C. N. Arunachala Mudaliar vs C. A. Muruganatha Mudaliar and Another
Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.
Court: supreme-court
Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 191 of 1952
Decision Date: 14 October, 1953
Coram: B.K. Mukherjea, Mehr Chand Mahajan, B. Jagannadhadas
In the matter titled C. N. Arunachala Mudaliar versus C. A. Muruganatha Mudaliar and another, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 14 October 1953. The opinion was authored by Justice B. K. Mukherjea, and the bench was composed of Justice B. K. Mukherjea, Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan, and Justice B. Jagannadhadas. The petitioner in the case was C. N. Arunachala Mudaliar, while the respondents were C. A. Muruganatha Mudaliar and the second respondent mentioned. The judgment reference includes the citation 1953 AIR 495 and 1954 SCR 243, and it has been cited subsequently in several reports, namely E 1965 SC1730 (10), RF 1967 SC 591 (8), R 1975 SC 431 (9) and R 1987 SC 518 (7). The issue concerned the application of Hindu law to a property that had been gifted by a father to his son, specifically whether such a gift could transform the property into ancestral property in the son’s hands, and how a will should be interpreted where it contains presumptions about the nature of the interest granted.
The Court explained that a property gifted by a father to his son does not automatically become ancestral property merely because it was received from the father. The donor, that is, the father, is fully competent to specify in the instrument of gift whether the donee, the son, is to hold the property exclusively for himself or whether the gift is intended for the benefit of the donor’s broader family branch. If the deed of gift or the will contains explicit provisions detailing the nature of the interest, the son’s rights in the property will be governed by those terms. In the absence of clear language describing the interest to be taken, the matter becomes one of construction; the Court must then ascertain the donor’s intention from the wording of the document together with the surrounding circumstances, applying the established canons of construction.
The material question, according to the judgment, is whether the grantor truly intended to make an outright gift of the property to his son or whether the apparent gift formed part of a scheme to partition the property among family members. The Court emphasized that no presumption in favor of either interpretation exists, because a father is free to either gift or partition his property as he sees fit. The judgment referred to several earlier authorities that illustrate this principle, including Muddun v. Ram (6 W.R. 71), Nagalingam v. Ramachandra (I.L.R. 24 Mad. 429), Bhagwat v. Mst. Kaporni (I.L.R. 23 Pat 599), Jugmohan Das v. Mangal Das (I.L.R. 10 Bom. 528), Parsottam v. Jankibai (I.L.R. 29 All. 354), and Amarnath v. Guran (A.I.R. 1918 Lah. 394). The case of Lal Ram Singh v. Deputy Commissioner, Partabgarh (64 I.A. 265) was also mentioned for its relevance.
Further, the Court considered a scenario where a testator with three sons, after allocating certain properties to his wife and other relatives, devised that the self-acquired properties listed in Schedules A, B and C of his will should be taken respectively by his eldest, second and third son. The testator expressly provided that each son would enjoy his allotted property with absolute rights and full powers of alienation, including the ability to gift, exchange or sell the property, thereby allowing the property to pass hereditarily from son to grandson. The Court held that because the will expressly vested the sons with absolute ownership and unrestricted alienation rights, the properties conveyed under the will did not become ancestral property in the hands of the sons with respect to their own male issue.
The Court observed that the will expressly granted the sons absolute rights together with full powers of alienation; consequently, the property bequeathed to them could not be treated as ancestral property in relation to their own male descendants.
The matter before the Court was a civil appeal numbered 191 of 1952, filed under special leave granted by the Supreme Court on 21 May 1951. The appeal concerned the judgment and decree dated 13 December 1949 issued by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court, composed of Justices Rao and Somasundaram, which affirmed, with minor modifications, the earlier decision of the Subordinate Judge of Coimbatore rendered on 20 February 1946 in O.S. No. 138 of 1945. The appellant was represented by counsel appearing on his behalf, while the first respondent was represented by counsel on his side. The judgment was delivered on 14 October 1953 by Justice Mukherjea.
The appeal challenged the division-bench decision on the grounds that the lower court had erred in its findings regarding the nature of the property and the entitlement of the parties. The suit at the trial stage had been instituted by the plaintiff, who was designated as respondent No. 1 in the appeal, seeking specific allotment and partition of his one-third share in the properties described in the plaint. The plaintiff claimed that the properties formed part of the joint family estate of a family consisting of himself, his father (defendant No. 1), his brother (defendant No. 2), and sought a one-third share in accordance with his legal right. Both the plaintiff and defendant No. 2 were sons of defendant No. 1 by his first wife, who had predeceased him. After the death of the plaintiff’s mother, defendant No. 1 remarried; his second wife was identified as defendant No. 3 in the suit.
According to the plaint, the arrival of the step-mother created discord between the father and his sons, leading the father to assert exclusive ownership over the family property and to deny any rights of the sons. This alleged conduct prompted the filing of the suit. The properties claimed for partition were enumerated in Schedule B of the plaint and comprised four parcels of agricultural land totaling a little over five acres, a residential house situated in the town of Erode, as well as jewellery, furniture and brass utensils. Paragraph II of the plaint further alleged that a sum of approximately Rs 15,000 was deposited in the name of the first defendant with Erode Urban Bank Limited; the plaintiff contended that this amount also formed part of the joint family property to which he was entitled to a share.
In his written statement, defendant No. 1 contested all of the plaintiff’s allegations and denied the existence of any joint family property that could be claimed by the plaintiff. He asserted that the properties described were not held in common and that the plaintiff’s claims therefore lacked legal basis.
Defendant No 1 asserted that items I and II listed in Schedule B, together with the house, were self-acquired by his father and that he had obtained them under a will executed in 1912. He further contended that the remaining immovable properties, as well as the cash, furniture and brass utensils, were his own acquisitions, and that the plaintiff’s sons had no interest in any of those assets. Regarding the jewellery mentioned in the plaint, he claimed that only a few pieces existed and that they belonged solely to his wife, Defendant No 3. Defendant No 2, who was the brother of the plaintiff, fully supported the plaintiff’s case. In her written statement, Defendant No 3 maintained that she was not a necessary party to the suit and that any jewellery that existed was owned exclusively by her. After hearing the arguments, the trial judge concluded that the properties bequeathed to Defendant No 1 by his father should be treated as ancestral property in his possession and that the other properties acquired by Defendant No 1 from the income of the ancestral estate also acquired the character of joint property. Consequently, the Subordinate Judge issued a preliminary decree in favour of the plaintiff, granting the relief claimed in the plaint except for certain articles of jewellery, which were held to be non-existent. Defendant No 1 appealed this decision to the High Court of Madras. The High Court dismissed the appeal, modifying the decree by holding that any jewellery that did exist belonged solely to Defendant No 3 and by rejecting the plaintiff’s claim for partition of the furniture and brass utensils. The High Court also refused Defendant No 1’s application for leave to appeal to this Court; however, he later obtained special leave to appeal under article 136 of the Constitution. The principal question presented for determination was whether the properties that Defendant No 1 acquired under his father’s will should be regarded as ancestral or as self-acquired properties in his hands. If the properties were deemed ancestral, the plaintiff’s brothers would become co-owners with their father, and, given that the other immovable assets were merely accretions to that original nucleus, the plaintiff’s claim would succeed. Conversely, if the bequeathed properties were characterized as self-acquired, the plaintiff’s case would fail. The law on this point, as noted by the lower courts, was not uniform, and divergent opinions of various High Courts required careful examination. For a proper determination, it was considered convenient first to refer to the law articulated in Mitakshara concerning a father’s right of disposition over his self-acquired property.
The Court examined the extent of the interest that a son or grandson may claim in property that the father holds. Placitum 27, Chapter 1, Section I of the Mitakshara school of Hindu law states: “It is a settled point that property in the paternal or ancestral estate belongs by birth, although the father possesses independent power to dispose of items other than immovable property for indispensable acts of duty and for purposes prescribed by legal texts such as gifts out of affection, support of the family, relief from distress and so forth; however, he is subject to the control of his sons and the rest in regard to the immovable estate, whether that estate was acquired by himself or inherited from his father or other predecessors, since it is ordained, ‘though immovables or bipeds have been acquired by man himself, a gift or sale of them should not be made without convening all the sons’.” The Mitakshara commentary emphasizes a religious duty of a man not to leave his family without means of support and concludes the passage by observing: “They who are born and they who are yet unbegotten and they who are still in the womb, require the means of support. No gift or sale should therefore be made.” This passage appears at first glance to impose a blanket restriction on a father’s power of disposition over his self-acquired property, treating it in the same way as ancestral lands.
Contrastingly, other sections of the Mitakshara commentary seem to deny any right of the sons to interfere with the father’s alienation of his self-acquired property. Chapter 1, Section 5, Placitum 9 declares: “The grandson has a right of prohibition if his undivided father is making a donation or sale of effects inherited from the grandfather: but he has no right of interference if the effects were acquired by the father. On the contrary he must acquiesce, because he is dependent.” The author of the commentary explains the reason for this distinction: “Consequently the difference is this: although he has a right by birth in his father’s and his grandfather’s property; still since he is dependent on his father in regard to the paternal estate and since the father has a predominant interest as it was acquired by himself, the son must acquiesce in the father’s disposal of his own acquired property.” These later passages directly contradict the earlier ones.
In an early Calcutta decision a tentative reconciliation was attempted by holding that the son’s right in the father’s self-acquired property was an imperfect right that could not be enforced at law. The issue later reached the Judicial Committee in the case of Rao Balwant v. Rani Kishori. Lord Hobhouse, delivering the judgment of the Board, observed that in the textbooks and commentaries on Hindu law, religious and moral considerations are often mixed with rules of positive law. He concluded that the passages in Chapter 1, Section 1, Verse 27 of the Mitakshara contain only moral or religious precepts, while those in Section 5, Verses 9 and 10 embody rules of positive law, and that the latter therefore prevail over the former. Consequently, he held that a Mitakshara father has full and unrestricted power to dispose of his self-acquired immovable property, and that his male issue cannot interfere with that power in any manner.
The Court observed that the verses found in Chapter 1, Section 1, Verse 27 of the Mitakshara commentary convey merely moral or religious guidance, whereas the provisions contained in Section 5, Verses 9 and 10 set out enforceable rules of positive law. Because a rule of positive law prevails over a moral precept, the latter is displaced. Consequently the Court held that, under Mitakshara law, the father who heads a joint Hindu family possesses absolute and unrestricted authority to dispose of any immovable property that he has acquired on his own. This authority cannot be curtailed by his male descendants in any manner. The Court noted that this principle of law has never been successfully challenged. It further recorded that every High Court in India, and rightly so, has affirmed that a Mitakshara father may sell his self-acquired immovable property to an outsider without obtaining the consent of his sons (2). The father may also grant that property as a gift to one son even if the act prejudices another son (3), and he may divide the property unequally among his heirs (4). In view of these decisions, the Court described the law on the father’s power of disposition as settled and free from controversy.
Nevertheless, the Court identified a remaining controversy concerning the nature of the interest that a son acquires when he receives his father’s self-acquired property by gift or testamentary bequest, particularly in relation to his own male issue. The question is whether such property remains the son’s self-acquired estate, free from any claim by his sons and grandsons, or whether it transforms into ancestral property in his possession, thereby rendering his male issue co-owners with him. The Court explained that various High Courts have reached differing conclusions, creating a noticeable divergence of opinion. The Calcutta High Court, as early as 1863, held that the gifted property becomes ancestral in the son’s hands, as if it were inherited from his father. Other High Courts have treated the issue as a matter of construction, deciding case-by-case whether the donor intended the gift to be ancestral or self-acquired, leading to a sharp split in judgments. The Madras High Court ruled that while a father may decide the character of the bequeathed property, the default position—absent an explicit statement that the property is to remain self-acquired—is that it should be treated as ancestral. The Patna High Court’s Full Bench accepted this Madras view, and a later Calcutta High Court decision appears to lean toward the same approach. In contrast, the Bombay High Court, a view also endorsed by the Allahabad and Lahore High Courts, contends that a gifted portion of the donor’s self-acquired property remains self-acquired in the donee’s hands unless the donor clearly expresses an intention that it should become ancestral.
The Court noted that the view prevailing in Bombay law treats a gift of self-acquired property to a donee as remaining self-acquired unless the donor explicitly expresses an intention that the property should become ancestral; this position has also been endorsed by the Allahabad and Lahore High Courts. The divergence of judicial opinion on this point was previously highlighted before the Privy Council in the case of Lal Ram Singh v. Deputy Commissioner of Partabgarh, where the Judicial Committee declined to resolve the issue because it was unnecessary for the determination of that case. The Court then listed the authorities cited earlier, including Muddan v. Ram, Nagalingham v. Ram Chandra, Bhagwat v. Mst. Kaporni, Lala Mukti Prasad v. Srimati Iswari, Jugmohan Das v. Sir Mangal Das, Parsotam v. Janki Bai, Amararanth v. Guran, and the reported decision 64 T.A. 265.
In examining the settled principle that, under Mitakshara law, a father possesses an absolute right of disposition over his self-acquired property—a right from which his male descendants cannot claim any exception—the Court expressed the view that it cannot be held that a property bequeathed or gifted to a son must invariably become ancestral property in the hands of the donee, thereby granting the donee’s own sons a co-ordinate interest. The Court observed that the extreme position advanced in the earlier Calcutta case, which the Court had referenced, rests on two principal grounds. The first ground relies on the well-known doctrine of equal ownership of father and son in ancestral property, a doctrine articulated by Mitakshara on the authority of Yagnavalkya. The second ground contends that the Mitakshara definition of “self-acquisition” neither includes nor can accommodate a gift of this nature, and therefore such a gift must be deemed partible property between the donee and his sons.
Regarding the first ground, the Court explained that the foundation of the doctrine of equal ownership of father and son in ancestral property is the passage of Yagnavalkya stating: “The ownership of father and son is co-equal in the acquisitions of the grandfather, whether land, cattle or chattel.” The Court observed that Vijnaneswar references this passage in Chapter 1, Section 5 of his work, where he discusses the division of a grandfather’s estate among his grandsons, granting the grandsons a birthright in the grand estate equal to that of the sons and entitling them to shares on partition, albeit determined per stirpes rather than per capita. The Court held that this discussion is irrelevant to the present question. It affirmed that, according to Mitakshara, a son indeed possesses a birthright in both his father’s and grandfather’s estate, but it also reiterated that Mitakshara itself draws a distinction between ancestral (grandfather’s) property and the father’s self-acquired property, a distinction that is central to the Court’s analysis.
The Court referred to the authority of Ram, volume six of the New York Reports at page 71, and also to Yagnavalkya’s Book 2, chapter 129, to explain that when property is held by a father, the son possesses an equal share with the father in that property; however, in the father’s self-acquired property the son’s share is unequal because the father retains an independent power or predominant interest in such property (1). The Court observed that the son may claim this equal right only after the grandfather’s property has passed to the father and has become ancestral property in the father’s possession. The grandfather’s estate ordinarily becomes ancestral in the father’s hands when the father inherits it upon the death of the grandfather or when the grandfather makes a partition of his own property during his lifetime. In both of those situations the father acquires the grandfather’s property by virtue of his legal status as a son or descendant, and consequently the property assumes an ancestral character in the father’s hands. Conversely, when the father receives the grandfather’s property as a gift, the father’s entitlement does not arise from his status as a son or any legal right, but solely from the grandfather’s discretionary act of bestowing a favour, which could equally have been given to any other individual. The nature of the father’s interest in such gifted property therefore depends on the grantor’s intention. The Court noted that considerable confusion has arisen because this distinction has not been properly appreciated. In determining whether a particular piece of property is ancestral in the hands of a person, it is necessary to examine not only the relationship between the original owner and the current holder but also the mode of transmission; property may be classified as ancestral only when the present holder has acquired it by virtue of being a son or descendant of the original owner. The Court held that the Mitakshara school of law is clear on this point. It treats gifts from a father as a separate category and, in several passages, declares such gifts to be exempt from partition. For example, Chapter 1, Section 1, Placitum 19 of the Mitakshara cites a passage of Narada stating that, aside from property gained by valor, the wealth of a wife and property acquired by learning constitute three kinds of property exempt from partition, together with any favour conferred by a father (1). Likewise, Chapter 1, Section 4 of the Mitakshara deals with items not liable to partition, and it lists property “obtained through the father’s favour” among the things on which no partition may be directed (1). This principle is further emphasized in Section 6 of Chapter 1, which addresses the rights of post-humous sons or sons born after a partition; Placitum 13 of that section notes that although a son born after a partition inherits the entire estate of his parents, any property affectionately bestowed by the father or mother on a separate son remains with that son.
The passage explains that a son who has been separated from the family must continue to remain with the father. The court then cites a passage from the ancient sage Yagnavalkya, stating that “the effects which have been given by the father and by the mother belong to him on whom they are bestowed.” The commentary highlights that the phrase “obtained through favour of the father” (pitr-prasada-labdha), which appears in placitum 28 of section 4 of the Mitakshara, is of great importance. According to the Mitakshara, a father who follows the Mitakshara school of Hindu law possesses the power to divide both ancestral property and property that he has acquired on his own at any time he wishes, and he may do so even without obtaining the consent of his sons. However, when the father does decide to effect a partition, the division must be carried out in strict compliance with the procedural rules prescribed by law. The text further explains that the law even permits a certain degree of inequality in the distribution, for example the disparity that may exist between the eldest son and the younger sons, as specifically indicated in the Mitakshara. The father’s personal preference or discretion cannot alter these legal requirements. By contrast, when the father makes a gift that is purely an act of generosity and not a formal partition, he is not bound by any legal restriction on his discretion; he may exercise his freedom to give without being limited by any rule. It is precisely in such gratuitous gifts, which are described as obtained through the father’s favour, that the scholar Vijnaneswar, following earlier authorities, affirms the exclusive right of the sons to the gifted property. The court consequently holds that there is no basis for the proposition that, under the Mitakshara, an affectionate gift from father to son automatically becomes ancestral property belonging to the donee. Accepting that proposition would provide a complete answer to the earlier contention that such gifted property should be treated as partible between the father and his sons because it would not fall within the definition of “self-acquisition” as articulated by the Mitakshara. In chapter 1, section 4 of his treatise, Vijnaneswar lists and discusses categories of property that are not subject to partition. The first placitum of that section gives a definition of “self-acquisition”. This definition, which is drawn from Yagnavalkya, states that any property acquired by a coparcener himself, provided it does not diminish the father’s estate and is received as a present from a friend or as a gift at marriage, does not belong to the co-heirs. One argument presented by counsel was that a father’s gift to his son cannot be said to have been acquired by the son without causing detriment to the father’s estate; therefore, such a gift would not qualify as self-acquisition under the cited definition and consequently could not be exempt from partition. The court found this argument untenable. Section 4 of the first chapter of the Mitakshara enumerates several categories of property that, according to the author, are exempt from partition, and “self-acquisition” constitutes only one of those categories. Gifts from the father constitute another distinct category of exemption, explicitly mentioned in placitum 28 of the same section. The court agrees with the position expressed in the latest edition of Mayne’s Hindu Law, which holds that a father’s gift falls within the category of property that is exempt from partition.
In this case, the Court observed that because a gift from a father is already classified as an exception, the rule in placitum 28 cannot be interpreted to require that such a gift must also be made without any detriment to the father’s estate; to impose that condition would lead to a manifest contradiction, for it is impossible to conceive of a father dispensing a gift out of his estate without the estate suffering some diminution. The Court further stated that there is no real inconsistency between placitum I and placitum 28 of the same section. Each of these provisions constitutes a distinct and independent category of property that is exempt from partition, and consequently no division of such property may be ordered. (1) Mayne’s Hindu Law, 11th edition, paragraph 280, page 344. Another line of argument, which the Court noted had attracted the approval of the learned Judges of the Patna High Court in the full-bench decision cited earlier, contended that the exception concerning a father’s gift recorded in placitum 28 applied only to partitions between the donee and his brothers, while the male issue of the donee would still be entitled to a share through partition. The Court rejected this argument as untenable. It explained that if the rule governing self-acquisition is intended to apply to every type of partition—whether the partition is among collateral relatives or between a father and his sons—there can be no logical basis for treating placitum 28 differently, even though it appears in the same chapter and addresses the identical subject matter. Therefore, the provision cannot be limited solely to partitions among collaterals. The Court added that the rationale for attempting such a distinction rests on the theory of equal ownership of ancestral property between father and son, a theory the Court had already examined and found inapplicable to gifts made by a father. Consequently, the Court concluded that a property transferred by a father to his son does not automatically acquire the status of ancestral property merely because the recipient is the son or an heir of the father. Because it is well-settled that a Mitak-shara father possesses full authority to dispose of his self-acquired assets, it follows that the father may expressly stipulate, at the time of making the gift, whether the son is to hold the property exclusively for his personal use or whether the gift is intended to benefit the son’s branch of the family. If the deed of gift or a will contains clear provisions specifying the intended nature of the son’s interest, the Court indicated that no difficulty would arise; the son’s rights would be governed by the express terms of the grant. However, where the instrument lacks unambiguous language describing the type of interest the donee is to acquire, the matter becomes one of construction. In such circumstances, the Court must ascertain the donor’s intention by examining the language of the document in conjunction with the surrounding facts, applying the well-known canons of construction. The Court emphasized that the focus must be placed on the substance of the disposition rather than on its mere form. (1) Vide Bhagwant v. Mst, Kaporni, I.L.R. 23 Pat. 599.
The Court explained that the essential issue to be decided was not the form of the instrument but the true substance of the disposition. In every case the Court must ask, after taking the document and all surrounding facts into account, whether the donor intended to grant a benefit that would belong exclusively to his son and could be dealt with by the son at his own pleasure, or whether the apparent gift was in fact part of a scheme of partition whereby the son received merely the share that would ordinarily fall to him and his branch of the family on division of the estate. In other words, the Court had to determine whether the grantor truly wished to make a free gift of his property or to effect a partition of the same. Since a father is free under law to either gift or partition his property as he sees fit, there is no legal presumption that he intended one mode over the other. Applying these principles, the Court then turned to the facts of the present case. The will of the father, which gave the plaintiff the two items listed in Schedule B, was exhibited as Exhibit P-1 and was dated 6 June 1912. The will was a straightforward document. It stated that the testator was sixty-five years old and that all his property was his own, having been acquired by him and not derived from any ancestral fund. He was survived by three sons, the eldest being the plaintiff. In substance the will provided that, after the testator’s death, the properties described in Schedule A would pass to the eldest son, those in Schedule B to the second son, and the properties in Schedule C to the youngest son. Each son was to enjoy his allotted property with absolute rights and with full powers of alienation, including gift, exchange, sale and the like, and these rights would descend hereditarily to his grandchildren. The will further indicated that the testator had already transferred certain properties to the wives of his two brothers and to his own wife; these transferees were to enjoy those properties during their natural lives, and upon their deaths the properties would vest in one or the other of his sons as specified in the will. Schedule D was earmarked for the marriage expenses of the third son and an unmarried daughter, and authority was given to the testator’s wife to sell that property in order to meet those expenses. Upon reading the document in light of the surrounding circumstances, the Court concluded that the dominant intention of the testator was to make suitable provision for those near relations whom he regarded as having claims of affection and bounty, rather than merely to divide his estate among his heirs in the manner they themselves would have done after his death.
The testator desired to avoid disputes in the future. He did not intend the division of his estate to follow the partition scheme contemplated by Hindu law, because under such a scheme he would have been obliged to give his wife a share equal to that of a son and to allocate a one-quarter share to his unmarried daughter. In that alternative scenario the wives of his brothers would not have been involved at all, and there would have been no question of authorising his wife to sell any property in order to meet the marriage expenses of his unmarried son and daughter. Instead, the testator deliberately chose a distribution that was different from the distribution that would arise under intestacy. The point that is material for the present decision is the kind of interest that the testator gave to his sons in the properties devised to them. The will is perfectly explicit: it vests each son with absolute rights and confers on each son full power to alienate the property by sale, gift or exchange. The will contains no indication that the bequeathed properties were to be held by the sons for the benefit of their families or for future generations, and although the will mentions various other relatives, it makes no reference at all to the sons’ own sons. This absence of reference shows that the testator intended each son to have complete ownership of the property that was bequeathed to him, and that he left the care of the sons’ families and children entirely to the sons themselves. Consequently, the testator’s intention was not to give his sons the same rights that they could have acquired under intestacy, a conclusion that is reinforced by the two subsequent revocation instruments executed by the testator.
The first revocation, identified as Exhibit P-2 and dated the Z6th of March 1914, cancelled the portion of the will that had given the Schedule C property to the youngest son because that son had fallen into disreputable company and was disobedient to his father. By this instrument the testator withdrew the bequest in the youngest son’s favour and instead allotted the same property to his two elder sons, directing them to pay, out of the proceeds, a maintenance allowance to their youngest brother, or to his family if he were to marry. The second revocation, Exhibit P-3, was executed on 14th April 1914 and nullified the earlier revocation. Under Exhibit P-3 the property that had been intended for the youngest son was taken away from the two elder brothers and handed over to the testator’s son-in-law. The legatee was further instructed to deliver the property to the third son when the testator felt confident that the third son had reformed himself properly. In the Court’s opinion, when the will is read as a whole, it becomes clear that the testator intended the legatees to acquire the properties in an absolute right, as their own self-acquisition, without any restriction imposed by the rights of their sons or grandsons. In other words, he did not intend the property to become ancestral property of the sons. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed, the judgments and decrees of the lower courts were set aside, and the plaintiff’s suit was dismissed.
The Court set aside the decrees issued by both the lower courts and dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff. In reaching this decision, the Court observed that the issue presented in the appeal was of considerable significance and that there existed a substantial divergence of judicial opinion on the matter, particularly concerning the plaintiff’s alleged status as a pauper. Consequently, the Court directed that each party should bear its own costs incurred in all the proceedings before the courts. The appeal was therefore allowed. The Court also recorded the names of the representatives appearing for the parties: the appellant was represented by counsel S. Subramanian, while the respondent identified as No. 1 was represented by counsel M.S.K. Aiyangar. The citation of the judgment was noted as LB(D)2SCl00-3.