Kalipada Chakraborti And Another vs Palani Bala Devi And Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 19 of 1952

Decision Date: 16 January 1953

Coram: B.K. Mukherjea, N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar, Ghulam Hasan

In the case titled Kalipada Chakraborti and Another versus Palani Bala Devi and Others, the Supreme Court of India pronounced its judgment on 16 January 1953. The decision was authored by Justice B.K. Mukherjea, and the bench comprised Justices B.K. Mukherjea, N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar and Ghulam Hasan. The petitioners were Kalipada Chakraborti and another individual, while the respondents were Palani Bala Devi and several others. The judgment appears in the 1953 reports as AIR 125 and in the Supreme Court Reporter as 1953 SCR 503, and it has been cited in later authorities such as RF 1961 SC 564, E 1969 SC 204, R 1972 SC 2069, and R 1988 SC 1511. The matter concerned the application of Hindu law relating to religious endowments, specifically the shebaiti right, the succession of that right by a widow, the nature and extent of the widow’s rights, the power of alienation by the widow, and the appropriate limitation provision for a suit brought by a reversioner against an alienee.

The Court observed that although a shebaiti right contains an element that possesses the legal characteristics of property, the shebaiti right is a form of property that is unusual and cannot be classified as immovable property in the ordinary sense. The Court further held that a shebaiti right is a hereditary office and therefore falls within the express language of Article 124 of the Limitation Act of 1908. Consequently, a suit instituted by a reversioner seeking to recover a shebaiti right from persons to whom a Hindu widow—who had succeeded to the right on her husband’s death—had transferred the right, is governed by Article 124 and not by Article 141. The possession of the alienee becomes adverse to the reversioner, and the limitation period begins to run against the reversioner only when the succession opens to him, because the reversioner’s claim is founded upon the last male holder rather than upon the widow.

The Court referred to the decision in Gnanasambanda v. Velu ([1900] 27 I.A. 69) to explain that, while a trustee’s office may carry no beneficial interest, a shebaiti right combines both the attributes of an office and of property. Since the shebaiti interest is hereditary and follows the line of inheritance from the founder, a female heir is deemed to hold a widow’s estate in the shebaiti right. The Court identified two principal limitations on a widow’s estate. First, the widow’s power to alienate the shebaiti right is restricted. Second, after the widow’s death, the right does not descend to her own heirs but passes to the heirs of the last male owner. The second limitation is applicable to the succession of a female shebait’s rights. Regarding the first limitation, the Court affirmed that a female shebait’s power to alienate the right is constrained in the same manner as a male shebait’s power, because such constraints are inherent in the shebaiti right itself and exist irrespective of whether the office is vested in a male or a female heir. The Court also cited the earlier decision in Pydigantan v. Rama Dass ([1905] ... ) in support of these principles.

The Court referred to the decisions reported in I.L.R. 28 Mad. 197 and Lilabati v. Bishen ([1907] 6 C.L.J. 621). It explained that the rule stating that adverse possession against a Hindu widow could not be treated as adverse possession against the reversionary heirs was not a rule that depended solely on the specific provision of Article 141 of the Limitation Act, nor was it limited only to cases that fell within that article. Rather, the rule was consistent with the established principles of Hindu law and with the general principle that the right of the reversioners was a mere expectation of succession. Because that right was not derived through the widow, it would be manifestly unjust for the reversioners to lose their entitlement due to the widow’s negligence or acquiescence. The Court cited Srinath Kuer v. Prosunno Kumar ([1883] I.L.R. 9 Cal. 934), Banchordas v. Parvati ([1899] 26 I.A. 71) and Jaggo v. Utsava ([1929] 56 I.A. 267) as authorities that approved this view, and also referred to Katama Natchiar v. Rajah of Shivagunga ([1925] 52 I.A. 332).

The judgment was delivered in the civil appellate jurisdiction in Civil Appeal No. 19 of 1952. The appeal arose from the judgment and decree dated 19 June 1950 of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta, which had been rendered by Justices Das and Guha, and it was an appeal against the original decree numbered 48 of 1949. The matter originated from a judgment and decree dated 22 December 1948 of the Subordinate Judge, Third Court, 24-Parganas, in Title Suit No. 53 of 1944. Counsel N. C. Chatterjee, assisted by A. K. Dutt, represented the appellants, while Panchanan Ghose, assisted by Radha Kanta Bhattacharya, represented the respondent. The judgment was pronounced on 16 January 1953 by Justice Mukherjee. The Court observed that the appeal was filed by the plaintiffs seeking to set aside the decree of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court dated 19 June 1950, which had reversed the findings of the Subordinate Judge, Third Court, 24-Parganas, in the same title suit. The factual background was not contested, and the dispute essentially revolved around a single question: whether the plaintiffs’ suit was barred by limitation. The trial court had decided in favour of the plaintiffs on that point, whereas the High Court, on appeal, had reached the opposite conclusion. The controversy concerned a one-third share in a shebaiti right relating to a private debutter dedicated to an idol called Dakshineshwar Jew, located in the village of Dhop Dhopi in the 24-Parganas district of West Bengal. The deity was ancient, and its reputed founder and first shebait was Udhab Chandra Pandit. It was undisputed that through successive transmissions the shebait rights had ultimately vested in Iswar Chandra Chakroborti, who was the common ancestor of all parties to the suit. The Court noted that a genealogical table would clarify the relationships among the various persons involved in the present litigation and their connection to the common ancestor.

The genealogical record indicated that Haran, who is now deceased, was married to Rajlakshmi; Surendra Sashi, who had been adopted, was married to Tarakali; Abani, a widow, is identified as the fourth defendant; Kali Nirmal are the first and second plaintiffs; Moni, Sarat, Surendra and Nagendra, who are deceased, had adopted Bidhu through Gopal; Palani, the third defendant, is married to Bala, the first defendant. The facts further state that Iswar died leaving six sons as his heirs, namely Ashutosh, Govinda, Gopal, Sadananda, Trailokhya and Haran. When those six sons partitioned the estate of their father, they also divided the shebaiti right into six equal portions. The division was carried out by the customary method known as palas or turns of worship, whereby each son received the privilege of worshipping the deity for five days in every month. During the five days allotted to a particular son, that son alone performed the duties of the shebait and received the emoluments attached to the office. Over time, a family custom developed that allowed these palas to be bought, sold or otherwise alienated among members of the shebait’s family. Govinda, who was the father of the plaintiffs and who originally enjoyed five days of pala each month under his share, sold his interest in the shebaiti right to his brother Haran. As a result of that transaction Haran obtained ten days of pala each month, which amounted to a one-third share in the entire shebaiti right. Haran died without leaving any issue, and under Hindu law his widow Rajlakshmi became his sole heir. Rajlakshmi consequently continued to hold that one-third share of the shebaiti right together with the other property of the deceased. On 17 June 1920 Rajlakshmi executed an ijara lease of her one-third shebaiti right for a term of two years in favour of Satish Chandra Dey. On 1 April 1921 Satish transferred that leasehold interest, concerning the palas, to Ram Rakhal Ghose. Earlier, on 6 August 1920, Ram Rakhal had himself obtained a lease from Rajlakshmi of the same shebaiti right for a period of five years, with the lease to commence at the expiration of Satish’s lease. Ram Rakhal admittedly took possession of the office of shebait and began to exercise the associated rights from 1 April 1921. By a deed of conveyance dated 7 November 1921 Rajlakshmi effected an outright sale of her shebaiti right to Ram Rakhal. Twenty days later, on 27 November 1921, Ram Rakhal sold this interest to Nagendra and Surendra, who were two sons of Trailokhya. Surendra died subsequently, and on 20 June 1925 his widow Tarakali conveyed her husband’s share in the shebaiti right to Nagendra, who was Surendra’s brother. Consequently Nagendra, in addition to the portion he had already inherited from his own father, came to possess the whole one-third share in the shebaiti right, represented by ten days of pala each month, the same share that had previously been held by Haran. Rajlakshmi died on 22 December 1943, and the two plaintiffs, who

In this proceeding, the two surviving sons of Govinda instituted a suit seeking recovery of possession of the one-third shebaiti right that had previously belonged to Haran. They asserted that, at the time of Rajlakshmi’s death, they were the next heirs of Haran and therefore entitled to that share. By that stage Nagendra had died, and the principal defendant in the suit was his daughter, Palani Bala, who was a minor and was represented by her husband acting as guardian. The second defendant was a receiver appointed to manage the property of Palani Bala in a guardianship proceeding pending before the District Judge of 24 Parganas. Defendants three and four were the surviving descendants of Iswar, who held the remaining interest in the shebaiti right. The plaintiffs contended that the one-third share that Haran possessed during his lifetime had passed to his widow, Rajlakshmi, but that her rights were limited to those of a Hindu widow. They further maintained that, upon Rajlakshmi’s death, the interest reverted to the plaintiffs as the nearest heirs of Haran. Consequently they prayed that they be placed in possession of the one-third share, which was represented by ten days of pala each month, and that the defendant No. 1 be evicted. They also claimed mesne profits from the date of the widow’s death. Although the plaint described the temple, its appurtenant lands and the structures thereon, no relief was sought regarding those properties. The defendants, on behalf of defendant No. 1, opposed the suit, mainly arguing that the sale of the shebaiti right by Rajlakshmi, the widow of Haran, was a void transaction that created no right in the purchaser. They asserted that the possession taken by Ram Rakhal and subsequently by his vendees, who were predecessors of defendant No. 1, was adverse to all shebaits, thereby giving defendant No. 1 an indefeasible title to the one-third share by adverse possession and rendering the plaintiffs’ suit barred by limitation. Several other contentions were raised but were not material to the present consideration. The trial judge, by judgment dated 22 December 1948, rejected the defenses raised by the defendant and granted a decree in favour of the plaintiffs. Regarding limitation, the subordinate judge found that article 141 of the Indian Limitation Act did not apply and that the suit was not time-barred for two reasons: first, that Nagendra had purportedly purchased only the life interest of Rajlakshmi, acknowledging the reversionary interest of Haran’s heirs; and second, that Rajlakshmi and Nagendra were co-shebaits, meaning that possession could not be characterised as adverse.

The Court noted that, because the parties were co-sharers in law of the deity, the possession of one could not be regarded as adverse to the other, and no allegation or proof of ouster had been made in the present case. Against the trial judge's decision, defendants No 1 and No 2 filed an appeal before the Calcutta High Court, where the matter was heard by a Division Bench consisting of Justices Das and Guha. While the High Court affirmed all the other findings of the trial judge, it disagreed with the trial judge on the question of limitation. The High Court held that article 124 of the Limitation Act was the proper provision to apply, and that defendant No 1 together with her predecessors had been in possession of the hereditary office of shebait in adverse claim to the plaintiff for more than twelve years prior to the institution of the suit. Accordingly, the High Court concluded that the plaintiff’s claim was barred by limitation, reversed the trial court’s judgment, and dismissed the suit.

The sole issue presented for determination before the Supreme Court was the question of limitation, and the arguments advanced by counsel on both sides gave rise to two distinct questions. The first question was whether, on the facts of the present case, the plaintiff’s suit should be governed by article 124 or by article 141 of the Limitation Act. If article 141 were applicable, there was no dispute that the suit was timely. If, however, article 124 applied, the second question required consideration: when did the defendant or her predecessors acquire possession of the hereditary shebait office adverse to the plaintiffs? Specifically, was their possession adverse from the moment of the transfer by Rajlakshmi, or did it become adverse only upon her death?

The Court reiterated the well-settled proposition that, under Hindu law, the alienation of a shebaiti right by a shebait in favour of a stranger is absolutely void and cannot be validated even by custom. Consequently, the person who receives such a void alienation is a trespasser, and his possession is adverse to the transferor from the very inception of the transaction. Counsel for the plaintiffs, Mr Chatterjee, did not challenge the correctness of this legal principle. Instead, he argued that the possession of the shebaiti right by defendant No 1 and her predecessors might have been adverse to Rajlakshmi from the date of the transfer, and that, on the strength of such adverse possession, they could have acquired a statutory title against her with respect to the shebaiti interest. Nevertheless, Mr Chatterjee contended that even if such adverse possession continued for a period exceeding the statutory limitation, it would bar the widow but would not bar the reversionary heirs, who do not derive their title from or through her. He submitted that this principle underlies the law of limitation in India since 1871 and is encapsulated in article 141 of the Limitation Act.

The Limitation Act contains an explicit provision that recognises and gives effect to the principle in this matter. Counsel for the plaintiffs argues that even if article 141 does not apply to the present facts and article 124 is the appropriate provision, the suit remains timely because the defendant or her predecessors only took adverse possession of the shebait office after the widow’s death. Counsel for the respondents counters that no general rule of law states that adverse possession against a Hindu widow cannot be counted as adverse possession against her reversionary heirs. He explains that such a rule is a special principle that depends entirely on article 141 of the Limitation Act and applies only to cases that fall within that article’s scope. The respondent’s counsel maintains that article 141 does not apply to the facts of this case, therefore there is no basis for holding that adverse possession against the widow, even if continued for the statutory period, would fail to bar the reversionary heirs. He further states that the rule existing before article 141 was introduced governed all cases not directly covered by that article, and that rule remains applicable. According to the respondent, article 124 is the correct provision for this matter, and because the transferee’s possession of the shebaiti interest was admittedly adverse to the holder of the office at the time of transfer, that possession is also adverse to any subsequent holder regardless of the source of title. It is submitted that in a hereditary office such as that of a shebait, the powers of a female shebait are no more limited than those of a male shebait, and that during a female shebait’s incumbency the trust estate resides in her completely and effectually as it would in a male trustee. Consequently, a male trustee who succeeds a female shebait cannot invoke the principle underlying article 141 to escape adverse possession consequences. The Court notes that these points are important and merit careful consideration. The Court observes that the earlier Limitation Act of 1859 contained no specific provision for suits by reversioners seeking recovery of property held by a Hindu widow in her restricted right. Instead, the 1859 Act only contained general provisions in sections 12 and 16, which set limitation periods of twelve years for immovable property and six years for movable property from the time the cause of action arose. Moreover, even before that statute, a decision of the Supreme Court of Calcutta, reported as Peel, C. (1), addressed the issue.

J. observed that for many years the law has consistently treated a widow as fully representing the estate of her deceased husband, and that once an adverse possession claim bars the widow, the same bar extends to the heir who succeeds after her; this would not be the result if the widow were merely a life tenant under English law. The Court then referred to the 1863 decision in Katama Natchier v. Rajah of Shivagunga, which was rendered by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. That decision articulated a principle that has remained unchallenged: when the estate of a deceased Hindu passes to a female heir, any decree that is fairly and properly obtained against her concerning her estate, provided there is no fraud or collusion, binds the reversionary heir as well. Turner L.J., delivering the judgment of the Board, explained that for a period the entire estate would be vested in the widow, absolutely for certain purposes and only qualified for others, and that until her death it would be impossible to determine who would be entitled to succeed. He noted that the same principle applied to tenants-in-tail representing inheritance in this country and that it would cause great inconvenience if succeeding heirs were not bound by a decree fairly and properly obtained against the widow. The case was argued on the premise that although the widow holds only a partial interest in her husband’s estate for some purposes, the whole estate vests in her for other purposes, making her interest comparable to that of a tenant-in-tail under English law. Consequently, when a suit concerns not a personal claim against the widow but the estate which she fully represents in law, a decree fairly and properly obtained binds the reversionary interest. While adverse possession was not raised in that particular case, the rule it established was later relied upon in several judgments under the Limitation Act of 1859, especially in situations where the question was whether an adverse possession that exceeds the statutory period, and therefore bars the widow, would also bar her reversionary heirs. The leading authority on this point is the decision in Nobin Chunder v. Issur Chunder, which Mr. Ghosh emphasized heavily. In that case, a trespasser had taken possession of the estate against the widow, and the Court held that such adverse possession was effective against the reversioners as well. The Court explained that the cause of action accrued to the widow, and that a suit brought either by her or by her reversionary heir must be filed within the period prescribed by law.

In that decision, the Court held that a suit for recovery of possession of immovable property had to be filed within twelve years from the date of dispossession, as prescribed in section twelve of the Limitation Act of 1859. The Court observed that this result could be justified by the law of limitation as it then existed. The 1859 Act contained no distinct provision for reversionary heirs; consequently every action to recover possession of land had to be commenced within twelve years of the moment when the cause of action arose. When a trespass was committed against the widow, the moment the trespass began created the cause of action, and a suit against the trespasser had to be filed within twelve years, irrespective of whether the plaintiff was the widow herself or a reversionary heir. The learned Judges noted that reversionary heirs could not sue for possession while the widow was still alive. To resolve this difficulty, the Court invoked the principle of “representation of the estate by the widow,” a doctrine articulated in the Shivagunga case. Chief Justice Sir Barnes Peacock explained that although the reversionary heirs were unable to sue during the widow’s lifetime, they could not be allowed to escape the limitation period for an adverse holding against her. He reasoned that, when the widow is regarded as the representative of the estate, decrees obtained against her without fraud or collusion bind the reversionary heirs, and therefore the same limitation period that bars the widow also bars the heirs. Applying this reasoning, the Court held that an adverse possession claim against the widow would also extinguish the reversionary interest, because the same principle of representation applied. The Privy Council affirmed this principle in Aumirtolall v. Rajonee Kant, and Sir Barnes Peacock reiterated the decision in Nobin Chunder v. Issur Chunder. The Court pointed out that the Privy Council judgment of 1875 was rendered under the old 1859 Limitation Act, which had been repealed by the Limitation Act of 1871. Article 142 of the 1871 Act—corresponding to article 141 of the current Act—explicitly set a twelve-year limitation for a Hindu claimant seeking possession of immovable property on the death of a Hindu female heir, with the period running from the heir’s death. This provision was later extended to include a Muslim claimant, reproduced in the 1877 Act and again in article 141 of the present legislation, reflecting the legislature’s deliberate amendment of the earlier law.

In this case the Court observed that the legislative change embodied in Article 141 was a deliberate amendment to the existing law. Article 141 refers to a “like suit”, meaning a suit for possession of immovable property that is covered by the preceding article. The earlier article dealt with a suit brought by a remainderman or a reversioner in the technical sense used by English lawyers. To avoid any confusion that might arise from using the term “reversioner” in connection with the estate of a Hindu or Mahommedan female heir, the legislature expressly employed the words “a Hindu or Mahommedan entitled to possession of property on the death of a female heir.” The estate of a Hindu female heir is well known to be highly anomalous; it cannot be classified strictly as an estate of inheritance nor as a life estate, although it possesses elements of both. The legislative purpose in inserting this provision was clearly to eliminate those anomalies for the purpose of applying the law of limitation, and for that purpose the widow’s estate was treated as if it were a tenant-for-life estate. This interpretation had previously been adopted by a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Srinath Kur v. Prosunno Kumar (1883) 9 Cal. 934 and by the Bombay High Court in Vundravandas v. Cursondas (1897) 21 Bom. 646, the latter decision being affirmed by the Privy Council in Ranchordas v. Parvati (1899) 26 I.A. 71. The decision in Ranchordas has long been regarded as authority for the rule that the statute of limitation does not commence against the reversioner when a Hindu female holder of a limited estate is dispossessed; instead, the reversioner may institute a suit within twelve years of the death of the female heir, that moment when the estate actually falls into possession. The Judicial Committee, in Ranchordas, also expressly held that even with respect to movable property—where Article 141 is inapplicable—the reversioner’s right to the property accrues at the widow’s death and not earlier. Some later cases, such as Vaithialinga v. Srirangath (1925) 52 I.A. 322, suggested that the principle laid down in Ranchordas had been undermined and that the doctrine of representation of the estate by the widow, which underpinned the rule in Shivagunga’s case, could be extended to an action of adverse possession against the widow. However, the Privy Council, in Jaggo v. Utsava (1929) 56 I.A. 267, dispelled all doubts on this point. Consequently, the Court concluded that the law is now perfectly settled: except where a decree has been obtained fairly, properly, and without fraud or collusion, the reversioner’s cause of action to recover the property arises only on the death of the Hindu or Mahommedan female heir.

In this matter, the Court observed that when a Hindu female heir holds a property as a limited owner, a reversioner may bring an action to recover that property either against a person to whom the female heir has transferred it or against a trespasser who holds it adversely, but such cause of action only arises upon the death of the female heir. The Court noted that this rule has been part of the law of limitation in this country since 1871 and it is consistent with the recognised principles of Hindu law. The Court explained that the right of reversionary heirs is a mere expectation of succession, known as spes successionis, and because the reversioners do not derive their title through or from the widow, it would be manifestly unjust for them to lose their rights merely because the widow’s property is destroyed by the adverse possession of a stranger. Consequently, the argument advanced by counsel that a general principle should apply in such cases was held to be unsound. Turning to the specific issues, the Court examined whether the present suit should be governed by article 124 or article 141 of the Limitation Act. The learned judges of the High Court had held, correctly, that the benefit of article 141 could be claimed only where the female heir possessed a qualified estate, after whose death the plaintiff, as heir of the last male holder, would be entitled to the property. They concluded that this condition was not satisfied because the dispute concerned the right of shebaitship, and the rights of a female shebait are not more restricted or qualified than those of a male shebait, although a shebait cannot transmit the office to his own heirs. The High Court relied upon the Madras High Court decision in Pydigantan v. Rama Dass (1) and the Calcutta High Court decision in Lilabati v. Bishen (2). The Court found this method of approach doubtful. While acknowledging that a trustee’s office carries no beneficial interest, the Court held that shebaitship, as now well settled, combines both office and property, is heritable and follows the line of inheritance from the founder; therefore, when the heir is female, she must be deemed to possess a widow’s estate in the shebaiti interest. The Court further observed that ordinarily a widow’s estate is subject to two limitations: first, her right to alienate the property is restricted; second, after her death the property does not pass to her own heirs but to the heirs of the last male owner. The Court affirmed that the second limitation is indeed present in the present case.

The Court observed that the second element, namely the succession to the rights of a female shebait, was clearly present in the case, as reflected in the cited authorities. Regarding the first element, the Court noted that the restriction on the power of alienation applied equally to a female shebait as to a male shebait. This equality arose because the shebaiti right itself carried inherent limitations and restrictions that operated regardless of whether the shebaitship vested in a male or a female heir. Although the Court did not endorse the line of reasoning adopted by the High Court on this point, it concurred with the learned judges that the appropriate provision of the Limitation Act to be applied was article 124 rather than article 141. The Court affirmed that the shebaiti right possessed an element with the legal characteristics of property, yet it recognized that shebaitship represented a peculiar and anomalous form of property that could not readily be classified as immovable property in the ordinary sense. Article 141 was noted to refer expressly to immovable property and not to property in the general sense of the word. Conversely, it was well-settled that a shebaiti right constituted a hereditary office and therefore fell within the express language of article 124 of the Limitation Act. The Court reasoned that when a specific article of the Limitation Act directly covered the situation, it would be improper to apply another article whose applicability was uncertain. Consequently, the Court held that article 124 was the proper provision to govern the present dispute and turned to consider whether the suit filed by the plaintiffs was barred by the limitation prescribed under that article, as the High Court had held.

Article 124 governs suits for possession of a hereditary office and prescribes a limitation period of twelve years measured from the date on which the defendant takes possession of the office adversely to the plaintiff. The legislative intention, as the Court explained, was to treat a hereditary office in a manner analogous to land for the purpose of barring possession suits after a specified period, thereby extinguishing the plaintiff’s right to possession. The Court cited the decision in Angurbala v. Debabrata to illustrate this principle. The issue that then arose was the determination of the exact moment when the defendant, or her predecessor, took adverse possession of the shebait office with respect to the plaintiffs. It was conceded that the possession was indeed adverse to Rajlakshmi, who was the holder of the shebaiti at that time. However, counsel for the defendants, Mr. Chatterjee, argued that because the plaintiffs had not claimed their right through or from Rajlakshmi, the defendant could not be said to have taken adverse possession of the office against the plaintiffs. To support this contention, he referred to the definition of “plaintiff” contained in section 2(8) of the Limitation Act, which includes any person from whom a plaintiff derives his right to sue.

The court observed that section 2(8) of the Limitation Act defines a plaintiff as any person from or through whom a plaintiff derives his right to sue. In response to this definition, counsel for the appellant argued that a shebait, much like a trustee, embodies the entire trust estate and that the succeeding trustee, even if he does not strictly claim through the previous holder of the office, must be considered bound by the acts or omissions of that predecessor. To support this position, the counsel cited the judgment of the Judicial Committee in Gnanasambanda v. Velu (1900) 27 I.A. 69. The court, however, rejected this contention. It explained that article 124 of the Limitation Act concerns a hereditary office, meaning that the office passes from one person to another solely because the latter is an heir of the former. Under Hindu law of inheritance, when a female heir succeeds, she enjoys only a limited interest for the duration of her life, and after her death the succession does not pass to her own heirs but to the heirs of the last male holder. The court emphasized that the same rule applies to the succession of a shebaitship. By reading article 124 together with section 2(8), the court concluded that, to defeat the plaintiff’s title under article 124, it must be shown that the defendant took possession of the office adversely to the plaintiff or to someone from or through whom the plaintiff derives his title, and that such adverse possession occurred more than twelve years before the suit was filed. This principle is precisely what the Judicial Committee set out in Gnanasambanda v. Velu. In that case, two hereditary trustees of a religious endowment sold their managerial rights and transferred the entire endowed property to the defendant appellant. The sales were declared null and void, and the purchaser’s possession was deemed adverse to the vendors from the outset. The plaintiff, Velu, was the son and heir of one of the hereditary trustees; he instituted his suit more than twelve years after the transaction, claiming possession of the office together with the heir of the other trustee, who was joined as a defendant. The Judicial Committee held that Velu’s suit was barred because “the respondent Velu could only be entitled as heir to his father Nataraja, and from him and through him, and consequently his suit was barred by article 114.” The court noted that this portion of the judgment appears to have been overlooked by both the Calcutta High Court and the Madras High Court in the present matter. Finally, the court observed that even if, under ordinary inheritance law, the plaintiffs would be heirs of the husband of Rajlakshmi, such a relationship is irrelevant, because they would not be deriving their right to sue “through and from” the widow.

In light of the reasoning just articulated, the Court determined that the suit brought by the plaintiffs is not barred by any legal impediment. Consequently, the Court decided to allow the appeal that had been filed by the appellants. By allowing the appeal, the Court ordered that the judgment and decree previously rendered by the High Court be set aside in their entirety. The Court further directed that the judgment and decree originally pronounced by the trial judge be restored and given full effect. The Court also emphasized that the restoration of the trial judge’s judgment reinstates all relief that had been granted to the appellants in the original proceeding. In addition, the Court ordered that the costs of the proceedings be awarded to the appellants, and that such costs be payable in all courts where the matter had been or could be litigated. The direction that costs be paid in all courts ensures that the appellants are fully compensated for the expenses incurred at each stage of the litigation. The order therefore constitutes an allowance of the appeal. The agents appearing for the appellants were identified as Sukumar Ghose, and the agent appearing for respondent No 1 was identified as R R Biswas.