Saraswathi Ammal And Another vs Rajagopal Ammal
Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.
Court: Supreme Court of India
Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 200 of 1952
Decision Date: 20 October 1953
Coram: B. Jagannadhadas, Mehr Chand Mahajan, B.K. Mukherjea
The case was titled Saraswathi Ammal and Another versus Rajagopal Ammal and was decided on the twentieth day of October in the year 1953 by the Supreme Court of India. The judgment was authored by Justice B. Jagannadhadas, who was joined on the bench by Justices Mehr Chand Mahajan and B. K. Mukherjea. The petitioners were identified as Saraswathi Ammal and another individual, while the respondent was named Rajagopal Ammal. The official citation for the decision is reported in the 1953 volume of the All India Reporter at page 491 and also in the 1954 volume of the Supreme Court Reports at page 277. Subsequent citations include references in the 1970 Supreme Court Reports and the 1978 Supreme Court Law Reports, indicating the continuing relevance of the decision.
The matter concerned the application of Hindu law to the dedication of property for religious purposes, specifically the dedication of immovable assets for worship at a tomb, also known as samadhi. The Court observed that a perpetual endowment of property for the purpose of samadhi-kainkaryam, meaning worship conducted at the tomb of a particular person, is not recognised as valid under Hindu law. The Court further explained that when a purpose is claimed to be a valid object for perpetual dedication on the ground of religious merit but lacks a demonstrable public benefit, the claim must be supported by a scriptural basis that is applicable to Hindus. The Court warned that the categories of religious purposes that are based merely on the belief in the acquisition of religious merit cannot be expanded indiscriminately, because such expansion would be inconsistent with public policy and the requirements of modern society.
In reaching its conclusion, the Court referred to earlier authorities that supported its view, including the decisions of Kunhamutty v. T. Ahmad Musaliar and Others, A. Draviasundaram Pillai v. N. Subrahmanya Pillai, and Veluswami Goundan v. Dandapani. The Court distinguished other cases, such as M. K. A. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Vada Levvai Marakayar and Others and the Board of Commissioners for Religious Endowments v. Pidugu Narasimham and Others, indicating that those precedents did not apply to the present facts. Additional cases mentioned for their relevance included Fatma Bibi v. Advocate-General of Bombay and Another, Dwarakanath Bysack and Another v. Burroda Persaud Bysack, Rupa Jagashet v. Kishnaji, and Parthasarthy v. Tiruvengada Pillai and Others.
This civil appeal, numbered 200 of 1952, was brought in the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. It arose from an appeal against a judgment and decree dated the fifteenth day of July 1949 rendered by the High Court of Judicature at Madras, the bench of which comprised Chief Justice Rajamannar and Justice Ayyar. The appeal also concerned an earlier decree of the Subordinate Judge of Tinnevelly in Original Suit number 35 of 1944, which had been appealed as Civil Appeal Nos. 625 of 1945. Counsel for the appellants consisted of Mr. R. Ganapathy Iyer and Mr. K. Vaitheeswran, while the respondent was represented by Mr. Ramchandra Iyer. The judgment of the Supreme Court was delivered by Justice Jagannadhadas.
The factual background of the appeal involved a suit for partition of the estate of the late Kanakasabapathi Pillai. The plaintiff and the first defendant were identified as the two daughters of Kanakasabapathi Pillai. The second defendant was the husband of the first defendant. The deceased, Kanakasabapathi Pillai, was described as a self-made businessman who had established a successful motor bus service and had acquired substantial movable and immovable property. He died on the twenty-fourth day of August 1942 without leaving any male heir, leaving behind his widow, Gomathi Ammal, and his two daughters, namely the plaintiff and the first defendant. Following his death, the widow continued to operate the motor bus service and managed the remaining properties with assistance from the second defendant, who acted as her manager. The widow subsequently passed away on the seventh day of March 1940, after which the first defendant and her husband continued to reside with the widow’s mother. Upon the mother’s death, the first defendant and her husband took possession of all the properties, including the motor service, prompting the plaintiff to institute the present suit, initially framed as a proceeding for administration and later amended to seek partition and separate possession of her share in the properties.
The defendant and her husband had lived continuously with the plaintiff’s mother. Upon the mother’s death, the defendant and her husband obtained possession of all the property, including the motor-bus service. The plaintiff therefore instituted the present suit, initially framing it as a suit for administration, but subsequently amending the pleadings to seek partition and separate possession of her one-half share in the properties. Both the Subordinate Judge and the High Court decreed a partition of the estate together with ancillary reliefs. Although there were minor variations between the decree of the High Court and that of the Subordinate Judge, those differences were not material and required no further comment. The defendants stood as the appellants before this Court.
Shortly before her death, the widow, Gomathi Ammal, executed two documents on the same day, namely 4 November 1940. The first document was a sale deed by which she conveyed the entire bus service, as a going concern, to the second defendant for a consideration of Rs 80,000 (Exhibit D-6). The second document was a settlement deed by which she dedicated certain immovable properties, valued at approximately Rs 27,000, for the performance of services that she described as being of a religious and charitable character (Exhibit D-8). The principal dispute between the parties centred on the validity of these two deeds, in addition to a collateral question as to whether some of the properties described in the suit formed part of the estate of the late Kanakasabapathi and were therefore subject to partition.
Regarding the sale deed (Exhibit D-6), both courts below concurred that the deed had been executed for grossly inadequate consideration and had been procured through undue influence and fraud on the part of the second defendant. Consequently, the sale deed was set aside by each court. Concerning the characterization of individual assets, the Subordinate Judge held that item 25 of Schedule I, item 6 of Schedule III-C and item 5 of Schedule IV did not belong to the estate of Kanakasabapathi, whereas all remaining items did belong to that estate. The High Court affirmed this finding, and no further appeal has been filed on those determinations.
The only questions that remain for this Court concern the settlement deed (Exhibit D-8) and the properties enumerated in Schedules I and II that are attached to that deed. Those properties constitute Schedule XI of the plaint. For a clear appreciation of the issues raised on appeal, the Court finds it appropriate to set out the settlement deed (Exhibit D-8) as follows:
“The properties described in schedule I herein are the properties which belong to the estate of my husband the late T. G. Kanakasabapathi Pillai Avargal aforesaid. They were purchased by him in his name and after his death, they belong to me and are in my possession and enjoyment. All the properties described in schedule II herein are my private properties which were purchased in my name from out of my own funds and which are in my possession and enjoyment. My husband aforesaid who had been sick for about two months prior to 24th August,”
In the settlement deed, Gomathi Ammal recorded that her husband, T. G. Kanakasabapathi Pillai Avargal, fell seriously ill in 1942 and died on 24 August 1942. While he was ill, he told her that, should he die, his body ought to be interred in the property described as the first item of Schedule I. He further directed that the vacant lands listed as items 2 to 6 of Schedule I should be attached to that first-item property and become an integral part of it so that the tomb could be accessed freely. He instructed that the income generated by the properties enumerated as items 7 to 17 of Schedule I should be applied to the expenses of the services (kainkariyam) required for the maintenance of his samadhi (tomb). He stipulated that the properties in the first schedule should be managed, enjoyed, and that the services to the samadhi should be performed by her during her lifetime and, after her death, by persons she might appoint at her discretion. He further ordered that those properties should be burdened solely with the mentioned services, that no other person should acquire any right or interest therein, and that none of the properties should be alienated in any way. He directed that any necessary improvements should be undertaken on the properties and that a written settlement should be prepared setting out these particulars.
Gomathi Ammal stated that, within a few days after preparing the written settlement, her husband died and was entombed in the property identified as the first item of Schedule I, in accordance with his wishes. She appointed a person to conduct the daily pooja for the samadhi as well as special Gurupooja and annadhanam (charitable feeding) during the month of Avani (August–September) of the first year, on the day of Tiruvona Nakshatram. She reported that the expenses incurred for these rituals during that year amounted to Rs 200 for daily pooja and the salary of the appointed person, and Rs 1 000 for the Gurupooja and annadhanam. She noted that the properties listed as items 7 to 16 of Schedule I yielded only Rs 400 per annum, which was insufficient to meet the cost of the required services. Consequently, she expressed her intention to ensure that the services would continue regularly and decently by contributing any amount needed beyond the limited income, and that the performance of these services would be hereditary, permanent, and perpetual, with appropriate arrangements made to that effect.
She further explained that, in order to fulfill her duties toward her husband and recognizing the need to draw upon the income from her own private properties described in Schedule 2 for the samadhi services, she executed the settlement deed, also encompassing those private properties. Accordingly, she charged all the properties mentioned in Schedules I and 2 solely with the purpose of supporting her husband’s samadhi services. She stated that she had decided that out of
The settlement deed provides that the income earned from the properties identified as “the aforesaid properties,” together with any Revenue Union and other theervas payable in respect of those properties, shall first be applied to cover expenses incurred for repairs and improvements. After these deductions, the remaining balance shall be used to meet the costs of the daily pooja performed at the samadhi, the salary of the individual who conducts that daily pooja, and the expenses associated with Gurupooja and annadhanam that are performed each year on the day of Thiruvona Nakshathram in the month of Avani. The deed further states that any surplus left after meeting these specific religious expenses shall be applied to matters relating to education. During the settlor’s lifetime, the properties listed in Schedules I and II shall be enjoyed, and all of the aforementioned activities shall be carried out with the income generated from those properties. After the settlor’s death, the responsibility for performing these acts shall pass to K. Ramaswami Doss Avargal, the settlor’s junior son-in-law who is married to the settlor’s younger daughter, the son of Krishna Konar Avargal, a Yadhava and Vaishnavite who also manages the settlor’s motor service. The settlor expressed a belief that K. Ramaswami Doss Avargal is the only fit and proper person to execute these duties faithfully, regularly and efficiently after her lifetime, and that thereafter his male descendants, in hereditary succession as hukdars, shall continue the performance of the same duties.
The deed further states that the vacant land located in Koilpatti, which is described in Schedules I and II and is a place that is gaining importance from day to day, may be sold only when a suitably high and profitable price can be obtained. The proceeds from any such sale may be used to acquire other substantial properties that are capable of generating income. Except in the circumstances of such a sale, no one is permitted to make any other alienation of the properties, and any alienation made in contravention of this provision shall be deemed invalid. Likewise, no person has the right to cancel the settlement or to make any alteration to it.
From the above provisions it appears that Kanakasabapathi was entombed after his death, and the core issue before the court is the validity of the dedication made for that purpose. The settlement deed is predicated on the premise that the dedication was carried out in accordance with the husband’s wishes, and that the items listed in Schedule II, specifically items 18 to 24 attached to the plaint, constitute the widow’s own property rather than part of Kanakasabapathi’s estate. The lower courts rejected both of these premises, holding that the assertions were not correct. No question was raised before the lower courts or before this court that the settlement, even if otherwise valid, exceeded the authority of the limited owner, Gomathi Ammal. Consequently, the lower courts concluded that the dedication was invalid – a conclusion reached partially by the Subordinate Judge and wholly by the High Court.
In reaching its decision, the High Court had relied on the precedent set in Kunhamutty v. Thondikkodan Ahmad Musaliar and two others (1) and on subsequent cases that followed that line of authority. Counsel representing the defendants-appellants challenged the appropriateness of applying those decisions to the present matter. They further argued that the dedication under dispute was primarily intended for religious and charitable purposes, specifically for Gurupooja, annadhanam and for educational activities, and thus should fall outside the ambit of the cited cases. The Court found it appropriate to address this latter argument first. The settlement deed, as described in the record, lists items I through VI as vacant parcels of land. Item I contains the samadhi, while items II through VI, together with item I, have been earmarked to ensure free access to and the benefit of the samadhi. Items VII through XXV have been dedicated on the condition that the revenue generated from them be applied to certain specified services. Those services are: (i) the expenses incurred in performing the daily pooja at the samadhi and the remuneration of the individual who conducts that daily pooja; (ii) the performance of Gurupooja and the provision of annadhanam on the annual Sradh day, which falls on Thiruvona Nakshathram in the month of Avani and commemorates the death of the late Kanakasabapathi; and (iii) any surplus remaining after meeting the first two categories of expenses to be directed towards matters related to education. The appellants' counsel drew attention to the fact that the recital in the deed indicates that the widow had expended only Rs. 200, as documented in I.L.R. 58 Mad. 204, on the daily pooja expenses, and that she had spent Rs. 1,000 on Gurupooja and annadhanam on the day of the annual Sradh. They argued that this modest outlay was intended to enable the Gurupooja and the annual Sradh to be carried out regularly, and that the income from items VII to XXV of Schedule XI to the plaint had been dedicated for that purpose. Accordingly, they submitted that the principal aim of the dedication was to fund the pooja and the feeding of participants on the Sradh day, with any residual amounts to be applied to educational purposes, and that under this view the dedication should be held valid. The Court, however, could not accept this submission. It observed that the evidence on record does not clarify what the term “Gurupooja” actually denotes in the deed, nor does it establish whether it refers to something beyond the simple worship of the deceased interred in the samadhi. While the term “Guru” ordinarily signifies a spiritual teacher, the Court noted that it could also be applied to an ancestor regarded as a Guru. Nevertheless, the settlement deed contains sufficient indication of the predominant intention behind the dedication. A careful examination of the document reveals that the Gurupooja and annadhanam on the Sradh day were intended as components of the worship performed at the tomb. This interpretation is unmistakable, at least with respect to items 1 through 10.
The properties that were the subject of the dedication generated only a modest income, and the Court observed that the purpose behind the dedication was the alleged wish of the deceased husband that both the properties and any income they produced should be applied to the expenses of kainkariyam, that is, the services connected with the samadhi. The dedication of the additional items numbered eleven to twenty-five was undertaken solely on the basis of the same impulse. The record shows that in the first year after the husband's death the wife herself arranged for the daily pooja together with Gurupooja and annadhanam on the sradh day, and she incurred expenses for these rites. It was specifically noted that she spent an amount of one thousand rupees on Gurupooja and annadhanam on the sradh day, and that this expenditure was clearly part of the samadhi kainkariyam which she had undertaken. The Court therefore concluded that she endowed further properties, beyond those originally given in accordance with her husband’s desire, in order to continue the samadhi kainkariyam on the same scale. Consequently, all of the various expenditures mentioned were intended to meet the costs of the samadhi kainkariyam and were not meant for any other religious or charitable purpose. The Court pointed to the wording of the deed, Exhibit D-8, which states: “I have, therefore charged all the properties mentioned in schedules 1 and 2 herein (Schedule 11 of the plaint) solely with my husband’s samadhi kainkariyam.” This clause confirms that the dedication was aimed specifically at the samadhi kainkariyam, that is, the worship at the tomb, rather than at the annual sradh or at educational activities. Even though a large portion of the income might be required for Gurupooja and annadhanam in connection with the annual sradh, the dominant intention behind the dedication was the samadhi kainkariyam. Accordingly, the validity of the dedication must be examined on that basis and not as a dedication meant for performing the annual sradh on a substantial scale or for annadhanam per se. The fact that any surplus might be used for educational purposes does not alter this assessment, because such surplus is contingent, indefinite, and dependent on the unrestricted discretion of the second defendant regarding the scale at which he chooses to conduct the samadhi kainkariyam. The Court therefore had to consider the validity of a dedication made under Exhibit D-8 that was primarily for worship associated with the tomb of a deceased person. The Court also noted that the Madras High Court had previously ruled against similar dedications in several cases, namely Kunhamutty v. Thondikkodan Ahmad Musaliar and two others (1), A. Draivaisundram Pillai v. N. Subramania Pillai (2) and Veluswami Goundan v. Dandapani (3). It was further brought to the Court’s attention that after the judgment in the present case, the Madras High Court, in a later reference, had reconsidered those decisions, although the full-bench reference ultimately did not materialise because the subject matter had been compromised.
The Court observed that the line of Madras decisions reported in the 1946 Indian Monthly Law Journal, volume 354, had been sent for reconsideration and the question had been referred to a Full Bench. However, the Court was informed that the Full Bench reference never materialised because the subject-matter of the reference had become compromised. The Court then explained that, according to the Madras judgments previously cited, the erection of a samadhi or a tomb over a deceased person’s remains and the making of provisions for gurupooja and other ceremonies connected with that tomb could not be regarded as charitable or religious purposes under Hindu law. This conclusion was not based on a view that the dedication was for a superstitious purpose and therefore void; indeed, the Court noted that the doctrine of superstitious uses had no application in India. The reasoning in the Madras cases was that a trust of this kind could obtain exemption from the rule against perpetuity only when it was established for a purpose that Hindu law recognised as both religious and charitable, and Hindu law did not recognise a dedication for a tomb as satisfying either requirement.
The learned counsel for the appellants vigorously argued that the perpetual dedication of property in the present case, as in the earlier Madras authorities, should be understood as being made on the belief that it produced spiritual benefit to the deceased. The counsel likened the dedication to the performance of a sradh, that is, worship of ancestors, and therefore maintained that the dedication was for a religious purpose and consequently valid. To support this position, the counsel relied upon a passage from the eleventh edition of Mayne’s Hindu Law, page 192, which states that what constitutes a purely religious purpose and what makes a religious purpose charitable must be decided entirely according to Hindu law and Hindu notions. The counsel further contended that even if such worship had not originally formed part of Hindu religion, the practice had now arisen and was accompanied by a belief in its spiritual efficacy, and that courts could not refuse recognition to such belief or inquire into its truth so long as it was not contrary to law or morality. The counsel also submitted that, unlike English law, the presence of an actual or assumed public benefit was not the decisive factor in determining a religious purpose under Hindu law.
The Court agreed that the characterization of a religious purpose under Hindu law must indeed be determined according to Hindu notions, a principle that had been recognised by the courts for a long time, for example in Fatma Bibi v. Advocate-General of Bombay and another. The Court also noted that it could not be disputed that, under Hindu law, religious or charitable purposes were not limited to those that produced a tangible public benefit. The acquisition of religious merit was an additional important criterion. The Court illustrated this point by referring to a series of cases that upheld the validity of perpetual endowments for the maintenance and worship of family idols or for the continued performance of annual sradh ceremonies for an individual and his ancestors.
The Court observed that under Hindu law, the dedication of property for the purpose of maintaining idols or for the continual performance of annual shraddhas for an individual and his ancestors has been recognized as a valid religious purpose. The Court referred to the decisions in Dwarakanath Bysack and another v. Burroda Persaud Bysack (I.L.R. 4 Cal 443) and Rupa Jagashet v. Krishnali (I.L.R. 9 Bow 169) as authorities supporting this view. The Court noted that the ancient Hindu scriptures clearly delineate the types of activities that generate religious merit and that warrant a perpetual endowment of property. In support of this, the learned author Prananath Saraswathi, in his treatise on the Hindu Law of Endowments, explained on page 18 that from very early times the sacred writings of the Hindus divided works productive of religious merit into two categories, namely ishta and purtta, a classification that continues to the present day. He further stated that the entire object of Hindu endowments can be found within the enumeration of ishta and purtta. The author listed the specific activities that fall under ishta works on pages 20 and 21, and those that constitute purtta works on page 27. These classifications have been adopted by later scholars of Hindu Religious Endowments and were accepted by Justice Subrahmania Ayyar in his judgment in Parthasarthy Pillai and another v. Thiruvengada Pillai and others (I.L.R. 30 Mad 340 at 342). While the Court acknowledged that these lists are not exhaustive, it emphasized that what contributes to religious merit in Hindu law is principally a matter of scriptural injunction.
The Court further explained that when a purpose is claimed to be valid for perpetual dedication on the ground of religious merit, even if it does not demonstrably benefit the public, it must be shown to have a basis in Hindu scriptures. In other words, the purpose must be supported by recognized Shastraic authority for Hindus. The Court recognized that over time additional religious practices and beliefs may have emerged and obtained acceptance from certain groups as purposes that confer religious merit. However, for such beliefs to be accepted by the courts as sufficient for a valid perpetual dedication of property without any element of actual or presumed public benefit, it must be demonstrated that they have achieved wide recognition and constitute the religious practice of a substantial and large class of persons. The Court noted that this specific question does not arise for direct determination in the present case. Nevertheless, the Court rejected the proposition that the belief of one or more individuals alone is enough to permit them to create a valid settlement that permanently ties up property.
In concluding, the Court warned that the categories of religious purposes based solely on the belief in acquiring religious merit cannot be expansively broadened in a manner that conflicts with public policy and the needs of modern society. The Court observed that the learned judges of the Madras High Court had referred to a Full Bench decision in which it was argued that the erection of tombs for deceased persons and the endowment of property for their upkeep and for the performance of worship at such tombs were common among certain Hindu communities, and that such practices were believed to confer spiritual benefit. The Court noted that the validity of such endowments had been recognized by the courts, but also pointed out that the case cited by the High Court judges, namely Muthu Kana Ana Ramanatham Chettiar v. Vada Levai Marakayar and Other (I.L.R. 34 Mad 12), concerned Muslims, and that the position regarding Hindus might be different.
The Court noted that the decision which the High Court had referred to was the case of Muthu Kana Ana Ramanatham Chettiar v. Vada Levai Marakayar and Others (1), a decision that concerned Muslims and therefore might reflect a position that is specific to the Muslim community. The Court was also directed to a statement found on page 223 of the second edition of P. R. Ganapathi Iyer’s work entitled Hindu and Mohamedan Endowments, which reads: “Gifts for the maintenance of tombs or samadhis of private persons have been regarded as valid under the Hindu law.” (1) I.L.B. 34 Mad. 12. The Court examined this statement and observed that it could not locate any authority on which the author relied for making that assertion. The only possible source that the Court could identify was a single passage in the reported case of the Most Reverend Joseph Colgan v. Administrator-General of Madras (1), which says: “Dedication of property in perpetuity for the performance of religious ceremonies, maintenance of tombs and other purposes not allowed by English law to be charitable, have always been held lawful amongst Hindus and Muhammadans.” Regarding the portion of that passage that relates to Hindu tombs, the Court found no support from its own knowledge or experience. While it is acknowledged that a few Hindu saints have been venerated and, on rare occasions, entombed, the Court is not aware of any established practice among Hindus of dedicating property for the purpose of maintaining such tombs. The Court observed that, if such instances were to arise, they might be treated differently from the situation of an ordinary private individual whose remains are entombed and who is worshipped. The Court also examined the decision reported as The Board of Commissioners for Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Pidugu Narasimliam and Others (2). That case involved a rather unusual set of facts in which images of sixty-six heroes, said to have died in a thirteenth-century war between two neighboring kingdoms, were placed in a regular temple and were worshipped by the public for several centuries, with land grants made during the Mughal period to support such worship. The learned judges in that case inclined to hold that the worship was religious; however, the Court stressed that the case concerned a grant made by a sovereign authority and did not involve an endowment for the worship of a tomb. In the three Madras decisions where it was held that a Hindu’s perpetual dedication of property for worship at a tomb was invalid, the Court noted that none of those decisions indicated the existence of a widely accepted practice of erecting tombs, worshipping at them, or making endowments on the belief that such worship would yield religious merit. Similarly, in the present proceedings, no question was raised that the community to which the parties belong recognized any such practice or belief. The defendants, in their written statement, made no assertion to that effect. Consequently, the Court found no basis to sustain a claim that a recognized Hindu custom supported perpetual dedication of property for tomb worship.
On the other hand, the plaintiff, in paragraph twelve of his plaint, asserted that the “Institution of samadhi and ceremonies connected with it are not usual in the community to which the parties belong.” The Court observed that it could reasonably be assumed that such a practice was unlikely to develop among Hindus, because cremation rather than burrial of the dead was the customary practice in that community, except perhaps in the case of sannyasis and in certain dissident groups that might follow different rites.
The Court further stated that it saw no basis for questioning the correctness of the earlier Madras decisions, which had held that a perpetual dedication of property for the purpose of worship at a tomb was not a valid arrangement among Hindus. In light of this reasoning, the Court affirmed the judgment of the High Court, dismissed the appeal, and ordered that the appeal be dismissed without the award of costs. The appeal was consequently dismissed.
The agent representing the appellant was identified as S. Subramanian, while the agent for the respondent was recorded as M. S. K. Aiyangar.