Buddu Satyanarayana And Others vs Konduru Venkatapayya And Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 121 of 1951

Decision Date: 26 February 1953

Coram: Mehr Chand Mahajan, DAS

In the matter titled Buddu Satyanarayana and Others versus Konduru Venkatapayya and Others, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 26 February 1953. The decision was authored by Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan and was pronounced by a bench comprising Justice Das, Justice Sudhi Ranjan, and Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan. The petitioners were Buddu Satyanarayana together with other appellants, while the respondents were Konduru Venkatapayya and the remaining respondents. The case is reported in the All India Reporter at page 195 of the 1953 volume and also in the Supreme Court Reporter at page 1001 of the same year; a later citator reference appears in the 1965 Supreme Court Reports. The dispute involved the interpretation of an inam grant, specifically whether a presumption of a lost grant could be invoked and whether the grant covered only the right of melwaram (a usufructuary right) or the land itself. The court examined the construction of the grant, the appropriateness of a suit for ejectment, and the rights of the archakas (temple priests). In its headnote the court explained that a presumption of lawful title may support long-enjoyed possessory rights only when no actual proof of title is available, but such a presumption cannot be applied when sufficient evidence exists regarding the nature of the grant and its intended beneficiaries. The court further held that the matching figures in the Inam Register and the Inam Statement did not lead to the inference that the grant comprised solely melwaram rights. Moral considerations for archakas might be relevant in framing a scheme for a temple, but they were deemed inappropriate in a direct ejectment action where the title was proved. On the facts, the judges found clear evidence that the inam grant had been made by the grantor in favour of the temple, thereby precluding any presumption of a lost grant in favour of the archakas, and they concluded that the grant conveyed ownership of the land itself rather than merely melwaram rights.

The appeal, numbered Civil Appeal No. 121 of 1951, came from a judgment and decree dated 15 December 1948 handed down by the High Court of Judicature at Madras, where Judges Subba Rao, Pancha, and Pakesa Ayyar had sat in Appeal No. 474 of 1945. That high-court decision arose from a decree dated 31 July 1945 issued by the Subordinate Judge of Tenali in Original Suit No. 24 of 1944. For the appellants, the Attorney-General for India, M. C. Setalvad, appeared with counsel N. Subrahmanyam and K. R. Chowdhury. The respondents were represented by counsel K. S. Krishnaswamy Aiyangar, assisted by M. Seshachalapathi. The judgment was delivered on 26 February 1953 by Justice Das. The appeal concerned a suit for recovery of possession of immovable property measuring approximately ninety-three acres and thirty-three cents, as detailed in Schedule A to the plaint. The suit had been instituted by Konduru Venkatapayya, respondent No. 1, in his capacity as the Executive Officer appointed by the Government on 15 July 1942 to administer the Sri Somasekharaswami Temple located at Kotipalle in the hamlet of Donepudi. The temple had been officially notified on 26 October 1939 under Chapter VIA of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act of 1927. The proceedings were initiated in forma pauperis. The claim for ejectment against the defendants was founded on the allegation that the properties formed part of the temple estate, having been granted by an inam issued in 1770 by Janganna Rao, then Zamindar of Rachur. The plaintiffs asserted that defendants numbered one to sixteen, together with their predecessors, were archakas who performed regular Nitya Naivedya and Deeparadhana services and thus held the property on behalf of the temple, while defendants numbered seventeen to forty-three were lessees under the archakas.

The suit concerned approximately ninety-three acres and thirty-three cents of land, the description of which was set out in Schedule A annexed to the plaint. The action was filed by Konduru Venkatapayya, who was identified as respondent No. 1, in the capacity of Executive Officer appointed by the Government on 15 July 1942 to administer the Sri Somasekharaswami Temple situated at Kotipalle in the hamlet of Donepudi. The temple had been formally notified under Chapter VIA of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act (Act 11 of 1927) on 26 October 1939. The plaintiff inaugurated the suit in forma pauperis. The relief claimed was an ejectment of the defendants on the basis that the disputed properties belonged to the temple by virtue of an Inam grant made in 1770 A.D. by Janganna Rao, who then held the Zamindari of Rachur. According to the plaintiff’s allegation, defendants numbered I to XVI and their predecessors were Archakas who performed the Nitya Naivedya Deeparadhana services for the temple and consequently held the land on the temple’s behalf. Defendants numbered XVII to XLIII were described as lessees under the Archakas. The plaintiff asserted that the Archakas (defendants I-XVI) were improperly asserting ownership over the land, while the other defendants claimed possession of portions of the land as lessees. After issuing a registered notice demanding that the defendants surrender possession of the suit properties to the Executive Officer of the temple, the plaintiff observed that the defendants continued to occupy the land notwithstanding the notice. The defendants responded by filing written statements in which they raised a variety of contentions and issues, which the court deemed unnecessary to recount in detail.

The learned Subordinate Judge, by his judgment dated 31 July 1945, decreed in favour of the plaintiff and granted the relief sought. Several of the defendants subsequently appealed the decree to the High Court, but the High Court dismissed those appeals. The dissatisfied defendants then obtained leave from the High Court to bring an appeal before the Federal Court, and that appeal is now before this Court. The appeal raises only two substantive questions, both of which were also presented before the High Court. The first question asks whether the Inam grant of 1770 was made in favour of the temple itself or in favour of the Archakas who were burdened with the performance of religious duties. The second question inquires what precise right the grant conferred on the grantee—whether it was a grant of the land itself or merely a grant of the mel varam interest in the land. Counsel for the Government, appearing as Attorney-General, contended that because the defendants and their predecessors had possessed the land since ancient times, a presumption should arise that such possession stemmed from some lawful title. Relying upon several judicial decisions, the Attorney-General argued that the principle of a lost grant should be applied in favour of the Archakas, who had enjoyed quiet possession for more than one hundred and fifty years. The Attorney-General acknowledged that the authorities recognise a presumption of lawful title where no documentary proof of title is produced, but emphasized that such a presumption cannot be entertained where there is sufficient and convincing evidence regarding the nature of the original grant and the identity of the parties to whom it was made. Although the original grant document is not available, the evidence includes two documents that appear decisive on the question of title, namely Exhibit P/3, a copy of the relevant entries in the Inam Register of 1860, and Exhibit D/3, a copy of the statement made by the then Archakas before the Inam Deputy Collector, both of which were admitted as evidence in the trial. The Court must therefore consider whether the documentary evidence establishes the true nature of the grant and its intended grantee, thereby determining the appropriate presumption on the defendants’ claim of title.

It was observed that a presumption of title may be invoked to support long and quiet possession when no documentary proof of ownership is available, but that presumption could not be applied where sufficient evidence exists that clarifies the nature of the grant and identifies the persons to whom it was made. Although the original grant document could not be produced, the evidence before the Court included two documents that were considered decisive on the question of title. The first document, labelled Exhibit P/3, was a copy of the relevant entries in the Inam Register of 1860. That register had been prepared after inquiries made by the Inam Deputy Collector, and it had taken into account the statements furnished at that time by the then-Archakas. The statement filed by those Archakas before the Inam Deputy Collector was also produced as Exhibit D/3. In the Inam Register (Exhibit P/3), under the general heading “Class extent and value of Inam”, the entry was classified in column 2 as “Devadayam”. Column 3 listed the survey numbers together with the word “Dry”, indicating the nature of the land covered by those numbers. Column 5 gave the areas of the lands, and column 7—titled “where no survey has been made and no assessment fixed by Government, the cess paid by the ryot to the Inamdar, or the average assessment of similar Government land should be entered in column (7)”—showed the respective assessments for the three survey numbers, which together amounted to Rs. 198,139. The next group of columns, under the heading “Description, tenure and documents in support of the Inam”, provided further details. Column 8, describing the Inam, recorded the remark “For the support of a Pagoda. Now kept up”. Column 9 indicated that the Inam was free of tax, described as “sarvadumbala”. Column 10, dealing with the nature of the tenure, stated “Permanent”. Column 11 named the grantor as Janganna Rao, and column 12 gave the year of grant as Fasli 1179, corresponding to A.D. 1770. Column 13 listed the name of the temple as the original grantee, and columns 16 and 17 repeated the temple’s name and its location. Turning to the statement filed by the Archakas during the Inam Inquiry of 1859-60 (Exhibit D/3), it identified Sree Somasekharaswami Varu as the name of the Inamdar and present enjoyer. The name of the temple also appeared in columns 3, 5, 6 and 12 of that statement. Column 13, headed “Income derived from the Inam whether it is sarvadumbala or jodi. If jodi the amount”, recorded the income as “sarvadumbala Inam Cist according to the rate prevailing in the neighbouring fields Rs. 26,631.” The statement bore the signatures of the Karnams and the witnesses.

In this case, the Court observed that the statement recorded in Exhibit D/3 specified that the Inam was “sarvadumbala Inam Cist according to the rate prevailing in the neighbouring fields Rs. 26631.” The record of Exhibit D/3 carried the signatures of the Karnams and the witnesses. The Court further noted that neither Exhibit P/3 from the Inam Register nor Exhibit D/3 mentioned the Archakas as grantees, nor did either document show the Archakas holding any interest, personal or otherwise, in the subject matter of the Inam grant. The two exhibits, taken together, demonstrated convincingly that the Inam grant had been made in favour of the temple by the original grantor. In view of this clear documentary evidence regarding the nature of the grant, the Court held that no presumption could be drawn in favour of the Archakas concerning a lost grant. Accordingly, agreeing with the High Court, the Court concluded that the deity was the proper grantee and that the first question presented to it must be decided against the appellants.

The learned Attorney-General then argued that, even assuming the Inam grant was made to the temple, it was only a grant of melvaram interest and that the Archakas, who possessed kudivaram rights, could not be displaced. He relied heavily on an unreported Madras High Court judgment in Appeal No. 213 of 1942 (The Board of Commissioners for the Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Parasaram Veeraraghavacharyulu and others). That judgment held that the Inam settlement records contained a single clear indication of the extent of the grant. The judgment explained that the Inam Inquiry statement, Exhibit V, which formed the basis of the Inam Commissioner’s decision, included a column headed “Income realised from the Inam sarvadumbala” showing an entry of “Rs. 14 sarvadumbala.” On its face, this entry appeared to indicate that the Inam yielded an income of Rs. 14 free of all charges. However, the Inam Register, Exhibit IV, showed that the assessment of the Inam, based on enjoyment of 16-97 acres, was also Rs. 14. This suggested that the extent of the Inam corresponded to the amount of the assessment. The Court in that case concluded that the decision rested on the recital in Exhibit V that the Inam income was Rs. 14, read together with the recital in Exhibit IV that the assessment on the land was also Rs. 14. On those materials, the court affirmed the findings of the learned District Judge, although it did not adopt the District Judge’s reasoning, and held that the grant was a grant of melvaram only.

The Court found that the facts of the earlier case differed markedly from the present matter. In the earlier case, the Archakas were found to have had kudivaram rights before the Inam grant was made, and the copies of the Inam Register and Inam Statement in that case listed the Archakas as grantees and present enjoyers of the Inam. By contrast, in the present case the Archakas are not mentioned in either Exhibit P/3 or Exhibit D/3, there is no evidence that they possessed any title to kudivaram rights, and the amounts shown differ: the assessment column in Exhibit P/3 records Rs. 198 139, whereas the income column in Exhibit D/3 records Rs. 26 631. Apart from these distinctions, the Court considered the decision relied upon by the learned Attorney-General to be of doubtful authority, noting that the earlier decision was primarily based on the equality of assessment and income amounts, a circumstance not present in the present case.

In the present matter, the Court observed that the individuals who are currently enjoying the Inam grant are identified as the present enjoyers, and the amount recorded in column 2 of the Inam Register under the heading “assessment” matches the amount shown in column 3 of the Inam Statement under the heading “Income derived from Inam.” The Court further noted that, unlike in the earlier case, the Archakas do not appear in either Exhibit P/3 or Exhibit D/3, and there is no evidence placing any title to kudivaram rights in their hands. Moreover, the assessment shown in column 7 of the Inam Register (Exhibit P/3) amounts to Rs. 198,139, whereas the income derived from the Inam shown in column 13 of the Inam Statement (Exhibit D/3) amounts to Rs. 26,631. On the basis of these disparities, the Court found that the decision cited by the learned Attorney-General rests on doubtful authority. The earlier decision had primarily, if not entirely, relied on the coincidence of the assessment amount and the income amount to conclude that the Inam grant consisted solely of the revenue assessment, that is, melvaram rights. The Court could not accept that reasoning. Whether the Inam comprised only the land’s revenue (melvaram) or the land itself, encompassing both melvaram and kudivaram rights, the entries in the Inam Register were required to be made in the same manner. Even if the grant included both rights, the assessment would still be recorded in column 7, and no different format was prescribed for a grant that covered both interests. Consequently, the Court held that no inference could be drawn that the grant consisted only of melvaram rights merely because column 7 lists only the assessment amount, and therefore the reasoning underlying the decision relied upon by the Attorney-General could not be sustained.

The Court also referred to a dissenting opinion from another Bench of the Madras High Court in Yelamanchili Venkatadri & another v. Vedantam Seshacharyulu & others, indicating that the earlier decision was not uniformly accepted. In the present case, the Court affirmed that the High Court was correct in preferring the later decision over the unreported one mentioned by the Attorney-General. Given the differing entries in the respective columns of Exhibit P/3 and Exhibit D/3, the Court concluded that the Inam grant made in favour of the temple necessarily included both interests in the land. The Attorney-General had argued that the grantor, Janganna Rao, acted only as the Collector of revenue and therefore could not convey more than the revenue rights he possessed. He cited the Kistna District Manual by Gordon Mackenzie, but the Court observed that the individual referred to in that manual was not the same grantor involved in the present case, and consequently, that argument was not pursued further.

Finally, the learned Attorney-General argued that the Archakas, who had faithfully performed their services from generation to generation since ancient times, should not be removed from the entire lands in equity. He proposed that they be allowed to remain in possession of the lands, to appropriate to themselves the expenses incurred in performing their services and a reasonable remuneration, while the remainder of the income should be transferred to the temple as its property. He cited two unreported decisions of the Madras High Court: one in Appeal No. 218 of 1946 reported in A.I.R. 1948 Mad. 72, Dandibhotla Kutumba Sastrulu v. Kontharapu Venkatalingam, and another in Appeal No. 709 of 1944, Buddu Satyanarayana v. Dasari Butchayya, Executive Officer of the Temple of Sri Malleswaraswami Varu, China Pulivaram. He observed that in a proceeding for framing a scheme relating to a temple, it might be permissible to consider the moral, if not legal, claims of the Archakas and to provide some protection for their rights. However, he maintained that such considerations were altogether inappropriate in a suit for ejectment that was based on proof of title. He further noted that if the two cited decisions indeed established that principles applicable to scheme-framing or scheme-enforcement could be applied to the present ejectment case, it would be difficult to uphold those decisions either on the strength of authority or on principle.

The Court examined the conduct of the Archaka defendants as recorded in the present case. Although they held the position of Archakas, they asserted an adverse right despite the honest admission in the Inam statement (Exhibit D-3) that their predecessors’ title had been conceded. The Court observed that such conduct disqualified them from any claim founded on equity. The explanation first offered in paragraph 7 of their present statement of case—that their predecessors had made no claim to the property at the time of the Inam Inquiry because of respect for the deity as required by Agama Shastra—was found to be unconvincing. The Court further held that granting any equitable relief would depend on factual determinations, including the income generated by the property, reasonable expenses and remuneration for services, and the amounts appropriated by the Archakas to date. None of these issues had been investigated in the present proceedings, and the request for equitable relief appeared to be a last-ditch effort after the Archakas had lost their earlier battles. Consequently, the Court concluded that no indulgence could be shown to the Archakas, even if equitable relief were permissible in a suit of this nature. The appeal was therefore dismissed with costs, and the order of dismissal was entered.

The judgment recorded that the individual bearing the name S. Subramaniam was listed as the agent who appeared on behalf of the appellant in these proceedings. It also recorded that the individual named M. S. K. Aiyangar was listed as the agent who appeared on behalf of the respondent. The appearance of these names in the order indicated that each party had been represented by counsel whose identity was noted for the record. By specifying “Agent for appellant” and “Agent for respondent” next to the respective names, the judgment identified the persons responsible for presenting the case and arguments of each side before the Court. This notation formed part of the formal record of representation associated with the final disposition of the appeal.