Punjab National Bank Ltd vs Employees Of The Bank

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 181 of 1952

Decision Date: 10 April 1953

Coram: M. Patanjali Sastri, B.K. Mukherjea, Ghulam Hasan, Natwarlal H. Bhagwati

In this case the matter was styled Punjab National Bank Ltd. versus Employees of the Bank and the judgment was rendered on 10 April 1953 by the Supreme Court of India. The opinion was authored by Justice M. Patanjali Sastri, who was joined by Justices B. K. Mukherjea, Ghulam Hasan and Natwarlal H. Bhagwati. The petitioner was Punjab National Bank Ltd., referred to as the Bank, and the respondents were the employees of the Bank who were represented collectively by their union. The citation for this decision appears in the 1953 volume of the All India Reporter at page 296 and in the Supreme Court Reporter at page 686. The case concerned the application of section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, in the circumstances where a strike was undertaken while another industrial dispute was already pending before an Industrial Tribunal.

The headnote summarized the factual backdrop: while an Industrial Tribunal was hearing certain disputes between the Bank and its workmen, the respondents together with more than a thousand other workmen initiated a general strike in connection with a fresh dispute. The Bank dismissed the striking employees. On subsequent reference to a second Tribunal, that Tribunal held that the strike was illegal and consequently that the dismissal was lawful. The Labour Appellate Tribunal, on appeal, found that although the strike was illegal the Bank had condoned the strike, and therefore ruled the dismissals to be illegal, ordering reinstatement of the workmen. On further appeal, the Supreme Court observed that even if the strike were illegal and the Bank had not condoned it, the pending proceedings before another Tribunal under section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, prohibited the Bank from dismissing the workmen without obtaining written permission from that Tribunal, a permission that had not been secured. Accordingly, the Court held the dismissals to be illegal on that ground. The Court also noted that section 33 applies to both strikes and lock-outs, although it is located in Chapter VII, “Miscellaneous,” rather than in Chapter V, which is headed “Strikes and Lock-outs.”

The judgment was issued under the civil appellate jurisdiction in Civil Appeal No. 181 of 1952. Special leave to appeal had been granted by the Supreme Court on 16 October 1952 from the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India at Calcutta dated 22 December 1952, which had set aside an award dated 9 February 1952 made by the Chairman of the Industrial Tribunal, Delhi. For the appellant, the Bank, the Attorney-General for India, M. C. Setalvad, appeared together with counsel N. C. Chatterjee and B. L. Agarwal. For the respondents, counsel A. S. B. Chari and Hardyal Hardy represented the employees. The judgment of the Court was delivered by Justice Patanjali Sastri, Chief Justice, and it commenced by noting that the appeal was made by special leave from the Labour Appellate Tribunal’s September 22 1952 decision, which had set aside the February 9 1952 award of the Industrial Tribunal constituted to adjudicate certain disputes between the appellant, Punjab National Bank Ltd., and its workmen.

In this dispute the parties were the National Bank Ltd., Delhi, referred to as the Bank, and the workmen represented by their Union. Earlier disagreements between them had already been referred on 21 February 1950 to an Industrial Tribunal chaired by Sri K. S. Campbell-Puri. While those proceedings were pending, the Bank alleged that the workmen, together with more than a thousand other employees, began an unlawful general strike on 18 April 1951 over a new dispute. The Bank therefore served a notice to the strikers stating that if they did not return to work by 24 April 1951 they would be considered to have voluntarily left their service. When the strikers ignored that notice, the Bank issued a second notice on 27 April 1951 terminating their employment. The Government of India subsequently intervened, and after discussions with Bank officials the Bank consented to reinstate all the employees except for one hundred and fifty individuals against whom it had objections because of alleged subversive activities and other improper or unlawful conduct before and during the strike. On 2 July 1951 the Government constituted a Tribunal to determine the dismissals of those one hundred and fifty employees. The Tribunal called for the parties’ statements of case, heard the evidence, and on 9 February 1951 issued an award refusing reinstatement on the sole ground that the workmen had participated in an illegal strike in violation of section 23(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, thereby entitling the Bank to dismiss them. The Tribunal, however, awarded the dismissed workmen compensation in the form of salary and allowances calculated at half the normal rates from the date of dismissal until the award’s publication. The workmen then appealed to the Labour Appellate Tribunal at Calcutta. That Tribunal agreed that the strike was illegal but held that the Bank had effectively condoned it, and consequently the Bank could not rely on the illegal strike as justification for dismissal. The Appellate Tribunal further found the dismissals wrongful because no specific charges had been framed against any of the workmen for alleged violent or subversive acts, nor had any opportunity been given to them to explain. It therefore concluded that additional evidence was required on certain points identified in its order and reserved its decision on whether the workmen were entitled to reinstatement until such evidence could be obtained. Counsel for the Bank advanced a two-fold argument: first, to dispute the finding that the Bank had, under the circumstances, condoned the illegal strike; and second, to maintain that the Bank was entitled to rely on the illegal strike as a valid ground for terminating the workmen’s employment.

In the appeal, counsel for the Bank contended that the illegal strike could serve as a ground for the dismissal of the respondents and therefore the respondents could not be reinstated, because reinstatement would compel the Bank to employ them anew, a power the Labour Appellate Tribunal did not possess. Accordingly, counsel urged that the Court set aside the Tribunal’s order dated 22 September 1952 and dispense with the further inquiry directed by that order. The Court considered it unnecessary to express any opinion on whether the Bank had, in fact, condoned or waived the illegal strike. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that no such condonation existed and that the Bank could rely on the illegal strike as a legitimate ground for dismissal, the Court examined the effect of section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. That provision states, inter alia, that no employer may dismiss or otherwise remove any workman involved in a dispute while proceedings are pending before a tribunal, unless the tribunal gives its written permission. The Bank had not obtained such permission. If the pendency of the proceedings before the tribunal referred to as Sri Campbell-Puri rendered the respondents’ strike illegal under section 23(b) of the Act, then the Bank’s dismissal of the respondents without the required permission under section 33 was likewise illegal. The Court found no merit in the Attorney-General’s argument that section 33 did not apply because strikes and lock-outs are dealt with in Chapter V and because the respondents were not parties to the dispute before Sri Campbell-Puri. The terms of section 33 are sufficiently broad to encompass the present situation, and its placement in Chapter VII titled “Miscellaneous” does not limit its general application to all dismissals, regardless of the grounds asserted. This is further underscored by the amendment made by Act XLVIII of 1950, which removed the words “except for misconduct not connected with the dispute” from the newly substituted section. Moreover, it is clear that the respondents were parties to the disputes before Sri Campbell-Puri, as it is conceded that any award made by the tribunal would bind them. Consequently, section 33 applied, and the Bank’s contention that the dismissal was lawful and that the Tribunal therefore lacked jurisdiction to order reinstatement was rejected. There being no basis to interfere with the Labour Appellate Tribunal’s order, the Court dismissed the appeal with costs. Appeal dismissed. Agent for the appellant: Ganpat Rai. Agent for the respondent.

The final part of the judgment displayed the name V. P. K. Nambiyar, indicating that this individual signed the opinion. The presence of the name at the conclusion signified that V. P. K. Nambiyar was the judge who authored the decision. By attaching his name, the judgment identified the judicial officer responsible for the reasoning and the order given. The signature served as the formal acknowledgment that the reasoning and conclusions set out in the opinion were prepared and endorsed by V. P. K. Nambiyar. This naming at the end of the document fulfilled the procedural requirement of indicating the judge who rendered the judgment, thereby completing the official record of the case.