Mushtak Hussein vs State of Bombay

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 96 of 1952

Decision Date: 30 March 1953

Coram: Mehr Chand Mahajan, Vivian Bose, B. Jagannadhadas

In the matter titled Mushtak Hussein versus the State of Bombay, judgment was delivered on the thirtieth day of March, 1953 by the Supreme Court of India. The opinion was authored by Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan and was decided by a bench consisting of Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan, Justice Vivian Bose and Justice B. Jagannadhadas. The petitioner was identified as Mushtak Hussein and the respondent as the State of Bombay. The official citation for this decision appears as 1953 AIR 282 and 1953 SCR 809, and the case has subsequently been referenced in numerous reports including R 1955 SC 104, RF 1955 SC 287, F 1960 SC 706, R 1962 SC 605, E 1963 SC 1696, RF 1968 SC 609, RF 1970 SC 977, RF 1970 SC 1033, R 1971 SC 1606, F 1973 SC 43, RF 1973 SC 243, R 1973 SC 278, F 1973 SC 1180, RF 1973 SC 1222, R 1973 SC 2187, R 1973 SC 2288, F 1976 SC 1151, RF 1976 SC 1992, F 1983 SC 1014 and R 1986 SC 1070.

The headnote of the judgment records that, in directing the jury, the trial judge described the case as a “jigsaw puzzle with some missing links,” urging jurors to employ their ingenuity, assess probabilities and attempt to solve the puzzle. The Court held that such instructions amounted to misdirection because they invited jurors to rely on speculative reasoning rather than the evidence presented. The Supreme Court explained that where a jury’s verdict is based on assumptions and conjecture arising from misdirection, the Court may either order a retrial or remit the matter to the High Court with specific directions to reevaluate the merits in light of the Supreme Court’s decision and to determine whether a failure of justice has occurred. Alternatively, the Supreme Court may itself examine the merits and decide if justice was denied. In reaching that conclusion, the Court affirmed its authority to consider the entire case to ascertain whether misdirection resulted in a failure of justice, citing the precedent set in Abdul Rahman v. Emperor (AIR 1946 Lah. 82). Furthermore, the Court observed that while a High Court may summarily dismiss an appeal that prima facie presents no arguable issue without giving reasons, it is preferable that, in cases presenting arguable points, the High Court provide at least a brief indication of its reasoning in a summary rejection.

The judgment continues by noting that the present appeal fell under criminal appellate jurisdiction and was identified as Criminal Appeal No. 96 of 1952. Special leave to appeal had been granted by the Supreme Court on the fourteenth day of February, 1952, allowing review of an order dated the seventeenth day of September, 1951 issued by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, whose decision had been rendered by Judges Bavdekar and Chainani. The appeal therefore proceeded under the procedural framework set out in the Supreme Court’s order.

Appeal No. 1026 of 1951 was filed against the judgment and order dated 28 July 1951 rendered by the Court of the Third Additional Sessions Judge at Poona in Sessions Case No. 78 of 1951. The appellant was represented by counsel A. S. B. Chari and J. B. Dadachanji, while the respondent was represented by C. K. Daphtary, the Solicitor-General for India, assisted by Porus A. Mehta. The appeal was heard on 30 March 1953, and the judgment of the Court was delivered by Justice Mahajan.

The appellant had been convicted on 28 July 1951 on a charge under section 366 of the Indian Penal Code. The conviction arose from an allegation that the appellant, who was a music teacher, had kidnapped a minor girl named Shilavati at Poona with the intention of forcing or seducing her to illicit intercourse. Following the trial before the third additional Sessions Judge, who sat with a live jury, the appellant was sentenced to two years of rigorous imprisonment. The jury returned a guilty verdict by a narrow majority of three to two. After examining the jury’s decision, the Sessions Judge concluded that the verdict was not perverse and therefore affirmed it. The appellant subsequently filed an appeal to the High Court, but the High Court dismissed the appeal summarily without a detailed reason. The present appeal before the Supreme Court was entertained by way of special leave.

According to the prosecution, the alleged kidnapping occurred on 12 December 1949. The prosecution asserted that the appellant, being a music teacher, went to Shilavati’s home and, under the pretext that a girl was waiting at his house and that he wished to compare Shilavati’s voice with that of the other girl, persuaded Shilavati to accompany him to his residence. There, with the assistance of a second accused described as Iqbal Putlabai, the appellant allegedly abducted Shilavati. Four months later, Shilavati was located in Bombay living in the house of a person identified as Babu Konde. A medical examination subsequently established that Shilavati was pregnant. To substantiate the charge against the appellant, the prosecution examined a total of sixteen witnesses, of whom four were classified as eye-witnesses: Prahlad, Jamunabai, Namdeo and Shilavati herself.

Jamunabai, who was Shilavati’s mother, gave testimony that on the evening of 12 December she returned home and learned from her sister-in-law Jamunabai and other relatives that the appellant had taken Shilavati on the false pretext of comparing her voice with that of a girl named Prabha who was allegedly waiting at his house. She further stated that Shilavati did not return thereafter. Upon receiving this information, Jamunabai, together with her brothers and sister-in-law, proceeded to the appellant’s house and questioned him as to why Shilavati had not been sent back. The appellant replied that he had dispatched her by bus. When Shilavati failed to appear at home, the mother reported that Shilavati herself went to the police and lodged a complaint. Ananda, identified as the uncle of the girl, also testified to the same sequence of events. Prahlad, a brother of Shilavati and a school-going boy, testified that he observed Shilavati leaving her house in the company of the appellant while he was playing outside the school premises. Namdeo, a bricklayer, testified that on 12 December at approximately three-thirty in the afternoon, while returning from work, he saw Shilavati walking together with the appellant. The prosecution’s case was further supported by the medical examination of Shilavati, which confirmed her pregnancy, and by the totality of the witness statements presented.

Medical examination established that Shilavati was a girl of fifteen or sixteen years of age and that she was pregnant. She was examined in the capacity of Party, Witness number ten and she gave testimony that the accused had come to her residence at approximately three-thirty in the afternoon and had told her that a singing party was being held at Kirkee and that she should accompany him there. She recounted that she proceeded with the accused on the promise that he would return her to her home before her mother came back. While she was at the accused’s house she was asked to smell certain substances; she said that the fumes made her feel giddy and rendered her unable to speak. She further stated that when she regained consciousness the following morning she found herself in a hut at Sion in Bombay. On making enquiries to a person named Kassam she was informed that the accused had left her at that location.

On the twelfth of December, at about eleven-forty at night, Yamunabai went to the Padamji Gate police station and lodged a complaint. In that complaint she asserted that Shilavati had quarrelled with a woman named Shantabai, had left the house, and had not returned. She requested that the police ascertain the whereabouts of her daughter. The next day, on the thirteenth of December, Yamunabai sent another complaint to the Police Inspector of A Division, Poona. In that communication she alleged that the accused habitually visited her house to give harmonium lessons to Shilavati, that she had learned that he had sent a note to her daughter while she was absent and had invited her to his house, and that when she inquired about Shilavati’s location the accused gave evasive answers.

The head constable on duty received Yamunabai’s complaint, read the application aloud to her, and recorded her statement, which read as follows: “My daughter Shilavati, age about thirteen or fourteen, left my house at four o’clock in the afternoon. I searched for my daughter at my paternal aunt’s house but could not find her there. M. H. Gyani (the accused) used to come to my house to coach my daughter in singing. I do not know whether he has taken my daughter away, nor have I seen him taking her away. I mentioned his name in my application by mistake. My daughter has gone out of my house to some other place. A search should therefore be made for her… I again state that my daughter left the house after quarrelling with my mother Harnabai. This is given in writing.”

In July 1950 Yamunabai addressed an application to the Collector of Poona. In that application she stated that she had appointed the accused as a music master for her daughter and that on Monday, the twelfth of December 1949, at about six p.m., the accused together with his friend Badsha had induced and kidnapped her daughter and taken her to an unknown place. She asserted with certainty that no one other than M. H. Gyani and Badsha had abducted her daughter. In the witness box Yamunabai, as previously noted, gave a version of events that differed from the statements made in the earlier complaints, and the testimony of Shilavati herself was also presented.

Shilavati did not fully corroborate her mother’s version of events. On 14 March 1950 she sent a letter, identified as Exhibit 4-G, to her mother. The portion of the letter that is material to the case reads as follows: “Since last so many days, I have left the house and I have not sent any letter to you and you must also be worrying as to where I have gone. I am at Bombay and quite well too. Do not worry about me, I had gone to the river at Bamburda, and there some one forced me and brought me to Bombay and he was prepared to marry with me. He was an ordinary and old fellow. J did not like it and he was going to convert me to Mahomedanism. I felt very sorry for this and I was very much sad. He beat me twice or thrice. To whom shall I express my sorrow? But there was a boy staying there whom I told all the facts and told him to save me anyhow. He promised to save me. There were two days remaining for my marriage. Till then, he arranged for my stay and also for dinner, and one day before the marriage, previous night he took me out from that place. There were many police complaints against him, and he, at the cost of his life, saved me. I married him in order to return his obligations. Now I am very happy, I am not in need of anything now. He is an ordinary boy. He works in a press, and he is a worker. He is from us and his name is Baburao Konde and next time we will send a photograph of both of us. Do not worry about me. I am very happy. Namaskar to all, elderly persons and ashirwadas to youngsters. Namaskar to grandmother Harnabai. Convey namaskars to Anand mama, Vithal mama, Ram mama, Shankar, Prahlad, Laxman, Hirabai, Jamnabai, Yamunabai, Jaibai, and to master.”

Shilavati was a recognised Harijan talent who regularly participated in dramatic performances and also gave public music and dance performances for remuneration. The content of the letter she wrote from Bombay was clear and, on receipt of that letter and further correspondence – details of which need not be repeated – the police were able to ascertain her whereabouts and consequently return her to her mother, Yamunabai. The judgment then turns to the statutory framework governing appeals against jury verdicts in India. The law, in certain circumstances, permits an appeal and empowers the appellate court to replace the jury’s verdict after a fresh consideration of the evidence. Such provisions give the appellate court broad authority to overrule or modify a jury’s decision in the interests of proper administration of justice, while acknowledging that appellate judges have not personally observed or heard the witnesses and therefore must exercise this responsibility with great caution. Section 423, sub-section (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, articulates this principle, stating that the appellate court may intervene only when it is of the opinion that the jury’s verdict is erroneous because of a misdirection by the judge or a misunderstanding by the jury of the law as explained by the judge.

In this case, the Court referred to the statutory provision that states: “Nothing herein contained shall authorize the court to alter or reverse the verdict of a jury unless it is of opinion that such verdict is erroneous owing to a misdirection by the judge or to a misunderstanding on the part of the jury of the law as laid down by him.” The Court also quoted Section 537 sub-clause (d), which provides that no finding, sentence or order of a court of competent jurisdiction may be reversed or altered on appeal because of a misdirection in any charge to the jury unless that error, omission, irregularity or misdirection has actually caused a failure of justice. Accordingly, the Court explained that a jury verdict can be set aside only when it is established that a serious misdirection by the judge in charging the jury has produced a failure of justice and has misled the jury in arriving at its verdict. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that the trial judge misdirected the jury on several important points and breached the rules of criminal jurisprudence and evidence. According to that counsel, the judge failed to warn the jury that it would be unsafe to rely on the statement of Shilavati without corroboration by other material evidence. The counsel maintained that the judge should have told the jury that, although the law permits a jury to act on uncorroborated testimony if the circumstances justify it, ordinarily such testimony should not be relied upon unless it is corroborated in material particulars. The omission, the counsel asserted, amounted to a grave misdirection, and the jury, lacking the warning, likely based its verdict on the uncorroborated evidence of the girl. Further criticism was directed at the portion of the charge in which the judge referred to Shilavati’s allegation that Kassam Khan told her the appellant had left her there, on the ground that the jury had been instructed to act on inadmissible evidence. The counsel also argued that directing the jury to “solve the jigsaw puzzle” of the case by using its own ingenuity and by piecing together the various fragments constituted a serious misdirection. The final alleged misdirection involved the passage: “After weighing the probabilities of the case, the evidence on record, as prudent men if you come to the conclusion that the story given by the prosecution does not appear to be probable and that the accused must not have committed the offence, then in that case you have to return a verdict of not guilty.” The Court indicated that it was not necessary to address every point raised by the counsel.

According to the counsel, the judge had clearly misdirected the jury when he instructed them to resolve the problem that arose by applying their own ingenuity and, if necessary, by engaging in speculative reasoning, effectively granting the jury unrestricted authority to reach a verdict based on personal conjecture. The counsel further emphasized that the judge told the jurors that they should return a verdict of not guilty if, after their deliberation, they found it improbable that the accused had committed the offence, a direction that the counsel described as fundamentally opposed to established principles of criminal jurisprudence and likely to have influenced the jury’s judgment. The judge’s charge, as quoted, read: “So you will find, gentlemen, that there are as many as six versions before this court and therefore you have to consider all these versions and probabilities of the case, to find out whether the improved version now before the court is a correct one. I would also like to bring to your notice the letter written at the instance of Shilavati from Bombay. That letter is Exhibit 4-G. Shilavati, in her examination before the court, does not admit that this letter was written at her instance; however, she admitted before the police that the letter was indeed written at her request, and this admission was elicited during her cross-examination. In that letter she stated that on the day in question she proceeded to the Bamburda river where she was forcibly kidnapped by a man who intended to marry her, a man she described as old and whose proposed marriage she did not approve. She further asserted that a man named Konde rescued her from this situation, conveyed her to Bombay and subsequently married her.” The counsel then characterized the case as a jigsaw puzzle placed before the jury, noting that in a jigsaw puzzle all pieces are presented and must be assembled using ingenuity, although some links appeared to be missing in the present matter. He accepted the submission of the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor that, in such circumstances, the jury must weigh the probabilities of the evidence and determine from the material before them whether the puzzle can be solved. The counsel further outlined the factual points before the jury: a quarrel involving Shantabai, an alleged chit sent by Accused No. 1, and the girl's subsequent journey to the Bamburda river where she was kidnapped. He asked the jurors to consider whether it was possible that Shilavati received a chit, presumably from Accused No. 1, which had been seen by Shantabai and subsequently disclosed to Harnabai, the girl’s grandmother. The counsel suggested that the elderly witness Harnabai might have been pressured or coaxed, perhaps even to the extent of making statements that could affect the overall assessment of the case.

The Court observed that the testimony suggested a young, impetuous girl might have fled in desperation to the Bamburda River, mentioning that river in her account. It noted that the confluence of the Mula and Mutha rivers lies near a mosque, and it questioned why the girl went to that place and whether she may have intended to end her life. The evidence indicated that the girl was later discovered in a hut at Sion in Bombay in the company of an elderly Muslim man identified as Kassam Khan and his attendant. The Court required consideration of the possibility that Kassam Khan and his attendant persuaded the girl to accompany them to Bombay and that Kassam Khan may have intended to marry her. It also directed that the Court examine whether a man named Konde rescued the girl from Kassam Khan, who was apparently about to wed her, and subsequently married the girl himself. The record confirmed that the girl was ultimately found in Bombay with Konde, and that the girl herself testified that she had been in a hut at Sion while Kassam Khan and his attendant kept watch over her.

The Court further instructed that the jury must assess all probabilities presented by the prosecution. It referred to the existence of six differing versions before the Court and urged that the jury evaluate each version and the associated probabilities to determine whether the revised version now before the Court was correct. The Court criticized the learned judge’s direction to the jury to assemble the “jigsaw puzzle” using their ingenuity, stating that the judge misdirected the jury by encouraging them to rely on imagination rather than on the evidence placed on record by the prosecution. The Court also noted that the judge indulged in speculation by presenting several conjectures for the jury’s consideration. Specifically, the judge surmised that the girl might have gone to the river to commit suicide and asked the jury to entertain this speculation. The judge further surmised that a note from the accused had been received by Shilavati, that Shantabai had seen the note and disclosed it to Harnabai, the grandmother, who presumably reprimanded Shilavati and told her to leave the house, leading the “hot-blooded” Shilavati to go to the river to take her own life. The Court emphasized that the record contained no evidence of the receipt of such a note, nor of Shantabai’s alleged observation of it or of any such disclosure to Harnabai.

The Court observed that the judge had spoken of Harnabai threatening Shilivati and of Harnabai’s threat to Shilivati, and that all of these suggestions presented to the jury originated from the judge’s own imagination. The Court held that such conjectures were bound to mislead the jurors into believing that they could rely on fanciful surmises in trying to solve the case. The Court noted that the instruction to the jury to solve the “jigsaw puzzle” by using its ingenuity was not confined to a single isolated sentence of the charge; rather, the instruction permeated the entire charge. In reiterating this point, the judge again told the jury, “As I have already told you, you have to piece together all the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle and try to find out what story appears to you to be probable; whether the girl was drugged at all, or whether, as she stated in her letter, she went to a river at Bamburda and there met this Kassam Khan and his keep and, along with them, she went to Bombay of her own accord.” In the closing portion of the charge, the judge added, “After weighing the probabilities of the case, evidence on record, as prudent men if you come to the conclusion that the story given by the prosecution does not appear to be probable and that the accused must not have committed the offence, then in that case you have to return a verdict of not guilty.” The Court found that these words were unlikely to give a correct guide to the jury in reaching its decision. The Court explained that the jury should have been instructed only to consider, after weighing the probabilities and the evidence on the record, whether, as prudent men, they thought the prosecution had proved the charge against the accused. The Court was satisfied that, as a result of these misdirections, the jury had most probably returned a split verdict of guilty by three to two, not on the basis of evidence but on the basis of assumptions and conjectures. The Court then turned to the question of what procedural step should be taken to rectify the mischief and to serve the ends of justice. The Court identified three possible courses. The first, and simplest, was to order a retrial of the appellant. The second was to remit the case to the High Court with a direction that the High Court should reconsider the merits of the case in light of the present decision and determine whether a failure of justice had occurred because of the misdirections. The third option was for the Court itself to examine the merits of the case and to decide whether a failure of justice had taken place and an innocent person had been convicted. The Court referred to the settled principle that, in deciding whether a failure of justice has resulted from a misdirection, the trial court is entitled to consider the whole case, citing Abdul Rahim v. Emperor. The Court therefore concluded that one of these three routes must be adopted to correct the error.

The Court observed that the expression “in fact” found in section 637(d) of the Criminal Procedure Code indicates that a court may examine the evidence itself in order to decide whether a miscarriage of justice has occurred. In the unusual facts of the present matter the Court elected to follow the third option previously outlined, because at this stage that approach best served the ends of justice. It was clear from the material placed on record that no reasonable body of persons could honestly conclude that the appellant had kidnapped Shilavati as the prosecution alleged. Accordingly the Court assumed the responsibility of resolving the case without awaiting the opinion of the High Court, holding that any alternative course would only impose unnecessary harassment on the appellant. With due deference the Court nevertheless expressed the view that the High Court ought not to have dismissed the appellant’s appeal summarily, since the appeal raised arguable issues that required consideration, although the Court did not deem it necessary to address every point raised. The Court noted that where a matter prima facie presents no arguable issue, a summary rejection is justified; however, in cases presenting genuine issues the summary order should at least indicate the High Court’s views on the points raised. The Court further explained that, in special leave petitions under article 136 of the Constitution, the lack of the High Court’s opinion on such points sometimes leaves this Court feeling embarrassed when it must decide without that guidance. (1) A.I.R. 1946 P.C.

The learned Solicitor-General argued that the present case was not one in which the Court could legitimately set aside the jury’s verdict and decide the case according to its own appraisal of the evidence. He contended that the charge to the jury must be taken as a whole, and that although minor objections might be raised to certain passages, the trial judge had fairly presented the case of both parties before the jury. He further asserted that the trial judge had openly expressed a view of the evidence that was strongly against the prosecution, and therefore the accused could not claim that the charge, which was favorable to him and adverse to the prosecution, was legally defective. The Solicitor-General also maintained that the jury was free to accept the mother’s statement as well as the girl’s statement despite the conflicting versions identified in the charge, and that once the jury had done so the matter was concluded. The Court reiterated that a charge to the jury cannot be described as fair if it directs the jury to approach the decision from an incorrect perspective.

The Court observed that the jury was instructed to form its decision by relying on its own ingenuity and on conjecture and speculative reasoning; consequently, the learned Solicitor-General’s submission could not be given serious consideration. It was further held that the jury’s verdict was erroneous, for no reasonable assembly of men could have reached such a conclusion in light of the established facts and circumstances recorded in the case file. The testimony of Yamunabai, which had already been set out earlier in this judgment, was then examined in detail. She claimed that on the evening of 12 December 1949, at approximately six-thirty p.m., she returned home to discover that Shilavati was absent. She reported that she inquired of Jamna and Hira, who told her that accused 1 had arrived, claimed there was a girl in his house whose voice needed to be compared with Shilavati’s, and, on that pretense, had taken the girl away. Prahlad, identified as PW 4, testified that when his mother arrived home at six o’clock, he informed her that he had seen Shilavati in the company of accused 1. Jamnabai, PW 5, stated that the accused entered the house at three p.m., asserted that a girl had come to his residence for singing, and, using that excuse, removed Shilavati, after which Yamunabai was told of the incident. Ananda, PW 6, repeated this same narrative. The Court found that this version was completely undermined by the various complaints Yamunabai had made to the police. It was noted that in her initial police report at 11-40 p.m., she failed to mention that her son, Jamuna, and Namdev had told her that the appellant had taken the girl away, allegedly transporting her back by bus. Moreover, after sending a written complaint to the Poona Police Inspector on 13 December, accusing the appellant of kidnapping her daughter, she later gave a statement to the head-constable in which she withdrew that allegation, stating unequivocally that the girl had left the house after a quarrel with Harnabai. In her first police report she had attributed the departure to a quarrel with a woman named Shantabai. The Court concluded that such statements could not be dismissed as mere figments of imagination; they must have been based on some foundation, and they directly contradicted her present version. Subsequently, when she addressed an application to the Collector accusing the appellant and Badsha of kidnapping her daughter, she asserted that they had taken the girl to an unknown place at six p.m., whereas earlier complaints placed the alleged occurrence at approximately three-thirty p.m. The letter dated 14 March 1960, written at Shilavati’s request to Yamunabai, was found to falsify all of Yamunabai’s versions and to clearly indicate that the girl had left the house voluntarily. The Court further noted that the letter sent her regards to the appellant, a tone that would have been unlikely had the appellant actually kidnapped the girl. Another version presented in the evidence alleged that the girl received a chit from the appellant, which led to a quarrel and her subsequent departure. In view of the entire record, the Court held that the version now given by Yamunabai in court or by Shilavati after being influenced by her mother could not be accepted. It appeared that the appellant, who had previously acted as a music master giving lessons to the girl a few months before her disappearance, had been convicted under section 366 of the Indian Penal Code not on the basis of solid evidence but on surmises and conjectures, a conclusion underscored by the learned Solicitor-General’s reference to the bricklayer’s statement.

The letter suggested that the girl had left her home voluntarily, without any force or coercion applied to her. In that correspondence she also conveyed greetings to the appellant, a tone that would be unlikely were he to have abducted her. Another version presented in the evidence described the incident as arising from a written note that the girl had received from the appellant, which allegedly triggered a quarrel and caused her to depart the house. On the basis of the material before the court it became clear that the account now offered by Yamunabai in the courtroom, or by Shilavati after coming under her mother’s influence, could not be accepted. The appellant, who had been employed as a music master and had given lessons to the girl in the months preceding her disappearance, was convicted under section 366 of the Indian Penal Code. That conviction, however, was not supported by any direct evidence and instead rested upon mere surmises and conjectures presented by the prosecution. The solicitor-general drew the Court’s attention to the recorded statements of a bricklayer and a boy named Prahlad. A simple reading of those statements revealed that they were false and appeared to have been fabricated in order to fill gaps in the prosecution’s case. Harnabai was never produced as a witness, and the trial judge, in his charge to the jury, correctly observed that several links were missing from the prosecution’s evidence and could only be supplied by conjecture. Both Yamunabai and Prahlad deliberately omitted any mention that the girl participated in dramas or performed dances in public venues. They attempted to portray Shilavati as an unsophisticated girl with no knowledge of the world, asserting that she never danced publicly or acted in any public drama. The record, however, contains abundant material, including photographs used in advertisements and police statements, which demonstrate that she performed in various dramas for a fee of five rupees per performance. She also gave regular dance exhibitions and clearly intended to pursue singing and dancing as her lifelong profession. The fact that the brother and the mother strained to create a false impression before the court by giving untruthful testimony was itself sufficient to demonstrate that their evidence could not be relied upon. Consequently, the Court was firmly of the view that a grave miscarriage of justice had occurred, the appellant being an innocent man wrongly convicted of a serious offence based largely on conjecture. The conviction, the Court held, resulted directly from misdirection that the trial judge had given to the jury during his charge. For these reasons the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the jury’s verdict, and acquitted the appellant of the offence with which he had been charged.

The appellate body considered the charge that had been brought against the appellant, as previously detailed in the record, and rendered a decision to allow the appeal. By granting the appeal, the court set aside the earlier judgment that had found the appellant guilty of the alleged offence. Consequently, the appellant’s conviction was vacated and the appellant was released from liability for the charge. The record shows that the appellant was represented before the court by an authorised agent named V. P. K. Nambiyar, who acted on the appellant’s behalf throughout the proceedings. On the opposite side, the state’s interests were presented by an authorised agent named G. H. Rajadhyaksha, who acted as the respondent’s representative. The court’s order therefore reflected the representation of both parties by their respective agents and concluded that, with the appeal allowed, the legal consequences of the original conviction were nullified, resulting in the appellant’s acquittal of the alleged criminal conduct.