Rizwan-Ul-Hasan And Another vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 79 of 1952

Decision Date: 5 February 1953

Coram: Mehr Chand Mahajan

Rizwan-Ul-Hasan and another filed a petition against the State of Uttar Pradesh, which was decided by the Supreme Court of India on 5 February 1953. The judgment was authored by Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan, who also constituted the bench with Justice Das and Justice Sudhi Ranjan. The case is reported in 1953 AIR 185 and 1953 SCR 581, and it appears in subsequent citations such as 1962 SC 1172 (28) R and 1970 SC 720 (6) R. The matter concerned the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926 (Act XII of 1926), specifically section 3, dealing with proceedings before a Sub-Divisional Magistrate. The central question was whether an application made by respondents to a District Magistrate, which alleged lack of bona fides on the part of a trying magistrate and sought transmission of that application to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate for a report, amounted to contempt of court and whether any prejudice to the administration of justice was shown.

During the pendency of proceedings brought under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, two accused persons identified as A and B were appearing before a Sub-Divisional Magistrate. A and B submitted an application to the District Magistrate, alleging that the proceedings against them were not bona-fide and containing statements that amounted to a counter-charge. The then-officiating District Magistrate, who was the second appellant, forwarded this application to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate and, after receiving a report indicating that A and B should be asked to file a formal complaint before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, advised the accused to comply. Subsequently, a brother of A filed a similar petition with the District Magistrate, again alleging impropriety on the part of the trying magistrate. The first appellant, who was the District Magistrate, also transmitted this petition to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate for a report and, on receiving the report, ordered that there was no reason to withdraw the file from the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. The Allahabad High Court held that because the applications contained allegations that could interfere with the trial under section 145, the transmission of those applications by the District Magistrates was done without adequate circumspection, and that, despite their lack of intent to influence the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, the appellants were guilty of contempt of court. The Supreme Court, however, held that the act of transmitting the applications to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate and seeking a report did not constitute interference with the course of justice but was merely the performance of the District Magistrates’ supervisory duties. Moreover, the Court found no evidence that any real prejudice or substantial interference with the due course of justice had resulted from the transmissions, and therefore concluded that no contempt of court had arisen. The Court also referred to the decision in Anantalal Singha v. Alfred Henry Watson (1931 I.L.R. 58 Cal. 884) in support of its reasoning.

The case was reported in I.L.R. 58 Cal. 884 and concerned Criminal Appeal No. 79 of 1952. The appeal was taken by special leave from the judgment and order dated 16 April 1951 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 17 of 1950. Counsel for the appellants comprised K. S. Krishnaswami Iyengar assisted by H. B. Asthana, while counsel for the respondent was N. C. Sen. The judgment was delivered on 5 February 1953 by Justice Mahajan. The two appellants were officers of the Uttar Pradesh Civil Service. In March 1950, the first appellant, Rizwan-ul-Hasan, was appointed District Magistrate of Jalaun. The second appellant, Mohammad Munawar, was posted as a Magistrate in the same district and had been officiating as District Magistrate for a period in early March 1960. On 2 March 1950, a person named Phundi Singh instituted proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Jalaun, alleging that Kedarnath and Matadin intended to cut his standing crop by force and that an imminent danger of breach of peace existed. The magistrate issued notices to the accused parties and ordered attachment of the standing crop. Two days later, on 4 March 1950, Shriram, the brother of Kedarnath, filed a counter-application alleging that Thakur Pratap Singh was the true instigator behind Phundi Singh’s proceedings. On the same date, Kedarnath and Matadin filed an application similar to Shriram’s before the District Magistrate, accompanied by a recommendatory letter addressed to the District Magistrate from Lalla Ram Dwivedi, Secretary of the District Congress Committee.

The second appellant, while officiating as District Magistrate, received the application of Kedarnath and Matadin and transmitted it to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Jalaun, where Phundi Singh’s case was pending, requesting a report. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate returned the document, commenting that a proper complaint should be presented in his court in the ordinary manner based on the allegations contained in the application. Consequently, the second appellant returned the application to Kedarnath and Matadin and advised them to approach the Sub-Divisional Magistrate in a formal and proper way. Subsequently, Phundi Singh filed an application before the Allahabad High Court under section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, alleging contempt by the second appellant. The High Court held the second appellant guilty of contempt of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. In its reasoning, the Court observed that the second appellant had forwarded the applications of the opposite parties together with an introductory letter to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Jalaun. The Court expressed that, although there was no intention on the part of the second appellant to influence the Sub-Divisional Magistrate concerning the section 145 proceeding, intention was not material to the question of contempt; rather, the act of forwarding the applications without due circumspection was sufficient to constitute contempt.

The Court observed that, for the purpose of determining whether contempt had been committed, the accused’s intention was immaterial. It was clear that the accused acted without the necessary caution and deliberation. The application he forwarded to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate contained statements that interfered with the substantive issues of the proceeding under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In the affidavit filed by the accused, he admitted that he had sent the application merely to obtain protection for the second and third opposite parties and their crop, based on an allegation that the other party intended to take action the following night. The Court held that, under those circumstances, the accused could either have issued a police order himself or, at the very least, had he conveyed only a concise summary of the complaint that required immediate protection of life and property. By transmitting the full allegations made by the second and third opposite parties to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Jalaun, whose court was already handling the case under section 145, the accused engaged in conduct that amounted to contempt of that court.

Regarding the first appellant, the factual record showed that on 22 March an application signed by Shriram and alleging misconduct by the trying Magistrate was received by post at the District Magistrate’s office. On 25 March 1950 the first appellant forwarded the same application to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate for a report, attaching a note that read, “S.D.C. Please look into these allegations and let me have a report.” The Sub-Divisional Magistrate submitted his report on 4 April 1950, after which the first appellant, satisfied that the allegations were unfounded, issued an order stating that there was no reason to withdraw the case from the file. In the contempt proceedings before the Allahabad High Court, arising from Phundi Singh’s application under section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, the first appellant and others were found guilty of contempt of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate’s Court. The Court reasoned that the transmission of Shriram’s application on 25 March to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate constituted contempt by the sixth opposite party. The mere need to act on the accusations contained in the application did not alter the conclusion. The application contained statements branding Phundi Singh as a habitual offender and describing the section 145 proceeding as fictitious and initiated at the behest of Pratap Singh. The Court held that the entire application should not have been transmitted; instead, only the pertinent extracts concerning the allegations against the magistrate should have been sent. It noted that the application could have been treated as a transfer application, although such a request was not made, and it was neither properly presented, affixed with an affidavit, nor stamped, being merely a request for protection of the applicant’s crop from hostile persons.

The Court noted that the petitioner's filing contained no specific request for relief; it was not properly presented, it lacked an accompanying affidavit, and it bore no court stamp. The petitioner merely sought some measure to protect his crop from individuals described as “bad characters.” After the High Court had held both appellants guilty of contempt of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Jalaun, it had taken no punitive action because it considered the contempt to have arisen from carelessness and a lack of vigilance rather than from any deliberate intention to flout the law. The High Court emphasized that officials who are responsible for transmitting communications to courts must exercise vigilance and care to ensure that nothing is forwarded which might, even remotely, influence the merits of a case. In the present judgment, the Court concluded that the contempt proceedings instituted against the two appellants were fundamentally misconceived and therefore had to be set aside. Both appellants occupied superior positions to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate at the time they forwarded the applications of Kedarnath and Matadin for a report, and they were obligated to supervise his duties. The Court found it difficult to perceive how the simple act of transmitting those applications to the magistrate and seeking his opinion could constitute interference with the course of justice or amount to contempt of his court. Their conduct could not be characterised as having any tendency to disturb judicial proceedings. The applications were sent to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate in the ordinary course of official practice, and the Court could not accept the High Court’s view that only extracts should have been forwarded. The full applications did not contain material likely to interfere with justice. When the second appellant was acting as District Magistrate, he received the same application together with a letter of recommendation from the Secretary of the Congress Committee. This document was a counter-complaint, and the appellant correctly forwarded it to the magistrate who was already dealing with the original application. He had no duty to censor the letter or to extract only portions for the magistrate’s consideration. The recommendatory letter was an annexure to the application and had to be transmitted along with it. The Court affirmed that the Secretary’s act of drafting a recommendatory letter on the facts of the case to influence the District Magistrate’s decision was rightly condemned by the High Court, describing such conduct as a calculated attempt to divert the course of justice and qualifying it as a serious contempt of court. The Secretary of the Congress Committee was appropriately found guilty of contempt and punished; he had not appeared before this Court, and consequently his matter was not further pursued. Nonetheless, the Court could not discern any manner in which the appellant’s act of sending the counter-charge application to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, who was already seized of the original complaint, amounted to contempt of court.

The Court noted that it was not concerned with the Secretary of the Congress Committee, but it could not find any manner in which the appellant’s act of sending an application—characterised earlier as a counter-charge to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate who was seised of the original complaint—constituted contempt of court. The Court explained that the law recognises three distinct categories of contempt: first, contempt that scandalises the court itself; second, contempt that involves abusing parties who are involved in proceedings before that court; and third, contempt that prejudices the public against persons before the cause is heard. The Court held that the appellant’s conduct did not fall within any of these three categories.

Regarding the first appellant, the Court referred to the authority conferred by section 528 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which permits him to withdraw a case pending before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate under section 145 of the same Code. On 22 March, Kedurnath and Matadin filed an application containing allegations against the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and the appellant was entitled to exercise the powers under section 528 if those allegations were substantiated. It is ordinary practice to forward such applications to the concerned magistrate for comment, and the appellant did precisely that. After receiving the magistrate’s observations and being satisfied that the allegations were unsupported, the appellant chose not to withdraw the case.

The Court could not discern how the District Magistrate’s action, performed in the normal and regular discharge of his duties, could be said to interfere with the administration of justice or to create any pre-judgment against the complainant in the proceedings governed by section 145. The Court observed that section 528 contains no provision preventing a magistrate from acting unless he is prompted by a petition of a party, and the Code imposes no restriction on any person presenting facts to the District Magistrate that might suggest it prudent to examine whether the magistrate should continue to preside over a specific case.

Consequently, the Court concluded that the High Court erred in holding that the two appellants acted without due circumspection and were guilty of contempt of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate’s court. The Court further opined that, on the facts, it was impossible to find any prejudice arising from the two applications sent by the appellants to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, nor was any protective action necessary for the tribunal hearing the case under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Court cited the observation of Rankin C.J. in Anantalal Singha v. Alfred Henry Watson (1) that jurisdiction to punish contempt is not to be invoked unless there is real prejudice amounting to a substantial interference with the due course of justice.

In this case the Court explained that a charge of contempt may be invoked only when there is genuine prejudice that can be characterised as a substantial interference with the proper administration of justice, and when the purpose of the Court’s intervention is a practical one. The Court further observed that, based on established authority, a Court will not exercise its contempt jurisdiction merely on the basis of a question of propriety without concrete evidence of such prejudice. Applying this principle, the Court concluded that the allegations against the two appellants did not satisfy the requirement of real prejudice and therefore could not sustain a contempt proceeding. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court that had been passed against the two appellants, and acquitted them of the offence alleged under section three of the Contempt of Courts Act. The appeal was thus dismissed in favour of the appellants. The representation for the appellant was made by counsel identified as S. Subramanian, while the respondent was represented by counsel identified as C. P. Lal, with reference to the cited authority (1) (1931) 58 Cal. 884 at 895.