Flection Commission, India vs Saka Venkata Subba Raounion Of India

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 205 of 1952

Decision Date: 27 February, 1953

Coram: M. Patanjali Sastri, B.K. Mukherjea, Vivian Bose, Ghulam Hasan, Natwarlal H. Bhagwati

In the matter titled Flection Commission, India versus Saka Venkata Subba Raounion of India, a judgment was delivered on 27 February 1953 by the Supreme Court of India. The judgment was authored by Justice M. Patanjali Sastri and the bench comprised Justices M. Patanjali Sastri, B. K. Mukherjea, Vivian Bose, Ghulam Hasan and Natwarlal H. Bhagwati. The petitioner was the Flection Commission, India and the respondent was Saka Venkata Subba Raounion of India, who appeared as an intervener. The same date, 27 February 1953, is recorded as the date of judgment, and the bench is again identified as being headed by Chief Justice M. Patanjali Sastri together with Justices Mukherjea, Bose, Hasan, Bhagwati and Natwarlal H. Bhagwati. The case citation is reported as 1953 AIR 210 and 1953 SCR 1144, and further citation references include RF 1954 SC 207 (3), R 1954 SC 440 (5), R 1956 SC 246 (21, 23), F 1961 SC 532 (3), R 1962 SC 1513 (3, 4), R 1963 SC 1124 (1, 2, 5), R 1965 SC 1892 (7), R 1967 SC 112 (10), D 1967 SC 1244 (12), R 1976 SC 2283 (43), RF 1986 SC 1272 (83) and R 1992 SC 1277 (19, 61). The judgment concerned the Constitution of India, 1950, specifically articles 132, 192 and 226, and examined the power of a High Court to issue writs, the limitations on that power, and the question of whether a writ could be issued against a person residing outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court. The factual backdrop involved an election to the Madras Legislative Assembly. The respondent, having been convicted and sentenced to seven years of rigorous imprisonment, was nevertheless elected as a member of the Assembly. At the direction of the Speaker, the Governor of Madras referred the question of the respondent’s disqualification to the Election Commission, whose permanent offices were located in New Delhi, seeking to determine whether the respondent could sit and vote in the Assembly. The respondent subsequently applied to the High Court of Madras under article 226 of the Constitution for a writ restraining the Election Commission from inquiring into his alleged disqualification. The Court held that the High Court’s power to issue writs under article 226 was subject to a two-fold limitation: a writ could not extend beyond the territory over which the court exercised jurisdiction, and the person or authority against whom the writ was directed had to be amenable to that jurisdiction either by residence or by location within the territorial limits. Accordingly, the High Court of Madras had no jurisdiction to issue a writ against the Election Commission. The Court further held that articles 190(3) and 192(1) applied only to disqualifications that arose after a member’s election, and that neither the Governor nor the Election Commission possessed jurisdiction to investigate a disqualification that had arisen long before the election. Finally, the Court explained that a tribunal or authority permanently situated and ordinarily operating outside the territorial limits of a High Court could not be deemed to be functioning within those limits and therefore could not be subjected to that High Court’s jurisdiction merely because its actions affected the rights of parties within the court’s territory.

The Court observed that the mere presence of a dispute concerning the right of the opposite party to sit and vote in the Madras Legislative Assembly, together with the fact that the parties lived in the State of Madras, did not confer jurisdiction on the High Court of Madras to issue a writ against the Election Commission. The Court noted that the Election Commission was a statutory authority created by the President, with its permanent offices located in New Delhi, and therefore lay outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Madras High Court. Consequently, the High Court could not entertain a writ under article 226 of the Constitution seeking to restrain the Commission. The Court further explained that an appeal could be taken to the Supreme Court under article 132 of the Constitution from any judgment, decree or final order of a Single Judge of a High Court, provided that the required certificate of appeal was obtained. The appeal in this case was filed as Civil Appeal No. 205 of 1952, challenging the judgment and order dated 16 September 1952 issued by the Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Madras (the Subba Rao judgment) in Writ Petition No. 599 of 1952. The petition had been originally presented under the special original jurisdiction of the Madras High Court pursuant to article 226 of the Constitution. The appellant and intervener were represented by the Attorney-General for India, assisted by counsel, while the respondent was represented by counsel appointed for that purpose. The Supreme Court rendered its judgment on 27 February 1953, and the opinion was delivered by the Chief Justice of India, Patanjali Sastri.

The factual backdrop of the dispute involved the respondent, who had been convicted by the Sessions Judge of East Godavari in 1942 and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for a term of seven years. He was released on the occasion of Independence Day on 15 August 1947. In June 1952 a by-election was scheduled for a reserved seat in the Kakinada constituency of the Madras Legislative Assembly. The respondent wished to contest that election but discovered that section 7(b) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 rendered him ineligible because five years had not yet elapsed since his release. Accordingly, on 2 April 1952 he submitted an application to the Election Commission seeking an exemption that would permit him to stand as a candidate. No response to the application was received by the deadline of 5 May 1952, which was the last date for filing nominations. Undeterred, the respondent filed his nomination on that day, and during the scrutiny of nomination papers neither the Returning Officer nor any other candidate raised an objection to his candidature. The election was conducted on 14 June 1952; the respondent obtained the highest number of votes and was declared elected on 16 June 1952. The results were published in the Fort St. George Gazette (Extraordinary) on 19 June 1952, and the respondent took his seat in the Assembly on 27 June 1952. In the meantime, the Election Commission had rejected his exemption request and communicated the rejection by a letter dated 13 May 1952, a letter which the respondent never received. On 3 July 1952, the matter progressed further, leading to the issuance of a writ of prohibition by the Madras High Court, which restrained the Commission from inquiring into the alleged disqualification of the respondent, thereby giving rise to the present appeal before the Supreme Court.

In this case, the Speaker of the Assembly read to the House a communication that had been received from the Election Commission, informing that the respondent’s application for exemption had been rejected and that the Speaker should take such action as he thought fit. Because the rejection raised the question of the respondent’s disqualification, the Speaker forwarded the matter to the Governor of Madras, who in turn sent it to the Commission for its opinion, as mandated by article 192 of the Constitution. The respondent subsequently challenged both the competence of the Governor’s reference and the actions taken by the Governor in response to that reference. The Commission replied that the respondent’s case would be heard on 21 August 1952. Accordingly, the Chief Election Commissioner, who at that time was the sole member of the Commission, travelled to Madras and conducted a hearing on that date, during which the respondent’s counsel and the Advocate-General of Madras were heard. At the conclusion of the hearing, the parties agreed that if the respondent’s counsel wished to make any further representations or arguments, those submissions should be placed in writing and reach the Commission in Delhi by 28 August 1952, after which the Commission would consider them before delivering its opinion to the Governor.

On the same day, 21 August 1952, the respondent filed an application before the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution. In that application, he contended that article 192 applied only to disqualifications that arose after a member had been elected, and that when a disqualification existed before the election, the appropriate remedy was to challenge the validity of the election before an Election Tribunal. He therefore prayed for a writ of mandamus or prohibition directing the Commission to refrain from proceeding with the Governor’s reference, noting that the Governor had not been made a party to the proceedings. Upon receipt of the rule nisi issued by the High Court, the Commission objected to the Court’s jurisdiction to grant the writs, arguing that the Commission was not situated within the territory over which the High Court exercised jurisdiction. A further objection was raised that the Governor’s action in seeking the Commission’s opinion could not be challenged because article 361(1) conferred immunity, and that the Commission, whose role was merely to give an opinion and not to decide the question of disqualification, could not be proceeded against under article 226. On the merits, the Commission asserted that a proper construction of article 192 made it applicable to disqualifications arising both before and after an election, and that both the Governor’s reference of the respondent’s disqualification to the Commission and the Commission’s subsequent opinion were valid and competent. The application was heard by Justice Subba Rao, who considered the preliminary objections and the substantive arguments presented.

The judge rejected the preliminary objections that had been raised and pronounced that, when read in its proper sense, article 192 was limited to cases of disqualifications that arose after the election had taken place. Consequently, the judge concluded that the Commission possessed no authority to entertain the question of the respondent’s disqualification because that disqualification had occurred long before the election. On that basis, the judge issued a writ directing the Commission not to proceed with the inquiry that the Governor had referred to it under article 192. Despite this restrictive order, the judge also granted a certificate under article 132, holding that the matter involved substantial questions of law concerning the interpretation of the Constitution, and therefore the Commission was permitted to file an appeal against the judgment.

In response, counsel for the respondent advanced a preliminary objection, contending that an appeal from a judgment delivered by a single High Court judge was barred by article 133(3) of the Constitution even though a certificate had been issued under article 132. The counsel argued that the broader provisions of article 133(1)(c), which allow a certificate of fitness for appeal to the Supreme Court, entirely overlapped the more limited article 132(1) that addressed only the specific ground of a substantial constitutional question. Accordingly, the counsel maintained that the power to grant a certificate on any ground, including the one relied upon, must be regarded as arising under article 133(1)(c). Since article 133(3) expressly prohibits an appeal from the judgment, decree, or final order of a single High Court judge, the counsel asserted that the appeal should be dismissed. The argument was further supported by reference to clause 2 of article 133 and the proviso to article 145(3), both of which contemplate appeals involving substantial constitutional questions being brought without first obtaining a certificate under article 132. The Court rejected these contentions, observing that while constitutional questions may indeed be raised in appeals filed without a certificate, the language of article 132 clearly permits an appeal from any judgment, decree, or final order of a High Court provided that the requisite certificate is obtained, and it imposes no limitation based on the number of judges who rendered the order. The Court noted that, had the legislature intended to exclude appeals arising from single-judge rulings, it could have inserted a reference to article 132 in the opening words of article 133(3) as it had done for the preceding clause. Accepting the respondent’s position, the Court explained, would render article 132 redundant for civil proceedings and would defeat the purpose of the Explanation to article 132, which was designed to supersede the Federal Court decision in S. Kuppuswami Rao v. The King and to ensure swift resolution of fundamental constitutional issues. Moreover, the Explanation does not apply to the term “final order” used in article 133(1). The overall scheme of the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction, the Court observed, places questions of constitutional interpretation in a special category regardless of the nature of the underlying proceeding, and it therefore allows the broadest possible right of appeal in such cases. Accordingly, the Court overruled the preliminary objection and held that the appeal was maintainable.

The Court observed that the Explanation to article 132 was enacted with the purpose of overriding the earlier decision of the Federal Court in S. Kuppuswami Rao v. The King (1) and of assuring that constitutional questions could be resolved promptly when they formed the core of a dispute. The Court held that if the Explanation were interpreted as inapplicable to the expression “final order” that appears in article 133(1), the very purpose of the Explanation would be defeated. The overall design of the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction, the Court explained, shows that matters concerning the interpretation of the Constitution are placed in a distinct category, irrespective of the type of proceeding in which they arise, and that a very broad right of appeal is intended to be available in cases that raise such constitutional questions. Accordingly, the Court overruled the preliminary objection raised by the respondent and declared that the appeal was maintainable. The citation for the earlier Federal Court case was recorded as (1) [1947] F.C.R. 180.

The Court then turned to the issue of the powers of a High Court under article 226. It noted that article 225 preserves for the existing High Courts the same jurisdiction and powers that they possessed immediately before the Constitution came into force. The Court recalled that there had been conflicting opinions on the scope of those powers, but that an authoritative decision of the Privy Council in the Parlakimedi case (1) clarified the matter. The Privy Council held that the High Court of Madras—similarly the High Courts of Bombay and Calcutta—had no authority to issue the so-called high prerogative writs beyond the geographical limits of their original civil jurisdiction. The authority to issue such writs within those limits was derived from the High Court’s status as the successor to the Supreme Court that previously exercised jurisdiction over the Presidency Town of Madras and that had been replaced by the High Court created under the Charter Act of 1861. The Court further explained that, apart from these three courts, the other High Courts in India possessed no power to issue such writs at all. In the context of the new constitutional framework, the framers, seeking to guarantee basic safeguards for the people that they termed fundamental rights, deemed it necessary to provide a swift and inexpensive remedy for the enforcement of those rights. Observing that the prerogative writs developed by the courts of England were particularly suitable for urgent and decisive intervention, the framers conferred on the High Courts, within the sphere of the States, expansive powers to issue directions, orders, or writs primarily for the enforcement of fundamental rights, while also including the power to issue such directions “for any other purpose.” This was intended to place all Indian High Courts in a position comparable to that of the Court of King’s Bench in England. However, the Court stressed that despite the breadth of these conferred powers, a two-fold limitation was imposed on their exercise. First, the power must be exercised “throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction,” meaning that any writ issued by a High Court cannot extend beyond the territories over which that Court has jurisdiction.

The Court noted that the second restriction on the High Court’s authority to issue prerogative writs is that the person or authority to which the writ is addressed must be “within those territories”, a phrase that clearly requires the addressee to be subject to the Court’s jurisdiction either by residence or by physical location within the defined territories. The Court observed that this limitation logically follows from the historical origin and development of the power to issue prerogative writs as a special remedy in England. It was emphasized that such power did not form part of the original or the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of King’s Bench. Referring to the scholarly work of Professor Holdsworth in History of English Law, Vol. 1, page 212 and following, the Court explained that these writs originated from the King’s prerogative to supervise the proper observance of law by his officials and tribunals, and were therefore issued by the Court of King’s Bench in the forms of habeas corpus – to ascertain whether subjects were lawfully imprisoned; certiorari – to verify whether proceedings against them complied with law; mandamus – to compel officials to perform duties imposed by law; and prohibition – to restrain inferior tribunals from acting beyond their jurisdiction. The Court also referred to the introductory remarks in the judgment of the Parlakimedi case. Consequently, the writs were directed specifically at the persons or authorities against whom relief was sought, were made returnable to the issuing court, and, in cases of non-compliance, could be enforced by attachment for contempt. These characteristics made it essential that the individuals or bodies to which the Court ordered the writ be situated within its territorial jurisdiction for the remedy to operate effectively. The Court expressed disagreement with the learned Judge below who had held that a tribunal or authority permanently located and normally operating elsewhere, but exercising jurisdiction within those territorial limits so as to affect the rights of parties, should be deemed “function’mg” within the High Court’s territorial limits and therefore amenable to its jurisdiction under article 226. The Court cited the authorities 70 I.A. 129 and 140 in support of this view. It was further submitted by counsel for the respondent that the High Court possessed jurisdiction to issue a writ to the Commission at New Delhi because the question referred concerned the respondent’s right to sit and vote in the Legislative Assembly of Madras, and because the parties likewise resided in the State of Madras. The respondent’s counsel analogised this situation to a court exercising jurisdiction over persons outside its territorial limits when the cause of action arose within those limits. Reliance was placed on the Privy Council observations in the Parlakimedi case, which stated: “The question of jurisdiction must be regarded as one of substance and that it would not have been within the competence of the Supreme Court to claim jurisdiction over such a matter as the.”

The Court observed that the suggestion that a writ of certiorari could be issued against the Board of Revenue merely because the Board was situated in the town was not acceptable. Accepting such a view would, in the Court’s opinion, improperly enlarge the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to include disputes over the settlement of rents of ryot holdings in Ganges between parties who were not otherwise within its jurisdiction, a result it could not endorse. The Court explained that the principle that “the cause of action attracts jurisdiction” applies only to suits and is founded on statutory provisions; it does not extend to the prerogative writs that may be issued under Article 226 of the Constitution. Article 226 makes no reference to any cause of action or to the place where the cause arises, but it does require the presence of the person or authority against whom the writ is directed within the territory over which the High Court exercises jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court found little assistance in the earlier observations cited by counsel. The case cited by the counsel was the Parlakimedi matter, which arose from proceedings before a special Revenue Officer who had been tasked with fixing a fair rent for certain holdings within the zemindary estate of Parlakimedi, an estate located beyond the ordinary civil jurisdiction of the Madras High Court. Dissatisfied with the Revenue Officer’s determination, the ryots appealed to the Board of Revenue, whose offices were in Madras. The Board, acting through a single member, reduced the rent in favor of the ryots. The zemindar then sought a revision before the Collective Board, which instead increased the rent. In response, the ryots approached the High Court for a writ of certiorari to set aside the Collective Board’s order, which had been passed in Madras. The Privy Council examined the jurisdictional question from two angles. First, it considered whether jurisdiction could be founded independently of the local civil jurisdiction that the High Court exercised over the Presidency town. In this respect, the Council looked at the powers of the Supreme Court at Madras to issue certiorari beyond the Presidency town under clause 8 of the Charter of 1800, noting the suggestion that the High Court had succeeded to the Supreme Court’s authority to issue prerogative writs throughout the Province. The Council concluded that the Supreme Court would not have possessed jurisdiction to control a company-court dealing with a dispute between Indian inhabitants of Ganjam concerning the rent payable for land in that district. Second, the Council considered whether jurisdiction could arise solely because the Board of Revenue was located in the town. Referring to its earlier decision in the Besant’s case, which held that the High Courts of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay could issue certiorari within the scope of their local jurisdiction, the Council held that this principle could not be extended to a case involving the settlement of rent for land in Ganjam merely on the basis of the Board’s location within Madras.

The Court observed that the mere fact that the Board of Revenue was ordinarily resident or located within the town of Madras, or that the order which was challenged had been made in that town, could not by itself confer jurisdiction on the High Court. The Court explained that if such a view were adopted, the High Court’s jurisdiction could be avoided merely by moving the Board of Revenue out of the town’s outskirts, and the Court’s jurisdiction would never arise except when an appeal or revision proceeding was actually instituted before the Board of Revenue. The passage already quoted, which the respondent’s counsel had emphasized, made clear that the decision did not create a rule allowing the Court to dispense with the requirement that the person or authority to whom a writ is addressed must be present within the local limits of the Court’s jurisdiction.

In considering the specific facts, the Court noted that the location of the appellate authority in Madras was not sufficient to establish jurisdiction because both the subject-matter of the dispute – the settlement of rent for lands in Ganjam – and the Revenue Officer who made the original settlement were situated outside the High Court’s territorial limits. The Court said that if the Madras Court were recognised as having jurisdiction to issue a certiorari to the appellate authority located in Madras, it would effectively be recognising jurisdiction over the Revenue Officer in Ganjam and over the rent settlement there, a jurisdiction that the Court had previously held it never possessed. This was the substantive point the Court was examining, and the observations did not support the proposition that, where the cause of action or the parties are within the Court’s territorial limits, the High Court may issue prerogative writs to persons or authorities located beyond those limits.

The Court further explained that the decision under discussion did not hinge on interpreting any statutory provision akin in scope, purpose, or wording to article 226 of the Constitution, and therefore offered little assistance in construing that article. It was argued that a resident of Madras, aggrieved by a threatened infringement of his rights by an authority located in Delhi and acting without jurisdiction, could not be expected to seek relief under article 226 in the Punjab High Court. The Court regarded this argument as moot, observing that the language of article 226 is reasonably clear and it is pointless to speculate about what the framers may or may not have contemplated. Finally, the Court acknowledged that it had been drawn to several High Court decisions addressing situations where the authority exercising jurisdiction at first instance is situated in one State while the appellate authority resides in another State.

The Court observed that the matter at first instance originated in one State while the appellate authority was situated in another State. It held that the present appeal did not require a determination as to which High Court possessed jurisdiction to issue prerogative writs under article 226 of the Constitution. Having already expressed its view on the applicability of article 226 to the facts of the case, the Court considered it unnecessary to engage in a detailed discussion of whether article 192(1) was limited to members who, after being elected, later became subject to a disqualification arising from subsequent events. Nevertheless, after hearing complete arguments on that point, the Court deemed it appropriate to state its opinion, particularly because both parties had invited the Court to address the issue in light of its broader significance.

The Court then set out the constitutional provisions that governed the question. Article 190(3) provides that if a member of a State Legislature either (a) becomes subject to any of the disqualifications enumerated in clause (1) of article 191, or (b) resigns by writing addressed to the Speaker or Chairman as appropriate, the member’s seat shall at once become vacant. Article 191(1) enumerates the grounds of disqualification for a person to be chosen as, or to continue as, a member of a State Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council. Those grounds include holding an office of profit under the Government of India or any State specified in the First Schedule unless the State Legislature by law declares the office to be exempt; being of unsound mind as declared by a competent court; being an undischarged insolvent; not being a citizen of India, having voluntarily acquired foreign citizenship, or owing allegiance to a foreign State; and being disqualified by any law made by Parliament. Article 192(1) states that any question as to whether a member has become subject to any of the disqualifications listed in article 191(1) shall be referred to the Governor for decision, and the Governor’s decision shall be final. Clause (2) of article 192 further requires the Governor, before deciding, to obtain the opinion of the Election Commission and to act in accordance with that opinion. Finally, article 193 provides that if a person sits or votes as a member of a State Legislative Assembly or Council while knowing that he is not qualified, is disqualified, or is prohibited from doing so by any law of Parliament or the State Legislature, he shall be liable, for each day of such participation, to the penalty prescribed, which includes a monetary fine recoverable as a debt due to the State.

In this case, the Court recorded that a person who votes while disqualified was liable to a fine of five hundred rupees, recoverable as a debt owed to the State. The Court then observed that the respondent had been convicted and sentenced in 1942, which disqualified him both from being chosen as a member of the Legislative Assembly and from sitting as a member, according to article 191(1)(e) read with section 7 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The Court noted that the five-year period prescribed by that provision began on his release on 15 August 1947 and had not expired by the date of the election. Consequently, the respondent was already disqualified at the time of his nomination on 15 March 1952. The Court then posed the question whether, under article 192, the respondent could be said to have “become” subject to the disqualification when the disqualification already existed prior to his nomination. The Court explained that the parties presented rival interpretations of the word “become” in the context of the constitutional provisions. The Attorney-General contended that the entire set of provisions dealing with disqualifications of members – articles 190 to 193 – should be read as a single scheme. He argued that because articles 191 and 193 clearly covered both pre-existing and later-arising disqualifications, articles 190(3) and 192(1) must also be understood to refer to both kinds of disqualification. According to that submission, the provisions together created an integrated mechanism for defining disqualifications and for providing the machinery to determine questions that arise in relation to them. He further argued that the use of the word “become” in articles 190(3) and 192(1) was not inappropriate, because becoming subject to a disqualification was predicated on the status of a “member of a House of Legislature”. Hence, a person who was already disqualified but who nonetheless was elected could, the Attorney-General said, correctly be described as “becoming” subject to the disqualification at the moment of his election. The Court rejected that line of reasoning as overly ingenious and not sound. It observed that article 191, which sets out the same disqualifications for election and for continuance in office, and article 193, which prescribes the penalty for sitting and voting while disqualified, are indeed drafted in language broad enough to encompass both pre-existing and subsequently-arising disqualifications. However, the Court held that this does not automatically extend the same breadth to articles 190(3) and 192(1). The meaning of those two articles must be derived from the ordinary language employed. In the Court’s view, articles 190(3) and 192(1) work together to provide a remedy only when a member incurs a disqualification after having been elected. The expressions “becomes subject” in article 190(3) and “has become subject” in article 192(1) imply a change in the member’s status after election, and the provision that the seat “shall become vacant” upon such disqualification further reinforces the interpretation that the articles contemplate a sitting member acquiring a disability while in office, not a pre-existing disability existing at the time of election. The Court therefore concluded that the suggestion that the language of article 190(3) could be applied to a pre-existing disqualification was a strained and untenable construction.

It was held that applying article 190(3) to a disqualification that existed before a person was elected would require his seat to be deemed vacant at the instant of election, a construction that was described as strained, far-fetched, and therefore unacceptable. The Attorney-General conceded that replacing the words “becomes” or “has become” with the word “is” would convey his intended meaning more accurately, but he could not explain why the statute did not use that wording. It was observed that if articles 190(3) and 192(1) are confined to disqualifications incurred after election, there would be no mechanism for unseating a candidate who acquired a disqualification after nomination but before election, because such a disqualification does not constitute a ground for an election petition under article 329 of the Constitution read with section 100 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The judgment noted that any anomaly arising from this situation stems from a lacuna in the latter enactment, a gap that could have been easily filled, and that this gap cannot be pressed as an argument against the respondent’s construction of the constitutional provisions. Conversely, accepting the Attorney-General’s contention would likely lead to contradictory decisions, with the Governor issuing a reference under article 192 while an Election Tribunal examined an election petition under section 100 of the parliamentary statute. For these reasons, the judgment agreed with the learned judge that articles 190(3) and 192(1) are applicable solely to disqualifications to which a member becomes subject after he has been elected, and that neither the Governor nor the Commission possessed jurisdiction to inquire into the respondent’s disqualification that arose long before his election. The judgment further held that the High Court was not competent under article 226 to issue any prerogative writ to the appellant Commission; consequently the appeal was allowed, the writ of prohibition issued by the learned judge was quashed, and no order as to costs was made. Appeal was allowed. Agent for the appellant and the intervenor was G H Rajadhyaksha, and the agent for the respondent was S Subramaniam.