Purnendu Nath Tagore vs Administrator-General Of West Bengal

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 20 May, 1953

Coram: Mahajan

The case titled Purnendu Nath Tagore versus Administrator-General of West Bengal was decided by the Supreme Court of India on 20 May 1953. The judgment was delivered by Justice Mahajan. The appeal challenged a decision of the Calcutta High Court dated 27 June 1950, which had affirmed an earlier judgment rendered by Justice S.R. Das Gupta on 8 July 1949 in Suit Number 3798 of 1948.

The central issue for determination was whether, when the will dated 14 March 1927 of the deceased Raja Prafulla Nath Tagore was properly construed, the Administrator-General of Bengal was entitled under that will to possession of a house known as “Tagore Villa” situated at Alambazar for a period of fifteen years. The High Court had answered this question in the affirmative, and that answer was the subject of the present appeal. The deceased Raja, a Hindu adherent of the Dayabhaga school of Hindu law, died on 2 July 1938 leaving a widow and five sons. The appellant, Kumar Purnendu Nath Tagore, was the eldest son. On 14 March 1927 the late Raja executed his last will and testament, which comprised eighty-three paragraphs. Clause 82 of the will reads in these terms: “I give my Alambazar Garden House ‘Tagore Villa’ together with all articles of furniture to my eldest son Sriman Purnendu Nath Tagore. On the expiry of the term of office of the Executors and Trustees, Sriman Purnendu Nath shall get the said Garden House. No other son of mine shall be competent to put forward any claim to the said Garden House or the articles of furniture.” The Raja possessed extensive movable and immovable properties both within and beyond the original jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. After his death his five sons obtained, on 24 August 1938 in testamentary Suit No. 12 of 1938, an order for the issuance of probate, which was subsequently granted to them. On 8 April 1948 the sons were removed from their offices as executors and trustees, and the Administrator-General of West Bengal was appointed the sole executor. On 22 November 1948 the Administrator-General instituted an originating summons seeking a determination of the question concerning possession of Tagore Villa and any incidental directions.

The appellant opposed the Administrator-General’s claim on the ground that, if the will were properly interpreted, he alone was entitled to exclusive possession of Tagore Villa at Alambazar and to the income therefrom from the date of the Raja’s death. This assertion was grounded in the language of Clause 82 of the will. The Court noted the well-settled legal principle that a donor or legatee may take only what is bestowed upon him on the conditions stipulated in the grant. By Clause

In the judgment, the Court observed that clause 82 of the will granted the appellant the Garden House at Alambazar only after the term of office of the executors and trustees had expired. Clause 10 of the same will directed that, following the testator’s death, the executors and trustees were to conduct the affairs of the estate in accordance with the rules fixed by him. For the purpose of paying the legacies, the testator prescribed the following procedure: the legacies mentioned in the will were to be paid in full within fifteen years of his death, and during those fifteen years the estate was to be managed under the supervision of the executors and trustees. The executors and trustees were instructed to discharge all legacies out of the modest savings generated from the income of the estate year after year, and they were expressly prohibited from selling any portion of the estate or any immovable property in order to meet those payments. Accordingly, the executors appointed under the will were required to take possession of and assume charge of the entire estate left by the testator, and they were mandated to satisfy the legacies from the savings derived from the income of the whole estate within the stipulated fifteen-year period. In effect, the whole estate was vested in the executors for fifteen years for the benefit of the legatees, and only after the termination of that period of administration was the appellant entitled to receive the Alambazar Garden House. Under the ordinary rule of law, therefore, the appellant’s right to the house arose only upon the expiry of the executors’ and trustees’ term of office. The appellant, however, contended that the Alambazar House had been gifted to him absolutely and that the condition postponing his enjoyment of the house for fifteen years was repugnant to the gift and thus void. He relied upon Section 138 of the Succession Act and on a number of English authorities, the first of which was Saunders v. Vautier, (1841) 4 Beav 115 (A). In that case, a testator had bequeathed all his East India stocks to his executors and trustees on trust, directing that the interest and dividends should be accumulated until the beneficiary X attained the age of twenty-five years, at which point the stock together with the accumulated interest and dividends was to be transferred to X absolutely. The residuary estate was bequeathed to others. The Court held that there was an immediate gift of the East India stock and, notwithstanding the direction in the will, X was entitled to it upon attaining the age of twenty-one. The principle articulated in that decision represented an exception to the general rule that a donee or legatee may take only what is given on the terms on which it is given.

A donee or a legatee could only receive what was given to him on the terms on which it was given. The Court observed that conditions requiring accumulation of income or postponement of possession were void because they could not be attached to an absolute gift of property. The principle articulated in Saunders v. Vautier, (1841) 4 Beav 115 (A), was again examined in the leading English case of Gosling v. Gosling, (1859) Johns 265 (B). In that decision, Wood, V. C. stated that the Court has always recognised the right of every person who reaches the age of twenty-one to enjoy the absolute use and enjoyment of property bequeathed by a will, irrespective of any testator’s direction that the enjoyment be delayed until a later age, unless, during the interval, the property is given for the benefit of another. He further explained that once the property belongs to the heir, any attempt by the testator to impose a fetter on the heir’s full enjoyment as soon as the heir attains twenty-one is ineffective. Accordingly, unless the will or a codicil contains a clear intention that the devisees are not to enjoy the property until they reach twenty-five, or that some other person is to enjoy it during that period, or unless the property is expressly taken away from the devisees until the time of attaining twenty-five so as to create an intestacy with respect to previous rents and profits, the Court did not hesitate to strike down any clause that prohibited the devisees from full enjoyment until the age of twenty-five. This rule has been repeatedly followed in England, has been applied in India, and is reflected in Sections 138 and 119 of the Succession Act. Section 119 deals with legatees who are not entitled to immediate possession; in such cases an interest in the estate vests in the legatee, although possession does not. Section 138 provides that if a fund is bequeathed absolutely to or for the benefit of a person, but the will contains a direction that it shall be applied or enjoyed in a particular manner, the legatee is entitled to receive the fund as if the will had contained no such direction. Consequently, when a will grants an absolute interest in certain property to a legatee, any provision that postpones the legatee’s right to possession beyond the legatee’s majority is contrary to Section 138 of the Succession Act and is therefore void.

In the present case the Court observed that a provision which postponed a legatee’s right to possession beyond the time when the legatee obtained a full legal interest was void. Such postponement conflicted with the legatee’s absolute interest together with the accompanying right to immediate possession, and consequently was invalid under the general doctrine of repugnancy that English courts have applied to wills. The Court cited the English decisions in Saunders v. Vautier (1841) 4 Beav 115 and Gosling v. Gosling (1859) Johns 265, authorities that have also been followed by Indian courts. However, the Court noted an exception to this rule: if, during the period of postponed possession that extended beyond the legatee’s minority, the income of the property was directed to a third person, the doctrine of repugnancy did not apply.

The Court then turned to the findings of S R Das Gupta J., whose appeal bench had concurred that the testator’s will intended the income from all of the testator’s properties to meet the payments specified in the will, including expenses for seva and periodic ceremonies of the Thakur. The will further required that, after all legatees had been paid in full and the other tasks mentioned in the will were completed, the executors and trustees should allocate the zemindaries listed in Clause 23 for the seva and ceremonies, convey the Alambazar property to the appellant, and distribute the residuary estate to the heirs. The learned judge also held that a proper construction of the word “estate”—the source of income for meeting the will’s obligations—could not be limited to “properties other than Alambazar Garden House.” The present Court agreed fully with that interpretation. It held that Clause 10 made it clear that the entire estate of the testator, including the Alambazar house, was to vest in the executors for fifteen years, during which they were to realize the estate’s income for the benefit of the legatees identified in the will; upon satisfaction of those legatees, the estate was to be distributed according to the various clauses. The Court rejected the appellant’s counsel’s argument that the term “estate” in Clause 10 excluded the property conveyed to the appellant by Clause 82, pointing out that other provisions, such as Clause 20, supported the broader construction. Clause 20 expressly authorized the executors and trustees to let out all houses and lands in Calcutta, the mofussil, or any future acquisitions, while reserving those required for family residence from being let out, thereby confirming the trustees’ power to manage all houses, including the Alambazar house.

In this case, the Court observed that Clause 20 authorised the executors and trustees to let out any house situated in Calcutta or in the mofussil, and also gave them authority to permit members of the testator’s family to reside in any of those houses when needed for residence. The Court further noted that Clause 41 directed that if the testator’s widow wished to stay at any place outside Calcutta, arrangements had to be made for her to reside either at the Alambazar Garden House, at a house in Kasi, or at any other house of her choosing. Both clauses together indicated that the management of all houses for a period of fifteen years was vested in the executors and trustees. Counsel for the appellant argued that Clauses 20 and 41 showed that the executors were not empowered to let out the Alambazar house because that house was the deceased’s residential house and was intended to be kept for the residence of his wife. The Court was unable to accept this contention. The proper construction, according to the Court, was that the executors were given full authority to manage the houses and to let them out, subject only to any arrangements that might be necessary for the residence of the widow or other family members. The Court then turned to Clause 81, which the appellant relied upon to claim that the Alambazar Garden House had been absolutely granted to him from the date of the testator’s death. Clause 81 reads: “Save and except the legatees that I have provided for in this my present will and save my garden house at Alambazar Tagore Villa together with articles of furniture I give to my sons all my remaining movable and immovable properties that will be left and also the movable and immovable properties whereto my right will accrue in future. Subject to the management and payment of those several trusts (Debutter, etc.), and the legacies that I have created or I have directed the creation thereof in this will my sons shall continue to hold and enjoy all the said movable and immovable properties.” The appellant contended that, apart from the Alambazar house, all other properties were given to the sons subject to the payment of legacies, and that no such condition was attached to the Alambazar house. The Court found that this argument did not reflect a correct interpretation of Clause 81. The Court explained that for a period of fifteen years all properties, including the Alambazar house, had to remain under the control of the executors, and that the executors' administration would cease on the expiry of the fifteen-year term. Consequently, if any legacies remained unpaid at that time, the heirs could take the other properties only subject to the claims of the legatees, whereas the Alambazar house would be released from the claims of the legatees after the fifteen-year period. Accordingly, Clause 81 did not support the appellant’s claim.

The Court observed that the provision under consideration did not in any way assist the appellant’s case. After a complete review of every clause contained in the will and after considering all of the arguments that had been placed before it, the Court expressed no hesitation in affirming the construction of the will that had been adopted by the High Court. The matter was held to be analogous to the decision reported in Profulla Chander v. Jogendra Nath, 1 Cal LJ 605 (C). In that earlier case the eighteenth clause of the testator’s will contained a direction expressed as follows: “…… that after 13 years from my death my executors and trustees shall make over to my sons the properties which I devised to them respectively and under this my will, but in the meantime my sons shall only be entitled to the monthly sum of Rs. 100 each as hereinbefore directed to be paid to them, and my executors and trustees shall have in their discretion absolute disposal over the balance of the income of the said properties so devised to my said sons for the purpose of carrying cut the directions hereinbefore contained for causing new buildings to be erected in the premise …… and for otherwise improving the other trust properties.” The counsel for the appellant in that case argued that the clause created an absolute gift of the premises to the sons and that the direction allowing the trustees to deal with the property for a period of thirteen years amounted to an unlawful restraint on the devise and should be set aside. The Court, however, held that it was impossible to conclude that the testator intended an absolute gift of the entire present interest to the sons. The Court further explained that the case was not governed by the rule in Lloyd v. Webb, 24 Calif 44 (D), where an absolute gift to the testator’s son was to take effect at a later date without any disposition of the immediate interest. Instead, the will directed that the intermediate interest was to remain with the trustees for the purpose of carrying out specific trusts, and that the gift to the sons during the thirteen-year period was limited, becoming an absolute gift of the whole estate only upon the expiry of that period.

For the reasons outlined above, the appeal was dismissed. The Court ordered that the costs of both parties be paid out of the estate.