Jagadguru Gurushiddaswami vs Dakshina Maharashtra Digambarjain Sabha

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 187 of 1952

Decision Date: 14 October 1953

Coram: B.K. Mukherjea, Mehr Chand Mahajan, B. Jagannadhadas

In the matter titled Jagadguru Gurushiddaswami versus Dakshina Maharashtra Digambarjain Sabha, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 14 October 1953. The opinion was authored by Justice B. K. Mukherjea, and the bench was composed of Justices B. K. Mukherjea, Mehr Chand Mahajan and B. Jagannadhadas. The petitioner was Jagadguru Gurushiddaswami and the respondent was Dakshina Maharashtra Digambarjain Sabha. The case was recorded under the citations 1953 AIR 514 and 1954 SCR 235. The matters addressed involved the religious endowments Act, a permanent lease granted by the head of a math, the subsequent gift of the leased premises by the lessee, a decree obtained by the succeeding head against the heirs of the lessee for recovery of possession, and the question of whether that decree bound the donee. The appeal also considered the maintainability of a fresh suit against the donee and the operation of the Limitation Act of 1908, specifically section 10A and Article 134B, in relation to the meaning of “valuable consideration.” The Court also referred to the authority (1) [1911] 1 Ch. 92 at p. 98, 236 for the definition of valuable consideration.

The factual background, as summarized in the headnote, indicated that in 1887 the head of the math had granted a permanent lease of property belonging to the math. In 1910 the lessee’s successor in interest gifted the leased premises to a Jain Sabha for the purpose of constructing a school, imposing the condition that if the school were removed or ceased to exist, the site would revert to the donor. The petitioner became head of the math in 1925 and, in 1932, instituted an ejectment suit against the heirs of the lessee, alleging that the lease was not binding on the math. The petitioner obtained a decree for possession, although the Jain Sabha was not made a proper party and was dismissed from that suit. In 1943 the petitioner filed another suit against the Jain Sabha seeking possession, contending that the Sabha, as a sub-lessee under the defendants in the earlier suit, was bound by the decree. The Court held that the rule that a sub-lessee is bound by a landlord’s decree against a lessee did not apply because (a) the 1932 suit was based on title and aimed at ejecting trespassers rather than being a landlord-lessee eviction, and (b) the land had been transferred to the Sabha by gift, not by sub-lease. The Court further held that the suit was not protected by section 10 of the Limitation Act because the lease involved valuable consideration; consequently, the defendant could not rely on the limitation provision that prescribes the period within which a suit must be brought. The Court explained that “valuable consideration” has a well-known legal meaning and is not synonymous with “adequate consideration.” The judgment was pronounced in civil appellate jurisdiction as Civil Appeal No. 187 of 1952, appealing from the judgment and decree dated 19 October 1949 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay delivered by Justices Bavdekar and Dixit.

In this appeal, the appellant challenged the judgment and decree issued by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court on 19 October 1949, which had affirmed, on further appeal, the orders pronounced by the Civil Judge of Hubli in the original decree numbered 275 of 1946. The original decree traced its origin to the judgment and decree dated 17 December 1945 in Special Civil Suit No. 21 of 1944 before the Civil Judge (Senior Division) at Hubli. The appellant was represented by M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, assisted by J. B. Dadachanji, while the respondent was represented by G. R. Madhavi, assisted by K. R. Bengeri. The judgment of the appellate Court was delivered on 14 October 1953 by Justice Mukherjea. Both the trial court and the High Court had decided that the plaintiff’s suit was barred by the limitation provisions, and therefore the appellant sought relief from the Supreme Court on that point.

The plaintiff appellant occupied the position of the spiritual head, or Mathadhipati, of a Lingayat monastery known as Murusavirmath, which was situated in Hubli Taluka of Dharwad district. On 13 November 1887 the then head of the monastery, Guru Siddhwaswami, executed a permanent lease of a parcel of land belonging to the Math, identified as part of revenue survey number 34, in favour of a person named Pradhanappa. The lease required the lessee to pay a rent of Rs 50 per annum for the first six years and thereafter Rs 25 per annum. On 19 June 1892 Pradhanappa transferred a portion of the lease-hold property, described in Schedule 1(b) of the present suit, to a man named Bharamappa. After the death of Guru Siddhwaswami in 1897, his disciple Gangadhar Swami succeeded him as head of the Math and continued to accept the stipulated rent from the lessee without repudiating the earlier permanent lease. In April 1905 another portion of the same land, identified in Schedule 1(a), was sold under execution of a decree against the heirs of Pradhanappa; it was first purchased by a person named Kadayya, who subsequently conveyed it to Bharamappa, who already owned the Schedule 1(b) parcel. On 8 April 1910 Bharamappa executed a deed gifting the entire premises, comprising plots 1(a) and 1(b), to the Dakshina Maharashtra Digambar Jain Sabha, a registered body, for the purpose of constructing a school for Jain students. Following the death of Gangadhar Swami on 31 August 1920, the administration of the Math was temporarily managed by a committee of management. On 25 November 1925 the present plaintiff, Guru Siddhwaswami, assumed the position of head of the Math. Subsequently, on 27 August 1932 the plaintiff instituted proceedings seeking recovery of possession of the leased land, thereby raising the question of whether his suit was barred by the limitation period.

In the year 1932 the plaintiff instituted a suit identified as Suit No 80 of 1932 against the heirs and successors of Bharamappa, seeking recovery of possession of the land that was covered by a permanent lease. The plaintiff alleged that the lease had been granted without any legal necessity, that therefore the alienation of the land was not binding on the Math, and that it became void upon the death of the last Mahant. In that suit the Jain Sabha was introduced as defendant No 23, but it was named incorrectly. The trial judge dismissed the suit. The plaintiff appealed to the High Court of Bombay, and the High Court, by a judgment dated 26 November 1942, reversed the trial judge’s decision. The High Court allowed the plaintiff’s claim for khas possession of the disputed land against all of the defendants, except for defendant No 23, which was removed from the suit on the ground that it had been misdescribed.

On 3 December 1943 the plaintiff, now as appellant, commenced the present suit against the respondent Jain Sabha, again claiming khas possession of the land that had been gifted to the Sabha by Bharamappa. The plaintiff again asserted that the original permanent lease was not supported by any legal necessity and therefore could not bind the Math; consequently, the defendant could not acquire any title by virtue of a grant from the successor of the lessee. The Jain Sabha contested the claim, and the controversy focused on two material questions: first, whether the original permanent lease was indeed supported by legal necessity; and second, assuming it was not, whether the plaintiff’s suit was barred by the limitation period prescribed in article 134-B of the Indian Limitation Act. The trial judge found in favour of the plaintiff on the first question, but ruled against the plaintiff on the limitation issue, resulting in the dismissal of the suit. The plaintiff appealed to the High Court of Bombay, where the learned judges affirmed the lower court’s decision and dismissed both the appeal and the suit. The propriety of that decision was subsequently challenged before the present Court.

Both the trial court and the High Court held that a suit of this nature fell within the ambit of article 134-B of the Limitation Act, which fixes a twelve-year limitation period measured from the date of death of the preceding Mahant. The plaintiff’s predecessor had died in 1920, and the present suit was filed more than twelve years after that date, rendering it time-barred. To overcome the limitation defence, the learned Attorney-General, appearing in support of the appeal, advanced a two-fold contention. Firstly, it was argued that the decree for ejectment granted in favour of the plaintiff against the heirs of Bharamappa in the earlier 1932 suit should bind the present defendant as well, based on the principle that a decree against a lessee also binds a sub-lessee. Accordingly, the defendant was claimed not to be competent to resist the plaintiff’s possession claim, which was

In the second argument, the counsel contended that the limitation period should be saved by the operation of section 10 of the Indian Limitation Act. Regarding the first argument, the Court first observed that even if the appellant’s position were correct, the suit presently before the Court would still be barred by section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code, and the appropriate remedy for the plaintiff would therefore be to seek execution of the decree that had been obtained in the earlier suit. The Court noted, however, that this obstacle was not necessarily fatal, because section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code empowered a court to treat a suit as an execution proceeding when no question of limitation or jurisdiction impeded the plaintiff. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the contention advanced by the learned Attorney-General could not succeed. The Court explained that, as a matter of law, it could be presumed that a sub-lessee was bound by a decree for possession granted to the lessor against the lessee, irrespective of whether the sub-lease was created before or after the decree, provided that the ground of eviction also determined the sub-lease (1). The Court then identified two insurmountable difficulties in applying that principle to the facts of the present case. First, the suit of 1932 was not a suit by a landlord or former landlord against his tenant for eviction on the basis of termination of tenancy. The Mahant who had granted a permanent lease in 1887 may not have been able to rescind his own grant, and the lease could be regarded as valid for the duration of the alienating Mahant’s life. Upon his death, the successor was at liberty to repudiate the lease and reclaim possession on the ground that the alienation did not bind the endowment. In the case before the Court, the immediate successor of the alienating Mahant had initially consented to the lessee’s continued possession, thereby creating an interest in the lessee that corresponded with the successor’s lifetime or tenure. After the successor’s death, however, no rent was accepted from the lessee and the lease was not treated as continuing; consequently, in 1932 the successor instituted a suit to recover possession of the property against the successors of the original lessee, arguing that they had acquired no title from a grant that, lacking legal necessity, was not binding on the Math. The Court emphasized that this was not a landlord-tenant suit; rather, it was a suit by the holder or manager of the Math to recover Math property that had been improperly alienated by the predecessor, on the ground that the defendant became a trespasser as soon as the former Mahant died and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover possession upon proof of his title.

In examining the facts, the Court observed that there was a serious difficulty in accepting the contention that the Jain Sabha, as the defendant, could be described as a sub-lessee of Bharamappa or of Bharamappa’s heirs. The Court carefully inspected the instrument that Bharamappa had executed in favour of the Jain Sabha and found that, both in its formal appearance and in its substantive effect, the document constituted a deed of gift rather than a sub-lease. The purpose of the gift was clearly specified: it was intended to enable the construction of a school building on the land, a school that was to provide education for the boys and girls belonging to the Jain community. The deed also included a condition that, should the school be removed from the site or cease to exist, the land would automatically revert to the donor. The Court held that attaching such a condition to a deed of gift did not transform the deed into a sub-lease. Consequently, the suit that was filed in 1932 could not be characterized as a traditional eviction suit brought by a landlord against a tenant, and the present defendant could not be treated as a sub-lessee of the parties who had been before the Court in that earlier action. Although the misdescription of the Jain Sabha’s interest had led to the dismissal of the earlier suit, the Court noted that this procedural irregularity was irrelevant to the present determination. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the first argument advanced by the Attorney-General, which relied upon the notion of a sub-lease relationship, must fail.

The Court then turned to the second point raised by the Attorney-General, concerning the applicability of section 10 of the Indian Limitation Act. The Court explained that for a suit to benefit from the provisions of section 10, it must be brought against a person in whom the property has become vested in trust for a specific purpose, or against that person’s legal representatives or assigns, provided that the assign is not an assignee for valuable consideration. While it is true that the term “assign” can be interpreted broadly enough to include a lessee, the Court emphasised that the lease in question was granted for valuable consideration. Because the lease was for valuable consideration, the case fell within the exception outlined in section 10, and therefore the defendant could not claim protection from the statutory limitation merely on the ground that the property was, in the defendant’s view, held in trust. The Attorney-General further argued that the transfer could not be said to be for valuable consideration because the rent fixed for a large tract of land—Rs 50 for the first six years and subsequently Rs 25—was nominal, especially given the land’s substantial potential value. The Court pointed out that the phrase “valuable consideration” has a well-established legal meaning and is not synonymous with “adequate consideration.” Although the rent might appear modest by contemporary standards, the Court relied on the findings of the lower courts, which had held that the consideration was not illusory in the circumstances prevailing at the time of the transaction. This finding was a concurrent factual determination that bound the Court in this appeal. In view of these observations, the Court held that both of the Attorney-General’s contentions lacked merit and consequently dismissed the appeal with costs.

The Court observed that the expression “valuable consideration” carries a well-known meaning in law and that it must not be equated with the phrase “adequate consideration”. It explained that, although the amount of rent fixed for the lease might appear low when measured against contemporary standards, the lower courts had examined the circumstances that existed at the time the transaction was effected and had concluded that the consideration was not illusory in any respect. In reaching that conclusion, the courts below had taken into account the economic conditions, the nature of the land involved, and the prevailing market values at the relevant date, and they had found that the rent, however modest, was genuine and therefore satisfied the requirement of valuable consideration. The Court regarded this determination as a concurrent finding of fact, meaning that both the trial court and the appellate court below agreed on the factual issue, and consequently that finding bound the present appeal. On the basis of this factual conclusion, the Court held that the two arguments advanced by the learned Attorney-General could not succeed. Both submissions were therefore deemed to have failed. Accordingly, the Court ordered that the appeal be dismissed and that the costs of the proceedings be awarded against the appellant. The final order recorded that the appeal was dismissed. The agents appearing for the parties were identified as Rajinder Narain for the appellant and Naunit Lal for the respondent.