Nawab Singh vs State of Uttar Pradesh

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 28 September, 1953

Coram: B.K. Mukherjea

In the matter titled Nawab Singh versus the State of Uttar Pradesh, decided on 28 September 1953, the Supreme Court of India, with Justice B K Mukherjea authoring the judgment, heard an appeal that had been granted special leave. The appeal challenged a judgment of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court dated 19 September 1951, which had been rendered in Criminal Appeal No 333 of 1951. That High Court judgment affirmed, with a slight modification, the earlier decision and order of the Additional Sessions Judge of Budaun made in Sessions Trial No 142 of 1950, and it upheld the conviction of the appellant under sections 302 and 364 of the Indian Penal Code, imposing the sentences of death and transportation for life respectively. The factual background of the case was relatively concise. According to the prosecution, the two deceased individuals, identified as Lalman and Thanni, were brothers belonging to a prosperous trading family residing in the village of Kurha Shahpur in the Budaun district, where they operated a sugar manufactory. Lalman had a son named Itwari. On the day of the alleged offense, 11 December 1949, at approximately five in the evening, work was in progress within the sugar manufactory, which was situated in a thatched hut, and Itwari, Thanni together with several other persons were present. At that moment four men approached the site from the north, led by the appellant Nawab Singh. The entrants were partially dressed in military uniform; Nawab Singh was carrying a pistol, while among his three companions one bore a pistol, another a gun, and the third a lathi. As soon as these men arrived, Itwari fled the scene. Upon arrival, Nawab Singh inquired about the whereabouts of Itwari; the individuals present responded that they did not know. It is alleged that Thanni then shouted that Nawab Singh and his gang had come. Immediately thereafter Nawab Singh aimed his pistol at Thanni and discharged it, killing Thanni. The sound of the gunshot drew Lalman to the location, where Nawab Singh instructed two of his companions, who were stationed at the entrance of Lalman's house, to apprehend Lalman. They succeeded, binding his hands behind his back with his own turban, and escorted him eastward. Two additional shots were heard, and subsequently Lalman's body was discovered at a site situated to the east. Following the completion of the police investigation, criminal proceedings were initiated against Nawab Singh and two of his associates, namely Rishipal Singh and Chhabram Singh. All three were committed to the court of sessions and tried before the Additional Sessions Judge, Budaun, who convicted Nawab Singh under sections 302, 302/149, 364/149 and also under section 148 of the Indian Penal Code.

In the original trial, Nawab Singh received a death sentence for the murder of Thanni. He was also sentenced to transportation for life for abducting Lalman with the intention of killing him and for the eventual killing of Lalman. In addition, the trial court imposed a term of three years’ rigorous imprisonment on the charge under section 148 of the Indian Penal Code. The two other accused individuals were acquitted because the court found that the evidence did not remove the benefit of doubt in their favour. Following the conviction, Nawab Singh appealed to the High Court of Allahabad. The trial judge had also referred the case to the High Court for confirmation of the death sentence. The High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the Additional Sessions Judge’s judgment, except that it set aside the conviction and sentence under section 148 of the Indian Penal Code. The present appeal to this Court was filed against that High Court judgment.

The sole ground raised in support of the appeal, as advanced by counsel appearing for the appellant, was that the prosecution’s version of events—that Thanni was killed by a single pistol shot fired by Nawab Singh—was materially contradicted by the medical report and by the testimony of certain prosecution witnesses. The medical report indicated that the victim’s body bore multiple gun-shot wounds, and Exhibit P-6 recorded that an empty.12-bore cartridge was recovered from the spot where the body lay. Counsel argued that, under such circumstances, the prosecution could not sustain its narrative unless it produced expert evidence establishing that the injuries could have been caused by the weapon alleged to have been used. It was observed that this line of argument had not been raised before the High Court, neither during the hearing of the appeal nor at the stage when leave to appeal was sought before this Court. The Court found that the contention lacked substance and that the alleged discrepancy was, upon close scrutiny, illusory. The prosecution’s case was that Nawab Singh was armed with a pistol, which he used to fire at Thanni. The pistol was described as a locally manufactured weapon, and the prosecution witness expressly stated that.12-bore cartridges could be discharged from such pistols. This version of events had been accepted by the Additional Sessions Judge, and there was no inherent improbability in finding a.12-bore exploded cartridge near the victim’s body or in the presence of multiple injuries. The prosecution did not contend that only a single shot was fired by Nawab Singh, and the Court noted that the term “gun fire” employed by the prosecution witnesses was used in its ordinary, colloquial sense, not to distinguish between a pistol and a rifle.

In this case, the Court observed that the term “gun fire” used by the prosecution witnesses was intended in a plain, everyday sense and that the testimony clearly showed the witnesses did not intend to distinguish between a gun and a pistol when they spoke of a shot being fired. Consequently, the argument raised by the learned counsel on that point was rejected as untenable.

Mr. Umrigar, appearing for the accused, subsequently contended that a considerable period of time had passed since the death sentence had been imposed and that, on that basis, the capital punishment should be reduced to a sentence of transportation for life. The Court acknowledged that, in appropriate cases, an excessive delay in carrying out a death sentence may be considered a factor warranting commutation. However, the Court emphasized that such delay is not a matter of statutory rule but rather a consideration that primarily falls within the discretion of the local Government. The Court further explained that when exercising such discretion, the particular facts of each individual case must be taken into account.

Applying this principle to the present matter, the Court found that the murder in question was both cruel and deliberate and that no mitigating or extenuating circumstances existed that could justify a reduction of the death sentence. On that basis, the Court concluded that there was no ground to commute the capital punishment and thereby dismissed the appeal.