Chairman of the Bankura Municipality vs Lalji Raja and Sons

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 23 of 1952

Decision Date: 12 March 1953

Coram: Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, Mehr Chand Mahajan

The case is titled Chairman of the Bankura Municipality versus Lalji Raja and Sons and was decided on 12 March 1953 by the Supreme Court of India. The judgment was authored by Justice Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, who sat on the bench together with Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan. The petitioner in the proceedings was the Chairman of the Bankura Municipality and the respondents were Lalji Raja and Sons. The official citation for this decision is reported in 1953 AIR 248 and 1953 SCR 767. The judgment also appears in the citation reference RF 1977 SC2279 (19). The statutory framework relevant to the controversy involved the Calcutta High Court Rules, Part 1, Chapter 11, Rule 9, which governs the jurisdiction of a Single Judge, and the Bengal Municipal Act of 1932, specifically sections 428, 431 and 432. The headnote of the report states that an order issued by a District Magistrate under sections 431 and 432 of the Bengal Municipal Act (XV of 1932) for the disposal of food seized under section 428 does not constitute an order of forfeiture of property within the meaning of the proviso to Rule 9 of Chapter II of Part II of the Calcutta High Court Rules. Consequently, a Single Judge of that High Court does possess jurisdiction to hear a reference arising from such an order. The headnote further observes that unless a loss or deprivation of property is imposed as a penalty or punishment for a crime, offence or breach of engagement, it should not be characterised as a “forfeiture” of property.

The matter before the Supreme Court was Criminal Appeal No. 23 of 1952, which challenged an order dated 18 January 1952 of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta (presided over by Justice Chunder) in Criminal Reference Case No. 110 of 1951. Counsel for the appellant comprised N.C. Talukdar and A.D. Dutt, while the respondents were represented by Ajit Kumar Dutta and S.N. Mukherjee. The appeal was filed under article 134(c) of the Constitution, raising the question of whether a Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court could entertain a reference arising from an order made under sections 431 and 432 of the Bengal Municipal Act, XV of 1932. The Court examined the scope of a Single Judge’s criminal jurisdiction as defined in the proviso to Rule 9, Chapter II, Part I of the High Court Rules. The relevant excerpt of the proviso reads: “Provided that a single Judge may hear any Appeal, Reference, or Application for revision other than the following: (1) One relating to an order of sentence of death, transportation, penal servitude, forfeiture of property or of imprisonment, not being an order of imprisonment in default of payment of fine ….” From this wording, the Court concluded that a Single Judge is expressly barred from hearing any reference or revision that concerns an order of forfeiture of property. The pivotal issue, therefore, was whether the order issued by the learned District Magistrate of Bankura under sections 431 and 432 of the Bengal Municipal Act amounted to a forfeiture of property within the meaning of the proviso, a determination that would decide the Single Judge’s jurisdiction to entertain the reference.

In this case, the order issued under the Bengal Municipal Act of 1932 was held to constitute an order of forfeiture of property within the meaning of the proviso previously cited. The respondents were the owners of several oil mills situated in the town of Bankura, which lay inside the jurisdiction of the Bankura Municipality. On 6 March 1950 the Municipal Sanitary Inspector received information that the manager of the Sree Gouranga Oil Mill, an establishment belonging to the respondents, had deposited approximately three hundred bags of rotten, decomposed and unwholesome mustard seeds in the courtyard of the rice mill owned by Sree Hanseswar Maji, and had also placed about six hundred bags of similarly unwholesome mustard seeds in the respondents’ own mill godown for the purpose of sale and for the preparation of oil. Acting on an application made by the inspector, the Sub-Divisional Officer of Bankura issued a search warrant the same day. The Sanitary Inspector, upon executing the warrant, discovered a large quantity of mustard seeds in the possession of the respondents; these seeds were found to be highly unsound, unwholesome and unfit for human consumption. The inspector seized the seeds between 6 March and 8 March 1950 and subsequently requested a written consent from the respondents authorising their destruction. The respondents refused to give such consent. Consequently, the inspector retained all of the seized bags—totaling nine hundred fifty-one and one-half bags—in the respondents’ mill godowns, doing so with the respondents’ consent. After a number of proceedings, which need not be detailed for the purpose of this appeal, the District Magistrate of Bankura, in Magistrate’s Petition No 58 of 1950 and relying on sections 431 and 432 of the Bengal Municipal Act, issued an order on 14 August 1951. The magistrate found that the stock of mustard seeds seized on 6 March 1950 remained unfit for human consumption on that later date. However, because the seeds were not capable of yielding oil and could be used as manure or cattle-feed, the magistrate declined to direct their destruction. Instead, he ordered that the Commissioners of the Bankura Municipality dispose of the seeds as manure or cattle-feed, ensuring that the seeds were rendered incapable of being used as human food before disposal. The respondents then filed a petition under section 435 of the Criminal Procedure Code before the Additional Sessions Judge of Bankura, challenging the magistrate’s order and seeking a reference to the High Court. The Additional Sessions Judge held that the seizure of the mustard seeds was illegal and that no evidence existed to show that the seeds had been deposited for sale or for the preparation of oil for human consumption. Accordingly, he made a reference under section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code to the High Court for the purpose of quashing the proceedings. Justice Chunder, seated singly, accepted the reference, set aside the District Magistrate’s order and remanded the matter for retrial before another magistrate, as he concluded in the opinion of the learned Additional Sessions Judge.

The Court observed that the District Magistrate had reached his decision based solely on his personal observations made during the inspection of the mustard seeds, and that he had not relied on any material presented in the official record. An application was subsequently filed before a Bench of the High Court seeking permission to examine whether Justice Chunder, sitting alone, possessed the jurisdiction to entertain the reference, given the rule that had been cited earlier. The counsel for the appellants argued that the order issued by the District Magistrate of Bankura under sections 431 and 432 of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932, amounted to an order for forfeiture of property within the meaning of the proviso to the rule, and therefore Justice Chunder lacked authority to consider the reference; consequently, his order ought to be set aside. Section 431 of the Act provides that, first, whenever any living thing, article of food or drug seized under section 428 is not destroyed with consent under subsection (1) of section 429, or when a perishable article of food so seized is not dealt with under subsection (2) of that section, it must be presented before a Magistrate as soon as practicable after the seizure. Second, if the Magistrate finds that such living thing is diseased or unsound, or that such food or drug is unsound, unwholesome or unfit for human consumption or medicinal use, the Magistrate shall order its destruction at the expense of the person who possessed it at the time of seizure, or shall direct that it be otherwise disposed of by the Commissioners so that it cannot be used as human food or medicine. Section 432 states that when any authority, in the exercise of powers conferred by this chapter, directs the destruction of any living thing, food or drug, or its disposal to prevent its use as food or medicine, the thing so dealt with shall be deemed to become the property of the Commissioners. The word “forfeiture” was defined by Murray’s Oxford Dictionary as the loss or deprivation of goods as a consequence of a crime, offence, breach of engagement, the penalty for the transgression, or a punishment for an offence. The appellants contended that, because section 432 provides for the vesting of the condemned food or drug in the Commissioners, the owner is stripped of his proprietary rights, and therefore the Magistrate’s order under section 431(2) should be characterized as a forfeiture of property. The Court held that this contention was unsound. According to the dictionary definition, forfeiture requires that the loss or deprivation of goods occur as a result of a crime, offence or breach of engagement, or must be imposed as a penalty or punishment for such wrongdoing. Unless the deprivation of the goods is imposed as a penalty or punishment for a criminal or civil breach, it cannot be described as a forfeiture.

In this case the Court explained that the term “forfeiture” was defined in Murray’s Oxford Dictionary as the loss or deprivation of goods that occurs because of a crime, an offence, a breach of engagement, or as a penalty for such transgression. Accordingly, unless the loss or deprivation is imposed as a punishment for a crime, offence or breach, it could not be described as forfeiture. The Court observed that section 431(2) of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932 merely required the destruction of food or drug that was found to be unsound, unwholesome or unfit for human consumption, or otherwise its disposal by the Municipal Commissioners so that it could no longer be used as food or medicine. The purpose of section 432, which placed the condemned food or drug in the possession of the Commissioners, was to enable the Commissioners to carry out the destruction or disposal contemplated in section 431(2). This vesting was therefore a procedural step to effect the required destruction and was not, in the Court’s view, a forfeiture of the property by the Municipality. The Court further noted that the owner of such condemned items could not lawfully retain or use them; the items had to be destroyed or disposed of to prevent public health risks. Consequently, the powers granted to the Municipal Commissioners were essentially the same duties that the owner would be expected to perform, and the order directing destruction could not amount to a forfeiture of the property.

The Court then turned to the statutory scheme governing penalties. It pointed out that Chapter XXIV of the Act set out specific penalties for offences, with sections 501 to 504 prescribing penalties for particular violations and section 500 providing a general penalty provision for the offences listed therein. Section 431, however, was not mentioned among these penalty provisions, and therefore forfeiture of property was not among the punishments envisaged by the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932. The High Court rule on sentencing grouped death, transportation, penal servitude, forfeiture of property and imprisonment together as penalties for crimes. In that context, forfeiture referred only to the deprivation of property that results as a penalty for a criminal offence. For such a forfeiture to exclude the jurisdiction of a single Judge, it had to be a forfeiture imposed as a penalty for a crime. The Court observed that Shri N. C. Taluqdar had been unable to identify any provision in the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932 that made the action contemplated under section 431(2) a penalty or punishment for the commission of a crime. The offence that could be alleged against the respondent was defined in section 421, and the punishment prescribed in section 500 for that offence was a fine, not forfeiture. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the order issued under sections 431 and 432 was not a forfeiture of property within the meaning of the High Court rule, and that the statutory framework did not treat the order as a penalty for an offence.

In this case the Court held that the order issued by the District Magistrate of Bankura on 14 August 1951, which was made under sections 431 and 432 of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932, did not constitute an order of forfeiture of property as defined by the proviso to rule 9 of Chapter II, Part I of the Rules of the High Court. Consequently, the Court concluded that Justice Chunder possessed the necessary jurisdiction to receive the reference and to decide the matter that had been raised before him. Because the order was not an forfeiture within the prescribed meaning, the appeal filed against it could not succeed. The Court therefore recorded that the appeal failed and was dismissed. The order of dismissal was confirmed by stating that the appeal was dismissed. For the purposes of the record, the agent representing the appellant was identified as Sukumar Ghose, while the agent representing the respondent was identified as B. B. Biswas.