Kumbha Mawji vs Union of India

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeals Nos. 133 and 134 of 1952

Decision Date: 16 April 1953

Coram: B. Jagannadhadas, Mehr Chand Mahajan, Vivian Bose

In this matter, the Supreme Court considered an appeal filed by Kumbha Mawji against the Union of India. The judgment was delivered on 16 April 1953 by a bench comprising Justice B. Jagannadhadas, Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan and Justice Vivian Bose. The case is reported in the 1953 volumes of the All India Reporter at page 313 and in the Supreme Court Reports at page 878, and it has been cited in later decisions such as E 1970 SC 189 and E 1981 SC 2075. The dispute arose under the Indian Arbitration Act of 1940, specifically sections 14(2), 31(3) and 31(4). The questions before the Court concerned the proper manner of filing an arbitral award, the necessity for the award to be filed by a party who possesses the authority of the arbitrator or umpire, and the determination of which court held exclusive jurisdiction when the same award was filed in more than one court. The headnote of the judgment states that a party’s mere filing of an award in court without the arbitrator’s or umpire’s authority does not satisfy the requirements of section 14, and that authority must be specifically alleged and proven. It further explains that the expression “in a reference” in section 31(4) includes an application made after the arbitration has concluded and a final award has been rendered, and that the subsection confers exclusive jurisdiction on the court where the first application for filing the award under section 14 is made.

The factual backdrop involved the respondent, who was a party to the arbitral award, presenting an application before the Subordinate Judge of Gauhati on 10 August 1949 under section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, requesting that the umpire be directed to file the award in court. Upon receiving this application, the Gauhati court issued a notice to the umpire directing him to lodge the award before 24 August 1949. Because the original award had already been handed to the parties, the umpire, by post on 18 August 1949, sent a copy of the award bearing his signature to the court. The Gauhati court then instructed the respondent to file the original award, which the respondent complied with on 3 September 1949. In parallel, counsel for the appellant dispatched the original award to the Registrar of the Calcutta High Court on its original side on 17 August 1949, seeking its filing there; the Calcutta High Court recorded the filing on 29 August 1949. The Court held that, since the umpire had, on the direction of the Gauhati Subordinate Judge, transmitted a signed copy of the award to the Gauhati court on 18 August 1949, the first filing for the purposes of section 31(3) occurred in the Gauhati court. Consequently, the Gauhati court possessed exclusive jurisdiction to entertain the reference under section 31, despite the later filing of the original award in the Calcutta High Court. The judgment therefore affirmed that the earlier filing determines jurisdiction, and that the authority of the umpire to file the award must be explicitly demonstrated.

The Court noted that the award was filed in the Gauhati Court only after the appellant’s solicitor had transmitted the award for filing to the Calcutta High Court. In those circumstances the Gauhati Court alone had jurisdiction to proceed with the hearing of the dispute under section 31 of the Arbitration Act. Accordingly, the judgment of the Calcutta High Court was affirmed.

This appeal was listed under civil appellate jurisdiction as Civil Appeals Nos. 133 and 134 of 1952. It arose from the judgment and decree dated 23 February 1951 of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta, rendered by Chief Justice Harries and Justice Bannerjee in Appeal No. 44 of 1950. That judgment and decree were themselves based on the judgment and decree dated 16 December 1949 of the same High Court, delivered by Justice Sinha in its ordinary original civil jurisdiction in Award Case No. 208 of 1949. Counsel for the appellant was represented by a senior advocate and his counsel, while the respondent was represented by the Solicitor-General for India and his counsel.

The judgment of the Court was delivered by Justice Jagannadha Das. On 28 January 1948 the appellant, Khumba Mawji, entered into an agreement with the respondent, the Dominion of India, to manufacture and supply stone boulders and ballast to the Bengal-Assam Railway from the Chutiapara quarry. The agreement was executed at Calcutta, although the work was to be performed in Assam. A term of the agreement stipulated that any differences between the parties should be referred to arbitration by two arbitrators, one nominated by each side, and that if the arbitrators could not agree, the matter should be decided by an umpire nominated by both arbitrators.

When differences actually arose, the dispute was first referred to the two arbitrators. Their disagreement led to the appointment of an umpire, Mr P C Chowdhury. The umpire issued two awards around 20 July 1949 in favour of the appellant. By one award he directed the respondent to pay a sum of Rs 3,67,000 to the appellant on or before 19 August 1949, with interest at six per cent per annum in case of default. By the other award he directed the respondent to pay a sum of Rs 83,000 to the appellant under the same terms. The umpire is said to have handed over the original copies of each award to the respective parties.

On 10 August 1949 the respondent filed an application under section 14, sub-section (2), of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, before the Subordinate Judge of Gauhati in Assam, praying that the umpire be directed to file both awards in court so that the petitioner might have an opportunity to raise objections. Upon receipt of that application, a notice was issued to the umpire requiring him to file the awards in that court before 24 August 1949.

In response to the notice issued by the Subordinate Judge of Gauhati in the money suit numbered 63 of 1949, the umpire, Mr. P. C. Chaudhury, sent a letter dated 18 August 1949 to that Judge. In that letter the umpire explained that the two arbitral awards, each signed by him, had been made in the presence of the parties and handed to him on 20 July 1949. He attached copies of the awards, each bearing on its reverse side the receipt signed by the parties acknowledging the awards. Upon receiving the umpire’s letter and the attached copies, the Subordinate Judge issued an order on 24 August 1949 stating that the notice to the umpire had been served, that the umpire’s report and copies of the awards (the originals of which had been delivered to the parties) had been received, and that the respondent was required to file his copy of the awards on 3 September 1949. Accordingly, on 3 September 1949 the respondent filed the two awards that the umpire had handed over to it, and the Subordinate Judge’s court proceeded to issue further notices and to consider any objections filed by the parties.

A week after the respondent’s initial application in the Gauhati court, on 17 August 1949 the solicitors representing the appellant, identified in the correspondence as Messrs. Mukherjee and Biswas, wrote to the Registrar of the High Court, Original Side, on behalf of their client, Mr. Kumbha Mawji. They enclosed the two original arbitral awards, each stamped and dated 20 July 1949, one for the sum of Rs 3,67,000 and the other for Rs 83,000, both bearing the umpire’s signature, and requested that the office cause the awards to be filed and that notices regarding the awards be issued as soon as possible. After an exchange of letters in which the Deputy Registrar asked the solicitors for additional documents, the Deputy Registrar wrote back on 29 August 1949 confirming that the awards had been filed. He instructed the solicitors to obtain the filed awards from the court and to serve the parties with the statutory notice that fixed a date for judgment on the award by the Commercial Judge.

Following that instruction, notices were served on both parties. The notice addressed Kumbha Mawji and the Dominion of India, represented by the Assam Railway, stated that the award of the umpire appointed under the arbitration agreement had been filed on 29 August 1949 and that the Commercial Judge of the court would pronounce judgment on the award on 7 November 1949. The notice was dated 29 August 1949 and was served on the respondent on 2 September 1949. Consequently, proceedings relating to these awards were initiated, purportedly under section 14(2) of the Indian Arbitration Act, both in the Subordinate Judge’s court in Gauhati and on the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court.

In this matter, applications under section 14(2) of the Indian Arbitration Act were filed concurrently before two different forums: the Subordinate Judge of Gauhati in Assam and the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court. After receiving the notice issued by the Gauhati court on 3 September 1949, the appellant appeared before that court on 28 October 1949. He subsequently obtained a series of adjournments, which the court granted on several occasions, thereby extending the hearing schedule. These postponements continued until 10 December 1949, when the Gauhati court declined any further delay and fixed 20 January 1950 as the date for an ex parte hearing. In the meantime, the respondent, having been served with the notice issued by the Calcutta High Court, filed an affidavit on 24 November 1949, which was dated 15 November 1949, asserting that the Calcutta Court lacked jurisdiction and that the awards were invalid. On the same day a counter-affidavit dated 19 November 1949 was lodged on behalf of the appellant. The affidavits were then placed before the Commercial Judge of the Calcutta High Court, who considered the submissions on 16 December 1949. The learned Judge dismissed the respondent’s objections and proceeded to pass judgment on both awards.

Subsequently, the respondent appealed to the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court. The Division Bench set aside the single judge’s decision. The learned judges held that no proper application under section 14(2) of the Indian Arbitration Act had been made before the Calcutta High Court, and consequently that court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Before the single judge, the principal objection raised by the respondent, recorded in paragraph 14 of his affidavit dated 15 November 1949, was the following: “I submit further that inasmuch as the application of the Dominion of India under section 14(2) of the Indian Arbitration Act was made as aforesaid to the said Court at Gauhati before the award was filed in this Hon’ble Court by Kumbha Mawji, the Court at Gauhati alone has jurisdiction.” Under section 31(1) of the Indian Arbitration Act an award may be filed in any court that has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the reference. The reference in the present case arose from a contract that was executed in Calcutta and was to be performed in Assam. Accordingly, both the Gauhati court and the Calcutta High Court possessed jurisdiction over the subject matter. The respondent, however, argued that, in view of section 31(4) and the fact that an application under section 14(2) for a direction to the umpire to file the award had been made to the Gauhati court on 10 August, that court was seized of the matter from that date. He contended that any subsequent application under section 14 made to another competent court should be barred by section 31(4).

The principal issue that the learned single Judge examined concerned whether an application made after the award was rendered was barred by section 31(4) of the Arbitration Act. The Judge held that section 31(4) applied only to applications filed while a reference to arbitration was still pending, and not to applications that were made after an award had been made. Accordingly, he reasoned that the question of exclusive jurisdiction for filing an award depended on identifying the court in which the award was first filed under section 14(2), rather than the court where the application for filing was first presented. Applying this approach to the facts, the Judge concluded that the award had been filed earlier in the Calcutta High Court and not in the Gauhati Court. He therefore held that, pursuant to section 31(3), the Calcutta High Court possessed exclusive jurisdiction and proceeded to pass judgment on the award, noting that the respondent had not raised any objections within the prescribed time. On appeal, the learned Judges of the Division Bench considered it unnecessary to resolve the matter on the specific grounds raised by the single Judge. They observed that, on the facts, there was no evidence that the award had been properly filed in the Calcutta Court under section 14(2), because the alleged filings were not made by the umpire nor shown to be made under his authority. On this limited basis they set aside the single Judge’s decision, vacated the judgment that had been rendered in favor of the appellant, and remitted the matter for fresh consideration of the two awards, thereby giving rise to the present appeals.

The Court then identified three questions that required adjudication. First, whether the appellant possessed the umpire’s authority to file the awards in court under section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act. Second, whether, in light of section 31(3), the awards could be said to have been filed in the Calcutta High Court earlier than in the Gauhati Court. Third, whether the scope of section 31(4) is limited to applications made during the pendency of arbitration proceedings only. Regarding the first question, section 14(2) provides: “the arbitrators or umpire shall, at the request of any party to the arbitration agreement or any person claiming under such party or if so directed by the court and upon payment of the fees and charges due in respect of the arbitration and award and of the costs and charges of filing the award cause the award or a signed copy of it, together with any depositions or documents which may have been taken and proved … to be filed in court, and the court shall thereupon give notice to the parties of the filing of the award.” This provision clearly indicates that when an award or a signed copy is filed in court by a party, that party must have the umpire’s authority to do so. The High Court had assumed that such authority existed, and no party contested before the present Court that a filing made by a party without the umpire’s authority satisfied the statutory requirement. The learned Judges of the High Court had concluded, on the evidence, that the appellant had not demonstrated the necessary umpire authority to file the original awards on his behalf.

In interpreting section 14 sub-section (2), the Court observed that the provision required a party to file an award only when that party possessed the authority of the umpire to do so. The provision expressly stated that, upon filing the award, the court would give notice to the parties. Accordingly, the Court held that a filing made by a party without the umpire’s authority could not satisfy the statutory requirement. The High Court had applied this interpretation and had not been challenged on the ground that a filing by a party, even without the umpire’s authority, might nevertheless fulfil the provision. The learned Judges of the High Court concluded that the evidence did not establish that the appellant had been given the umpire’s authority to file the original awards on the umpire’s behalf.

The appellant relied on paragraph 7 of an affidavit dated 19 November 1949, filed on his behalf on 24 November 1949, in which it was asserted that “On or about 21 July 1949, the said umpire made over the said original award to this deponent for filing.” The appellant argued that this statement demonstrated the necessary authority and that the respondent had not contradicted the claim in any reply affidavit, thereby rendering the filing valid. The High Court rejected this argument on two factual bases. First, a letter from the umpire to the Gauhati Court dated 18 August 1949, sent in compliance with a court notice, merely stated that the umpire had handed the awards to both parties and did not indicate that he authorised either party to file the awards on his behalf. Second, the Court reasoned that it was unreasonable to suppose that the umpire, a person of ordinary sense, could have authorised both parties simultaneously to file the same award. The Supreme Court agreed with this reasoning, holding that the mere delivery of the original awards to the parties did not automatically confer the umpire’s authority to file them. Such authority had to be specifically alleged and proven. The affidavit’s statement was limited to an assertion that the umpire handed over the original award for filing; it did not allege that the award was handed over for filing on the umpire’s behalf, and therefore the filing could not be deemed compliant with section 14(2).

Appellant’s counsel submitted that the issue of whether the umpire had authorised the appellant to file the awards was never raised as an objection before the learned single Judge of the High Court, and therefore it should not be taken up for the first time on appeal. It was observed that neither the affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent nor the judgment of the learned single Judge contained any reference to such an objection being made in the lower court. The appellate judges themselves recognised this omission when they remarked towards the end of their judgment that the point on which the appeal succeeded had not been argued in the court below, yet it was a point of law and no objection was entered by the respondent to the appellant raising it. Although it may be difficult to characterise the question as a pure point of law, the extract clearly shows that the respondent did not object to the point being raised. No suggestion has been made before this Court that the statement in the appellate judgment was in any way erroneous.

Appellant’s counsel further argued that, had the appellate judges been inclined to decide the case solely on this issue, they should have called upon the umpire to confirm whether the appellant possessed the requisite authority, or at least afforded an opportunity to produce the umpire’s affidavit supporting such authority. The counsel pressed that such an opportunity should now be granted. The Court, however, found that it was neither necessary nor desirable to reopen the matter at this stage, especially after the lapse of time. Beyond the mere lack of proof of authority, it was evident that, on the facts and under sub-section (2) of section 4, the appellant was required to allege categorically that he held the umpire’s authority. This allegation was absent not only in the affidavit dated 19 November 1949 but also in the letter accompanying the filing of the awards on 17 August 1949. That letter, which may be treated as the initial application, contained only a plain statement that the two original awards duly signed by the umpire were enclosed for filing and a request directing the office to file the awards, without any reference to filing under the umpire’s authority.

The Court observed that the request to issue notices did not satisfy the requirements of section 14 sub-section (2) of the Act for filing the awards by the appellant’s solicitors on behalf of the umpire. Consequently, the Court held that there was no sufficient compliance with the statutory conditions to deem that the awards had been filed by the umpire as required by the Act. The judgment then turned to the second issue, namely whether, under section 31 sub-section (3), the awards should be regarded as having been filed earlier in the Calcutta Court or in the Gauhati Court. The learned Commercial Judge had concluded that the filing in the Calcutta Court was earlier and, for the purpose of this enquiry, it could be assumed that the filing occurred under the umpire’s authority. According to that judge, the filing of the awards in the Gauhati Court should be recorded as taking place on 3 September, following the Subordinate Judge’s order dated 24 August 1949. The judge explained that this order caused the respondent to file the original awards with the Subordinate Judge without delay. In reaching that conclusion, the learned Judge overlooked the fact that on 18 August 1949 the umpire, responding to the earlier notice, had forwarded signed copies of the awards to the court. The Court also noted that those copies were already in its possession by 24 August 1949. The presence of the signed copies in the court before the later filing date fulfilled the statutory requirement of causing the award to be filed. That circumstance, the Court held, satisfies the requirement of section 14 sub-section (2), which merely obliges the umpire, on the court’s directions, to cause the original award or a copy thereof to be filed. The learned Judge claimed ignorance as to whether the copies sent to the Subordinate Judge were signed. He also failed to notice that the umpire’s letter dated 18 August 1949 expressly declared, “As directed by you I am sending herewith copies of the same (awards) signed by me.” The umpire’s explicit statement removed any uncertainty regarding the authenticity and signing of the copies. The Judge also considered that mere forwarding of the awards did not constitute filing, overlooking that section 14 sub-section (2) does not require the umpire’s filing, only that he cause the awards to be filed. The Court therefore concluded that transmission by post, performed in response to the court’s notice, satisfied the ‘causing’ requirement. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the filing in the Gauhati Court should be fixed as 24 August 1949. This date precedes the filing deemed to have occurred in the Calcutta Court. With respect to the Calcutta Court, the awards were physically placed there by the appellant’s solicitors on 17 August 1949. However, the Registrar’s notice dated 30 August 1949 stated that the awards were deemed to have been filed on 29 August 1949.

In the affidavit that the respondent filed in the Calcutta court on the 24th of November, 1949, paragraphs 8 and 9 asserted categorically that, with respect to the Gauhati court, the umpire had filed copies of the awards on the 24th of August, 1949, whereas, with respect to the Calcutta High Court, the awards had been filed on the 29th of August, 1949. The appellant did not contradict these statements in the counter-affidavit that was filed on the same date. From these undisputed facts, the Court found that the earlier filing required by section 31(3) of the Arbitration Act occurred in the Gauhati court and not in the Calcutta court, contrary to the earlier conclusion of the learned single Judge, which had been based on an erroneous impression of the facts. At this stage, the Court noted that it had not been suggested that, for legal purposes, the filing of the awards in the Calcutta High Court could be treated as having occurred on the 10th of August, 1949, the date on which the appellant’s solicitors sent a letter to the Registrar enclosing the awards. The Court observed that the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court had apparently raised this point, but the present judgment had assumed the contrary. Consequently, the Court expressed the opinion that, even if the appellant’s authority to file the award on behalf of the umpire were taken as given, the award must still be regarded as having been filed earlier in the Gauhati court. Accordingly, the Court was inclined to hold that only the Gauhati court possessed jurisdiction under section 31(3) of the Act. The third remaining issue concerned whether sub-section (4) of section 31 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 applied solely when the first application under the Act was made during the pendency of a reference to arbitration, or also when the first application was made after the arbitration had concluded and an award had been made. The appellate judges had not addressed this question. However, the trial Judge had considered it and held that the provision related only to an application made while the reference was still pending. In the trial Judge’s view, “In order to attract sub-section (4) an application must have been made during the pendency of the reference, and if such an application had been made, all other applications arising out of that reference (whether made in the reference or not) must be made in that court.” The trial Judge appeared to interpret the phrase “in a reference” in section 31, sub-section (4) as meaning “in the course of a reference.”

In this case, the Court considered the argument advanced by counsel for the appellant, which required detailed examination. The Court set out the text of Section 31 of the Indian Arbitration Act of 1940, which reads as follows: “(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, an award may be filed in any Court having jurisdiction in the matter to which the reference relates. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force and save as otherwise provided in this Act, all questions regarding the validity, effect or existence of an award or an arbitration agreement between the parties to the agreement or persons claiming under them shall be decided by the Court in which the award under the agreement has been, or may be, filed, and by no other Court. (3) All applications regarding the conduct of arbitration proceedings or otherwise arising out of such proceedings shall be made to the Court where the award has been, or may be, filed, and to no other Court. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, where in any reference an application under the Act has been made in a Court competent to entertain it, that Court alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitration proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of that reference and the arbitration proceedings shall be made in that Court and in no other Court.” The Court explained that sub-section (1) deals with the question of the appropriate forum for filing a completed award, thereby prescribing the local jurisdiction for that purpose.

The Court further explained that sub-section (2) defines the scope of the jurisdiction granted by sub-section (1). It declares that the jurisdiction is exclusive by stating that “all questions regarding the validity, effect or existence of an award or arbitration agreement between the parties to the agreement or persons claiming under them shall be decided by the Court in which the award under the agreement has been, or may be, filed and by no other Court.” Sub-section (3) was described as a provision that obliges the concerned party to file every application concerning the conduct of the arbitration or any matter arising out of the arbitration in that same court, thus ensuring that all such applications are made in one forum only. Finally, sub-section (4) was identified as going a step further than sub-section (3). It not only imposes an obligation on the parties to file all applications in a single court but also vests exclusive jurisdiction for those applications in the court where the first application was lodged. The Court therefore concluded that, when the entire Section 31 is viewed comprehensively, sub-section (1) determines the court that may receive the award, while sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) each reinforce that jurisdiction in three distinct manners: (i) by assigning one court the authority to resolve all questions about the award’s validity, effect or existence; (ii) by obligating the parties to present all applications relating to the arbitration in that same court; and (iii) by granting that court exclusive jurisdiction over any subsequent applications once the first application has been filed. This interpretation shows that the provisions are intended to give a single court effective and exclusive control over the arbitration matter, irrespective of whether the applications arise during the pendency of the arbitration or after its conclusion.

The Court observed that subsection (3) imposed on the parties an obligation to file every application concerning the conduct of arbitration proceedings or any matter arising out of such proceedings in a single court, and that subsection (4) conferred exclusive jurisdiction upon the court in which the first application relating to the matter was presented. The Court explained that the purpose of subsection (4) was therefore not limited to applications made only while an arbitration was pending. It emphasized that a single court must be endowed with effective and exclusive jurisdiction so that, through the combined operation of subsections (2), (3) and (4), conflict and scramble among courts could be avoided. This need for a single forum was regarded as equally important whether the dispute arose during the pendency of the arbitration, after the arbitration had concluded, or even before the arbitration was commenced.

The Court rejected any suggestion that the legislature intended to restrict the operation of subsection (4) to applications made solely during the pendency of an arbitration. It noted that such a restriction could be inferred only if the phrase “in any reference” were interpreted to mean “in the course of a reference”. The Court found no compelling reason for such a narrow construction.

The Court then turned to the structure of the Arbitration Act, which classified arbitrations into three distinct categories. The first category comprised arbitrations without court intervention, governed by sections 3 to 19 of Chapter I. The second category involved arbitrations with court intervention where no suit was pending, covered by section 20 in Chapter III. The third category consisted of arbitrations that were part of suits, governed by sections 21 to 25 of Chapter IV. The Court pointed out that the jurisdiction over certain matters for the latter two categories was provided in the provisions that specifically dealt with those categories, namely section 20, subsection (1) and section 21.

Subsection (1) of section 31, the Court noted, appeared to refer only to the first category of arbitrations. Consequently, a plausible argument could be made that subsections (2), (3) and (4) were intended to apply only to that first category. However, the Court observed that no such position had been raised before it. Considering the wide language used in these subsections, the Court held that subsections (2) and (3) had been assumed to cover all three categories of arbitration at every stage.

Having accepted that broader reading, the Court examined whether there was any reason to believe that subsection (4) was meant to have a very restricted operation. The Court referred to the view advanced on behalf of the appellant, which suggested that subsection (4) would exclude not only applications filed after an award was pronounced but also applications filed before the arbitration began, such as applications for filing the agreement of reference or seeking directions thereon. The Court reminded that section 31 was part of the “General” group of sections, which, by virtue of section 26, applied to all arbitrations. Therefore, unless the wording of subsection (4) of section 31 was so strikingly specific as to limit its scope only to applications made during the pendency of an arbitration, the Court held that such a limited construction must be rejected.

The Court further explained that the entire basis for the limited construction rested on interpreting the phrase “in any reference” in subsection (4) to mean “in the course of any reference”. The Court found this interpretation unconvincing. It observed that the preposition “in” is used in many contexts and can convey various shades of meaning. Citing the Oxford English Dictionary, the Court noted that one of the meanings of “in” is “expressing reference or relation to something; in reference or regard to; in the case of, in the matter, affair, or province of”. Applying this understanding to section 31, subsection (4), the Court concluded that the phrase “in any reference” should be read as “in the matter of a reference”. Since the Act defines “reference” as “reference to arbitration”, the Court held that “in a reference” means “in the matter of a reference to arbitration”. The Court therefore indicated that the phrase “in a reference” is, therefore,

The Court explained that the argument for a narrow reading of subsection (4) depended on interpreting the phrase “in any reference” as meaning “in the course of any reference”. The Court found that such an interpretation was not compelling in the ordinary sense. It observed that the preposition “in” is used in many contexts and can convey a variety of shades of meaning. Referring to the Oxford English Dictionary, the Court noted that one of the meanings of “in” is “expressing reference or relation to something; in reference or regard to; in the case of, in the matter, affair, or province of, especially with the sphere or department in relation or reference to which an attribute or quality is predicated”. Applying this to section 31, subsection (4), the Court held that it is reasonable to understand the phrase “in any reference” to mean “in the matter of a reference”. Since the Act defines “reference” as “reference to arbitration”, the expression “in a reference” therefore means “in the matter of a reference to arbitration”. The Court concluded that this wording is broad enough to encompass an application filed after the arbitration has concluded and a final award has been made, and that this is the correct construction in the present context. Consequently, the Court was of the opinion that section 31(4) vests exclusive jurisdiction in the court where an application for filing an award under section 14 was first made. The Court noted that it was undisputed that the Union of India filed its application before the Gauhati Court on 10 August 1949, while the appellant’s earliest filing before the Calcutta Court occurred on 17 August 1949. On the basis of these facts and the Court’s interpretation of section 31(4), it was clear that only the Gauhati Court possessed jurisdiction over the dispute, not the Calcutta High Court. Accordingly, both appeals were dismissed with costs. The appeal was dismissed. The appellant was represented by an agent, and the respondent was represented by an agent.