of that contract, does not amount to either removal or dismissal within the meaning of the rule. The same terminology is employed in article 311 of the Constitution, and consequently that article does not apply to the present situation; therefore no question of discrimination arises because the law whose protection the petitioner seeks does not extend to him. The petitioner was not compelled to enter into the contract; he was free, like any other individual, to either accept or reject the offer that was made to him. After he accepted, he retained all of the rights and remedies that are available to other persons in a similar position, including the right to enforce any contractual rights that may have been denied to him and to seek appropriate relief in the ordinary courts, on exactly the same basis as any similarly situated person. Accordingly, the petitioner was not subjected to discrimination and was not denied the protection of any law that others in comparable circumstances could claim. The petition for a writ is therefore misplaced, and article 16(1), which guarantees equality of opportunity in public employment, is also inapplicable. The dispute is purely contractual. When the petitioner’s first five-year contract expired, he was not a permanent government servant, and the government was under no obligation to re-engage him or to continue his service. Nevertheless, the government was free to offer him a continuation of employment on a temporary, contractual basis. Although his employment continued, it was, both in fact and in law, under a new and separate contract that was distinct from the earlier one, even though many of the terms remained unchanged. Article 16(1) concerns equal opportunity in matters of appointment or employment under the State, and the petitioner did not lose any such opportunity. He was treated in the same manner as any other individual to whom a temporary employment offer on similar terms was made. His grievance, when examined, does not stem from personal discrimination but from the fact that he was offered temporary employment on special conditions rather than permanent employment. The State, of course, retains the power to enter into temporary employment contracts and to impose special terms in each case, provided those terms are not inconsistent with the Constitution.

The Court observed that a contractual arrangement which is not inconsistent with the Constitution binds both the individuals who voluntarily accept its terms and the State that entered into it. The Court further noted that where employment is of permanent character, certain statutory guarantees attach to the employee. In contrast, where such statutory limitations do not apply, the Government, subject to the qualification earlier mentioned, was equally free to conclude special contracts of service with temporary workers engaged in work of a temporary nature, just as any private employer could do. The Court recognized that several issues concerning the merits of the petition had been mentioned before, but it deliberately refrained from expressing any view on whether the petitioner might possess other rights that could be enforced by other legal means. The proceeding before the Court concerned a petition under article 32 seeking enforcement of a fundamental right, and the sole question for determination was whether any fundamental right had been violated. After examining the submission, the Court concluded that no such infringement occurred. While initially, when the matter was first argued, the Court had decided that no order regarding costs would be made, it later observed that the petitioner had persistently sought to reopen the case and had again called upon the learned Attorney-General. In view of this continued insistence, the Court found it necessary to dismiss the petition and to award costs against the petitioner. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed with costs. The petitioner was represented by an agent named Bajinder Narain, and the respondent was represented by an agent named G. H. Rajadhyaksha.