K. Damodaran vs The State Of Travancore-Cochin
Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.
Court: Supreme Court of India
Case Number: Not extracted
Decision Date: 20 March, 1953
Coram: S.R. Das
K. Damodaran versus The State of Travancore-Cochin, decided on 20 March 1953, was heard before the Supreme Court of India. The judgment was authored by Justice S. R. Das. The appellant, K. Damodaran, together with P. Gopala Menon—one of the sons of the late Maharaja of Cochin—and Balanarayanan Nambiar, were indicted for alleged offences under Sections 389, 400, 448 and 104 of the Cochin Penal Code, which correspond respectively to Sections 409, 420, 468 and 108 of the Indian Penal Code. During the pendency of the proceedings Balanarayanan Nambiar died.
The Special Tribunal, presiding over the trial, framed two separate counts of charge against the appellant, hereinafter referred to as A1. The first count alleged that on or about 15-7-1947, at Ernakulam, A1 had cheated M. M. Paul, the Director of Food Supplies of the Government of Cochin, by dishonestly inducing him to deliver to A1 the sum of Rs 1,10,740, which was property of the Government of Cochin. This conduct was said to constitute an offence under Section 400 of the Cochin Penal Code, corresponding to Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code. The second count similarly alleged cheating by A1, again under Section 400 of the Cochin Penal Code, for a larger amount of Rs 4,42,960, which M. M. Paul was purported to have delivered to A1 on or about 21-7-1947.
In addition, the learned judge framed two counts of charge against P. Gopala Menon, hereinafter referred to as A2, under Section 104 read with Section 400 of the Cochin Penal Code, corresponding to Sections 109 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code. These charges alleged that A2 had abetted A1 in the two acts of cheating by persuading his father, H. H. the late Maharaja, to believe that the export of oil to Hyderabad at controlled rates would induce H. E. H. the Nizam to accede to the Union of India. Although the police charge-sheet mentioned a charge of forgery, no charge of forgery was actually framed against A1.
After a protracted trial, the Special Tribunal acquitted A2 but convicted A1 on both counts of cheating. A1 was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for eighteen months. The Tribunal also ordered that the sum of Rs 1,50,385/13/6 seized from A1, together with amounts deposited by him in other places, be forfeited to the Government of Travancore-Cochin. Furthermore, a motor car bearing registration No. M.S.C. 5678, which had been seized from A1, was ordered to be sold by public auction, with the sale proceeds to be credited to the same Government.
A1 appealed the conviction and sentence to the High Court of Travancore-Cochin, while the Government filed a revision petition seeking enhancement of the sentence. The High Court, agreeing with the findings of the Special Tribunal, held that the charges against A1 had been satisfactorily proved. Consequently, it upheld the Special Tribunal’s decision, dismissed A1’s appeal on 11-6-1951, and also dismissed the Government’s revision petition on the ground that no basis for enhancing the sentence had been established.
Subsequently, A1 obtained special leave to appeal to this Court on 22-10-1952. The appeal now stands before the Supreme Court for final disposal.
At the same time the High Court dismissed the Government’s revision petition because it found that no sufficient ground existed to justify increasing the sentence. After that decision the accused identified as A1 applied to this Court, and on 22-10-1952 he obtained special leave to appeal before this Court. The present appeal is now before us for final disposal. The offences alleged against A1 are said to have been committed in July 1947; therefore, in order to understand the competing positions, the Court must consider the circumstances that prevailed during that period. The other accused, Nambiar, is deceased, and A2 was acquitted; consequently it is sufficient to set out the prosecution case as it relates solely to A1, who is the only appellant before this Court. The Maharaja of Cochin, Kerala Varma, who was then about seventy-five years old, had ascended the throne on or about 31-1-1946 and reigned for a little more than two years. He was among the Indian princes who early on acceded to the Indian Union, while the States of Hyderabad and Travancore were at that time asserting their intention to remain outside the Union. Throughout the matters relevant to this case, M. M. Paul, who gave evidence as PW-1, was the Director of Food Supplies. In the middle of 1946 the Cochin Government had introduced controls over the price and movement of coconut oil. On 7-6-1947 a firm called South Indian Agencies Inc. submitted an application (Ex. C) to the office of PW-1 seeking a permit to export three hundred tons of coconut oil to Hyderabad State. The application bore the signature of A1 in his capacity as Managing Proprietor of the firm. Before this application could be processed, the Cochin Government issued an order on 21-6-1947 that deregulated coconut oil, leading to a sharp increase in its price. In response to the rising prices, PW-1 on 29-6-1947 issued an order freezing all coconut oil available in the State. Around that time A2, who was reputed to wield considerable influence over his father the Maharaja, intervened and requested PW-1 to grant a permit to A1’s firm for exporting three hundred tons of coconut oil to Hyderabad and for importing pulses from that State. PW-1 proposed certain terms and conditions under which such a permit could be issued, but A1, on 9-7-1947, refused to accept any of those conditions. The freezing order was subsequently withdrawn on 11-7-1947. Although a permit was no longer required for the export of oil after the deregulation, the price of oil had risen to such a level that it became commercially impractical to purchase oil at the prevailing market rate in Cochin for the purpose of exporting it to Hyderabad. At this juncture events began to accelerate. On 11-7-1947 the Maharaja summoned the Food Minister, Panampilli Govinda Menon (PW-14), and the Director of Food Supplies (PW-1). In the meeting the Maharaja informed both officials that South Indian Agencies, the firm of A1, should receive governmental assistance to export one thousand…
In the meeting held on 11 July 1947, the Maharaja requested that the South Indian Agencies, identified as A1’s firm, be assisted by the Government to export one thousand tons of coconut oil to Hyderabad. He emphasized that the request was of high political significance and of a confidential nature that could not be fully disclosed. The Maharaja further hinted that the assistance might facilitate the accession of the Nizam to the Indian Union. He asked that the oil be supplied to the firm at the controlled price that had been in force prior to the issuance of the de-control order. The Food Minister, Panampilli Govinda Menon, replied that if the Food Ministry intervened, it would attract criticism from the Legislature. However, he advised that, because the matter was political and the financial administration lay with the Diwan, the Diwan should be the appropriate officer to handle the request. The Maharaja said he would seek the Diwan’s input and instructed the Food Minister also to discuss the matter with the Diwan. The interview then concluded.
On the same day, an urgent message summoned the Diwan, C. P. Karunakara Menon, to the Palace. The Maharaja informed the Diwan that a person very close to the Nizam, capable of influencing the Nizam’s decision to accede to India, had arrived in Cochin and that one thousand tons of coconut oil should be made available to that person at the controlled rate for export to Hyderabad. The Maharaja proposed that the difference between the market price and the controlled price be borne by the Cochin State’s funds. The Diwan suggested exercising caution and conducting a proper inquiry before expending such a large sum from the State treasury, but the Maharaja insisted that the matter was urgent because of the significant political stakes and ordered the Diwan to issue a cheque immediately to the Director of Food Supplies. After leaving the Palace, the Diwan returned in a dejected mood. The Maharaja then dispatched the Sarvadhikariakar to verify that the Diwan had issued the cheque as directed. When informed that the Diwan had not done so, the Sarvadhikariakar reported back to the Maharaja, who again sent the official with a letter dated 11 July 1947. The letter stated that the Government would purchase one thousand tons of coconut oil at the market rate through the Director of Food Supplies and deliver it to the party nominally identified as A1’s firm at the controlled rate, treating any loss as a political expenditure. The letter instructed the Diwan to issue a cheque for the required amount in favour of the Director of Food Supplies and to direct the Director to complete the purchase as quickly as possible. On the morning of 12 July 1947, the Director of Food Supplies met the Diwan, who informed him that the Maharaja’s order must be carried out.
In the morning of 12 July 1947 the Diwan informed P. W. 1 that the order of the Maharaja had to be carried out. After a brief discussion the parties decided that, instead of the Government buying the coconut oil itself, A1’s firm would make the purchase and that P. W. 1 would pay the difference between the actual purchase price and the controlled price. The estimated amount of that difference was roughly Rs 5,65,000. The Diwan, identified as P. W. 6, prepared a formal note documenting the Maharaja’s sanction for issuing a cheque for Rs 5,65,000. This note was sent to the Maharaja, who signed it on 13 July 1947. In the evening of the same day P. W. 1 met A1, conveyed the decision to him, and explained that payment of the price difference would be made upon production of documents showing that the oil had been bought. A1 consented to these terms. On 13 July 1947 P. W. 1 instructed the Assistant Supply Officer, Jacob Killiath (P. W. 10), about the decision and authorized him to assist A1 in procuring the oil. P. W. 10 approached several merchants, but the rates quoted were about Rs 600 per candy. A1 informed P. W. 10 that he had already secured arrangements with West Coast Trading Co. at a rate of Rs 575 per candy.
On 15 July 1947 A1 visited P. W. 1’s office and presented the original invoice from West Coast Trading Co. for 200 tons of oil, amounting to Rs 3,89,200, together with a receipt confirming full payment of that price. Both documents were dated 14 July 1947 and were signed by M. A. Thomas (P. W. 2) on behalf of West Coast Trading Co. A1 also produced a letter dated 15 July 1947, written and signed by him on behalf of his firm, addressed to P. W. 1, stating that the purchase of 200 tons had been arranged and requesting that a cheque be issued for the price difference. P. W. 1 agreed to reduce the price of the oil to Rs 570 per candy, an amount that A1 accepted. Based on this reduced price, the difference on 200 tons was calculated to be Rs 1,107,740. P. W. 1 then went to the Diwan with the invoice, receipt, and letter (Exs. L, L1, M). The Diwan issued a cheque (Ex. N) in favour of P. W. 1 for Rs 1,107,740. Upon returning to his office, P. W. 1 endorsed the cheque and handed it over to A1. This payment formed the basis of the first count of charges against A1. At that time A1 indicated that he was arranging the purchase of the remaining 800 tons of oil. Since the Diwan was scheduled to travel to Delhi the following day, P. W. 1 informed him that A1 was making arrangements to buy the 800 tons, and the Diwan departed with him.
In the course of the commercial dealings, the first plaintiff handed over a cheque numbered Ex P for the sum of Rs 4,54,260 to the second plaintiff, and the first plaintiff also gave the sixth plaintiff a consolidated receipt identified as Ex Q for Rs 5,65,000. On the twenty-first day of July 1947, the accused A1 met the first plaintiff and disclosed that he had entered into an agreement with West Coast Trading Co. to supply the remaining eight hundred tons of oil. A written agreement, reproduced as Ex R, was produced together with a receipt, reproduced as Ex R1, which bore an endorsement acknowledging receipt of an advance payment of Rs 10,00,000. In addition, another receipt, reproduced as Ex S, was shown, indicating payment of a further sum of Rs 1,12,000 towards the purchase price of the eight hundred tons. Both the agreement and the receipts bore the signature of M A Thomas, identified as the second plaintiff. Relying on these representations and the supporting documents, the first plaintiff issued a cheque, reproduced as Ex T, for Rs 4,42,960 in favour of the firm of the accused A1. Subsequently, the accused provided two receipts: Ex W for Rs 1,10,740, which had been paid on fifteen July 1947, and Ex W1 for Rs 4,42,960, which was paid on the same day as the cheque, twenty-first July 1947. The amount reflected in receipt Ex W1 formed the basis of the second count of charges against the accused. After delivering the receipts Ex W and Ex W1, the accused requested that the originals of Ex L, Ex L1, Ex R, Ex R1 and Ex S be returned to him so that he could present them to his own principal. The originals were then reproduced in the office of the first plaintiff by his head clerk, Raman Menon (identified as the fourth plaintiff), and by another clerk, Sreevalsa Menon (identified as the fifth plaintiff). The copies, labelled Ex L, Ex L1, Ex R, Ex R1 and Ex S, remained in the first plaintiff’s office. On the thirtieth of July 1947, the accused handed to the first plaintiff a letter, reproduced as Ex Y, in which he wrote that one hundred tons of coconut oil had been lifted by S S Mahadevi on the twenty-fifth of July and that an additional quantity was ready for shipment by the first available steamer. The prosecution’s case asserted that, in reality, no oil had been purchased at all and that the representations made by the accused were false.
The narrative further disclosed that the accused A1 had a falling out with the second accused A2 and with Nambiar. Acting on a complaint by Nambiar, the accused A1 was arrested in Nagpur on the first of April 1948 on a charge of having stolen Rs 5,000 from a trunk in Nambiar’s house. During the investigation of that matter, the accused made several statements on different occasions, which prompted further inquiries and ultimately resulted in three accused persons being committed to trial on the allegations previously summarised. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant reiterated, as he had done before the High Court, that the charges framed against A1 were excessively vague and had hindered his ability to mount a proper defence and to confront the accusations. He argued that this vagueness amounted to a procedural illegality that vitiated the entire trial. The record confirmed that the charges were indeed vague, in that they failed to specify the manner and mode in which the alleged cheating was alleged to have been carried out, and they did not set out the particular acts or conduct that were said to have induced the first plaintiff to part with the two cheques, Ex N and Ex T.
It was observed that the indictment failed to describe the manner and mode in which the alleged cheating had been carried out, and therefore the charges should have been drafted more explicitly to set out the specific acts or conduct that were said to have induced Plaintiff-Witness 1 to surrender the two cheques identified as Exhibits N and T. The learned Attorney-General, appearing for the State, did not attempt to justify the lack of precision in the charges; instead, he endorsed the High Court’s view that the defect constituted an irregularity which, however, had not caused material prejudice to the appellant. The Court agreed with that assessment and found no reason to depart from the High Court’s conclusion. It was recalled that the prosecution’s case rested on only two incidents, each occurring on a distinct date, and that the evidence of the witnesses was taken in a chronological series. Plaintiff-Witness 1 gave testimony on the fourth day of January 1950; Plaintiff-Witness 2, identified as M. A. Thomas, was examined on the tenth day of January 1950; the two clerks designated as Plaintiff-Witness 4 and Plaintiff-Witness 5 testified on the eighteenth and nineteenth days of January 1950 respectively; the Diwan, Plaintiff-Witness 6, also appeared on the nineteenth of January 1950; the Assistant Supply Officer, Plaintiff-Witness 10, deposed on the twenty-first of January 1950; and the Food Minister, Plaintiff-Witness 14, was examined on the sixth day of March 1950. The collective testimony of these witnesses provided all of the particulars and details upon which the charges against the appellant were founded. The formal framing of the charges took place on the thirteenth day of June 1950, and the appellant was examined under the provision of the Cochin Penal Code corresponding to Section 342 of the Indian Penal Code. On the fourteenth of June 1950 the appellant underwent a further examination; when asked whether he wished to cross-examine any of the prosecution witnesses, he elected to do so, including Plaintiff-Witness 1 and Plaintiff-Witness 10 among those he sought to question. After completing this additional cross-examination, the appellant was again asked whether he desired to make any further comments on the evidence of Plaintiff-Witness 1 and Plaintiff-Witness 10. He made a brief statement and declared an intention to file a written statement, although the court record does not contain any such written submission from him. He also announced that he would file a petition requesting the examination of Sri Jose Kallivayalil and no other defence witness; the record shows that he, in fact, examined no defence witness at all. The appellant’s final examination occurred on the seventeenth day of August 1950. In these circumstances it could not be reasonably asserted that the appellant was unaware of the particulars and details of the charges against him, since those particulars were already part of the record before the charges were formally framed, and there is no indication that he was misled. The appellant’s clear understanding is further demonstrated by the absence of any complaint by him or his counsel regarding this issue before the Special Tribunal. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the High Court was correct in holding that the irregularity complained of did not cause real prejudice to the appellant and did not vitiate the trial. The prosecution case
According to the testimony of the first witness, the prosecution case, as outlined earlier, was completely established by his evidence if that evidence were accepted as true. He described the events that led to the incidents of 15 July 1947 and 21 July 1947. He said that on 15 July 1947 the accused had orally asserted that he had bought two hundred tons of oil, had paid the price to West Coast Trading Company, and had, to support this claim, produced the original documents labelled L and L1, which bore the signature of the second witness on behalf of the West Coast Trading Company, together with document M, which was admittedly signed by the accused himself. He further stated that on 21 July 1947 the accused verbally declared that he had entered into a firm contract for the purchase of the remaining eight hundred tons of oil, had actually paid ten lakh rupees and one lakh twenty-two thousand rupees to the West Coast Trading Company, and had supported this assertion by producing the original documents labelled R, R1 and S. Finally, he recounted that on 30 July 1947 the accused handed him a letter, identified as exhibit Y, stating that one hundred tons had already been shipped by the vessel S. S. Mahadevi and that another four hundred tons were ready for shipment by the first available steamer. Exhibits M and Y were admitted into evidence.
The defence contended that exhibits L, L1, R, R1 and S had been fabricated for the purposes of the case. It was pointed out that the wording of the accused’s letter M, dated 15 July 1947, which said that he had “made arrangements to purchase two hundred tons of coconut oil,” clearly indicated that he could not have produced an invoice dated 14 July 1947, of which exhibit L was a copy and which claimed that two hundred tons had already been purchased. This argument placed undue emphasis on the phrase “made arrangements to purchase.” Exhibits L and L1 were, in fact, an invoice and a receipt issued by the West Coast Trading Company to the accused’s firm, and it was therefore natural and proper for the accused to accompany those documents with a formal request for payment, so that the whole series of papers could serve as vouchers on which the first witness could base his payment. The demand for payment of the difference between the market price and the controlled price was intended to create the impression that the goods had been bought at a particular rate, without which the actual difference could not be calculated. Consequently, it did not follow that exhibit M falsified exhibits L and L1. Moreover, that line of argument could not be used to discredit the first witness’s evidence regarding the production of exhibits R, R1 and S. According to the first witness, on 13 July 1947 he had informed the accused that his firm should purchase the oil on behalf of the Government and that the Government would meet the price difference, and that the accused had agreed to these terms.
In this case, it was held that A1 was required to present to P W 1 a document as a token of the purchase prior to any payment being made, and that A1 had agreed to those terms. If this evidence is accepted as true, it becomes probable that A1 would be obliged to produce the original copies of the several exhibits that had been referred to earlier. P W 1 affirmed under oath that A1 had shown him those documents to support the claim that he had purchased the oil. The examination-in-chief of P W 1 concluded with the statement that the reason he issued the two cheques marked as exhibits N and T in favour of A1 was that A1 had represented that the purchase had been completed and that the documents he produced to indicate the purchase were genuine. During cross-examination, P W 1 reiterated that on 15-7-1947, before he endorsed cheque N, he was satisfied by A1’s representations and by the documents presented that two hundred tons of oil had been bought by A1. He further repeated that his reliance on A1’s oral representation concerning the purchase was grounded on the documents that had been produced. The two admitted exhibits, M and Y, clearly demonstrate that such representations had indeed been made. The testimony of P W 1 was substantially corroborated by the Diwan, identified as P W 6, and by the Assistant Supply Officer, identified as P W 10. Nevertheless, there are certain discrepancies in detail. For example, P W 1 stated that on 15-7-1947 he went to the Diwan carrying exhibits L, L1 and M to show them, whereas the Diwan later recalled that P W 1 did not present any original documents such as the originals of L, L1 and M; it is possible that the Diwan simply forgot this episode. Similarly, P W 1 asserted that A1 requested the return of the originals of exhibits L, L1, R, R1 and S in order to present them to his own principal, while P W 10 testified that A1 wanted the documents back because he would need them should any dispute arise between him and the West Coast Trading Co. Apart from these matters, there are other minor inconsistencies among the three witnesses. Reference was made to several subsequent statements made by P W 1, identified as HA, DB and DC, and it was observed that those later statements did not align with his courtroom testimony, leading to an allegation that his evidence was fabricated to implicate A1 and to protect himself. The trial judge addressed this criticism and concluded that the documents were consistent with the prosecution’s case, that P W 1 could not disclose full details without permission from higher authorities, and that only after the Maharaja’s death was he able to speak about the interview dated 11-7-1947. The proprietor of West Coast Trading Co., M A Thomas, has
P. W. 2 was examined as a witness. He began by explaining how he had become acquainted with A 1, A 2 and the deceased accused Nambiar. According to his testimony, A 1 informed him that a company called Pathanwala Ltd. required a large quantity of coconut oil and that A 1 wished to purchase the oil in order to supply it to that company. He said that after a discussion in which the deceased Nambiar also played a leading role, certain documents – identified as exhibits L, L1, R, R1 and S – were prepared with the purpose of impressing Pathanwala Ltd. into believing that A 1 was arranging the transaction and could induce the company to open a letter of credit for the required amount. A note was written on the copies of those documents stating that the documents were not intended to be acted upon and that they would be returned within two or three hours. The copies bearing the note were left with P. W. 2, while A 1 took the original documents away, returned after the stated time, and then destroyed them.
P. W. 2 further stated that although the documents he saw were similar to exhibits L, L1, R, R1 and S, there were differences in the amounts and quantities shown. He recounted that A 1 had first approached him on 19 July 1947 for the export of oil. He denied that any oil was actually purchased and asserted that he had received only a sum of Rs 12,000 by way of a cheque dated 21 July 1947, part of which was for the purchase of drums and part of which was a payment of Rs 1,000 that was then still owed to him by Nambiar. Regarding the correctness or genuineness of exhibits L, L1, R, R1 and S, the trial court relied on the evidence of witnesses P. W. 1, P. W. 4, P. W. 5 and P. W. 10. P. W. 2 acknowledged that those exhibits did not exactly match the originals that he had signed on behalf of his firm, and he attempted to explain that the documents had been created merely to impress Pathanwala Ltd., although he also affirmed that documents of a similar nature had indeed been prepared.
Despite the several discrepancies identified and the serious criticisms directed at the reliability of witnesses P. W. 1, P. W. 2, P. W. 4, P. W. 5 and P. W. 10, the trial judge held that the evidence of P. W. 1, P. W. 4, P. W. 5 and P. W. 10 was substantially correct and true. The High Court subsequently declared that it had “no hesitation in accepting the testimony of P. W. 1.” Because both lower courts arrived at concurrent findings of fact, the Supreme Court stated that it could not replace the appreciation of evidence made by those courts. The Court reiterated that, in the absence of any compelling reason, it had consistently refrained from acting as a third fact-finding tribunal and found no justification for departing from that well-recognised practice. Learned counsel urged the Court to hold that the lower courts had approached the case from an incorrect perspective and had overlooked certain basic facts, contending that, in view of the order of the Maharaja, the Diwan and
In the matter before the Court, it was submitted that the first witness, identified as P W 1, had no alternative but to pay the sum claimed by A 1, and that therefore there could be no occasion for A 1 to make any representation or to produce any document, nor could P W 1 have relied upon such a representation before actually making the payment; in other words, the submission argued that the alleged conduct could not constitute cheating. The Court found no substance in that contention. The order issued by the Maharaja, reproduced as Exhibit BC, directed that the Government purchase one thousand tons of oil at the prevailing market rate through the Director of Food Supplies—who was P W 1—and that the oil be supplied to the party who was nominally acting in the transaction, namely A 1, at a controlled price. The order never instructed the Diwan, identified as P W 6, or P W 1 to remit only the price differential in cash to A 1. Rather, it was the Diwan who concluded that it would not be practicable or expedient for the Government to procure the oil on the open market, and therefore directed that A 1 be asked to purchase the oil, to produce documents evidencing such purchase, and that the price difference would thereafter be paid. According to the testimony, A 1 accepted those terms. Consequently, A 1 was required to satisfy P W 1 by producing documents proving that the purchase had indeed been effected, and, as accepted by the lower Courts, A 1 did exactly that. For this reason, the charge of cheating could not be dismissed at the preliminary stage. It was further alleged that P W 1 had relied principally on the assurance given by his Assistant Supply Officer, P W 10, and that this assurance, rather than any representation made by A 1 or the documents produced by him, had induced P W 1 to issue the cheques. This issue, the Court noted, was a pure question of fact that had already been resolved by the findings of the Courts below. The record showed that P W 1, and the Courts below, accepted that he relied on the representations of A 1, which were supported by the documents A 1 produced, and that P W 10 also testified that he was satisfied that A 1 had actually purchased the goods. The fact that P W 10 gave such an assurance does not negate the possibility that P W 1 placed confidence in A 1’s representations or in the documents he produced; on the contrary, P W 10’s assurance may have reinforced P W 1’s willingness to act on A 1’s statements. A reading of the evidence in its entirety indicates that the only effect of P W 10’s assurance was to lead P W 1 to deem it unnecessary to contact West Coast Trading Co. in order to verify the correctness of A 1’s statements and the authenticity of the documents presented. As already indicated, the ultimate enquiry as to whose conduct—whether the representation of A 1 alone or a combination of that representation and the assurance of P W 10—actually induced P W 1 to part with the cheques is, in the final analysis, a question of fact that has been determined by the lower Courts.
In the present case, the question of what actually induced the plaintiff-deponent to hand over the cheques was a question of fact. The trial courts had examined the evidence and concluded that the plaintiff-deponent was persuaded to deliver the cheques by the representation made by the individual labeled A1, who asserted that he had purchased the oil and had already made payments to the sellers, a claim that was supported by the documents that A1 produced. The appellate Court observed that this finding was not contradicted by any material in the record and was indeed backed by the evidence placed before the courts. Consequently, the Court held that, given the surrounding circumstances and for the reasons previously set out, there was no justification for overturning the conviction of the appellant; the conviction was firmly grounded in fact. At the same time, the Court noted a strong indication from the record that other, possibly more senior, participants were involved in the fraud perpetrated against the Government. The fact that those individuals had not been apprehended or prosecuted did not excuse or absolve the appellant, whose guilt had been proved beyond reasonable doubt, but it did have relevance to the appropriate quantum of sentence. The Court further observed that the trial had been prolonged and that the appellant had spent a considerable period in custody. Moreover, the commission of the offence had been facilitated by a departure from the conditions laid down in the Maharaja’s order, as evidenced by Exhibit BC. The Court also remarked that the fraud might have been averted had the plaintiff-deponent taken the simple precaution of verifying A1’s representations, for example by contacting the second plaintiff-deponent by telephone or through another reliable means. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the conviction of the appellant but reduced the term of imprisonment to the period he had already served. The order directing the forfeiture of Rs 1,50,385/13/6, the directive to sell the motor car, and the instruction that the proceeds of such sale be credited to the Government were all left undisturbed. The appeal was therefore disposed of in accordance with these conclusions.