Kalawati and Another v. State of Himachal Pradesh

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeals Nos. 73 and 74 of 1952

Decision Date: 19 January 1953

Coram: N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar, M. Patanjali Sastri, B.K. Mukherjea, Vivian Bose, Ghulam Hasan

In the matter titled Kalawati and Another versus the State of Himachal Pradesh, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on the nineteenth day of January, 1953. The opinion was written by Justice N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar, who sat together with Justices M. Patanjali Sastri, B. K. Mukherjea, Vivian Bose and Ghulam Hasan. The petitioners, named Kalawati and another individual, were opposed by the respondent, the State of Himachal Pradesh. The case was reported in the 1953 volume of the All India Reporter at page 131 and in the Supreme Court Reporter at page 546. The relevant statutory provisions were sections 114, 201 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code of 1860. The factual matrix showed that the accused had been charged with abetment of murder under sections 114 and 302, while the Sessions Court had acquitted her of those charges and instead convicted her under section 201 for suppressing evidence and giving false information. Both the accused and the State appealed to the Judicial Commissioner, who set aside the conviction under section 201 and upheld convictions under sections 114 and 302, imposing the death penalty. The Supreme Court held that, even though the State had not appealed the acquittal under section 201, the Court could, on an appeal preferred by the accused, restore that conviction when it was intimately connected with the convictions under sections 114 and 302. The Court applied the principle stated in Begu versus King-Emperor (52 IA 191) and observed that the existence of only a single Judicial Commissioner in the State, without a two-judge bench as in High Courts, did not justify issuing a certificate of fitness for appeal under article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution when a death sentence was involved.

The criminal appeals were numbered 73 and 74 of 1952 and were filed under article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution of India against the judgment and order dated the sixteenth of June, 1952, issued by the Judicial Commissioner’s Court in Simla in Murder Reference No. a of 1951. Additional appeals numbered 10 of 1951 and 2 of 1952 arose from the judgment dated the fifth of December, 1951, of the Sessions Judge of Mahasu and Sirmur districts, Simla, concerning Sessions Trial No. 7 of 1951. Counsel for the appellant presented the case on behalf of Kalawati, while counsel for the respondent represented the State of Himachal Pradesh. The Court examined the procedural history, the nature of the convictions and acquittals, and the statutory framework governing abetment of murder, suppression of evidence and false statements. After weighing the arguments, the Supreme Court exercised its jurisdiction to set aside the earlier order, restore the conviction under section 201, and affirm the convictions under sections 114 and 302, thereby upholding the death sentence imposed by the Judicial Commissioner.

Counsel for the appellant Ranjit Singh appeared before the Court, and counsel for the respondent State of Himachal Pradesh was also present. The judgment was delivered on the nineteenth day of January, 1953, by Justice Chandrasekhara Aiyar. The factual background narrated by the Court described Kanwar Bikram Singh as a relative of the Rana of Kuthar and a landholder possessing certain estates. His summer residence was located at Bishanpura within the jurisdiction of the Solan police station, while his permanent dwelling on the plains was at Manimajra in the Ambala District. In the year 1938 he contracted marriage with Kalawati, who was one of the two appellants and the daughter of the late Raja of Nalagarh born of a mistress. On the morning of the sixteenth of July, 1951 Kanwar Bikram Singh was found dead while sleeping on the roof of his haveli at Bishanpura. The post-mortem report showed that he had sustained several incised wounds. The prosecution alleged that the murder was committed by Ranjit Singh, a distant cousin of the deceased, who acted with the assistance and connivance of Kalawati. It was asserted that the two appellants were engaged in an illicit relationship and that they resolved to eliminate Kanwar Bikram Singh because of his cruelty toward Kalawati. The last instance of alleged maltreatment was recorded on the sixth of July, when the victim is said to have slapped his wife. According to the prosecution, Kalawati, unable to bear continued humiliation and hoping to advance her liaison with Ranjit Singh, conspired with him to murder her husband. Consequently, Ranjit Singh was charged with murder under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, and Kalawati was charged under sections 114 and 302 IPC for abetment of murder.

The Sessions Judge of Mahasu and Sirmur found Ranjit Singh guilty of the offence and imposed upon him the statutory extreme penalty of death. Kalawati was acquitted of the charge of abetment under section 302 read with section 114, but the Judge convicted her under section 201 of the Indian Penal Code for suppressing evidence, shielding Ranjit Singh and furnishing false information concerning the murder, and sentenced her to five years of rigorous imprisonment. Both appellants challenged these findings before the Judicial Commissioner of Himachal Pradesh, while the State lodged an appeal against Kalawati’s acquittal on the murder charge. The Judicial Commissioner set aside Kalawati’s conviction and sentence under section 201, thereby granting her relief on that point. Simultaneously, the Commissioner upheld the State’s appeal, convicting Kalawati of an offence under section 302 read with section 114 of the Indian Penal Code and ordering transportation for life. The appeal filed by Ranjit Singh was dismissed. Thereafter, an application was made to the Judicial Commissioner under article 132 (1) of the Constitution seeking a certificate that the matter involved a substantial question of law regarding the interpretation of the Constitution. The Commissioner granted the certificate.

In this case, the Judicial Commissioner granted the certificate under article 132(1) of the Constitution, but he also noted that the matter was suitable for appeal to the Supreme Court under article 134(1)(c). He explained that the confirmation of a death sentence in the High Courts was usually performed by a bench of at least two judges. Therefore, it would not be appropriate for the same issue to be decided solely by his single judgment. The Court observed that the reason given for certifying the case as appropriate for appeal under article 134(1)(c) was not satisfactory. The Court held that, where a State has only one Judicial Commissioner who serves as the ultimate appellate authority, the established procedure for confirming a death sentence must still be followed. This requirement applies even if that Commissioner acts alone. The absence of a two-judge bench, as is customary in the High Courts, could not be used as a justification for treating the Supreme Court as an ordinary appellate and confirming court in such matters. The Court further stated that it was unnecessary to continue this discussion, because it had already examined the two appeals on their merits. It found no merit in the constitutional arguments raised on behalf of the appellants. Both appellants had previously made confessions of guilt that were recorded under section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code, but they later retracted those confessions before the committing magistrate. Despite the retractions, the confessions were introduced against them during the sessions trial and were also examined under section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Each appellant was questioned about specific details contained in the other’s confession. Counsel argued that a retracted confession should not be used at all, claiming that such use would violate article 20(3) of the Constitution, which forbids compelling a person to be a witness against himself. The Court found this argument unconvincing. It explained that a confession must be voluntary before it can be used against its maker, and the magistrate is required to ensure that the confession was given without any inducement, threat, or promise. No accused is obligated to confess, and any evidence obtained by compulsion must be excluded as irrelevant and inadmissible. Consequently, article 20(3) does not apply to a confession that was made freely, without inducement or threat. The Court acknowledged that a retracted confession generally carries only limited probative value for a conviction. It also held that the confession of one accused does not constitute evidence against a co-accused tried jointly for the same offence; it may only be considered against the confessor himself. This consideration relates to the evidential weight of the confession and does not raise any constitutional conflict. It was

In this case, counsel for the petitioner argued that subsection two of article twenty of the Constitution, which bars a person from being prosecuted and punished twice for the same offence, also prevents the State from filing an appeal against an acquittal. The argument proceeded on two main points. First, it was contended that if the prosecution does not result in any punishment for the accused, the provision of the Constitution would have no operative effect. Second, it was submitted that an appeal against an acquittal, where such an appeal is provided for under the procedural law, essentially amounts to a continuation of the original prosecution and therefore conflicts with the constitutional bar. After presenting these constitutional objections, the counsel for Kalawati chose to abandon further reliance on them and turned his attention to the substantive merits of the case.

The factual background of the matter involved a homicide that occurred on the open roof of Bikram Singh’s haveli at approximately four in the morning on the sixteenth of July, nineteen fifty-one. The first person to become aware of the disturbance was Mst. Shibbi, identified as PW-3, who served as a cook in the household and was sleeping on the same roof, a short distance from the victim. She reported hearing an unusual noise, observed a man moving away from near her sleeping place and descending a ladder at the back of the house, and then raised an alarm. On investigating, she found Bikram Singh fallen from his bed with his face turned downward. The other servants—Jora, Dayaram, and Nathu, who is PW-3’s husband—had been sleeping downstairs but rushed up to the roof upon hearing the commotion. A Laik named Ram also arrived carrying a gas light. Kalawati, who had been sleeping beside her husband, was not found in her bed; she was standing near the stairwell at the time of the incident. The injuries sustained by Bikram Singh indicated that he had been the victim of a fatal assault. The disturbance was heard by PW-7, who lived at some distance from the scene; he shouted for assistance, prompting the nearby police station to respond. At approximately four-forty in the morning, the head constable, identified as PW-24, arrived and recorded a statement from Kalawati in which she claimed that unknown dacoits had entered the house, killed her husband, and taken her jewellery. While the head constable was beginning the investigation, the station-house officer of Solan, PW-38, took over the case. During the subsequent inquiry several pieces of physical evidence were recovered. On the day of the murder, PW-19 discovered a scabbard at a distance of one furlong from the deceased’s house. Two days later, on the eighteenth of July, PW-22 unearthed a shirt and a kachha from beneath a stone in a water channel located about a mile away. On the twenty-fourth of July, the police arrested Ranjit Singh. It was reported that the police, with his assistance, retrieved a sword from a bush situated one hundred yards to the west of the crime scene after the accused himself cleared away some bushes. In addition to the sword, a collection of thirty-five ornaments belonging to Kalawati was later discovered, but the narrative of those findings continues beyond the present paragraph.

The Court recorded that the accused himself recovered thirty-five ornaments belonging to Kalawati on 27 October 1951. He found them concealed in a metal box that was placed inside an earthen pot and buried in the ground of a room in his house at Basdhera. Kalawati later gave a confession to the Magistrate, Sri Antani, on 28 July 1951, and Ranjit Singh’s confession was also recorded by the same Magistrate on 3 August 1951. The material evidence in the case therefore consists of these two written confessions and the testimony of the maidservant, Shibbi. The prosecution also relied on evidence relating to motive and on several discoveries made during the investigation, presenting them as corroborative circumstances to substantiate the truth of the confessions, which both appellants had withdrawn before the Committing Magistrate. It was evident from the record that Kalawati’s relationship with her husband, Bikram Singh, was strained. As early as 1946 she had complained of his violence and threatened to kill her, leading to the cancellation of his arms licence. Bikram Singh was an alcoholic who frequently quarreled with and ill-treated her. Around 1948, Ranjit Singh, a close relative, began visiting Manimajra or Bishanpura regularly and entered into an intimate relationship with Kalawati. This development gave rise to suspicion about her conduct with him. The evidence of Balbir Singh (brother of the deceased), Baldev Singh (manager of the estate), and Dropadi (mistress of the deceased’s father), examined as witnesses, supported the existence of this relationship. In her written confession, marked Exhibit P.A.A., Kalawati explained how and why her marriage had become difficult, described her liaison with Ranjit Singh, and detailed the conspiracy they allegedly hatched to eliminate Bikram Singh, including the plan carried out on the early morning of 16 July. She placed full responsibility on Ranjit Singh, stating that she had agreed to his scheme out of sheer disgust for her husband, and asserted that she made the confession to relieve her soul of sin.

Ranjit Singh’s confession, marked Exhibit P.A.C., which he later retracted, largely mirrors Kalawati’s account but emphasizes Kalawati’s primary role in the plot. He wrote that he would not have contemplated murdering Kanwar (Bikram Singh) if Kalawati had not urged him, adding, “Had Kalawati not asked me, I would not have thought of murdering Kanwar. The fault of worsening the relations between Kalawati and Kanwar lies on the Kanwar. He had illicit connections with his father's keep.” He admitted that he inflicted the injuries found on Bikram Singh with a sword. When examined before the Committing Magistrate under section 342, he did not challenge his confession in any way. However, during the Sessions Court proceedings he repudiated most of the material details, claiming that the confession had been dictated to the Magistrate by two police Sub-Inspectors and that he had merely been a passive listener to their statements. He signed the document out of fear after being beaten by the police.

In the present case, Ranjit Singh affixed his signature to a document out of fear after the police had beaten him. On the night of the fatal incident, Shibbi was sleeping at a distance on the same terrace as Bikram Singh and Kalawati. She awoke to a slashing sound and observed Ranjit Singh passing close to her bed before descending the back ladder of the house. She raised a loud cry, prompting the servants who were sleeping in the courtyard below to come up. Kalawati was standing near the steps of an adjoining room. When Shibbi informed her that Ranjit Singh was running away, Kalawati denied that the person was Ranjit Singh and alleged that dacoits had entered the house and stolen her ornaments. The lower courts accepted Shibbi’s testimony and found it credible, noting that even if she had been a false witness she could have said she saw Ranjit Singh assaulting Bikram Singh with a sword, yet she testified that she did not witness the murder itself. She said she saw only the back of Ranjit Singh hurrying down the ladder at a distance of about one yard from her bed and could not identify the weapon he held, except to describe it as something shining. She did not name Ranjit Singh before the Committing Magistrate’s proceedings because Kalawati had scolded her and demanded her silence. The suggestion that Shibbi’s husband, Nathu, was responsible for the murder because his hands were reportedly blood-stained when a crowd gathered was rejected as implausible, since he possessed no motive to kill his master. It was possible, however, that when Nathu arrived with the servants and the assembled crowd, he touched the body while trying to ascertain what had happened or offered water to the dying victim, a circumstance supported by some evidence. Kalawati had initially told the police that dacoits had attacked, and until the investigation progressed, suspicion naturally fell upon several individuals. Laik Ram, a shopkeeper situated opposite the scene and examined as PW 23, told the police that he suspected many persons, namely Shibbi and Nathu, Kalawati, a Sikh servant of the deceased, Balbir Singh the deceased’s brother, the driver who had formerly been a Sub-Inspector, and two Sikhs who were seen in the jungle at eight o’clock the previous evening. In addition to the confessions, the court observed several concrete facts that, in the court’s view, indicated beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of Ranjit Singh. Although he was a resident of Bashdera, his sword and scabbard were discovered near the crime scene, and he himself retrieved the sword from a bush. Moreover, his underwear was hidden under a stone in a channel close to the location of the incident. Kalawati herself stated in her confession

Kalawati told the police that the piece of underwear, described as “kachha,” appeared to belong to Ranjit Singh because she knew he had bought the cloth. She further explained that the garment had been sewn on her own sewing machine while she was present at Manimajra. More significant, she said, was the recovery of her own ornaments on 29 July 1951. The recovery took place in the presence of Ranjit Singh and with his assistance. According to her statement, the ornaments had been buried beneath the earth inside a room of his house in Bashdera. It was argued that the room was an open space, having no doors and no roof, and therefore it was probable that the ornaments had been planted there rather than being hidden by the owner. Kalawati’s confession also recorded that she had left the ornaments at Manimajra and that Baldev Singh, the manager, possessed the keys to the place where they were kept. From this she suggested that Baldev Singh might have handed the jewels over to the police for the purpose of implantation. Ranjit Singh, on his part, told the Court that while he was being taken to Bishanpura in a jeep, Baldev Singh handed the ornaments to Sub-Inspector Prithiram. The Court expressed no intention to differ from the Judicial Commissioner on this point of testimony.

The Court observed that Baldev Singh was not questioned at all in cross-examination about any hostility he might have harboured towards Kalawati, nor was any suggestion made as to why he would collude with the police in the manner alleged. Likewise, Sub-Inspector Prithiram was not examined about the allegation made by Ranjit Singh. A considerable amount of argument was directed at the notion that it was unlikely that Ranjit Singh would have buried the ornaments in his own house, especially in an open room, and that, if he intended to conceal evidence of the crime, he would have hidden them elsewhere. The Court noted that the ornaments were probably meant to be returned, and that Ranjit Singh might have believed that preserving them carefully was his duty. If he had concealed them in a locked room or a box, the discovery of such a cache by the police, who would inevitably search his house, would have been far more damaging to him. The Court further pointed out that the police did not obtain a confession from Kalawati until the evening of the 27th, leaving only a very short period for the authorities to retrieve the ornaments from Manimajra, transport them to Bashdera, plant them in Ranjit Singh’s house, return to Bishanpura and then escort Ranjit Singh to his home on the 29th so that he could point out the place of concealment. Consequently, the Court was not prepared to disagree with the learned Judicial Commissioner, who had rejected the Sessions Judge’s criticisms of the recovery and had accepted the prosecution’s version of events as true. Regarding Kalawati, the Court described the case as suspicious, without doubt. It was possible that she had aided and abetted Ranjit Singh in the criminal act. However, the Court also considered it possible that, although she was aware of Ranjit Singh’s occasional threats, made in the hope of protecting herself from ill-treatment and cruelty by her husband, she might not have believed that he would actually carry out such a threat. The Court reiterated that each accused alleged that the other had taken an active part in formulating the plan.

In this case the Court observed that the alleged scheme was to eliminate an inconvenient obstacle and a cruel person, and that the confession of Kalawati contained a noticeable defect. A close examination of her statement revealed that, according to her own account, the final planning of the plot took place on the afternoon of 8 July, while the handing over of the ornaments to Ranjit Singh occurred on the morning of 9 July. This timeline appears to be at odds with the diary of Bikram Singh, identified as PW-38/3, which records, under the entry for 8 July, the following: “Ranjit Singh gone to Simla for his personal work to enquire about his application. Then he will proceed Manimaira.” If this diary entry is accurate, the narrative that the conspiracy was hatched on the 8th and the ornaments were entrusted on the 9th becomes doubtful, unless it can be shown that Ranjit Singh was able to travel to Simla on the afternoon of the 8th and return to Bishanpura by the morning of the 9th – a possibility for which no evidence was presented. Consequently, the Court felt compelled to presume that the secret discussion between Kalawati and Ranjit Singh actually took place on 8 July, drawing this inference from the testimony of Balbir Singh (PW-1), who stated that he left Bishanpura for Manimajra with the children on 7 July, and from Kalawati’s own claim that the arrangement was made on the day after the children had departed. The Court also allowed that a mistake in the dates might have occurred. In addition to this questionable circumstance, the Court identified another factor that made it unsafe to accept Kalawati’s confession at face value. She had indicated a willingness to confess on the evening of 27 July and was indeed taken before the Magistrate. Not only was she prepared, but she also insisted on making the confession, and there was no clear justification for postponing the recording of her statement to the following day. Kalawati alleged that the Sub-Inspector requested a twelve-hour interval, claiming that her health was poor and that she needed time to consider the matter. Moreover, the confession contained extremely detailed observations that would not normally appear in such a statement. For example, she asserted: “We had become so close that I can claim to have seen all his clothes, because he used to keep his boxes usually with me and his room was also next to mine. He may not have seen all my clothes, but those that I wore must have been seen by him. Normally he would have seen only the jewellery which I wore. He had not known of my jewellery box.” The Court found the description of a conversation between Kalawati and Ranjit Singh, allegedly held in the presence of a maid-servant near the well where Kalawati washed her clothes, to be implausible. Because of these inconsistencies and the doubtful reliability of the confession, the Court expressed hesitation in relying upon it to convict Kalawati of aiding and abetting the murder. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that there could be little doubt that Kalawati had witnessed the murder of her husband, who was found lying beside her on a charpai.

Shibbi, who was about eighteen feet away, was awakened by the sound of a violent attack. The Court held that Kalawati must also have awakened, at least during the course of the assault if not at its commencement, because several injuries were inflicted in succession. When Shibbi regained consciousness, she found Kalawati’s bed empty and discovered her in a nearby room rather than at the scene of the incident. Shibbi then presented an elaborate story of dacoity, which the Court found untenable. Even if, in terror, Kalawati had fled from her bed and stood at a distance, the Court said it was almost certain that she would have known the identity of the offender unless his face had been completely concealed. The Court considered the first statement that Kalawati gave to the police head constable, who arrived immediately after the incident, to be false, and concluded that she knew or believed her version to be false. The line between abetment of the offence and giving false information to shield the offender was deemed very thin in her case; however, the Court preferred to err on the safe side and hold her guilty only of an offence under section 20-1 of the Indian Penal Code, as the learned Sessions Judge had done. Counsel for the appellant argued that, because Kalawati had been acquitted of this offence by the Judicial Commissioner and the Government had not appealed that acquittal, she could not now be convicted of the same offence by this Court. The Court rejected that argument as fallacious. It observed that section 201 is not limited to cases of a person shielding the actual offender; it can also apply to a person guilty of the principal offence, although practice ordinarily avoids convicting a person of both the principal offence and section 201. The Judicial Commissioner had acquitted Kalawati of the offence under section 201, which the Sessions Judge had convicted her of, only because he believed the principal offence of murder was attributable to her. The Court noted that, for the reasons already discussed, it would not be safe to convict her of the principal offence, and therefore the earlier acquittal did not legally impede a conviction under section 201. The Court cited the Privy Council decision in Begu v. King-Emperor (1), which held that a conviction under section 201 in a murder charge under section 302 is permissible without a separate charge, pursuant to section 237 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Court explained that if Kalawati had been acquitted of section 201 independently of the murder charge, the situation would differ; however, because her acquittal was closely tied to the murder charge, there was no obstacle to reinstating the conviction under section 201. Consequently, the Court proceeded to affirm that conviction.

The Court dismissed Appeal No. 74 of 1952, but it replaced the death penalty that had been imposed with a sentence of transportation for life, taking into account the considerable time that had elapsed since the incident and the likely intention of preventing further cruelty to a defenseless woman. In contrast, the Court allowed Kalawati’s Appeal No. 73 of 1952; consequently, her conviction and sentence under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code were set aside. However, the Court then convicted her of an offence punishable under section 201 of the Indian Penal Code and imposed a term of three years’ rigorous imprisonment for that conviction. The order therefore recorded that Appeal No. 73 was allowed, Appeal No. 74 was dismissed, and the original sentence was reduced. Counsel for the appellant in Appeal No. 73 was identified as B. R. Anand, while counsel for the respondent was identified as G. H. Rajadhyaksha. The judgment also cited the authority of Begu v. King-Emperor, reported as (1) (1923) 52 1. A. 191.