Hanuman Jute Mills vs Amin Das And Anr.

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 28 May 1953

Coram: Imam, J.

In this matter the Supreme Court of India considered two appeals by special leave that challenged the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal, Calcutta. The appellate tribunal had set aside the decision of the Third Industrial Tribunal, Calcutta. The appellant, Hanuman Jute Mills, had originally filed applications under Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 requesting the Tribunal’s permission to dismiss the respondents, Amin Das and another, in each of the two matters. The Tribunal granted that permission. Dissatisfied with the Industrial Tribunal’s orders, the respondents filed appeals before the Labour Appellate Tribunal.

The record before the Industrial Tribunal showed that the respondents had been warned repeatedly for poor work performance and misconduct, and in some instances they had been cited for violent acts. After these warnings, the respondents were absent from work without leave on a specified date and remained absent for ten consecutive days. Such unauthorised absence, according to the Standing Orders of the appellant, constituted misconduct that could attract the penalty of dismissal. The respondents claimed that their absence was involuntary because they had been arrested by the police. They subsequently applied for leave of absence, but the appellant refused their request.

When the matter reached the Labour Appellate Tribunal, that tribunal held that a substantial question of law was involved. It reasoned that the Industrial Tribunal had apparently failed to consider whether the appellant’s proposal to dismiss the respondents was motivated by an improper purpose, or whether it amounted to an unfair labour practice or victimisation. In reaching this view, the Labour Appellate Tribunal relied on a previous decision of this Court in Atherton West & Co. Ltd., Kanpur, 77 P. v. Suti Mill Mazdoor Union, (A). After examining the material in the record, the appellate tribunal concluded that, on the facts before it, the appellant was not acting in good faith and that the proposed dismissal appeared to be a case of victimisation.

The appellant argued that no appeal lay to the Labour Appellate Tribunal because, in its view, no substantial question of law arose from the appeals. It pointed out that the Industrial Tribunal had expressed the view that it could not say the appellant ought to have condoned the respondents’ unauthorised absence, since the appellant honestly believed that the respondents, by virtue of their past conduct, had forfeited any claim to leniency or concession. Accordingly, the appellant submitted that it could not be blamed for refusing to condone the respondents’ absence.

Conversely, counsel for the respondents emphasized that, in light of the Court’s earlier decision in Messrs Atherton West & Co. Ltd., (A), the Tribunal was obligated to inquire and determine whether a prima facie case existed for the discharge or dismissal of the workmen. The respondents further argued that the employer, its agent, or its manager must be examined to see whether any improper motive, unfair labour practice, or victimisation was present in the contemplated dismissal. This submission underscored the need for the Tribunal to assess the employer’s motives before reaching a conclusion on the legality of the proposed dismissals.

The Court observed that the Industrial Tribunal had not made any finding showing that the appellant’s action in the proposed discharge or dismissal of the workmen was free from an improper motive, or that the appellant had avoided any unfair labour practice or victimisation. Because the Industrial Tribunal left open the possibility that the appellant might have been driven by an improper motive, the Labour Appellate Tribunal was properly justified in concluding that the appeals before it presented a substantial question of law. The Labour Appellate Tribunal further held that the appellant’s conduct was not bona fide and that the dismissal amounted to victimisation; this determination was characterised as a finding of fact. Accordingly, the Court held that the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal should be upheld, since no pure question of law arose for the higher appellate court to consider.

It was not contested that an appeal to the Labour Appellate Tribunal may be entertained only when a substantial question of law, rather than a question of fact, is involved. Consequently, the Court needed to decide whether any such substantial legal issue was present in the appeals under consideration. The Industrial Tribunal had, in a fairly detailed manner, examined the material placed before it concerning the past conduct of the respondents. The record substantiates the statements made by the Industrial Tribunal, and the material it relied upon has not been seriously challenged before this Court. In the order dealing with the respondents Amin Das and Kashi Ram, the Industrial Tribunal observed that, although management could have chosen to condone the employees’ absence, it could not be said that they were obliged to do so if, in good conscience, management believed that the two workers had, by their previous conduct, forfeited any claim to leniency or concession. The Tribunal held that it was not for the Tribunal to pass judgment on the exercise of management’s discretion, and that the conduct of the two workers had been sufficiently troublesome for the employer. Even after the workers were implicated in a criminal case and detained, the Tribunal stated that it could not blame management for refusing to condone their absence. In the matter of the respondent Golok, the Tribunal noted that the worker had been sent by the police on a charge of rioting, and therefore management could not be blamed for refusing to condone his absence, especially given that the worker’s service record was unsatisfactory and he had already received two warnings. The Tribunal concluded that, in its view, management had not committed any grave wrong that required correction by the Tribunal. These observations make it clear that the Industrial Tribunal had indeed examined the appropriateness of the appellant’s discretion, found that the appellant acted in good faith, and determined that the dismissal was not motivated by an improper purpose or by any unfair labour practice or victimisation.

In this case the Court noted that the Industrial Tribunal had carefully examined the issue of whether the employer’s discretion to dismiss the two respondents was being exercised properly. The Tribunal concluded that the employer acted in good faith, that its desire to terminate the employment was not motivated by any improper purpose, and that no unfair labour practice or victimisation was involved in the decision to dismiss. While the wording of the Industrial Tribunal’s orders did not reproduce the exact language used in the earlier decision of Messrs Atherton West & Co. Ltd. (A), the substance of those orders nevertheless complied with the view expressed by this Court. At the time the Industrial Tribunal rendered its orders, the decision of this Court in the Atherton West case had not yet been pronounced; nevertheless, the Tribunal’s findings were in line with the observations later made by this Court. Consequently the Court held that the Labour Appellate Tribunal was in error when it asserted that the Industrial Tribunal had failed to apply its mind to the question of whether the employer was driven by an improper motive or was resorting to an unfair labour practice or victimisation in proposing the dismissals. That mistaken conclusion further caused the Labour Appellate Tribunal to assume that the appeals before it raised a substantial question of law. In the Court’s opinion, no such question of law arose, having regard to the factual findings of the Industrial Tribunal, and therefore the Labour Appellate Tribunal should not have entertained the appeals. The Court accordingly allowed the appeals, ordered that no costs be awarded, set aside the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal, and restored the original orders of the Industrial Tribunal.